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ABSTRACT
What explains variation in relatively rising state strategy towards declining great powers?
This project develops and tests a theory of state strategy vis-a-vis declining great powers, termed
Realist Decline Theory. Realist Decline Theory argues that states debating the strategies to
adopt towards a declining peer are forced to consider the costs and benefits of either preying on
the declining state, or supporting the decliner and helping it maintain its place within the great
power ranks. As the costs and benefits wax and wane, states adopt different degrees of predation
or support for self-interested reasons. Two variables - the polarity of the international system
and the declining state's military posture - determine these costs and benefits by shaping the
security threats facing relatively rising states.
This study uses multiple primary and secondary sources to measure Realist Decline
Theory's variables and evaluate its analytic power against competing explanations. The
argument is tested using two structured, focused comparisons of rising state strategy in the post-
1945 international system: American policy towards the declining Soviet Union (1989-1990),
and American and Soviet strategy towards the declining United Kingdom (1945-1949). These
cases were selected because they provide strong tests of the theory vis-a'-vis competing theories.
The cases also permit observation and evaluation of substantial variation in the nature of rising
state strategy. The overall finding is that Realist Decline Theory indeed explains variation in
rising state strategy, although other factors are important.
This study makes several contributions. First, it identifies and explains an empirical
puzzle that is either overlooked or only loosely explained by existing research. Second, the
study attempts to synthesize different streams of international relations theory in the realist
tradition into a unified realist theory of state strategy. Third, the research contributes to Cold
War historiography. Finally, the study offers insight for policymakers worried about the possible
decline of the United States and rise of new great powers to international prominence.
Thesis Supervisor: Barry R. Posen
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One:
Introduction:
The Puzzle of Rising State Strategy towards Declining Great Powers
"As President Obama has said many times, the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous
China. We do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation. And I disagree with the
premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an established power are somehow
destined for conflict. There is nothing preordained about such an outcome. It is not a law of physics, but a series of
choices by leaders that lead to great power confrontation."
- National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, 11 March 20131
"I do not accept second place for the United States of America."
- President Barack Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address 2
I. Introduction
This dissertation investigates the security consequences of great power decline - a great
power's sustained loss of economic and military capabilities relative to one or more other great
powers - in post-1945 world politics. It does so by examining when and why other, relatively
rising great powers threaten the security and power of a declining state rather than try to slow or
stop a declining state's fall down the great power ranks. Despite substantial policy interest in the
"decline of the United States" and a wide-ranging literature on the sources of great power decline,
there has been no systematic examination of when and why relative decline leads other,
relatively rising states to challenge a declining state's security.3 This project seeks to fill the gap
by asking three inter-related questions.4 First, why do some great powers take advantage of
1 Thomas Donilon, "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013" (The Asia Society, New York, March 11,
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/1 /remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-
president-united-states-a.
2 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address," January 27, 2010.
3 For policy discussions, see Christopher Layne, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony - Myth or Reality?: A Review
Essay," International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009); Eric S. Edelman, Understanding America's Contested
Primacy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 21, 2010); Gideon Rachman,
"American Decline: This Time It's For Real," Foreign Policy, February 2011; National Intelligence Council, Global
Trends 2030: Alternate Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012); Michele A. Flournoy,
Vikram J. Singh, and Shawn Brimley, "Making America Grand Again," in Finding Our Way: Debating American
Grand Strategy, ed. Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (Washington: Center for a New American Security,
2008); Robert D. Kaplan, "America's Elegant Decline," The Atlantic, November 2007; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-
American World, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2008); Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why
America's Edge Will Endure," International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 41-78; Joshua R. Itzkowitz
Shifrinson and Michael Beckley, "Debating China's Rise and U.S. Decline," International Security 37, no. 3
(December 2012): 172-18 1; on sources of decline, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1987); Mancur
Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981); Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Relative Decline and the Overconsumption-Underinvestment
Hypothesis," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (1991); William R. Thompson and Karen A. Rasler, The
Great Powers and Global Struggle 1490-1990 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994).
4 On the hole in the literature, see Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War: Concept and Propositions," International
Interactions 37, no. 1 (March 2011): 94; Jeffrey W. Legro, "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a
Rising Power," Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (2007): 515-534.
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another great power's decline by adopting predatory strategies that try to maximize their power
at the declining state's expense? Second, when and why do great powers pursue the opposite
course and adopt supportive strategies to slow or stop a declining state's fall? Above all, what
causes variation in both the choice and degree of predation and support across time and space?
The lack of attention to these questions is striking given variation within and across cases
in the timing and degree to which rising states challenge decliners. On the one hand, history is
replete with rising states seeking to grow their power at others' expense. Witness, for instance,
American efforts to subvert Great Britain's presence in North America throughout the nineteenth
century, and Soviet expansion in the aftermath of World War Two.5 Predation, however, is not a
universal trend. Having taken advantage of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century, for
example, the United States repaired its relationship with the declining United Kingdom in the
late 1800s and formed a permanent alliance in the aftermath of World War Two. Similarly,
Wilhelmine Germany tethered its cart to Austria-Hungary's increasingly decrepit horse in the
years before World War One.6 In short, great power decline is not always accompanied by
inveterate rising state efforts to take advantage of the situation. The goal of this project is to
uncover the sources and logic behind this variation in rising state strategy.
Unfortunately, scholars lack a baseline theory to understand this variation. In particular,
realism, the theoretical tradition that ought to be most concerned with power shifts, does not
offer a clear and consistent take on rising state strategy and great power decline. Structural
realism, in arguing that states seek survival and security, makes indeterminate predictions of
rising state behavior: although it shows that pressures from the system affect state strategy, it is
opaque whether rising states are better off trying to push declining states from the ranks of the
great powers in order to reduce threats to their security, or are better served cooperating with
declining states and trying to avoid causing other states to balance against them.7 On the other
hand, classical, hegemonic stability, and offensive realist accounts view international politics as
a zero-sum competition for power. These approaches therefore expect rising states to prey upon
declining states as the distribution of power shifts in their favor by using their newfound
advantages to try and further the trend.8 Yet while these arguments might explain cases such as
Anglo-American rivalry in the 1800s, they have difficulty accounting for instances of relatively
rising state support for declining great powers.9 Offense-defense realism offers still a third
perspective, suggesting that decisions to prey upon or support a declining great power hinge on
whether military technology and geography enable a rising state to easily wage war and coerce a
5 On Anglo-American rivalry, see James Davidson and Mira Sucharov, "Peaceful Power Transitions: The Historical
Cases," in Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order, ed. Charles Kupchan et al. (New
York: United Nations University Press, 2001); for Soviet expansion, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know:
Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Clarendon, 1997).
6 Volker Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
7 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
8 On classical realism, see Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 1st ed.
(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948); for hegemonic stability theory and the related power transition theory, see Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics; A. F. K Organski, World Politics,, 2d [rev.] (New York,: Knopf, 1968); A. F. K.
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); for offensive realism,
see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2001); Eric J. Labs,
"Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-49.
9 Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2010), 73-112; Robert Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981).
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declining great power.10 Yet although offense-defense realism may explain both intra-case and
inter-case variation, it faces problems accounting for why rising state strategy often changes
within the span of a few months or years without any apparent change in the state of technology
or geography. Ultimately, existing strands of realist theory capture some aspects of rising state
behavior towards declining great powers while leaving other cases or parts of cases unexplained.
To improve our understanding of rising state strategy during another state's decline, this
dissertation advances what I term "Realist Decline Theory." Realist Decline Theory draws from
the different strands of the realist tradition and attempts to integrate their insights into a unified
approach. It proposes that rising state decisions to support or prey upon a declining great power
depend on whether the declining state can help engender a stable and secure international
environment for the other great powers, or whether the declining state is inherently a threat to a
rising state. Drawing from the classical/hegemonic/offensive realist traditions, I show that rising
states often do try to maximize power at a declining state's expense and that, under certain
conditions, predation is a likely response to great power decline. However, drawing from
structural realism, I argue that predation is limited by the security costs a rising state pays for the
privilege of growing its power: when confronted with the possibility of internal balancing by the
decliner, of other states flocking to the aid of the declining state, and of losing the declining state
as an ally against other great power threats, rising states avoid the most extreme types of
predatory behavior and may even adopt supportive strategies. Finally, using an insight related to
offense-defense theory, I show that variation in the degree of rising state support or predation
hinges on the declining state's military posture, that is, its ability to perform military missions
needed to secure itself and penalize other states' predation. I elaborate on the theory and contrast
it with competing hypotheses drawn from Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory
in Chapter Two.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Following this introductory section, I
elaborate on the research questions and explore variation in state strategy towards declining great
powers. Having done so, I show that existing realist theories leave substantial inter- and intra-
case variation unexplained and highlight the need for a revised approach. Next, I briefly note the
competing liberal explanations that have gained prominence in the policy and academic worlds
in the absence of an integrated realist argument, paying particular attention to hypotheses drawn
from Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory as the two most widespread of the
type. I conclude with a preview of the remainder of this project.
II. Decline and Variation in Rising State Strategy
A. Decline and Worries of Rising State Predation
This project is motivated by a puzzle borne of the security concerns of declining great
powers, and the actual policies adopted by their relatively rising peers. On the one hand, states
in decline fear the future. Decline can occur as one state's growth slackens or becomes negative,
or due to the accelerating growth of one or more other great powers. Regardless of its source,
however, declining states "worry that if they allow a rising state to grow, it will either attack
10 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214;
Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no.
1 (July 1984): 58-107; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We
Measure It?," International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 44-82; an overview can be found in Keir Lieber, War
and the Engineers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
" Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations.
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them later with superior power or coerce them into concessions that compromise their
security."12 In other words, states fear that as their relative power wanes, relatively rising states
will expand the range of issues over which they seek influence in world affairs and escalate the
political, economic, and military demands placed on declining states. Given the changing
distribution of power, rising states can back these demands with increasingly credible threats to
use force if declining states balk at the terms. Eventually, these escalating demands can threaten
a declining state's vital interests, leaving the declining state in the unpalatable position of
accepting threats to its survival or risking war with a powerful adversary. 3 Levy captures the
overall dynamic, noting that states worry that decline "will be accompanied by a weakening of
one's bargaining position and a corresponding decline in the political, economic, cultural, and
other benefits that one receives from the status quo; and further that one might be faced with a
future choice between a dangerous war and a sacrifice of vital interests." 4 Put simply, states in
decline fear that rising states will adopt predatory strategies that exacerbate relative losses to
their power, hinder their security, and ultimately push them down or from the great power ranks.
These concerns, moreover, can carry profound real-world consequences. Arms races and
spirals of insecurity may emerge as declining states try to build up their militaries to hedge
against rising state coercion.15 Alliances may form and reform as declining states seek allies
against the possibility of rising state aggression and rising states respond in kind, thereby
generating the possibility of war via misperception. Crises may break out if declining states
attempt to spur economic and military growth but end up threatening other states in the process.16
Above all, a declining state may face increasingly strong preventive motivations for war and
launch preventive attacks to arrest a change in the distribution of power and forestall the
possibility of rising state predation.17 Preventive attacks, in turn, may escalate into broader
systemic wars that ensnare most of the great powers and reshape the basic distribution of power
in the international system.' 8 Declining state fear of predation, in short, may lead to foreign
policies and systemic consequences that undermine international peace and stability.
12 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 4.
" For a general discussion of the tradeoffs declining states may face, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Coping with the
Lippmann Gap," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (January 1987): 453-477; Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability ofEmpire
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Paul MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising
Success of Great Power Retrenchment," International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 7-44.
14 Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40, no. 1 (October 1987):
82-107; see also Levy, "Preventive War"; Douglas Lemke, "Investigating the Preventive Motive for War,"
International Interactions 29, no. 4 (December 2003); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 38; Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics, 197, 207; Steve Chan, "Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory: Implications for
Sino-American Relations," Security Studies 13, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 103-141; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist
Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995).
15 Copeland, The Origins of Major War.
16 Ibid.; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
17 Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War"; Levy, "Preventive War"; Copeland, The Origins
of Major War; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Chan, "Puzzles in
Power-Transition"; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
18 For example, the preventive attack launched by Sparta and its allies against Athens triggered the Second
Peloponnesian War that led to Athens' defeat and upended the status quo in ancient Greece. Two thousand years
later, preventive motivations were central to Germany's decision for war in 1914, helping inaugurate the First World
War and the reshuffling of European politics in the first half of the twentieth century. for these cases, see
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner and M. I Finley (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin
Books, 1972); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chap. 4-6. Note, however, that not all preventive motivations
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B. Predation and the Weight of History
At first glance, declining state concerns appear well founded as rising states often adopt
predatory strategies that try to further their gains at a declining state's expense. Having reviewed
the behavior of several rising states, Schweller offers that "the stronger and richer a state
becomes, the more influence it wants and the more willing and able it will be to fight to further
its interests."19 Empirically, scholars including Steiner, AFK Organski, and Jacek Kugler note
that Wilhelmine Germany seemed wedded to preying on the declining British Empire before
World War One.20 Miranda Priebe shows that the rising United States similarly worked to evict
Britain from North America throughout the nineteenth century.2' Later, a rising Japan tried to
carve out a sphere of influence in East Asia during the interwar period at the expense of the
United States, Britain, and France. Copeland suggests Nazi Germany used its conquest of
Western Europe in 1939-1941 to force a showdown with the USSR - the last remaining great
power on the continent - as German power peaked. Meanwhile, the Cold War saw first the
Soviet Union try to evict the United States from Europe as Soviet growth took off in the 1950s,
before the United States worked to exacerbate Soviet problems in the 1980s and early 1990s.2 4
And while the jury remains out, many policymakers and scholars watching China's rise and
growing assertiveness in East Asia argue that China will seek hegemony in the Western Pacific
by evicting the United States and dominating smaller states in the region.2 5
Still, a deeper look at history shows rising states do not invariably pursue predatory
strategies towards their declining peers. 26 First, some relatively rising states, at certain times and
are acted upon; see Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance,
1949-1954," International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1989): 5-49; William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether
to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," International
Security 25, no. 3 (December 2000): 54-99.
19 Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), 3.
20 Zara S Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977); Organski
and Kugler, The War Ledger.
21 Miranda Priebe, "Managing the Rise of Regional Challengers: Reassurance and Deterrence from Dominance"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming).
22 Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, chap. 5.
23 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, chap. 5.
24 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), 100-183; Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End
of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Jack F. Matlock, "The End of Detente and the
Reformulation of American Strategy, 1980-1983," in Turning Points in Ending the Cold War, ed. Kiron Skinner
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), 11-39; Jason Saltoun-Ebin, ed., The Reagan Files (Self-Published,
2010); note that acknowledging that the United States sought to weaken the USSR does not mean (as some claim)
that American efforts caused the USSR to collapse; Celeste A. Wallander, "Western Policy and the Demise of the
Soviet Union," Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 137-177.
2 John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 3, no. 4 (December 2010): 381 -396; Gary Schmitt, "When Will the Realists Get Real?," AEI
Foreign and Defense Policy, March 2, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/when-will-the-
realists-get-real/; for overviews and discussion, see Charles Glaser, "Will China's Rise Lead to War-Why Realism
Does Not Mean Pessimism," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (April 2011); Robert J. Art, "The United States and the Rise
of China: Implications for the Long Haul," Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 359-391.
26 Making a similar point is Vasquez, who observes that a number of power transitions -- situations where one great
power surpasses another in overall capabilities -- do not end in war; historically, some rising and declining states
even found themselves allied with one another; John A. Vasquez, "When Are Power Transitions Dangerous?," in
Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, ed. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 44-45.
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in certain places, pursue supportive strategies seeking to preserve declining states as great
powers. For example, having defeated Austria-Hungary during the wars of German unification,
Germany subsequently allied itself to Austria-Hungary, maintained the alliance despite Austria's
mounting weaknesses, and protected Austria-Hungary against Russia in the various Balkan
disputes before 1914.27 Similarly, a rising Japan cultivated Britain as an ally at the turn of the
twentieth century, while a rising Russia and declining United Kingdom made common cause
against Wilhelmine Germany in the decade before 1914.28 Nor is this variation simply a matter
of prewar diplomacy. After World War Two, for instance, both the United States and Soviet
Union bid for a rapidly declining United Kingdom's friendship by offering Britain a military
alliance and military backing.29 And, amidst concerns in the 1970s that the United States was
declining, Japan and the members of NATO increased their military spending to alleviate some
of the United States' defense burden, while China repaired its relationship with the United States
and emerged as a de facto ally.30
Recognizing that states may be as likely to support declining great powers as prey upon
them is an important and unexplored aspect of rising state strategy. However, this dichotomy
still omits important variation in the degree of rising state predation or support. Simply put, not
all rising states are equally predatory or supportive at all times and in all places, and there is
significant variation in the degree of rising state support or predation. Classical realists obliquely
hinted at part of this phenomena by differentiating between rising states holding "limited aims"
interested in making only minor changes to the extant international order, and "revolutionary
aims" seeking fundamental changes in the international system.31 Because classical realism
focused the systemic consequences of "limited aims" and revolutionary behavior, it sidestepped
the question of how these different types would act towards a declining state per se; by assuming
all states inherently maximize power, classical realism also missed the possibility that rising
states might pursue varying degrees of support and cooperation. The basic insight, though, still
stands: besides pursuing either predatory or supportive strategies, rising states can adopt varying
degrees of predation or support.
Take, for instance, American strategy towards the declining United Kingdom in 1945-
1949, and the declining Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the former case, the
years immediately after World War Two saw the United States take very limited steps to prevent
the decline of British power in Europe. This policy went so far that it was only after British
power collapsed in the winter of 1947 that the United States changed course and provided
extensive economic, diplomatic, and military assistance to the United Kingdom.32 Forty years
27 Samuel R Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991); Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914; William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments,
18 71-1890 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1931).
28 Ian Hill Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: Athlone,
1966); Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988).
29 See Chapters 5 and 6.
30 Robert Litwak, Ddtente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); William Kirby, Robert Ross, and Gong Li, eds., The
Normalization of U.S. - China Relations: An International History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
31 Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," 18-20; Jason W. Davidson, "The Roots of
Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39," Security Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 125-159.
32 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership; John L. Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?," Foreign
Affairs 52, no. 2 (January 1974): 386-402; Peter G. Boyle, "Britain, America and the Transition from Economic to
Military Assistance, 1948-51," Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 3 (1987): 521-538.
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later, Soviet power in Europe collapsed due to Soviet economic, military, and political
difficulties. Yet although the United States preyed upon the USSR throughout this period, newly
released documents show that the United States was significantly more predatory in 1990, as
American policymakers worked to reunify Germany, than when Soviet decline first began to
weaken the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe in 1988-1989. In the earlier period, policymakers
were hesitant to exacerbate Soviet problems, going so far as to encourage Communist
governments in the region to remain in power. In 1990, however, American policy not only
became extremely predatory, tried to accelerate the Soviet withdrawal from Germany, and
denied any Soviet influence over the pace and outcome of German reunification, but did so on
the very issue that was regarded as the most sensitive and important to Soviet security. In other
words, the United States was moderately predatory in 1989, but extremely predatory in 1990.33
Thus, just as some rising states pursue supportive strategies towards their declining peers, so too
do states pursue varying degrees of support or predation. The goal of this project is to identify
the origins of this inter- and intra-case variation, explain when declining state fears of rising
states are correct, and explore when decline is not as pernicious as states seem to fear.
III. Rising State Strategy and Realist Theory: Shortfalls and Prospects for Recovery
A. Realism, Power Shifts, and Baseline Predictions
Aside from the gap between declining state concerns and the weight of history, this
project seeks to fill a theoretical hole in the realist literature on great power behavior during
power shifts. Simply put, variation in rising state strategy is puzzling for scholars working in the
realist tradition. Although a family of theories rather than a single argument, common to all
realist accounts is an emphasis on states' pursuit of power and security as the primary driver of
world politics. 34 As a body of literature, it ought to therefore be most concerned with the
implications of fundamental change in the distribution of power borne of a power shift and able
to provide significant insight into relatively rising state strategy. Yet as noted earlier, this is not
the case. Not only are different strands of realist thinking contradictory, but each leaves
significant variation in rising state strategy on the table. As a result, a detailed examination of
the sources of rising state strategy can help scholars address a perennial debate in international
relations theory, namely: when and why do states maximize power at the expense of other actors,
when and why do they maximize security, and what causes states to act as power maximizers at
some times but power satisficers at others? 35
B. Structural Realism: Indeterminate Predictions
One argument comes out of the structural realist tradition. Structural realism, as
formulated by Kenneth Waltz, offers that states operating in an anarchic international system try
to survive as sovereign actors by providing for their security. Here, states seek power not as end
unto itself, but rather as a means to a security end. As a result, balances of power tend to form
and re-form as security-seeking states internally and externally balance threats to their security.
33 See Chapters 3 and 4. For an overview, see Gregory F. Domber, "Skepticism and Stability: Reevaluating U.S.
Policy During Poland's Democratic Transformation in 1989," Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 3 (2011): 52-82;
James Goldgeier and Derek Chollet, "Once Burned, Twice Shy? The Pause of 1989," in Cold War Endgame: Oral
History, Analysis, Debates, ed. William C. Wohlforth (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2003), 141-173; Mary E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009).
3 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 31.
3 On power maximization versus power satisfaction, see Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," The National Interest,
Spring 2002.
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Thus, this approach rightly suggests that decline may imperil the stability of the international
system as balancing breaks down, misperception of the distribution of power increases, and
declining states try to chain-gang their relatively stronger peers into contests with relatively
rising states in order to address a looming power shift.
Structural realism contains the central insight that pressures from other actors in the
international system affect state behavior. At the macro level, this core prediction might explain
why rising states sometimes try to maximize power and other times maximize security:
depending on the specific configurations of external power facing rising states, the system may
allow for greater degrees of predation or encourage power satisficing behavior as other states
balance a rising state's growing capabilities. Put differently, a rising state may improve its
security by maximizing power under certain conditions, while under other conditions,
maximizing power may threaten the security of other actors, cause them to balance, and thus
undermine a rising state's security.36 The possibility that systemic pressures may or may not
incentivize power maximizing behavior is a powerful and potentially useful insight.
However, and as Waltz writes elsewhere, structural realism is a theory of international
politics rather than a theory of foreign policy.37 As the preceding discussion implies, it is thus
indeterminate whether the theory predicts rising state security will be enhanced by acting as a
power maximizer or power satisficer at any given point; predatory behavior vis-d-vis the USSR
by the late Cold War United States is just as in line with structural realist insights as supportive
behavior vis-d-vis the United Kingdom in the early Cold War since both policies helped ensure
American security. Additional variables are therefore needed to round out the parsimonious
structural realist framework and derive specific predictions for any particular rising state. This
pushes us to look elsewhere to develop a specific theory of rising state policy towards declining
great powers.
C. Power Maximizing Realism: Predation Uber Alles
A second argument comes out of scholarship in the classical realist, hegemonic stability,
and offensive realist traditions. Although these different strands make otherwise distinct
predictions about the dynamics of the international system, they share a common assumption that
states (especially rising states) maximize power where and when they can. As power
maximizers, rising states therefore seek out opportunities to shift the distribution of power
further in their favor at a declining state's expense. Mearsheimer's discussion of American
strategy towards the Soviet Union is instructive. Writing in 1990, he argued that "states are
principally concerned about their relative power position in the system; hence, they look for
opportunities to take advantage of each other. If anything they prefer to see their adversaries
decline, and thus will do whatever they can to speed up the process and maximize the distance of
the fall.",3 8 In this view, rising states are on the hunt for declining state blood. As Lemke and
Kugler describe, as decline occurs and power shifts, "the resulting disjunctures generate
36 Davide Fiammenghi, "The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis,"
International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 126-154.
37 Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (September 1996): 54-
57.
38 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15,
no. 1 (Summer 1990): 53.
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challenges for the dominant state and opportunities for the rising states in the system, who
eventually will attempt to change the rules." 39
The notion of rising states as natural born killers is a powerful one and, as discussed, is a
popular perspective among states in decline. It also aptly captures instances in which rising
states adopted predatory strategies. The argument faces problems, however, accounting for
cases of rising state support. That is, if rising states are on the lookout for opportunities to grow
their capabilities and "do whatever they can to speed up [decline] and maximize the distance of
the fall," then instances in which rising states preserved declining states as great powers raise
questions of the argument's underlying logic. A similar issue relates to variation in the degree of
rising state predation. If states maximize power at declining states' expense, then they should
logically increase the degree of predation as the distribution of power moves in their favor over
time and they become relatively stronger. However, this hypothesis faces problems explaining
cases, such as the post-1890s Anglo-American rapprochement and the post-1968 Chinese-
American rapprochement, where the degree of predation decreased as the distribution of power
moved in the rising state's favor. Again, the empirical record suggests power maximization
arguments are incomplete and need either refinement or additional variables to explain the full
range of rising state strategies.
D. Offense-Defense Realism and Variation
A third and final argument comes from offense-defense realism.40 Offense-defense
theory has gone through several iterations over the last thirty years.41 At its core, though, is an
argument that war and coercion are more likely when geography, technology, and socio-political
structures ("the offense-defense balance") make it easier for states to aggress against each other;
periods of "offense-dominance" also hinder international cooperation. Conversely, war and
coercion are less likely, and cooperation easier to sustain, when geography, technology, and
socio-political structures favor the defense and the system is "defense-dominant." Applied to
rise and decline, offense-defense arguments suggest predation should dominate during periods of
offense-dominance, while defense-dominance breeds supportive strategies. That is, because
offense-dominance makes aggression easier, it creates power maximization incentives that
penalize weakening states. On the other hand, because defense-dominance makes it easier for
states to obtain security for themselves without aggressing against other actors, rising states need
not prey on decliners, decliners can more readily penalize states pursuing predation, and both
risers and decliners can improve their security by avoiding steps that threaten each other; defense
dominance thereby limits predation and creates incentives for support.
Because offense-defense theory is designed to explain variation in the propensity of states
to war and challenge one another, it seemingly offers a way of accounting for intra- and inter-
case variation in rising state predation and support. However, like power-maximizing realism, it
encounters empirical anomalies. First, there are notable cases in which "defense dominance,"
39 Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, "The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective," in Parity and War:
Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, ed. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1996), 9.
40 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999);
Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984); Van Evera, "Cult"; Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"; Glaser and
Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?"; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack
Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization
44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.
41 A good overview can be found in Lieber, War and the Engineers.
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produced extreme forms of predation rather than causing supportive strategies. This is notably
the case in the late Cold War when the United States intensely preyed on the Soviet Union
despite the defensive revolution wrought by nuclear weapons.42 Similarly, periods in which
policymakers perceived the offense to be dominant produced rising state support.43 This is most
prominent in the Anglo-Russian rapprochement before 1914, and the increasingly intense
support given to a declining Austria-Hungary by Germany.
A second problem comes from the precise nature of the intra-case variation. Because
offense-defense theory focuses on slow moving variables such as the nature of military
technology, the intra-case variation it explains should be similarly gradual and emerge haltingly
over time. In practice, however, rising state strategy often changes rapidly, in some cases almost
overnight. American strategy and the decline of the USSR is instructive. As described above
and discussed in detail later in this project, American strategy went from moderately predatory to
extremely predatory in the span of a few months in the winter of 1990 as the U.S. rejected prior
efforts to pressure without directly challenging the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and instead
sought to directly evict the Soviets from Germany. Yet although American policy changed, but
there was no concurrent shift in military technology, political constructs, or geography. As a
result, the variables central to offense-defense theory could not have driven the changes in the
case. Combined, the fact that we see predation during periods of defense-dominance, support
during periods of offense-dominance, and variation in the degree of predation/support without a
change in the offense-defense balance suggest offense-defense theory is similarly a problematic
account of rising state strategy towards declining great powers.
E. Net Assessment: Realism and the Puzzle of Rising State Strategy
On balance, although realism as a school of thought should have much to say about the
behavior of relatively rising states towards, each of the major strands of the realist tradition faces
problems accounting for the empirical record. This presents an immediate theoretical puzzle. If
rising states sometimes prey on declining states, sometimes support them, and exhibit different
degrees of supportive or predatory behavior that is un- or under-explained by the current
literature, then an effort to uncover the sources of this variation may help scholars better
understand the origins of power- and security-seeking behavior more generally. This effort, in
turn, can help bridge the different streams of realist thinking and begin integrating the different
insights into a unified realist theory in the context of great power decline and rise. Thus, aside
from the importance of this project to current policy debates and for addressing the chasm
between declining state concerns and the historical record, this dissertation hopes to improve our
theoretical understanding of rise and decline dynamics by linking what have heretofore been
disparate realist arguments. Towards this end, this project derives and tests a unified realist
model of rising state strategy towards declining great powers.
IV. Alternative Explanations
Absent a consistent realist explanation of great power decline and rise, alternate
explanations from the liberal tradition have moved in to fill the theoretical gap. If realist
arguments as a group suggest power shifts are fraught with danger and problems for both the
system and declining states themselves, then liberal accounts offer more room for optimism. For
4 on nuclear weapons as defense-dominant, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft
and the Prospect ofArmageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
4 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; Van Evera, "Cult."
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arguments in this camp, not only can power shifts be peacefully managed, but declining states
themselves can take steps that discourage rising state predation and encourage support.
Two liberal arguments have gained particular salience in the policy and academic worlds
as potential accounts of rising state-declining state relations. The first is Democratic Peace
Theory. As I discuss in the following chapter, Democratic Peace Theory suggests that the spread
of liberal democracy discourages competitions for power among the great powers and can thus
breed rising state support during power shifts. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic peace
arguments have been used by American foreign policy elites to both predict how rising states
might treat the United States if and when American dominance begins to erode, as well as offer
recommendations as to what policies the United States should pursue to ensure a benign world
for itself as other great powers begin to rise.44 The George W. Bush Administration's 2002
National Security Strategy hinted at the logic, noting that the United States was "attentive to the
possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition" as states such as India and China
developed their economic and military capabilities and proposed the key to avoiding such
competition was promoting a "balance of power that favors freedom." 45 The subsequent 2006
National Security Strategy was even more explicit.46 Building on ideas developed during the
Clinton Administration, the report concluded that whether the United States and other "main
centers of global power" enjoyed cooperative relations hinged on "states' treatment of their own
citizens." 47 That is, because "states that are governed well are most inclined to behave well," the
United States needed to "encourage all our partners to expand liberty, and to respect the rule of
law and the dignity of the individual, as the surest way to [. . .] cement close relations with the
United States." Faced with rising states such as China and India, the spread and deepening of
democratic institutions would ensure that a changing distribution of power "will contribute to
regional and international security." 48 Similar recommendations were endorsed by the Princeton
Project on National Security (many of whose members advised the Obama Administration) and
by Republican candidate Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election.49 If these arguments are
correct, then the United States should devote its resources to spreading liberal democracy in
order to ensure a peaceful landing if and when the United States declines.
A second argument comes from Institutionalist Theory. Broadly speaking, Institutionalist
Theory argues that the spread and deepening of international institutions can breed cooperation
and support amidst a shifting distribution of power by giving rising and declining states a mutual
44 For overviews, see Thomas Donnelly, Rising Powers and Agents of Change, National Security Outlook
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, January 2006); Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The
United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 94; G. John
Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds., Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the
21st Century: Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006), 47-49.
45 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White
House, September 2002), 25-26.
46 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White
House, March 2006).
47 Ibid., 36; William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The
White House, October 1998), 33-35, 47; William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century
(Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), 25-27, 36; William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security
Strategyfor a Global Age (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2000).
48 Bush, NSS 2006, 40-42.
49 Ikenberry and Slaughter, Liberty Under Law, 49; Mitt Romney, An American Century: A Strategy to Secure
America's Enduring Interests and Ideals (Romney for President, October 2011), 5.
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stake in maintaining the international status quo. As with Democratic Peace Theory,
Institutionalist Theory is prominent in the policy and academic worlds. Then-Undersecretary of
State Robert Zoellick, for instance, argued that the United States and a relatively rising China
could best cooperate with one another if China became a "responsible stakeholder" in the
international system and embraced the international institutions sponsored by the United States
in the post-1945 era; the 2006 National Security Strategy reiterated this theme.50 The Obama
Administration has also embraced this logic, arguing that to "achieve a just and sustainable order
that advances our shared security and prosperity, we are [. . .] deepening our partnerships with
emerging powers and encouraging them to play a greater role" in international economic and
security institutions.51 And in a range of articles and reports, prominent scholars such as
Ikenberry, Slaughter, and Deudney propose that by embedding rising and declining states in
common international institutions, "power transitions are likely to be more peaceful and
incremental [. . .] than in the past" by giving rising states "multiple access points and pathways
for integration" with the international status quo. This school of thought implies the United
States should devote itself to deepening international institutions and embedding rising states in
their structures to ensure a peaceful and benign international environment as American power
wanes.53
Overall, Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory offer optimistic visions of
rising state strategy towards declining great powers. So long as declining states make the right
policy choices today, they can discourage rising state predation and encourage supportive
strategies even as the distribution of power shifts in the future. Yet while these arguments are
prominent in both the academic and policy worlds, no study systematically evaluates their claims.
Thus, in addition to testing a refined version of realism as a theory of rising states strategy
towards declining great powers, this project also assesses the analytic traction afforded by
democratic peace and institutionalist arguments coming out of the liberal tradition. In doing so, I
hope to establish not just whether realism can be repaired to offer insight into rising state-
declining state relations, but also which theoretical tradition offers the most insight into rising
state strategy towards declining great powers in order to better guide ongoing policy debates.
V. Conclusion: The Path Forward
Having outlined the research questions and their importance to both policy and scholarly
debates, the remainder of this project proceeds as follows. Chapter Two details my unified
realist theory of rise and decline - what I term "Realist Decline Theory" - and discusses testing
50 Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" (presented at the Remarks to National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Washington, DC, September 21, 2005); Bush, NSS 2006, 41.
5 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House,
May 2010), 45.
52 G. John Ikenberry and Thomas Wright, Rising Powers and Global Institutions (Washington, DC: The Century
Foundation, 2008), 11-12; also G. John Ikenberry, "Woodrow Wilson, The Bush Administration, and the Future of
Liberal Internationalism," in The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century, ed.
G. John Ikenberry et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1-24; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); G. John Ikenberry, Vikram J. Singh, and Shawn Brimley, "An
Agenda for Liberal International Renewal," in Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, ed. Michele
A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008), 45-59; Daniel
Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," Review of International
Studies 25, no. 2 (April 1999): 179-196; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and
Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), chap. 8.
5Ikenberry and Slaughter, Liberty Under Law.
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procedures. To ensure a three-cornered test of my integrated realist argument, I also use Chapter
Two to detail competing, non-realist explanations of rising state behavior drawn from
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. Next, Chapters Three and Four test my
argument against its competitors using the history of American foreign policy towards the
declining USSR over the course of 1989 - 1990. These chapters leverage intra-case variation
and extensive qualitative research to show that Realist Decline Theory outperforms its
challengers. Chapters Five and Six subsequently provide a second test of the argument, using
the history of America and, to a lesser extent, Soviet foreign policy towards the declining United
Kingdom after the Second World War for empirical and theoretical leverage. Finally, Chapter
Seven summarizes the results of the tests, delineates the implications of my research for
international relations theory, outlines future avenues for research, and discusses policy
implications.
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Chapter Two:
Realist Decline Theory and Its Competitors
I. Introduction
The preceding chapter presented the central questions of this project and the puzzle of
rising state strategy towards declining great powers. In this chapter, I detail my competing theory
- what I term Realist Decline Theory - by laying out its core logic and contrasting it with
competing explanations drawn from Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory.
To preview the discussion, Realist Decline Theory is situated in the structural realist
tradition. It argues that states debating what strategies to adopt vis-a-vis a declining peer are
forced to consider the costs and benefits of either preying on the declining state, or supporting
the decliner and helping it maintain its place in the great power ranks. As the costs and benefits
wax and wane over time and space, states adopt varying degrees of predation or support for
purely self-interested reasons. Two variables - the polarity of the international system and the
declining state's own military posture - combine to shape the nature of the security
consequences and propel the relatively rising state's strategy. Thus, unlike power-maximizing
realist arguments, Realist Decline Theory offers a more optimistic assessment of the fate of
declining states as they are not universally preyed upon by their rising peers. Finally, and using
a basic offense-defense realist insight, the declining state's own military choices strongly
influence the degree of support or predation. I elaborate on my argument and the specific
predictions that follow later in this work.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in several sections. Following this introduction, I
define what I mean by great power decline and outline an approach to studying the strategies
used to manage another state's decline. Next, I discuss the underlying assumptions of Realist
Decline Theory. Subsequently, I explicate the costs and benefits a rising state may face from
preying upon a declining great power. I then discuss how polarity and posture shape influence
these costs and benefits, and thus determine a rising state's incentives to pursue varying degrees
of predation or support. From this, I discuss the predictions that flow from this theory. To lay
the foundation for a fuller test of my argument, I thereupon outline competing explanations and
predictions derived from Democratic Peace Theory and Liberal Institutionalist Theory.
Afterwards, I review the methodology used to test these arguments. I conclude by previewing
subsequent chapters.
II. Defining Decline
A. Conceptualizing Decline
I define relative decline one great power's sustained loss of a significant share of its
economic and military capabilities relative to one or more other great powers. There are seven
elements to this definition. First, decline is about change among the great powers. Modifying
Mearsheimer's definition, I define a great power as a state with sufficient economic and military
assets "to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in
the system."54 Second, decline reflects changes in economic and military capabilities. This
54 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 5.
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approach treats 'power' as material assets rather than as international influence. I do so because
capabilities are necessary to obtain international influence. 5
Third, this definition is agnostic as to the source of decline. Decline can occur in two
ways. First, a state can grow absolutely weaker over time if, for instance, its economy shrinks,
thereby causing other states to become relatively stronger. Second, even if a given state
continues growing, it can still decline in relative terms if another state's capabilities expand at a
faster rate. Britain's pre-1914 decline, for instance, resulted from the superior growth of the
American and German economies that reduced Britain's economic lead.56 My definition
accommodates both types.
Fourth, relative decline is about sustained change in the distribution of power. Decline
matters because it creates windows of vulnerability that leave a great power worse off tomorrow
than today. These windows give relatively rising states opportunities to exploit the decliner's
worsening position.57 For this situation to emerge, rising states need time to respond to the
changing distribution of power.58 Focusing on sustained change - meaning that a state slipping
down the great power ranks is unable to recover for a politically meaningful period -
accommodates this situation. 59
Fifth, decline is about significant losses to a state's relative power, that is, a fundamental,
large-scale shift in power.60 A number of variables affect how large a shift is necessary for
fundamental change, but the notion stands: decline refers to a major change in the distribution of
power rather than small oscillations in great power performance.61
Sixth, decline reflects changes among the great powers as a set. In other words, it
reflects shifts in power among the strongest states in the system, as well as changes in which
actors constitute the strongest states. This is the most contentious part of my definition, as
scholars are divided over what actors matter when discussing decline. Analysts working in the
power transition and hegemonic stability theory traditions define decline as the emergence of a
state approaching parity with the strongest actor in the system (i.e., the hegemon); decline is thus
an issue of the dyadic relationship between a hegemon and a rising challenger.62 In contrast,
scholars working within the classical realist, structural realist, and liberal traditions focus on
great powers as a set: decline can occur as the strongest state moves into second place or, for
instance, as the third place state moves into fourth place. 63
I follow the latter approach because focusing solely on the two strongest actors risks
understating the importance and frequency of decline. Theoretically, even if a state is "only" the
third strongest state in the system, its decline might lead it to take risky behaviors that increase
5 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; A. F. K Organski, World
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958).5 6 Friedberg, The Weary Titan.
5 Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," 87-88.
58 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 5-6.
59 MacDonald and Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment."
60 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Copeland, The Origins of Major War.
61 Van Evera, Causes of War.
62 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger; Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack
S. Levy, "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (December 1, 1999): 686-687.
63 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf,
1954); Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle (New York,:
Knopf, 1962); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 1st ed (New York: Norton, 2001); Robert
0. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," International Organization 36, no. 2 (April 1982): 325-355.
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64international tensions and the likelihood of war. Empirically, scholars ascribe important
international developments to shifts in power among states that qualify as great powers but not
hegemons or challengers. For example, the emergence of Europe's bipolar order hinged on the
postwar decline of British power, while the decline of Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman power
spurred European rivalries that contributed to the First World War.6 5 Capturing the range of
great power declines that are empirically meaningful suggests a non-hegemonic standard.
Finally, decline may reflect either a downward change in the ranking of one or more
great powers (e.g., decline from first to second place), or a loss of power within an existing
ranking (e.g., State A declining from 50 to 40 percent of State B's GDP). This is also
contentious. Recent research treats decline as a change in the ordinal great power rankings.66
This contrasts with earlier work that allows decline to occur even without change in ordinal
rankings.67 I follow the latter approach as there is no reason to assume ordinal rankings are more
or less important than shifts of power within an existing great power system. A simple thought
exercise demonstrates the point. Consider a multipolar system with four great powers. At the
start, State A has 35 percent of the capabilities in the system, State B has 30 percent, State C 25
percent, and State D 10 percent. Now imagine that the distribution of power changes as states A
and C gain at B and D's expense, such that a few years later the distribution of capabilities is
State A - 50 percent; B - 20 percent; C - 25 percent, and D - 5 percent. With 50 percent of
system capabilities, A is now stronger than any but a combination of all the other actors in the
system: B, C, and D have all declined relative to A, and A may be able to challenge their security
with little fear of military defeat. Focusing on ordinal rankings alone, however, would miss this
fundamental shift and the decline in B, C, and D's fortunes. Instead, the only change captured
by ordinal assessment is C's overtake of B. This may be an important development, but it is
likely to pale in comparison to these states having to deal with significant losses relative to A.
To capture the possibility that shifts in capabilities within rank may be as or more important than
shifts in ranks, I allow decline to reflect either a change within the great power ranks or among
the rankings themselves.
B. Measuring Great Power Decline
I generate a list of declining states in two stages. First, I define and identify a list of great
powers. Second, using this list, I identify shifts in the distribution of power that qualify as
decline. In the chapters themselves, I also check for evidence that policymakers recognized a
change in the distribution of power.
i. Identifying Great Powers
To qualify as a great power, a state must meet two criteria. First, it must hold significant
aggregate capabilities. Second, it must be able to make a good showing in an all-out
conventional fight against the strongest state in the system. To meet the first criteria, I modify
MacDonald and Parent's recent approach and look for states holding at least 10 percent of the
overall resources in a given region (e.g., Europe, East Asia). Because major conventional war
64 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 37-42.
65 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First
World War.
66 MacDonald and Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment"; Robert J.
Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Beckley, "China's Century?".
67 Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation,"
American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 727-743; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979;
Mearsheimer, Tragedy.
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will see states mobilize their societies for international competition, I focus after 1950 on states
holding at least 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a region. 1950 was chosen a
as a rough point after which states had recovered from the damage of World War Two. Here, I
use GDP data developed by Angus Maddison. Before 1950, I use the Correlates of War (COW)
Composite Index of National Capabilities (ClINC). CINC scores are a reasonable proxy for the
pre-1950 period as 1) the Second World War helped reveal the distribution of power in Europe in
a fully-mobilized fight, and 2) only three states potentially able to shape European politics (the
U.S., Soviet Union, and United Kingdom) survived the war roughly intact, such that overall GDP
levels are unreliable for this period.
After generating a list of states with at least 10 percent of the capabilities of a region, I
determine which states held at least one-fourth the resources of the strongest state therein. The
one-fourth threshold is an artificial construct to capture Mearsheimer's qualification that a great
power must be able to make a fair showing against the strongest state in the system. A 25
percent cutoff comports well with historical comparisons. The USSR, for example, is described
as one of the two poles in the bipolar Cold War competition despite a GDP that ranged between
thirty and forty percent of U.S. GDP, whereas Britain, France, and Germany held roughly 15
percent of U.S. GDP and are considered lesser powers.
Using this approach, the European great powers since 1945 were the United Kingdom
(through 1949), the USSR (through 1991), and the United States (ongoing). Before 1949, the
United Kingdom was the weakest the three surviving European great powers, but was
nevertheless quite powerful in geopolitical terms as it held roughly half the capabilities of the
Soviet Union as late as 1948.6 Similarly, the late Cold War Soviet Union was significantly
weaker than the United States, but was still much more powerful relative to any other actor.
Table 2.1: European Great Powers since 1945
State Years as Great Power
United Kingdom 1945-1949
Soviet Union 1945-1991
United States 1945-
ii. Identifying Decline
To identify declining great powers and the periods of their decline, I measure change in
the distribution of capabilities among these states. The hallmarks of this change are that one or
more states lose a significant share of their relative capabilities, within a short period of time, and
are unable to recover from the trend. To meet these criteria, I define decline as situations in
which 1) a great power loses at least 5 percent of its share of great power capabilities, 2) within a
ten year window, after 3) at least five years of sustained losses to great power capability share.
Methodology and justification are presented in the Appendix. When these conditions are met, I
code the situation as a case of great power decline and begin analyzing the strategies of other
states after this point. I continue this analysis until the declining state either drops from the great
power ranks entirely (falling below the 10 percent overall share/25 percent share of strongest
state thresholds), begins to recover as identified by 5 or more years of positive growth in
capability share, or a decade elapses. Table 2.2 summarizes the results.
68 Unavailable when I began this project, Paul Avey's recent work also includes Britain as a great power nearly on-
par with the Soviet Union immediately after World War Two; see Paul C. Avey, "Confronting Soviet Power: U.S.
Policy During the Early Cold War," International Security 36, no. 4 (April 1, 2012): 159-164.
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Table 2.2: Declining European Great Powers, 1945-200869
State Years of Decline Relatively Rising State(s)
United Kingdom 1945-1949 United States, Soviet Union
Soviet Union 1989-1991 United States
III. Dependent Variable: Rising State Strategy
Decline gives rise to debates as to how a declining state will provide security for itself at
a time when resources are growing scarce and the margin for strategic missteps is narrowing. To
obtain security in lean times, a declining great power must respond to the policies other,
relatively rising states adopt in response to its changing fortunes. 70 Reflecting this situation, the
dependent variable of this study is a relatively rising state's strategy towards a declining great
power.
Rising state strategies are substantively important for declining great powers. Because
power is a means to security, declining states live in a world where their resources may be
insufficient to address the array of threats they face. As a result, the policies adopted by
relatively rising states help determine the quality of the decliner's international political life. 71 If
a rising state decides to challenge a declining state's security, the decliner may find itself
involved in rivalries it cannot sustain and wars it cannot win. In this situation, a declining great
power can find its security imperiled by needing to accept defeat, reducing its international
presence and risking another state gaining control over vital interests, or exhausting itself trying
to balance more powerful foreign threats. Conversely, if a rising state comes to the aid of a
decliner, then the declining state can find allies that deter other states from taking advantage of
its weakness. As a result, a declining state may be in a more secure international position than
would be the case if left to its own devices. For scholars interested in assessing the consequences
of great power decline, the strategies of rising states towards declining great powers are a good
place to begin.
A. Definition and Concept
I define strategy as a political-military ends-means chain adopted by a rising state
designed to structure relations with a declining state.72 Using this definition, I identify four
strategies a rising state can pursue. These vary by 1) the goals a rising state pursues and 2) the
intensity of the means used to achieve its goals.
i. Goals: Predation versus Support
Rising states can pursue one of two goals towards a declining great power. By goal, I
mean the rising state's plans for structuring the declining state's place among the great powers.73
First, a rising state can try to eliminate a declining state as a great power and push it down or
from the great power ranks.74 When a state pursues this goal, I refer to it as pursuing a predatory
69 Although I did not know it when this dataset was being generated, Wohlforth also codes 1989 as the start of
Soviet decline; see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3
(Winter, -1995 1994): 103.
70 Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War."
71 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
7 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 4.
7 For a related approach to strategy, see Brendan R. Green, "The Systemic and Ideological Sources of Grand
Strategic Doctrine: American Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century" (PhD Diss., Department of Political Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), 27.
74 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
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strategy: a rising state looks to shift the distribution of power further against a decliner and
exacerbate the decliner's relative losses. Because power is a means to security in an anarchic
system, predatory strategies harm the declining state's security and worsen its situation in world
politics.
Alternatively, a rising state can pursue a supportive strategy. With support, a rising state
looks to slow or prevent losses to a declining state's capabilities and sustain the declining state as
a great power. Although support is the inverse of predation, existing scholarship has left the
phenomena under-developed and understudied.7 5 Drawing on the notion of rising state predation,
however, supportive strategies emerge when a rising maintains a declining state as a great power
by working to protect the decliner's power and security at a time of weakness.
ii. Means: Intense versus Cautious
Rising states pursue predatory and supportive strategies using the diplomatic and military
means at their disposal. To prey upon a declining state, a rising state must either 1) cause the
declining state to waste its capabilities and exhaust itself, or 2) directly take capabilities away
from the declining state. Rising states have three options in this process. First, a rising state can
maintain or escalate diplomatic and military disputes with the declining state. Maintaining or
escalating disputes may require the declining state to expend its resources balancing challengers.
An extreme variant of this option is what Mearsheimer calls a "bait and bleed" policy in which a
rising state maneuvers a declining state into a competition with another state to exhaust both of
them; the option is analogous to American efforts to sustain the Soviet Union's war in
Afghanistan in order to exhaust the fraying USSR.76 Second, a rising state may try to weaken
the decliner's economy and society by denying it critical materials, technological inputs, and
encouraging domestic opposition groups to challenge a ruling government. Such economic
attacks and domestic subversion limit the resources a declining state can mobilize for
international purposes.77 Finally, a rising state can try to strip the decliner of allies or threaten a
war against the decliner that will directly undermine the declining state's capabilities and harm
78its security.
75 Although classical realists allowed that some rising states might be "satisfied" with the international status quo,
they also argue rising states seek to expand their power and influence. It is difficult to understand how a rising state
can be interested in expanding, but also be satisfied; there is a tension in classical realist arguments. Regardless,
existing research focuses on when and why rising states adopt predatory strategies towards decliners and I am
unaware of a study that examines the origins of rising state "satisfaction." See Organski and Kugler, The War
Ledger; A. F. K Organski, World Politics,, 2d [rev.] (New York,: Knopf, 1968); Randall L. Schweller, "Managing
the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed.
Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), 1-31; Douglas Lemke and William Reed,
"Power Is Not Satisfaction: A Comment on De Soysa, Oneal, and Park," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no.
4 (1998): 511-516; for partial exceptions, however, see Steven Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy,
Trade, and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003); Jason W. Davidson, "The
Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39," Security Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 125-159.
76 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 153-154; Stephen M. Walt, "What Obama Could Learn from
Muhammad Ali," Foreign Policy Blogs, April 5, 2012,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/05/time_to-rope_a dope.
77 For claims that economic and political subversion were critical to the decline of the USSR, see Norman Bailey,
The Strategic Plan That Won The Cold War: National Security Decision Directive 75 (McLean, VA: Potomac
Foundation, 1998). Interviews with former Reagan Administration officials confirmed this perspective; author
interviews with Norman Bailey (16 June 2011); Tom Reed (10 March 2011); Roger W. Robinson (9 August 2011).
78 On strategies of splitting opposing coalitions, see Timothy W. Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How
Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," International Security 35, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 155-189.
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To support a declining state, on the other hand, a rising state 1) reduces the capabilities a
declining state uses to maintain its security so that the decliner does not exhaust itself, and/or 2)
transfers capabilities to the declining state. Again, a rising state has three general options. First,
it can settle outstanding political and military disputes with a declining state. Settling disputes
means that a declining state does not have to expend resources balancing a rising state. Second,
a rising state can extend diplomatic and military guarantees such as alliance offers to a declining
state. As noted earlier, these guarantees help deter or defeat other states from engaging in
predation.7 9 Finally, a rising state can directly transfer economic and military resources in the
form of economic and military aid to a declining state. Much like the Marshall Plan after World
War Two, resource transfers can subsidize a declining state's own capabilities.80
However, the intensity with which states use these means to pursue predation or support
also varies over time. By intensity, I mean the resources a rising state invests in aiding or
weakening a declining state and the extent to which a rising state is willing to see its policies
compromised based on other states' input. A rising state's means are intense when it uses any
and all means at its disposal to undermine or buttress a declining state's position, and sustains
these actions irrespective of signals of approval or disapproval from the other states in the system.
For example, when a rising state strips a declining state of allies or launches a war against the
decliner, it is using intense means to substantially weaken a declining state by resolutely using all
of its capabilities to challenge the decliner. On the other hand, means are cautious when a rising
state refuses to invest substantial economic, military, or political resources (relative to other
policy options) in challenging or aiding a declining state's position, and is willing to reshape its
policies based on the approval or disapproval of other actors. A rising state's provision of
symbolic or rhetorical diplomatic support to a decliner is evidence of cautious means: by
circumscribing the extent to which the rising state identifies itself with the decliner's political
position, it limits the extent to which it must come to the decliner's aid if war breaks out and the
likelihood other states will retaliate against it if the decliner behaves recklessly.8'
The difference between cautious and intense means is illustrated by the change in
American strategy at Cold War's end. Simply put, there is a qualitative difference between
American efforts in 1989 to encourage reform in members of the Warsaw Pact that might
gradually move these states out of the Soviet orbit, and the all-out effort to reunify German,
place the reunified state in NATO, and destroy the Warsaw Pact after 1990.82 In 1989, the
United States used cautious means: by limiting its effort to undermine the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe to rhetorical support for East European reforms rather than (as some hoped) an
effort to immediately pull these states out of the Soviet orbit, the United States limited its
exposure if the USSR were to launch a crackdown in the region, and consciously tried to avoid
linking U.S.-Soviet relations with the fate of Eastern Europe. Conversely, American means were
intense in 1990 as the United States focused on using all of its diplomatic and military means to
pull East Germany - the USSR's premier ally - out into the American orbit and refused to back
79 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn Snyder, Alliance
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
80 William C. Cromwell, "The Marshall Plan, Britain, and the Cold War," Review of International Studies 8, no. 4
(1982): 233-249; Scott Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a
European Recovery Program," The Journal ofAmerican History 65, no. 4 (March 1979): 1043-1068.
81 For a similar approach, see Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 37-42.
82 Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in
Europe, 1989-1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).
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away from this effort even when Soviet opposition spiked. Although the United States
consistently preyed on the USSR in 1989-1990, it did so with varying degrees of intensity.
B. Range of Variation
Combined, the different goals pursued and means used give rise to four ideal-type rising
state strategies. These are summarized in Figure 1 and discussed below. Please note that
although I discuss four ideal types, I recognize the dependent variable could also be
conceptualized continuously; the key is finding some way to make finer-grained distinctions
among the ends and means of rising state behavior. Nevertheless, the categories discussed below
correspond to what I see as the four basic strategies a relatively rising state may adopt towards a
declining state and provide a good baseline for future research.
Figure 2.1: Range of Rising State Strategies
Rising State Goals
Eliminate Decliner Preserve Decliner
as Great Power as Great Power
0
i. Extreme Predation
First, a rising state may pursue a strategy of Extreme Predation. With Extreme Predation,
the rising state's goal is predatory - to push the declining state from the ranks of the great powers
- and the means used are intense - to undercut the decliner's capabilities as directly as possible
using any and all means at the rising state's disposal. The United States, for instance, pursued
Extreme Predation toward the United Kingdom throughout the nineteenth century. As Miranda
Priebe points out, before the rapprochement of the late 1890s, the United States assiduously
worked to evict British power from North America, even fighting a war and risking several
militarized crises with the United Kingdom for the privilege. 83 Extreme Predation is therefore
marked by policies that sap significant resources from the declining state, undercut the declining
state's capabilities, and directly threaten the declining state's security even at significant cost and
risk to the rising state. Examples of such policies include waging war against the declining state,
targeting the declining state's allies, diplomatically isolating the decliner, and waging economic
83 Priebe, PhD Dissertation (Forthcoming).
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Extreme Predation Extreme Support
Moderate Predation Moderate Support
warfare (see Figure 2.2). Extreme Predation represents the classic fear of declining states,
namely, a situation in which a rising state's policies significantly weaken the declining state and
leave it vulnerable to the unknown and potentially-hostile intentions of its competitors.
Figure 2.2: Extreme Predation with Policy Indicators
Rising State Goals
Eliminate Decliner Preserve Decliner
as Great Power as Great Power
ci:
ri5
ii. Moderate Predation
Second, a rising state might pursue Moderate Predation. Here, a rising state's goal is to
weaken and eliminate the declining state as a great power, but it pursues this goal using cautious
means that avoid direct challenges to the declining state. Specifically, a rising state uses limited
investments of its own resources to make small, incremental gains at a declining state's expense
without causing immediate swings in the distribution of power, and backs away from even these
steps if other great powers begin to oppose the effort. In effect, a rising state tries to cause
limited shifts in the distribution of power in its (the rising state's) favor while limits its exposure
and resource commitment. Although these changes may accrue over time and lead to a
fundamental shift in the distribution of power, there is no expectation of dramatic change in the
near future.
Rising state policies indicative of Moderate Predation are refusal to negotiate over
outstanding political differences with a declining state, making asymmetric bargaining demands
that will disproportionately hurt the decliner, and launching limited arms races that may
gradually yield a military advantage to the riser (Figure 2.3). The archetype of a Moderate
Predation strategy is that which the United States pursued in the period leading up to the
Revolutions of 1989. As I explain below, the United States sought to create political and
economic conditions that would undermine Soviet influence in Eastern Europe over time and
hinder the USSR's ability to threaten the West, but which did not seek to immediately move the
states of the Warsaw Pact out of the Soviet orbit.
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Figure 2.3: Moderate Predation with Policy Indicators
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Rising State Goals
Eliminate Decliner Preserve Decliner
as Great Power as Great Power
Moderate Predation V, suppoll
Indicators:
Negotlation refusals
Asymmetric demands
Limited arms races
iii. Moderate Support
Third, a rising state may adopt a Moderate Support strategy. With Moderate Support, a
rising state's goal is to maintain a declining state as a great power. However, the means
employed are limited: a rising state is not prepared to incur significant risks or expend significant
resources of its own to aid the decliner. Instead, while a rising state is willing to take low-cost
and low-risk efforts to signal a generic interest in preserving the declining state, prevent other
states from challenging the declining state, and reduce the capabilities the declining state must
use to provide security for itself, the rising state is unwilling to go beyond a fairly low threshold
in support of these objectives. Thus, the hallmarks of Moderate Support are limited diplomatic
and military concessions to the declining state and a clear sense of the limits to which a rising
state will go to maintain the existing distribution of power. Illustrative policies are the provision
of token or ambiguous political and economic assistance, and the scaling back of arms races.
These policies forego opportunities for a rising state to shift the distribution of power against a
declining state and make it somewhat easier for the declining state to provide security for itself
by limiting the threat posed to the declining state's security, but neither fully identify the riser
with the decliner's security nor see the rising state use substantial resources of its own to come to
the declining state's aid. Figure 2.4 provides a summary.
American behavior towards the United Kingdom in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War corresponds to a Moderately Supportive strategy. By the end of World War
Two, the United States wanted a declining Britain to play a significant role in Europe to hedge
against a revived Germany and help balance the Soviet Union. It was therefore willing to offer
Britain limited economic assistance and provide symbolic political-military cooperation at a time
of British weakness. However, the United States also refused to formally commit itself to
Britain's (or Europe's) defense, and refused to provide the economic aid British and American
officials believed necessary to rebuild Britain's shattered economy. In effect, American
policymakers wanted Britain to remain a great power, were willing to offer some limited steps in
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pursuit of this objective, but were unwilling to make more fundamental sacrifices for the sake of
the United Kingdom. 84
Figure 2.4: Moderate Support with Policy Indicators
Rising State Goals
Eliminate Decliner
as Great Power
Preserve Decliner
as Great Power
iv. Extreme Support
Finally, a rising state might adopt a strategy of Extreme Support. Extreme Support is a
strategy in which a rising state uses intense means (i.e., it is willing to bear significant expense
and take large risks) to pursue the goal of preserving a declining state as a great power. To do so,
a rising state defines a declining state as a vital security interest, takes steps to strengthen a
declining state, and actively tries to prevent other states from growing stronger at the declining
state's expense by using its own resources to come to the declining state's aid. In effect,
Extreme Support sees a rising state help the declining state provide security for itself by
subsidizing and reinforcing a declining state's capabilities. Policies indicative of Extreme
Support are the provision of extensive economic and military aid to a declining state, offers of
diplomatic guarantees, and the formation of a military alliance (Figure 2.5). Historically,
Extreme Support characterized American strategy towards the United Kingdom after 1947.
Whereas the United States earlier worked to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power using
low costs and limited means, after 1947 the floodgates of American assistance opened as Britain
received substantial economic aid via the Marshall Plan, as well as military guarantees via the
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
8 4 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership; Terry Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-
1947 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981).
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Figure 2.5: Extreme Support with Policy Indicators
Rising State Goals
Eliminate Decliner Preserve Decliner
as Great Power as Great Power
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IV. Foundations of Realist Decline Theory
A. Security, Power Maximization, and Balancing
To explain variation in the predatory or supportive nature of rising state strategy, this
project advances what I call Realist Decline Theory. Realist Decline Theory is rooted in the
structural realist tradition, but complements a Waltzian focus on structure with insights from
power maximizing realism and offense-defense realism. It argues that states operating in an
anarchic system seek to survive as sovereign units and to advance their security by operating
with as few threats to their vital interests as possible.85 To obtain security, I argue that states
look to gain power: states seek to grow their economic and military capabilities relative to other
actors. In anarchy, power is the ultima ratio for ensuring state security and settling conflicts of
interest. Power therefore helps if a state goes to war and shapes bargaining over vital interests in
86peace. As a result, states try to gain capabilities of their own while undercutting the
capabilities of their peers.
The international system, however, limits how far power maximization can proceed.
Because all states seek power as a means to security, a given state can grow only so far before its
peers worry about its mounting capabilities, move to protect themselves, and counter the trend by
balancing. Balancing occurs as states 1) ally and pool capabilities with one another ("external
balancing"), and 2) develop their individual capabilities to confront potential threats ("internal
8s Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. For
definitions of "security," see David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," Review ofInternational Studies 23, no.
1 (January 1997): 13; Arnold Wolfers, ""National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political Science Quarterly
67, no. 4 (December 1952): 485.
86 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 1st ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf,
1948); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Geoffrey
Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations
for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995); Robert Powell, In the Shadow ofPower: States and
Strategies in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1999).
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balancing"). 87 The net effect is that states respond to changes in the distribution of power by
countering others' growth in order to protect themselves." As a result, states that constantly seek
greater capabilities can wind up in a less secure position as other states balance, offset the gains
from aggrandizement, and leave the power maximizing state in a more tense and conflict-prone
environment. As Snyder offers, blindly maximizing power is likely "to undermine [state] power
and security by provoking an overwhelming coalition of opposing states."8 9
Because balancing can erase the gains from aggrandizement, states will forego growing
their power when doing so promises to hurt their security by leading other states to balance.
States may want to be power maximizers, but they will first act as power satisficers, defined as
actors who value the security afforded by their current capabilities rather than the capabilities
they could obtain through aggrandizement. Put differently, states grow their power where they
can, but avoid power maximization when they must.90 Thus, states try to identify opportunities
to maximize power while constantly assessing whether power maximization threatens to lead
other states to balance against them. As threats and opportunities change over time, so do state
calculations over the benefits of power maximization and thus whether states act as power
maximizers or power satisficers. Ultimately, states evaluate the costs and benefits of power
maximization and will walk back aggrandizement when doing so is necessary to avoid or limit
balancing.
B. Decision-making, Rationality, and Updating
This approach does not assume states and their leaders are strategic geniuses that
successfully calculate the costs and benefits of every possible course of action. However, neither
does it assume states remain perpetually ignorant of structural constraints and only revise their
policies when the reactions of their peers begins to tell. Instead, I follow Mearsheimer and argue
that the constraints from the system and incentives for power maximization eventually manifest
themselves in state calculations and influence state policy. States and their leaders, in other
words, are rational actors who think carefully about the security problems before them and
attempt to adopt policies that improve their security and power.91 This process plays out in two
manners.
First, states may be forced to think in realist terms because a decision point has been
reached and the need to deal with a declining state compels states to think as strategic forward-
thinkers. This has to do with the anarchic nature of world politics. In an environment where
threats are manifest and security difficult to obtain, states cannot readily afford to miscalculate
how others might react to their drive for power. This is particularly true during periods of
decline. The potentially momentous shifts in relative power that can result from decline require
all major states to anticipate whether their peers will respond to the situation by taking advantage
of the changing distribution of power or hanging back. 2 Otherwise, if a state fails to anticipate
international reactions, it is likely to find its power and security under duress by other states
87 Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics; Posen, Sources; Walt, Origins ofAlliances.
88 Waltz, Theory, 106, 118. See also T.V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory
and Their Contemporary Relevance," in Balance ofPower: Theory and Practice in the 2 1s' Century, ed. T.V. Paul,
James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 6.
89 Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991), 6; Fiammenghi, "Security Curve."
90 Posen, "The Best Defense."
91 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 30.
92 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why nor Neorealist Theories of
Foreign Policy?," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996).
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eager to both protect themselves and improve their positions. 93 Operating in a competitive
international market, the stakes of the game during decline generally compel states to act as
strategic, rational actors.94
Still, not all states at all times successfully calculate the reactions of other great powers.
One need only look at Germany before 1914 or the Soviet Union during the Cold War to see that
states sometimes fail to properly assess others' responses when seeking security. 95 However,
states may still behave in line with my assumptions as they change their policies in response to
others' reactions: even if a state fails to correctly anticipate the consequences of its behavior
ahead of time, it can alter course as other states balance and it begins to see the consequences of
its poor decisions. The structure of the system therefore provides a corrective that encourages
states to adjust their policies even if they initially fail to appreciate the consequences of their
behavior.
V. Costs and Benefits of Predation
Building from these assumptions, I argue that whether and to what extent a rising state
adopts a predatory or supportive strategy depends on the costs and benefits of predation. In turn,
the preceding framework suggests both clear benefits to predation, as well as potential costs. As
these costs and benefits vary over time and space, states act with different degrees of predation
or support. In what follows, I first detail the specific costs and benefits to predation before
showing how they vary to produce different state behaviors.
A. Costs of Predation
There are three possible costs a relatively state may face from preying upon a declining
great power. These costs relate to the ways states balance one another. Some of these are
military costs that a state might immediately pay if it adopts a predatory course. Others are
political costs that take effect over time. Combined, however, they can provide strong reasons
for a rising state to avoid or limit predatory behavior.
. External Balancing
The first cost is external balancing. As noted, states are concerned with their relative
power position and the possibility that increasingly powerful states will harm their security.96 As
a result, states may ally with similarly concerned states to obtain the resources to prevent or
overcome foreign threats. This behavior is more likely if one or more states becomes relatively
more powerful at the expense of a decliner.
The possibility of external balancing means a state debating whether and how far to grow
its capabilities at a decliner's expense will eventually consider that efforts to increase its relative
power will lead other states to align against it. Once external balancing is recognized, rising
states must consider that predation will harm their security. First, a counterbalancing coalition
means the rising state may find itself involved in more crises or arms races than was previously
(before predation) the case. Second, a state can find itself in a more tense and conflict-prone
international environment. If, for instance, several geographically disparate states join a
counterbalancing coalition, then the state faces the problem of confronting multiple adversaries
93 For arguments on how shifts in the distribution of power can lead to miscalculation, see Stephen M. Walt,
Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
94 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 31.
95 Snyder, Myths ofEmpire, 66-111, 212-254; Scott D. Parrish, "The USSR and the Security Dilemma: Explaining
Soviet Self-Encirclement, 1945-1985" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University,
1993).
96 Walt, Origins; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration.
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on several fronts, thereby increasing the risk of miscalculation and raising the costs a rising state
must pay to defend itself.97 Finally, balancing raises the prospect of wartime defeat as the riser
faces a proportionally stronger counterbalancing coalition. With the possibility of victory
curtailed, the state finds itself in a dangerous situation in which enemies are legion and
opportunities for acquiring the capabilities to deter or defeat them scarce.
ii. Internal Balancing
The second cost is internal balancing by the declining state. Faced, for example, with the
growth of German naval power before 1914, the declining United Kingdom expanded and
consolidated the Royal Navy near British home waters to offset German gains. 98 Similarly, the
United States responded to its ostensible decline vis-a-vis the USSR in the 1970s by refocusing
its energies on defending Western Europe.99 Declining states, in other words, do not remain
passive in the face of external challenges, but mobilize their resources to deter or defeat
predation. As a result, a rising state pursuing predation may find itself involved in a crisis and
accidental war with the decliner, or push the declining state to lash out in a preventive war.144
Particularly problematic is a war with a declining state that is at least the military equal of a
rising state, as the rising state then stands a good chance of defeat. Facing this dynamic, a rising
state must decide whether and to what extent a decliner's internal balancing is likely to cause
problems that outweigh the benefits of predation. Given a declining state that may not go quietly
into the good night of international irrelevance, a rising state may need to bide its time until the
declining state is unable to oppose predation by force.
iii. Lost Allies
The final cost is the loss of potential allies. The anarchic nature of international relations
means states can never be fully confident as to others' intentions. 101 With each state forced to
protect itself using in an anarchic system, today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy (and vice
versa) if the threat environment changes. 0 2 The need to preserve potential allies against an
uncertain future imposes a third cost from predation. Although a rising state may welcome
another's decline given today's international environment, it cannot be confident that the
wholesale elimination of a declining great power is in its long-term best interest.1 3 After all, a
new threat may require the rising state to find allies, in which case today's declining state may be
a useful partner. Particularly as a declining state grows weaker, risers may not want to prey on
the declining state or let it fall from the great power ranks entirely lest they foreclose future
alliance options. As Edward Gullick observes, failure to otherwise preserve one's future alliance
97 See the problems outlined in Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International
Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986).
98 Friedberg, The Weary Titan.
99 John Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982 (Fort
Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984).
100 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 37-42; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, chap. 5.
101 David Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security
Studies 12, no. 1 (October 2002): 1-40; James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International
Cooperation," International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998): 269-305.
102 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security
25, no. 3 (December 1, 2000): 136.
103 Jack S. Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?," in Balance ofPower: Theory and Practice
in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004), 39.
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options may, "mean a failure to establish a workable balance" as successful balancing requires
"preserving the significant counterweights in the system of equilibrium." 04
B. Benefits of Predation
The benefits of predation are straightforward: by shifting the distribution of power in its
favor at a declining state's expense, a relatively rising state can gain more power that can be used
to advance its security. This benefit accrues in two ways. First, by weakening a declining state,
a rising state limits the threat the decliner poses to its security. A good example of this
phenomenon comes from the late Cold War. At the time, Soviet officials rightly worried that a
rising United States' efforts to reunify Germany within NATO would exclude the Soviet Union
from influencing European security affairs and allow the United States to dominate the
continent. 0 5 In purely dyadic terms, a state that successfully preys on a declining great power
means that it 1) has less reason to worry about aggression on the part of the decliner, and 2) has
reinforced its bargaining leverage in conflicts of interest with the decliner.
Second, by acquiring resources such as economic markets or strategically advantageous
territory, a state may improve its position relative to other states in the system. American and
British leaders, for instance, worried that the Soviet Union would take advantage of British
weakness after World War Two, gain military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, and use these
bases to threaten Western access to Persian Gulf Oil. Outside of the purely dyadic relationship
with a declining state, a predatory state may be able to gain capabilities that improve its ability to
compete with other great powers.
VI. State Calculations: Roles of Polarity and Posture
A. Polarity Posture, and Costs of Predation
Overall, rising states benefit from shifting the distribution of power in their favor at a
declining state's expense, but face potential political and military costs along the way.
Nevertheless, a rising state does not face these costs and benefits at all times and in all places.
Two variables - the polarity of the international system, and the declining state's own military
posture - shape the opportunities a rising state will have to reap the benefits of predation, and the
costs it is likely to face along the way. In turn, when a state faces substantial costs from
predation and receives few benefits, it is likely to support a declining state. Conversely, when a
state can reap large benefits and pay few costs, it is likely to pursue predation. In what follows, I
first briefly define polarity and posture before showing how they interact to produce different
degrees of predation or support.
i. Polarity
The first variable is the polarity of the international system. Following Mearsheimer and
Waltz, I define polarity as the number of great powers present in a given international system.106
Polarity can take one of two values: multipolar or bipolar. A multipolar system has three or
more great powers, each of which can challenge every other's power and security.107 In contrast,
a bipolar system only has two great powers, each of which constitutes the principal threat to the
other. Polarity matters because it determines the range of costs from predation: multipolarity
104 Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of
the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), 76-77.
105 Kristina Spohr, "Precluded or Precedent-Setting?: The 'NATO Enlargement Question' in the Triangular Bonn-
Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990-1991," Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4 (2012): 4-54.
106 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 55, 60-75; Waltz, Theory, 131.
107 The archetype of a multipolar system is pre-1914 Europe; A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,
1848-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
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maximizes the number of costs, while bipolarity minimizes them. As a result, multipolarity
limits how far a rising state can prey on a declining state before the costs of predation begin to
tell, whereas bipolarity imposes fewer costs and facilitates predation.
In a multipolar environment, a state confronts several great powers that can challenge its
security either now or in the future. The presence of several potential threats maximizes the
costs from predation. First, predation may cause the formation of a powerful counterbalancing
coalition as the decliner attracts capable allies. Second, the declining state may lash out in a
preventive war, crisis, or effort to spoil one's relative rise. Finally, because other great powers
may one day threaten one's security, eliminating the declining state as a great power deprives
oneself of a potential future ally. In short, all three costs of predation may emerge in
multipolarity as limits to predatory behavior. As a result, the rising state must carefully calculate
whether the benefits of power maximization are outweighed by the costs.
In contrast, bipolarity minimizes the costs of predation. With only two great powers in
the system, one of which is rising and the other declining, the riser can significantly improve its
relative power and security if it eliminates the decliner as a great power and removes the only
great power threat in the system. Moreover, in the absence of other great powers, the riser does
not need to fear external balancing as the declining state lacks potential allies. Finally, even
internal balancing by the decliner is a wasting asset. Although the decliner's own internal
balancing can deter rising state predation over the short and medium term, internal balancing
becomes less credible and less capable of deterring predation as the distribution of power shifts
over time. Eventually, the costs imposed on the riser by the decliner's internal balancing will
wane as the rising state grows too powerful. Combined, the limited losses and prospective gains
from predation in bipolarity creates significant incentives for a rising state to "kill" the decliner
provided it can do so without provoking internal balancing.
ii. Posture.
The second variable is the declining state's military posture. By posture, I mean whether
a declining state can deploy sufficient military assets to secure its vital interests relative to an
opponent's ability to challenge them. In other words, it reflects a simple net assessment of
whether the declining state can perform the military missions needed to protect its power and
security. This approach draws from existing research on conventional deterrence and military
strategy. Scholars working in the offense-defense tradition such as Mearsheimer, Posen, Glaser,
and Schelling emphasize that a critical component of a state's ability to defend against threats is
its ability to oppose another state's hostile actions at a particular time and place.108 To achieve
these ends, states must hold sufficient military assets to either defeat or deter a given adversary.
Posture can take one of two values. A robust posture exists when a declining state has the
military tools at its disposal to deploy and sustain adequate forces to secure a given interest - it
has the ability to perform required military missions to protect itself against expected threats.
Weakpostures, however, occur when the state lacks the military tools to protect its vital security
interests. 109
108 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Posen, Sources; Thomas
C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2008 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Charles L. Glaser, "Political
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no. 4 (July 1992): 497-538.
109 Many scholars characterize military postures as offensive, defensive, or deterrent. These are useful typologies.
My use of the term, however, comes closer to Press' and Glaser's conceptualization, in which a state can either
attain its military objectives with the forces at its disposal, or cannot. Although the offensive, defensive, or deterrent
nature of a state's military can have important political effects, the first issue is whether a state has sufficient
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Posture matters because it indicates the depths a declining state may go to arrest its
decline and the threat it poses in this process. As a result, posture affects the likelihood that a
rising state will bear the costs and reap the benefits of predation. When a declining state holds a
robust posture, other states are compelled to worry about its future behavior. First, a robust
posture means a declining state can more readily challenge and aggress against relative risers.
As Mearsheimer observes, all great powers inherently posses some offensive capability." 0 As a
result, rising states must worry that 1) a decliner with robust military forces will lash out in a
preventive strike, and 2) that a crisis will erupt and escalate into a costly but inadvertent
conflict." Moreover, even if a decliner is threatened by a rising state, a robust posture limits
other states' incentives to come to the decliner's aid: if a declining state is willing to pump its
resources into securing itself, then other states can buck-pass and wait it see how the rising
state's challenge evolves. 12
Weak postures carry the opposite effects. With a weak posture, a state lacks the capacity
to provide security for itself. This may carry two consequences. First, weak postures signal
rising states that the decliner is unlikely to threaten their security. Hence, risks that a declining
state may launch a preventive war or initiate a military crisis are largely eliminated. Second,
because a weak posture leaves a declining state unable to come to the aid of other states lest it
leave itself even more vulnerable to predation, weak postures indicate that the decliner may be
lost as an ally unless other states come to its assistance.
B. Interactions of Posture and Polarity: Predictions
Combined, polarity and posture unlock the costs and benefits of rising state predation.
With two variables that can each hold two values, this framework generates four ideal-type
strategies a rising state may adopt depending on the precise combination of polarity and posture.
This approach also generates a series of process predictions that describe 1) how rising states are
expected to calculate the costs and benefits of predation, and 2) the circumstances in which the
process changes over time.
i. Bipolarity and Robust Posture
First, a relatively rising great power may face a declining state in a bipolar system in
which the decliner holds a robust posture and can still provide security for itself. In this situation,
I predict a rising state will adopt a Moderate Predation strategy.
As noted, bipolar environments are characterized by the presence of two great powers
each of which constitutes the principle threat to the other. When one of these states declines, the
relative riser has an opportunity to eliminate all threats to its security and increase its relative
power by eliminating the declining state as a great power. Furthermore, because the declining
state cannot attract allies and has no value as an partner against future great power threats, all
that keeps the riser from trying to eliminate the decliner is the fear of the decliner's internal
balancing. Yet with a decliner holding a robust posture, the riser must take this threat seriously:
if the rising state pursues predation too intensely, the declining state may lash out in a war or
military resources in the aggregate that it could obtain its international objectives if it tried. In other words, separate
from whether a state's military is optimized for offensive, defensive, or deterrent missions, is the issue of whether or
not it has the raw military capacity to obtain given political objectives; see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility:
How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory
of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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crisis that harms the rising state. The rising state's ability to defend itself, in other words, keeps
the intensity of rising state predation in check. Moreover, given the trends in the overall
distribution of power, a rising state need not intensely prey upon a declining state and risk a war
in order to maximize its power. Time is on the riser's side and opportunities for killing the
decliner likely to mount in the future if the rising state simply bides its time. Instead, slow and
steady pressure on a declining state can yield results by exhausting the decliner and gradually
running it into the ground. In other words, despite the incentives for predation created by
bipolarity, the decliner's robust posture signals that the rising state should tread lightly: the
benefits of predation are significant, but the costs of predation are potentially high.
In this situation, I argue that rising states will adopt a strategy of Moderate Predation. I
expect the rising, state will pursue limited arms races to cause the decliner to expend scarce
resources and gradually shift the military balance of power in the riser's favor, deny the decliner
access to economic markets, and refuse to negotiate away outstanding political differences
diplomatically. If successful, this strategy will eventually so weaken the declining state that it
either falls from the great power ranks, or declines to the point where its posture changes and it
can no longer defend itself. In the interim, however, rising states will calculate that their optimal
approach is to prey upon the declining state with limited intensity. The aim is to kill the decliner
as a competitor, but to do so prudently to avoid a preventive war or accidental conflict.
ii. Bipolarity and Weak Posture
Rising state strategy will change if the declining state is no longer able to defend itself. If
a rising state confronts a declining bipolar rival and the rival holds a weak posture, then I predict
a rising state will pursue an Extreme Predation strategy. A rising state might, for example, strip
the declining state of allies or launch a war against a declining state. It may also provide aid to
the declining state's opponents, akin to the political backing the United States gave West
Germany when negotiating the fate of the Soviet presence in Central Europe.' 3 Lastly, a rising
state can diplomatically isolate the decliner and engage in economic warfare to ensure the
declining state is unable to recover from its present weakness.
The logic undergirding Extreme Predation is simple. The rising pole in a bipolar system
can significantly improve its security by gaining power at a declining state's expense. All that
keeps it from doing so is fear of internal balancing by the declining state. However, if a
declining state holds a weak posture, then the rising pole can prey upon the declining pole
confident that the decliner cannot retaliate. The rising state will thus calculate that it can
substantially benefit from power maximization and pay almost no costs. Here, the drive for
power propels a rising state to prey on the decliner in the hopes of eliminating it as a competitor,
while the decliner's military weakness means the riser can do so intensely.
iii. Multipolarity and Robust Posture
Third, a rising state may face a declining state in a multipolar environment in which the
declining state holds a robust posture. This situation creates complex calculations for the rising
state. On the one hand, there are potentially large costs to predation as other states ally with the
decliner against predation, the decliner itself might be lost as a future ally, and the declining state
internally balances. On the other hand, too intensely aiding a declining state that retains
significant military options of its can backfire if the decliner chain-gangs the rising state into
unwanted conflicts. 1 4 As a result, a relatively rising state can also improve its security by letting
113 Mary Elise Sarotte, "Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to 'Bribe the Soviets Out' and Move
NATO In," International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 110-137.
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the declining state weaken to the point where its posture changes, the decliner can no longer
provide security for itself, and the declining state is unable to entrap other coming to its
assistance.
On balance, a rising state is likely to respond to these cross-cutting incentives by
adopting a Moderate Support strategy. Moderate Support is characterized by cautious steps that
do little to actively help the decliner arrest its fall, but which also try to avoid making life harder
for the declining state. In effect, a rising state tries to prevent other states from gaining at the
decliner's expense, while doing little to directly preserve or protect the declining state. Adopting
Moderate Support allows the rising state to advance its security as the declining state weakens
and the threat of the decliner's internal balancing recedes. At the same time, preventing other
states from weakening the decliner means the rising state can still use the declining state as a
future ally. And, by avoiding predation, the rising state prevents the declining state from
attracting allies that might counterbalance and threaten the rising state. Overall, Moderate
Support benefits the rising state by allowing it to gradually obtain a stronger power position vis-
a-vis the declining state while limiting the risks involved. The goal in this situation is to preserve
the decliner, but to do so prudently until the threat environment clarifies.
iv. Multipolarity and Weak Posture
Finally, a great power may face a declining state in a multipolar system where the
declining state holds a weak posture. This situation leads to an Extreme Support strategy.
Extreme Support is characterized by intense efforts to prevent the declining state from growing
weaker and becoming vulnerable to others' predation. Policies indicative of Extreme Support
are alliance guarantees, the provision of significant economic and military aid, and consistent
diplomatic backing. These policies aim to preserve the declining state as a great power even at
large cost and sacrifice to the rising state.
In this situation, a rising state would still benefit by maximizing power at the declining
state's expense. However, there are significant costs associated with predation. In holding a
weak posture, the declining state signals to the other great powers that it is unable to defend itself
and is vulnerable if other states threaten it. As a result, a rising state will anticipate that
predation carries substantial costs as 1) other states ally with the decliner to prevent the rising
state from gaining power at the decliner's expense, and 2) the declining state is lost as a future
ally. Relatively rising states, in other words, have reason to come to the decliner's aid for purely
self-interested reasons, and no reason not to. The result is a strategy of Extreme Support that
tries to preserve the declining state using all means at a rising state's disposal. Extreme Support
is unlikely to help the decliner recover to the point where it can again threaten its peers, but it
will at least keep the declining state a member of the great powers and help it avoid falling any
further.
C. Summary
In sum, I argue that relatively rising great powers shape their strategies towards declining
great powers depending on the costs and benefits of power maximization. Drawing on insights
from structural realism, power maximization realism, and offense-defense realism, these costs
and benefits are determined by the polarity of the international system, as well as the declining
state's military posture. Framed differently, rising states are attuned to threats to their power
and the opportunities for gaining more of it as structured by the international system. This
situation may not only lead rising states to circumscribe predation, but even support and help
declining states survive as great powers. Figure 2.6 summarizes the expected strategies resulting
from the combination of polarity and posture.
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Rising State Strategies
Declining State Military Posture
Weak Robust
VII. Alternate Explanations
To assess the explanatory power of Realist Decline Theory, we want to know not just
how it performs in explaining rising state strategy towards declining great powers, but also how
it performs relative to other accounts of rising state behavior. In other words, we want to stage a
multi-cornered fight that evaluates 1) whether my argument has any explanatory power, and 2)
how much explanatory power it provides versus alternate accounts. 1 5 To do so, I derive a series
of hypotheses about rising state strategy from democratic peace and liberal institutionalist
arguments. To be clear, these theories have not been previously used to offer a full range of
arguments about rising state strategy towards declining great powers. However, because their
core logics and causal mechanisms relate to how states prioritize interests, recognize threats, and
look to advance their security, they can be used to deduce a series of rival hypotheses. Equally
important, elements of both the democratic peace and institutionalist theories of international
cooperation enjoy widespread appeal in the policy world. American policymakers in particular
employ democratic peace and institutionalist arguments to guide American relations with rising
states such as China and India. Thus, by testing hypotheses gleamed from Democratic Peace and
Institutionalist Theories against my argument, we are able to assess the overall utility of my
argument and use the results to inform ongoing policy debates.
A. Democratic Peace Theory: Joint Democracy Causes Support
i. Democracy Promotes Peace
Democratic Peace Theory argues that the spread of liberal democracy can dampen, if not
eliminate, the risk of international conflict. "6 Drawing from the statistical finding that
115 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodsfor Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997),
38, 83.
116 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (Winter
1986): 1151-1169. The notion that democracies will only fight other democracies is only intended to apply to
liberal democracies. I use the terms "democracy" and "liberal democracy" interchangeably.
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democracies rarely wage war against one another, democratic peace theorists identify three
causal mechanisms linking liberal democracy to a reduced risk of conflict. 1 ' First, democratic
institutions are transparent, make it difficult for statesmen to mobilize publics for a given course
of action and penalize leaders who fail to produce the desired results. As a result, democratic
institutions help states credibly signal their interests and power, and reduce the risk of conflicts
due to misperception and uncertainty. 18 Second, democratic institutions require policymakers to
respond to public opinion and the "will of the people."119 Because voters rather than
policymakers bear the direct costs of war while benefiting from peace, liberal democracies tend
to share a core set of interests relating to peace and mutual gains from cooperation. This
situation reduces the likelihood of war due to conflicting interests. Third, democracy promotes
"norms of compromise," the notion that disputes between democracies should be resolved
cooperatively rather than by force.12 0 By externalizing these norms, democratic states tend to
accommodate the interests of other democracies but contest conflicting interests with non-
democracies.
ii. Implications for Rising State Strategy
Applied to rising state strategy, democratic peace arguments suggest that whether a rising
state adopts support or predation depends on whether both rising and declining states are
democracies. If both rising and declining states are democratic, then the rising state will support
the decliner. Three factors drive this prediction. First, popular pressure may force rising states
to sympathize with the interests of a similarly democratic declining state. Second, statesmen
may recognize their common interest in preserving a fellow democracy against illiberal and
potentially hostile non-democracies. Finally, norms of compromise may prohibit predation
because predation implies coercion and would violate the mandate to resolve disputes
cooperatively. Instead, liberal states should bargain with other liberal states in a spirit of fairness
and a desire to see them advance against illiberal actors.
117 My understanding of democratic peace theory treats it as a dyadic phenomenon. Though Kant's original
formulation argued republican states are individually more pacifist than monarchies, Doyle and others responsible
for its modern revival treat it as a dyadic proposition. See Doyle, "World Politics." For an overview of Democratic
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The three mechanisms producing democratic peace also predict support should move
from Moderate to Extreme as the declining state weakens. First, a rising state that fails to
preserve a democracy may allow non-democracies to prey on the decliner, strengthen, and
subsequently threaten the rising state. To avoid this situation, a democratic great power should
support a declining state as necessary to prevent non-democracies from gaining at the decliner's
expense. Second, because leaders must regularly compete to stay in power, leaders that fail to
preserve a declining democracy against illiberal competitors will be removed from office. To
avoid electoral punishment, leaders should be on the lookout for signs other democracies are
declining and provide support as necessary. Finally, with democracies externalizing norms of
compromise and accommodation, there should be few barriers such as misperception and
miscommunication inhibiting a supportive response.
If, however, the decliner and rising state are not both democracies, then rising states will
pursue predation. First, popular pressure for supportive behavior may be lacking. Second, the
absence of a common set of democratic values may breed divergent interests and intense
competition. Finally, the absence of a common normative framework encouraging compromise
means states will be willing to resort to threats of force and coercion whenever state interests
diverge. This same logic suggests that the intensity of predation should increase over time as
rising states take advantage of the decliner to maximize power at the decliner's expense.
iii. Extensions: Changes in Declining State Regime Type
Democratic peace logic also suggests relatively rising states should respond to changes in
the domestic institutions of declining states. As Haas and Owen note, great powers sometimes
adopt different domestic regimes and become more or less liberal, democratic, autocratic and so
on over time. Domestic changes are particularly likely when a state is weak and the
international system in flux. At such times, domestic reformers in a declining state are likely to
push for internal changes to emulate more powerful members of the system. 23
These conditions seem particularly likely to emerge in declining great powers.12 4 Because
decline can cause fundamental shifts in the distribution of power, declining states operating in a
competitive international system face strong incentives to try to revitalize the bases of their
power. This may lead them to copy the domestic institutions of their rising, more successful
peers. Anecdotal evidence suggests rising states seriously consider such options even if they are
never implemented. In the years leading up to 1914, for instance, German leaders considered
liberalizing the German political system to shore of domestic legitimacy and mobilize greater
resources against a rising Russia. Similarly, Mikhail Gorbachev focused on liberalizing and
democratizing the Soviet Union in order to spur Soviet economic growth and better compete
with a surging United States.' 2 5
121 This situation may emerge because both the riser and decliner are non-democracies, or because one of the states
is a democracy and the other is a non-democracy.
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Because regime type may change, rising democratic states should monitor internal
reforms undertaken by a declining peer. If a rising democracy sees a declining non-democracy
beginning to liberalize, then the rising state should gradually reduce the intensity of predation.
Walking back predation not only allows the rising state to assess whether the declining state will
become a democracy, but also avoids intense predation that can empower hardliners in the
declining state opposed to liberalization from limiting domestic reforms by emphasizing the
threat posed by the rising state. 126 Ultimately, reforms that seem on the verge of converting a
declining state into a full-fledged democracy may lead a rising state to reorient its policy,
embrace the democratizing state to prevent backsliding, and adopt a supportive strategy.
However, the opposite is also true: a rising democracy that sees a declining democracy begin to
adopt non-democratic institutions will employ less support over time. In the end, a declining
state that appears on the verge of changing from democracy to non-democracy will lead to
predation.
Because non-democracies adopt predatory strategies, a rising non-democracy will
disregard changing declining state domestic institutions and act as described in the preceding
section.
B. Liberal Institutionalist Theory: Institutions Breed Support
i. Institutions Cause Support
A final set of arguments comes from liberal institutionalist theories of cooperation.
These arguments propose that the spread of international institutions, defined as "formal and
informal organizations, rules, routines, and practices that are embedded in the 'wider' political
order and define the 'landscape' within which actors operate," help states reap absolute gains
from cooperation rather than relative gains from competition. 127 Applied to great power rise and
decline, scholars such as Ikenberry, Lake, and Slaughter propose that by embedding rising states
and declining states in binding international security institutions, rising states will be encouraged
to pursue supportive strategies as the distribution of power shifts in their favor.128 Ikenberry
126 In other words, there may be a "second image reversed" dynamic in which external competition undermines
incentives for domestic change. In the late Cold War, for example, several analysts worried American pressure
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makes the point well in discussing China's rise and American decline, arguing that, "the Western
order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable
to the United States."1 29 The key to doing so, as he writes elsewhere, is ensuring the United
States strengthens "the rules and institutions of the liberal international order" while trying to
"accommodate and institutionally engage China."130
ii. Implications and Limitations for Rise and Decline
In theory, binding international institutions cause supportive strategies by helping rising
and declining states reach long-term, mutually beneficial cooperative agreements. They do so by
serving three functions. First, they "facilitate the flow of reliable information" surrounding the
interests of different states and provide a forum to help states negotiate on the basis of this
information. Second, institutions offer enforcement mechanisms in the form of tit-for-tat
punishment and intra-institutional sanctions. Punishment and sanctions discourage defection
from agreements by increasing the costs of violation. 132 Finally, institutions are a way for
powerful states to both limit their capacity to coerce weaker states and to reassure potential
opponents. As Lake describes, by "agreeing to work through institutions that have the potential
to block certain policies [. . .] the dominant state signals its commitment to 'moderate' ends
supported by key member states of that organization."1 33 Thus, barriers to cooperation are
reduced as weaker states come to trust stronger states, while stronger states accept constraints on
their power.134 By extension, institutions also provide ways for declining states to secure
political and military backing from rising states, as the free flow of information makes it easier
for declining states to credibly signal weakness while rising states are given an interest in coming
to a declining state's aid.
Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence that the theory works. Because Institutionalist
Theory requires great powers be institutionally embedded before decline occurs, the paucity of
international institutions until recently in world history leaves analysts unable to test whether
they sustain cooperation when power shifts. Analysts have instead looked to see whether 1) ad
hoc institutions created during the course of great power decline, and 2) solely the rising state's
membership in binding institutions, produce some of the benefits as hypothesized.135 Scholars
propose that even if institutions are absent ahead of time, rising and declining states can use ad
hoc or informal institutions created during a power shift to reap some of the benefits that would
Lake, "American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations," International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 1
(February 2006): 23-30; David A. Lake, "Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the
Rehabilitation of US Authority," Global Governance 16, no. 4 (December 2010): 471-484.
129 Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," 33.
130 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 356; see also Ikenberry and Slaughter, Liberty Under Law, 47-51.
131 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 92; Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories
and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 729-
757.
132 Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics 38, no. 1
(October 1, 1985): 1-24; Keohane, After Hegemony.
133 Lake, "American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations," 27; also Alexander Thompson, "Screening
Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents," Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
(2006): 229-54.
134 Ikenberry, After Victory.
131 Ibid., chap. 5-7; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement,"
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 51, no. 6 (2009).
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result from deeper forms of institutional cooperation.136 At the same time, rising states can
unilaterally reassure decliners by working through their own institutions to signal their benign
intentions. The level of support resulting from ad hoc and one-sided institutions is less than what
might result if both rising and declining great powers were embedded in the same institutions
ahead of time. However, such institutions may still provide ways for states to cooperate amidst a
changing distribution of power to a greater degree than might exist absent any institutional
mechanism.
iii. Predictions
Combined, Institutionalist Theory leads to the core prediction that decisions to prey upon
or support a decliner will depend on the presence or absence of binding international institutions.
If rising and declining states are bound by existing international institutions or can create ad hoc
institutions, then rising states will adopt supportive policies. Otherwise, the barriers to
cooperation in an anarchic world encourage zero-sum competitions for power and security,
thereby causing rising state predation. Because institutions enable states to reap gains from
cooperation, institutions foster a status quo bias: states would rather reap absolute gains from
cooperation than compete for relative advantage. When a state in an institution declines, the
change in the distribution of power raises the possibility of defection as the decliner's interests
change and its capacity to participate in the institution diminishes. Defection, however, would
require the remaining states in the institution to renegotiate the terms of interaction and, owing to
its failure to deter defection, undermine the institution's credibility.13 7 Rising states will be loath
to accept these outcomes. Instead, they will support the decliner in order to "purchase" its
continued institutional participation. This also implies that, in security affairs, rising states
should avoid buck-passing behavior that might leave the declining state vulnerable to external
coercion and undermine the credibility of the regime. Relatedly, the intensity of support should
increase over time as the decliner continues to weaken and the threat of defection grows.
A related hypothesis deals with situations in which only a rising state is institutionally
embedded. Absent mutually binding institutions, a rising state has no ex ante incentive to
support a declining state and forego predation. However, its own institutional participation acts
as a check on predation: the rising state cannot prey on a decliner without the approval of other
states in the institution. Because these other states 1) may be interested in cooperating with the
decliner, and 2) fear they will be chain-ganged into a conflict with the decliner, they are likely to
oppose predation.138 Because it might forfeit the benefits of cooperation and risk destroying the
institution if it ignores its partners, the rising state will respond to these pressures. 39 The result
will be a Moderate Support strategy. In this situation, the rising state will accept the demands of
its institutional partners and forego predation, but will do little to actively support and protect the
declining state as expected if mutually binding institutions were present.
C. Summary
In sum, Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory present strong competing
arguments to Realist Decline Theory. Whether by adopting particular domestic regimes or
136 This is clear in Ikenberry's discussion of the post-1945 and post-1989 settlements; Ikenberry, After Victory.
137 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 100-103.
138A realist might also argue that weaker states will fear the change in the distribution of power from predation and
worry that the rising state will target them next. However, because scholars such as Lake and Ikenberry propose
institutions limit opportunities for coercion and give weaker states influence over stronger states, Institutionalist
Theory suggests this concern is a non-issue.
139 Lake, "Making America Safe for the World."
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working through international institutions, these alternate accounts suggest purposeful state
action can limit the tendency of rising great powers to prey upon their declining rivals.
VIII. Research Design
Three tasks are needed to test my argument against its competitors. First, I need to
develop procedures for measuring the dependent variable (rising state strategy) in each case.
Second, the independent variables of the competing accounts must be operationalized. Finally,
we need a set of cases and testing procedures to weigh explanatory power afforded by the
different accounts. In this section, I review and justify my approach to these tasks.
A. Measuring the Dependent Variable
To measure rising state strategy, I rely on two key pieces of evidence. First, I look at the
policies adopted by rising states. Strategy, as Posen, Art, and others note, consists of a pattern of
policies adopted and maintained over a period of time. 40 By interrogating the pattern to identify
the ends sought and means chosen, we can use the underlying logic to identify the strategy.' 4 1
Here, diplomatic policies refer to the rising state's use of political and economic means
to affect the declining state's place among the great powers. Focusing on diplomatic policies
follows a basic insight: predatory strategies require a rising state to isolate a declining state to
ensure other states do not come to the decliner's assistance; conversely, support strategies
involve some form of diplomatic engagement with and backing for the declining state. Extreme
Predation occurs when a rising state actively organizes an anti-decliner coalition, hinders the
decliner's economic growth, and ensures the decliner's continued isolation. Moderate Predation
occurs when a state goes along with others' efforts to isolate the declining state or simply refuses
diplomatic negotiations with the decliner. With supportive strategies, however, rising states use
political and economic diplomacy to aid, protect, and back a declining state. I code Extreme
Support when rising states extend alliance offers, diplomatic assurances, and economic
assistance, whereas I code Moderate Support when I see limited or symbolic offers of support
and tentative diplomatic negotiations.
Military policies denote the rising state's use of its military to try to weaken or preserve
the declining state. Because force is the final arbiter in international politics, military policy
reveals significant information about a state's preferences for aiding or undermining a declining
state. Tracking whether and to what extent military policies are designed to defend or challenge
relatively declining states thus reflect the logic of rising state strategy. For example, the more
predatory a strategy, the more we expect military policies to try to seize a military advantage
over a declining state. The more supportive a strategy, the more military policies will try to
sustain the military status quo by either de-escalating military competitions with a declining state
and preparing to defend the declining state directly.
The second piece of evidence consists of the statements and arguments policymakers in
rising states use to explain a course of action. In public and, especially, in private, statesmen
present arguments for different policies and elaborate on the expected outcomes of these actions.
These direct quotes provide insight into the goals statesmen sought by adopting particular
policies, thereby allowing me to code the ends of a given strategy. The more predatory a
strategy, the more statesmen in a rising state should argue that a declining state is a threat and
should therefore be weakened or eliminated. Conversely, the more supportive a strategy, the
140 Posen, Sources; Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategyfor America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
141 Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2009).
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more statesmen should argue that the declining state is a potential boon to ensuring the rising
state's security and thus the attractiveness of preserving a declining state as a great power.
Table 2.3 summarizes the coding scheme.
Table 2.3: Coding Scheme to Identify Rising State Strategies
. . Indicators
Rising State Strategy IdctrDiplomatic Policy Military Policy Quotes about Goals
Extensive arms races, Statements and arguments such asIsolation of declining buildups, offensive "with this strategy, we will do what
Extreme Predation state, creating anti- threats towards declining it takes to eliminate e wdecliningdecliner coalition state; efforts to establish state as a great power."
military superiority
Refusal to negotiate Statements and arguments such asdiplomatic agreements; Limited arms races, "with this strategy, we may be able
Moderate Predation asymmetric diplomatic buildups to eliminate the declining state as a
demands; free-riding on great power."
other isolation efforts
Rhetorical & symbolic Statements and arguments such as
political support, limited Ending arms races, "with this strategy, we may be able
Moderate Support financial aid (e.g., disarmament provisions to preserve the declining state as a
UNSC backing) great power."
Diplomatic Guarantees, Statements and arguments such as
cooperative negotiations, Military alliance, "with this strategy, we will do
Extreme Support extensive financial military assistance whatever it takes to preserve the
assistance declining state as a great power."
B. Measuring Independent Variables
i. Realist Decline Theory: Polarity and Posture
To measure the central to Realist Decline Theory, I rely upon a series of indicators.
Measuring the polarity of the system is straightforward. As noted earlier, polarity refers to the
number of great powers present in the international system, and depends on the overall economic
and military capabilities at a state's disposal. Thus, using the list of great powers developed
earlier in this chapter, I count the number of great powers present at any point. When there are
two great powers, I code the system as bipolar. When there are at least three great powers, I code
the system as multipolar. Within the cases themselves, I also incorporate qualitative descriptions
of the economic and military capabilities available to the great powers to provide a fuller sense
of international politics within a given system.
Measuring the declining state's military posture is more complicated. Here, I rely on two
pieces of evidence. The first is the military balance between two states, and whether the
declining state has sufficient "military stuff' in terms of personnel, combat equipment, and
military plans to secure itself against a particular rising state threat. When the gross military
balance allows a declining state to secure itself against a rising state threat, then I code a robust
posture. When, however, a rising state can aggress and aggrandize and the declining state cannot
punish the effort, then I code a weak posture.
The second piece of evidence is whether a declining state is able to deploy and sustain its
forces in the field. Robust postures exist when a declining state not only enjoys sufficient assets
to protect its interests, but can project this power when threats manifest. That is, for robust
posture to exist, a declining state must have secure lines of communication and the ability to
project power to the point of confrontation. This situation prevails when a state has basing and
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transit rights through intervening territory or waters, no or manageable opposition from the
inhabitants of intervening territory, and the airlift, sealift, and ground transport to move
personnel and supplies. Conversely, weak postures exist when a declining state is unable to
deploy or sustain its forces. Indicators of weak postures are insufficient lift to deploy or supply a
given sized force in the field and faces significant military or political opposition to the
movement of personnel and supplies through intervening territories or waters; in these situations,
a state's lines of communication are vulnerable and securing a vital interest becomes a touchy
proposition.142
Overall, I code posture by offering a rough net assessment of the declining state's ability
to protect and provide security for itself against the specific threat(s) posed by the rising state. I
do not conduct full campaign analyses in each case, but rather look at the specific threat(s) posed
to a declining state by a relatively rising state and assess 1) the rough balance of forces, and 2)
the declining state's ability to deploy these forces to defend itself. Following Press' earlier work,
the intent is not to see how a war or military campaign will play out. 143 Rather, the aim is to
establish whether a declining state can, at the end of the day, provide military security for itself
against the range of challenges a rising state might pose and thus the role played by the declining
state's military in the rising state's cost-benefit calculations.
ii. Alternate Explanations
a. Democratic Peace Theory: Regime Type
I establish the presence or absence of democratic regimes using two sets of data.
Following convention, I first measure the presence or absence of democratic institutions using
the Polity IV scores of domestic regime type.144 Polity measures the democratic and non-
democratic features of ruling regimes on a categorical scale. Democracy is coded using on an
eleven point scale ranging from 0 to 10 depending on whether and to what degree a state holds 1)
regular and institutionalized elections, 2) has legislative constraints on the use of force by the
executive, and 3) guarantees civil liberties to a state's citizens; the higher the score, the more
democratic the regime. Countries scoring above 6 are considered democracies, while those
below 6 are considered non-democracies. Moreover, because democracy scores are assessed
annually, we can measure movement towards or away from democracy by looking at whether
combined scores move closer to or above 6 (indicating democratization) or away from 6
(increased non-democracy). 146 Overall, this approach establishes whether rising and declining
states are democracies, whether one or both are non-democracies, and whether the declining state
is becoming more or less democratic over time.
Second, within the cases, I supplement the Polity scores by using primary and secondary
sources to identify the institutional features making a given state democratic or non-democratic.
Specifically, I assess whether both states 1) were led by elected leaders who 2) were accountable
142 Thus, the U.S. faced perennial concerns throughout the Cold War as to whether its airlift and sealift assets were
up to the task of delivering U.S. forces to Europe in the event the Cold War turned hot.
143 Press, Calculating Credibility.
144 Monty G. Marshall et al., "Polity IV, 1800-1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen," Comparative Political
Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2002): 40-46. The Polity scores have been updated through 2011 and are available
online at: http://www.systenicpeace.org/polity/polity4.hti (accessed March 2013).
145 Sara McLaughlin et al., "Timing the Changes in Political Structures: A New Polity Database," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (April 1998): 231-242; George Modelski and Gardner Perry III, "'Democratization in
Long Perspective' Revisited," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69, no. 4 (May 2002): 359-376.
146 Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," The American Political Science Review
92, no. 1 (March 1998): 55-56.
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to the people, and 3) respected civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly; I also look
for signs that significant democratic reforms are occurring. The results lend greater confidence
in and provide nuance to the Polity scores.
b. Institutionalist Theory: Presence of Binding Security Institutions
For Institutionalist Theory to operate, we need to know whether binding international
institutions were present or created in the course of a change in the distribution of power.
Scholars working in the institutionalist literature, however, have generally failed to offer ways of
coding the presence or absence of binding institutions. Instead, they either qualitatively detail
whether which case-specific institutions successfully engendered great power cooperation, or
simply count the international institutions present in a case irrespective of the degree to which
they meaningfully bound states.14 7
To address this situation, I proceed in two steps. First, I take claims by institutionalist
scholars at face value. That is, I use existing studies to identify institutions scholars claim
successfully produced international cooperation and affected rising state strategy. As noted
earlier, many of these were ad hoc organizations, while others only bound the rising state.
Nevertheless, I use current scholarship to identify the institutional presence or absence of in the
interest of giving institutionalist claims as generous of a test as possible.
Second, I establish whether organizations not identified in current research were present
in a given case and met the implicit definition of a binding international institution. I first
determine whether other security institutions were present using the definition discussed earlier: I
look for "formal and informal organizations, rules, routines, and practices that are embedded in
the 'wider' political order" to help manage security affairs between rising and declining states.
Having done so, I code whether a given institution in a particular case can be considered binding.
A binding institution, as Ikenberry and others suggest, minimally consists of 1) multilateral
decision-making procedures, 2) an open negotiating venue in which states can exchange
information and bargain with each-other, and 3) an indefinite operating timeframe (necessary for
states to engage in tit-for-tat punishment strategies). 148 Only when all three conditions are met
does an institution meets the criteria for Institutionalist Theory to apply. Otherwise, I consider
the institution to be little more than epiphenomenal.
C. Cases and Testing Procedures
i. Case Selection
I test Realist Decline Theory against its competitors using a series of case studies. These
case studies examine rising great power strategies towards the two declining great powers
identified in post-1945 Europe: post-war Britain from 1945 to 1949, and the Soviet Union from
1989 to 1990. With Britain's decline, I examine the strategies adopted by the United States and
Soviet Union; owing to data limitations on the Soviet side, I devote greater effort to assessing
147 For the former, see Deudney and Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement"; Alexander Thompson,
Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and US Statecraft in Iraq (Cornell University Press, 2010); for the
latter, see Elizabeth Fausett and Thomas J. Volgy, "Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Interstate Conflict:
Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative Dimensions of Conflict in Postcommunist Space," International Studies
Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010): 79-101; Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett, "Democratic International Governmental
Organizations Promote Peace," International Organization 60, no. 4 (2006): 969-1000.
148 Other features may include the presence of a permanent supranational bureaucracy that can facilitate monitoring
and compliance with international agreements, and a formalized dispute settlement mechanism. While useful
additions, they are not necessary for an institution to be binding. Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson, "The
Independence of International Organizations Concept and Applications," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 2
(2006): 253-275.
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American behavior. For the Soviet Union's decline, I examine American strategy as the bipolar
contest that dominated Cold War Europe gave way to the United States' unipolar era; because of
the chaos and confusion surrounding the breakup of the USSR in 1991, I end the analysis of
U.S.-Soviet relations one year before the formal fall of the USSR as a great power, though
Appendix C offers a brief precis of the case.
There are two reasons to focus on cases of great power decline and rising state strategy in
the post-1945 environment. First, these cases partially control the presence of nuclear weapons
as a force in world politics. Because nuclear weapons maximize the advantages of the defender,
they may give declining states military advantages and provide rising states additional room for
caution that are missing from earlier cases of rise and decline.149 Second, modern states have the
knowledge and means to stage large-scale state interventions in their domestic economics and
societies. This may give declining states additional means to compete with rising states in the
face of a shifting distribution of power that were largely absent before the modern, post-1945
international system, and thus provide rising states reasons to tread lightly before pursuing
predation.150 Combined, great power rise and decline in the post-1945 world may operate
differently than decline in earlier periods. Analyzing the cases is thus intrinsically important for
building a theory of rising state behavior towards declining great powers."5
ii. Testing Procedures
I test Realist Decline Theory against its competitors using four methods. First, I perform
a series of congruence tests. These tests establish whether the predicted values on the
independent variables yield the predicted outputs on the dependent variable.' 5 2 It would be
problematic for the theory if, for instance, a relatively rising state in a bipolar world adopted a
supportive strategy. By assessing whether independent variables align as expected with the
dependent variable, we establish which theory offers more analytic traction than the others.
The second method is process tracing. 5 3 The competing theories specify not just
different conditions under which states pursue predatory or supportive strategies, but also
different rationales and intervening steps by which changes on the independent variables to
rising state strategy. By looking at sequences of events and the arguments statesmen use to
justify state policy, I establish whether the logic of the theories links movement on the
independent and dependent variables as anticipated. In other words, process tracing tests
whether what Press calls the "transmission mechanism" of a given theory is present or absent.' 5 4
This is necessary for three reasons. First, idiosyncrasies in a case may lead outcomes to diverge
from theoretical expectations even if the causal logic of a theory is strongly present. A state may,
for example, begin to prey on a declining great power, only to suddenly support the decliner if a
new threat unexpectedly emerges. Second, process tracing helps avoid spurious correlation.
Even if independent and dependent variables in a case align as expected, process tracing can
show if the rationale for a given strategy diverged from a theor's expectations; if so, then it
would bring the explanatory power of the theory into question. Finally, and related to the
149 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution.
150 Thanks go to Barry Posen for this suggestion.
151 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 83, 85.
152 Alexander L George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,
2005), chap. 9.; Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 54.
153 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chap. 10.
154 Press, "What Causes Credibility," 85-86.
155 Press, "What Causes Credibility," 85-86.
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preceding, because the different theories sometimes predict the same outcome, process tracing
can help us assess which theory offers comparatively more explanatory power.
Process tracing is particularly useful for assessing the utility of Realist Decline Theory as
a realist theory of foreign policy. Specifically, if the configuration of power and polarity
produce the calculations I predict, then we ought to see process evidence of the expected
cost/benefit calculations in the empirical record. To this end, I am particularly interested in
assessing what I term the "Rationales" - the debates, arguments, and justifications recorded in
memoranda, reports, and meeting minutes - offered by policymakers when shaping American
foreign policy.156 For example, if I am correct and the combination of bipolarity and a weak
declining state posture produces Extreme Predation, then we ought to see statesmen discuss the
1) extensive benefits and 2) limited costs that come from weakening a declining state, and thus
3) the need to press the decliner as hard as possible. Similarly, if bipolarity and a robust posture
produce Moderate Predation, then statesmen should underscore the need for caution and
prudence while still highlighting the attractiveness of weakening the decliner. On the other hand,
if multipolarity and a robust declining state posture produce Moderate Support, then statesmen in
a rising state will emphasize the desirability of protecting and aiding a declining state but
acknowledge the potential costs and thus limits to which they are willing to do so. Finally, if
multipolarity and a weak posture produce Extreme Support, then policymakers in the rising state
should emphasize the value of preserving the declining state, the problems that would result from
weakening or challenging it, and indicate their willingness to use any and all means at their
disposal to help the decliner.
Third, I use deep historical research to generate multiple points of observation against
which to assess the theories. By deep historical research, I mean extensive work using primary
and secondary resources to put oneself in the shoes of policymakers and think through a state's
policy options at the time.' 5 7 This approach leverages the fact that each case is not a single
observation as quantitative social science would offer, but rather provides multiple points against
which to test theories and weigh evidence. Equally important, states generate mountains of paper
in the form of memorandum, transcripts, and reports when pursuing their foreign objectives.
This qualitative record can provide a detailed blueprint of the strategic outcomes a rising state
sought, the policies it used to get there, and the reasoning behind the strategy. By acquiring deep
knowledge of a given case, I better establish whether a state adopted a particular strategy for the
reasons offered by my argument or its competitors.
Towards this end, I assembled thousands of unique primary documents from the Reagan
and H.W. Bush Presidential Libraries, the personal papers of Secretary of State James Baker, and
the U.S. National Archives. I also collected documents from the online collections of the
Truman Presidential Library and the British Royal Archives. This work was particularly
important for understanding the decline of the Soviet Union. Given the contemporary nature of
the Soviet case, the secondary literature is not as well established as the British case, requiring an
extensive effort to declassify documents and triangulate among sources. The upshot is that many
of the policymakers involved in the Soviet case are still alive, and I was able to interview more
than 50 senior policymakers from the Reagan and H.W. Bush Administrations, including key
decision-makers such as Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft,
George Shultz, and Dan Quayle to supplement the archival record.
156 For a similar discussion of realism as a guide to foreign policy practice, see Marc Trachtenberg, "The Question of
Realism:," Security Studies 13, no. 1 (October 2003): 156-194.
157 This approach is inspired by Trachtenberg, The Craft ofInternational History, chap. 3.
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Finally, I selected cases to present a series of hard tests for my theory against its
competitors. By hard test, I mean that my theory goes up against a case where the independent
variables central to one or more of the competing theories are strongly present. 158 As a result, at
least one of the competing explanations should provide significant insight into rising state
strategy if the competing theories are correct. Conversely, the cases provide strong evidence that
my argument is correct if Realist Decline Theory explains more of the cases than its
competitors.159 Put another way, if my argument outperforms competing arguments in cases the
competing arguments should easily explain, then we have significant evidence that my argument
offers significant explanatory power: if it were not a good explanation of rising state strategy,
then it should have readily failed such tests.160 Thus, the more we find evidence my argument
holds within and across these cases, the more confident we can be that the theory operates as
expected because it survives serious challenges from competing approaches.
An added advantage of this approach is its ability to engage competing theories on their
home turf. Because other scholars have used the theories I argue against to explain several of the
cases examined in this project, I am loading the dice against my argument. If other theories are
correct, then there we should not have to look hard to find evidence of their success. On the
other hand, if they do a worse job accounting for the evidence than Realist Decline Theory in
cases they should explain, then there is reason to view extant accounts with some degree of
skepticism. Overall, testing my theory against cases used by other scholars helps accumulate
knowledge by assessing whether existing arguments can survive theoretical and empirical
challenges.
IX. Conclusion: Preview of Subsequent Chapters
Having outlined my argument and contrasted it with its competitors, the remainder of this
dissertation tests and evaluates my claims. I begin in Chapters 3 and 4 with a detailed analysis of
American strategy towards the declining Soviet Union from 1989 through 1990. These chapters
show that American policy moved from Moderate Predation to Extreme Predation in a two year
stretch. It did so as Soviet military posture unexpectedly changed from robust to weak and
affected the United States' interest in challenging Soviet power and influence. These chapters
confirm 1) the hypothesis that a rising state in a bipolar system will prey on a declining state, and
2) that the declining state's posture affects the degree of rising state predation.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss changes in American and, to a lesser extent, Soviet strategy
towards the declining United Kingdom immediately after World War Two. American and Soviet
responses to British decline provide insight into decline processes in multipolar systems. Again,
the results offer strong support for my argument over its competitors, as American and Soviet
policy responded to changes in British military posture more than domestic politics or
institutionalization. The case is also empirically interesting and shows not just the ambivalence
with which the United States approached Anglo-American relations for much of the 1945-1946,
but the depths to which the Soviets went to avoid challenging a weakening United Kingdom until
158 Here, I try to take other scholars at their word: if prominent institutionalist or democratic peace scholars claim a
case supports their theory, I accept that the independent variables they identify must be strongly present until proven
otherwise.
159 Press, "What Causes Credibility," 86-87. For a related description of "strong" versus "weak" tests that also
informs my approach, see Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 30-35
160 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 80-81. The inverse is also
true. If the competing explanations cannot explain cases in which the variables they identify are strongly present,
then we have good grounds for questioning their explanatory potential; Press, "What Causes Credibility," 86-91.
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mid-1947. I delve into the history of American and Soviet policies using primary source
materials collected from the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the British Royal
Archives, and Truman Presidential Library, alongside memoirs, contemporary reports, and
secondary sources.
I conclude in Chapter 7 by summarizing the successes and failures of my theory relative
to its competitors and discussing the implications of the argument for current debates
surrounding the decline of the United States. Equally important, the chapter reviews next steps
in the research agenda, as well as the broader theoretical implications of the project. Overall,
offering a theoretically and historically grounded approach towards understanding rising-
declining state relations promises to make a contribution to ongoing policy debates, historical
scholarship, and international relations theory.
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Chapter Three:
Soviet Decline and American Strategy, Part I:
Moderate Predation in 1989
I. Introduction
A. American Strategy and the Decline of the Soviet Union, 1989-1990
The prior chapters presented the puzzle of state strategy towards declining great powers,
described Realist Decline Theory, and outlined a research agenda to evaluate my claims against
competing explanations. The next two chapters test Realist Decline Theory by examining
American strategy towards the declining Soviet Union in 1989-1990. As a whole, the Soviet
case tests Realist Decline Theory's predictions of great power behavior in bipolar systems. The
present chapter focuses on American behavior in 1989, while the following chapter addresses
strategy in 1990. I derive, test, and weigh separate predictions from the competing theories in
each.
Combined, these chapters revolve around a puzzle: why did American strategy towards
the declining USSR become more predatory over the course of 1989-1990? Specifically, why
did U.S. policymakers move in the winter of 1990 to evict the Soviet Union from Central and
Eastern Europe, where they were previously hesitant to directly challenge the Soviet presence in
the region? By 1989, American policymakers agreed that the Soviet Union was declining and
that the United States enjoyed a window of opportunity to press the Soviet Union for
"concessions" to American interests. With the United States surging ahead, American pressure
would either force Soviet leaders to appease the United States or accept an international
competition that a weakening USSR could not sustain.161
Despite this opportunity, American policymakers avoided intensely preying on the Soviet
Union and used cautious means to roll back the Soviet presence through the end of 1989. 16In
military affairs, American policymakers advanced a series of arms control proposals to reduce
both American and Soviet military forces that would stabilize Soviet-American military
competition on favorable, but not overwhelming, terms for the United States. 163 Equally
significant was the diplomatic game. As Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe
weakened in 1989, American policymakers avoided exacerbating unrest in the Soviet Union's
Warsaw Pact clients and challenging the Soviet alliance network.164 As recent scholarship
shows, the United States adopted a hands-off policy in which it pocketed Soviet concessions, but
avoided further threats to Soviet security.1 65
Yet having seemingly adopted plans for stable, long-term change, American
policymakers shifted course in 1990 and pursued Extreme Predation. The change occurred as the
U.S. and Soviet Union negotiated the terms under which East and West Germany could reunify.
161 Colin Powell to The President, "Your Meetings with Gorbachev," 2 December 1987, Duberstein Files, Box 4,
"Washington Summit Briefing Book," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL).
162 Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 120.
163 Interview, NSC official, 14 March 2013.
164 Amembassy Warsaw to SecState, "How To Elect Jaruzelski Without Voting for Him, and Will He Run?" 23 June
1989, online at: http://wwwigwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB42/; Brent Scowcroft to The President, "The
Soviets and the German Question," 29 November 1989, Scowcroft Files, Box 91116, "German Unification
(November 1989)," George H.W. Bush Presidential Library (hereafter GBPL).
165 Domber, "Skepticism and Stability"; Sarotte, 1989.
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Having sought through the close of 1989 to stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations by limiting pressure
for German reunification, the Bush Administration moved in 1990 to seek rapid German
reunification within NATO. This was a striking turn. American officials recognized that East
Germany constituted "the cornerstone of [Soviet] security posture, the jewel in [the Soviet]
imperial crown." Ending East Germany's independence and integrating a reunified Germany
with NATO would thus destroy the Soviet alliance system and directly threaten Soviet security
in Europe.166 Previously, the Bush Administration worried that pushing German reunification,
let alone reunification inside NATO, would trigger a military crisis; by 1990, however, the
United States pushed for reunification as rapidly as possible and ignored Soviet protests over the
process. The result was that a reunified Germany emerged in October 1990 on terms highly
favorable to the United States and detrimental to the USSR.
B. Failure of Existing Arguments and Contribution of Realist Decline Theory
This shift from Moderate to Extreme Predation is difficult to explain using existing
theories. Democratic Peace arguments suggest the United States should have been Moderately
Predatory in 1989 before becoming less so in 1990.167 The period saw the Soviet Union
implement democratic reforms announced earlier in the 1980s, including a popularly elected
legislature with decision-making powers and laws allowing freedom of speech and assembly.
The Soviet Union was not a democracy, but it was moving in that direction. In general, we
therefore expect American policymakers to monitor Soviet domestic politics as a clue to Soviet
behavior, grapple with the implications of Soviet reforms for American security, and shape
American policy in response to Soviet internal changes. Moderate Predation makes sense in
1989 as a way of hedging against a backslide in Soviet reforms, before moving to a mixed
strategy in 1990 falling between Moderate Predation and Moderate Support as Gorbachev's
reforms take root and gain traction. Neither was the case. American policymakers pursued
Moderate Predation in 1989 because of the continued Soviet military threat to Europe throughout
the year and ignored evidence of changing Soviet domestic institutions. Furthermore, as shown
in Chapter Four, 1990 was the height of American predation: rather than moving closer to
support due to Soviet internal changes, American strategy became more predatory.
Institutionalist Theory also predicts the United States should move away from predation
in 1989-1990. Ikenberry in particular describes the situation from 1989 onward as one in which
"the overall institutional character of Western order [. . .] presented a relatively benign face to
the Soviet Union during its time of troubles. The Western democracies together formed a
grouping of countries that made it very difficult for them individually or collectively to exploit or
dominate the Soviet Union." 68 This process of restraint and cooperation began in 1989 and
reached its apogee in the debates over German reunification as the United States and its allies
used "Western institutions to signal restraint and provide reassurance to the Soviet Union as it
faced the loss of the GDR [German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany]." 69 We therefore
expect to see Moderate Support begin in 1989 before giving way to Extreme Support in 1990 as
international institutions were used, deepened, and created to integrate the Soviet Union into the
Western system. We also expect American policymakers to work through these institutions:
institutions, if they shaped American policy, should serve as the prime venue for U.S.-Soviet
166 Raymond Seitz to The Secretary, "The Future of Germany in a Fast-Changing Europe," 10 October 1989, NSA,
Soviet Flashpoints Files, Box 38, National Security Archive (hereafter NSA).
167 Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War," 146-147, 152-155.
168 Ikenberry, After Victory, 219.
169 Ibid., 223.
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negotiations. As noted, however, American strategy was predatory from the start of 1989 and
became more predatory as Soviet power waned. In the process, American policymakers both
circumscribed the mandate of extant institutions and structured diplomatic negotiations to avoid
using institutions that might help the USSR obtain Western concessions; U.S. policymakers
avoided all but hints of institutional cooperation with the USSR for fear of actually being
institutionally restrained. As with democratic peace arguments, institutionalist accounts fall
short.
In contrast, I argue Realist Decline Theory provides a powerful tool to understand
American strategy. Given the bipolar U.S.-Soviet competition, the United States benefited by
preying on a declining USSR, as weakening the USSR limited the Soviet threat. Still, the United
States sought to avoid costly Soviet internal balancing. In 1989, American officials feared that
pressing the Soviets too hard would trigger a crisis that could escalate and imperil American
security. In the winter of 1990, however, changes to Soviet military posture meant that the
Soviet Union could no longer protect its position in Eastern Europe by force. These changes
meant that the United States could reap the benefits of predation while paying none of the costs -
they created an opportunity for the United States to immediately rollback Soviet power Eastern
Europe. Once the United States concluded that predation would no longer carry costs, American
strategy shifted from Moderate to Extreme predation. I deal with strategy in 1989 in this chapter,
before discussing the shift to Extreme Predation in Chapter Four.
C. Broader Contribution of the Argument
The argument advanced in these chapters stands on its own as a contribution to
scholarship on American policy at the end of the Cold War. Political scientists spent much of the
1990s and early 2000s debating why the Cold War ended with peaceful Soviet retrenchment
rather than a military showdown. Overwhelmingly, scholars focused on Gorbachev's decision to
end the Cold War on American terms.170 Theoretical treatments of American policy, however,
are scarce. Among available studies, the majority look to explain why the United States
ostensibly cooperated with the Soviet Union in ending the Cold War on mutually agreeable terms.
170 See, inter alia, Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics
45, no. 2 (January 1993): 271-300; Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," World
Politics 42, no. 1 (October 1989): 1-30; Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to
End the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 2002); Thomas Risse, "Ideas, Discourse, Power and the End of the
Cold War: 20 Years On," International Politics 48, no. 4 (July 2011): 591-606; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do
Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International
Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 185-214; Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000); reviews the debate can be found in Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds.,
Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations, 1st ed., New Visions in
Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
1I am referring mainly to theoretical treatments of American foreign policy. Among histories of the period, see
Jeffrey A. Engel, "A Better World...but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty
Years On," Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 25-46; Sarotte, 1989; Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe
Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War, 1st ed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993);
Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990
(New York: Poseidon Press, 1991); Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the
End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994); Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow:
George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, 1st ed (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008);
Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2000); see also the essays in Kiron K. Skinner, ed., Turning Points in Ending the Cold War
(Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2008); Melvyn P Leffler and Jeffrey Legro, eds., In Uncertain
Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
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For these scholars, the United States and USSR reached a benign rapprochement thanks to the
Soviet Union's success in convincing American policymakers that the USSR would not trick the
United States if the U.S. adopted a supportive strategy. 17 2 The resulting trust encouraged
American policymakers to restrain American ambitions, integrate the USSR into Western
institutions, and meet Soviet demands for security guarantees in Eastern Europe. Wohlforth
provides a good summary of this argument, offering that "From December 1989 onward,
[Gorbachev's] policy became increasingly focused on [. . .] stabilizing Western support for the
Soviet Union's eroding international position. Only at this point did the Western powers, led by
the United States, move 'beyond containment' to deep cooperation with Moscow." 173 The
"restrained America" perspective offers a rosy account of Soviet fortunes and a benign
interpretation of American foreign policy. 7 4
In contrast, a smaller group of scholars challenge the notion of American restraint and
support. In the analyses set out by Wohlforth (revising earlier arguments), Schweller, and Layne,
American strategy focused on rolling back Soviet power once it became clear that the Soviet
Union was declining.175 As a result, by 1989 the United States simply had to maintain a policy
demanding "complete Soviet surrender."176 Although no scholar has traced American policy
throughout the whole of 1989-1990, individual arguments collectively suggest that German
reunification, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the expansion of American power into Eastern
Europe followed from constant American efforts to press U.S. advantages whenever possible. 177
This project advances the state of the debate, as my empirical work poses problems for
both perspectives.'78 In contrast to the latter school of thought, I argue that there was important
variation in American policy between 1989 and 1990. In 1989, the United States was concerned
that intensely preying on the Soviet position in Eastern Europe would trigger a Soviet backlash.
172 James Goldgeier and Derek Chollet, "Once Burned, Twice Shy? The Pause of 1989," in Cold War Endgame:
Oral History, Analysis, Debates, ed. William C. Wohlforth (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2003), 141-173; Joseph Lepgold, "Failure or Learning Opportunity? The End of the Cold War and Its
Implications for International Relations Theory," in Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates, ed.
William C. Wohlforth (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 331-332; Rey Koslowski
and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the
International System," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 215-247; Ikenberry, After Victory, 215-233;
Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005),
214-244; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely."
173 Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 122.
174 Among historical works, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed:
A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 366-368; Beschloss and Talbott, Highest
Levels, 469-472; Robert B. Zoellick, "Practical Lessons for the post-Cold War Age'," European Affairs 4 (1990):
79-84; Robert B. Zoellick, "Two Plus Four: The Lessons of German Unification," National Interest (Fall 2000): 19;
Alexander Moens, "American Diplomacy and German Unification," Survival 33, no. 6 (November 1991): 537-538.
175 Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the
Cold War," Security Studies 9, no. 3 (2000): 60-107; William C. Wohlforth, "German Unification: A
Reassessment," in The Cold War: Reassessments, ed. Arthur L. Rosenbaum and Chae-Jin Lee (Claremont, CA: The
Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 2000), 171; Christopher Layne,
The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 106-113.
176 Schweller and Wohlforth, "Power Test," 93.
177 Ibid., 93-95; Wohlforth, "German Unification: A Reassessment," 175-176.
178 For an effort to grapple with the different ways of viewing U.S. policy in the period, see Robert Legvold,
"Lessons from the Soviet Past," in Reversing Relations with Former Adversaries: U.S. Foreign Policy After the
Cold War, ed. C. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998),
29-35.
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The solution was to encourage gradual change, but do nothing that might be seen as immediately
threatening to Soviet security. This changed in 1990, however, as the United States concluded
the USSR could no longer defend Eastern Europe, resulting in a revisionist policy that quickly
unified Germany in NATO and expelled the USSR from Eastern Europe. American policy
changed over time, such that treating American policy as monolithic mischaracterizes the
strategy.
Yet even if I follow the first school of thought in identifying a shift in American policy
during 1989-1990, the direction of change is the opposite of what Ikenberry, Haas, and others
argue. Far from cooperating with the Soviet Union, the United States became extremely
predatory and highly revisionist as time wore on. By early 1990, the United States not only
looked to evict the USSR from Central Europe, but actively created a diplomatic coalition to
isolate the USSR. In retrospect, members of the Bush Administration have argued that the
American strategy helped the USSR meet its "legitimate" security interests, as Soviet interests
were redefined. This is too glib by half: American policy was designed to limit Soviet options so
that Soviet leaders had no choice but to accept Soviet interests as defined by the United States.
D. Outline of Chapter
The remainder of this chapter evaluates American strategy in 1989. It proceeds in five
parts. Following this Introduction, I describe the changing distribution of power in the late Cold
War and the recognition that the Soviet Union was declining. Next, I code the independent
variables central to Realist Decline Theory and generate a series of predictions about the case,
before doing the same for Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. I then test the
various predictions against the empirical record, before summarizing the evidence and
previewing the subsequent chapter.
II. Identifying Soviet Decline
In line with existing scholarship on the international consequences of Soviet decline, I
begin the analysis of American strategy towards the USSR in 1989.179 By this time, Soviet
power as measured by share of great power GDP had declined relative to the United States
without any sign of improvement since the mid-1980s (Graph 3.1). The size and intractability of
Soviet losses allowed time for American policymakers to recognize and respond to the trend. In
this section, I confirm 1989 is a good starting point by briefly reviewing Soviet performance
versus the United States over the course of the 1980s and the effects thereof on American
assessment of the U.S.-Soviet competition. Although I code decline using great power GDP
shares, I mention political and military developments during the period to provide a more
nuanced qualitative analysis. Due to space constraints, a fuller discussion of the U.S.-Soviet
distribution of power is provided in the Appendix.
179 Wohiforth, "Gehnan Unification: A Reassessment," 159; Legvold, "Lessons from the Soviet Past," 17; Ikenberry,
After Victory, 215.
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Graph 3.1: Ratio of Soviet to US GDP, 1950-1989
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Over the course of the 1980s, the Soviet Union declined relative to the United States.'8 0
The change is ironic, as the start of the decade saw the U.S. officials worried that the United
States was declining due to the poor performance of the U.S. economy and concerns over
American military weakness.' 8  By the mid-1980s, however, the revival of American economic
power and Carter-Reagan defense buildup helped arrest the ostensible decline of American
fortunes. These changes led senior American policymakers to hope the United States might soon
recover lost ground. 1 At the same time, Soviet economic problems, which analysts had
identified in the late 1970s, began to accumulate.'' By the middle of the decade, the Soviet
economy dropped fell below 40 percent of the United States' for the first time in decades. After a
brief recovery, Soviet economic performance remained below that of the United States for the
rest of the 1980s. Already smaller than the U.S. economy (Graph 3.2), the Soviet Union fell
further behind that United States in economic potential.
" On the Soviet economic slowdown, see Abraham C. Becker, "Intelligence Fiasco or Reasoned Accounting'? CIA
Estimates of Soviet GNP" Post-Soviet Affifirs 10, no. 4 (October 1994): 291-329; Gertrude E. Schroeder,
"Reflections on Economic Sovietology," Post-Soviet Affifirs 11, no. 3 (July 1995): 197-234.
"" Jack F. Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: i-ow the Cold War Ended, 1st ed (New York: Random House, 2004),
11, 13; George P. Shultz, "A Perspective From Washington," in Turning Points in Ending the Cold War, ed. Kiron
Skinner (Stanford, C.A.: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), xx; Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, and Erez Manela,
The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
182 William P. Clark to The President, "The Prospects for Progress in US-Soviet Relations," 4 February 1983, Clark
Files, Box 8, "US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2)," Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library (hereafter RRPL).
183 "Agenda for Briefing of President-elect Briefing," I I December 1980, available online at:
http://www.f oia.cia.gov/sitcs/default/files/documentconversions17/1 9801 21 I.pdf; Richard Allen to The President,
"CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate," 21 November 1989 and Special National Intelligence Estimate,
"Dependence of Soviet Military Power on Economic Relations with the West." SNIE 3/11-4-81, both online at:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/delault/fices/docucnt_convcrsions//17/1981 I I I7.pdf/; Richard Pipes, "Reagan Soviet
Policy (Short Version)," November 1981, Pipes Files, Box 3, "Miscellaneous Papers," RRPL.
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Graph 3.2: Absolute Size of U.S. and Soviet GDP, 1950-1989
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The overall distribution of power, however, does not capture the USSR's qualitative
decline. For example, Soviet economic efficiency, meaning the rate at which raw economic
inputs produced goods and services, collapsed. In some cases, Soviet factor productivity was
negative, meaning the USSR was lowering its net worth by its economic activities! 114
Intelligence estimates, meanwhile, stressed the growing Soviet lag in high technology (Table
3.1) and by 1989 concluded that the USSR was unable "to compete in high-technology fields and
to efficiently integrate technological advances in the production process."18 5 These trends
promised to further hinder Soviet economic competitiveness and leave the USSR behind in the
most advanced military technologies as well.18 6
Table 3.1: The Soviet Lag in Critical Technologies1
Technology U.S. Lead, 1985 U.S. Lead, 1988-1989
Microcircuits 4-6 years 8-10 years
Minicomputers 4-6 years 4-10 years
Mainframes 6-8 years 8-15 years
Computer-operated Machine Tools 3-4 years 5-9 years
Flexible Manufacturing Systems 5-6 years 7-10 years
1 William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1994); Richard E. Ericson, "The Soviet Statistical Debate: Khanin Vs. TsSU," in The
Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden, ed. Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf (San
Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), 13-62.
185 Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Economy in a Global Perspective, March 1989, 19-20.
86 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War:
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter -2001 2000): 16.
117 Central Intelligence Agency, A Comparison of the US and Soviet Economies. Evaluating the Per/brmance of the
Soviet System, October 1985, 15; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Subcommittee on
National Security Economics, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, April 14, 1989 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 47.
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Soviet problems were sufficiently acute by 1985-1986 that newly selected Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev sought ways of revitalizing Soviet strength.18  When early efforts at
boosting economic performance through managerial accountability and a "disciplinary
campaign" failed,18 9 Gorbachev embarked on more extensive economic and political reforms.
The intent was to emulate Western economic systems while giving Soviet citizens a stake in the
success of the effort in order to mobilize support and encourage popular sacrifices. These efforts
culminated in 1987-1988 with laws 1) allowing limited private enterprises 2) creating a
parliamentary system (the Congress of People's Deputies) with free elections, and 3) tolerating
free-speech and political movements. 190 By the close of 1988, Gorbachev took another step by
slashing the Soviet defense budget and reducing military forces in Eastern Europe.' 9' After
military cuts were announced on 7 December 1988, the CIA reported that the changes would
prevent the USSR from carrying out offensive military operations against Western Europe
without substantial reinforcements. A few months later, Gorbachev further allowed the political
liberalization of Soviet client states in Eastern Europe as democratic opposition movements
gained strength. Although decline did not determine that the USSR would pursue such a
profound retrenchment, Gorbachev seems to have believed that only by reducing competition
with the United States could the USSR 1) obtain support from the West for Soviet internal
reforms, and 2) reduce the USSR's military burden to free-up resources for domestic recovery.
As Brooks and Wohlforth conclude, Soviet decline significantly increased the odds of
Gorbachev's domestic reforms and foreign retrenchment.192
These efforts proved insufficient. By 1989, the Soviet economy was in a state of crisis.
Instead of spurring economic growth, Gorbachev's reforms led to uncertainty and confusion that
worsened Soviet economic performance. Moreover, the military balance was in flux as Soviet
withdrawals proceeded and Soviet military strategists tried to modify plans in light of the
military retrenchment. Political liberalizations added to these problems by sowing dissent within
the Soviet leadership over whether the USSR should continue reforms, or maintain the status
quo. 193
At a time when the United States had recovered from the doldrums of the early 1980s,
American policymakers recognized the distribution of power was shifting in the United States'
favor by 1988-1989.194 Soviet problems suggested that the USSR faced a period of decline and
serious limits on its ability to compete with the West. As National Security Advisor Frank
Carlucci (echoing Secretary of State George Shultz) put it in December 1987, "the Soviet Union
is in deep trouble at home, in East Europe, and around the world. It can only get out of that
trouble with far-reaching reforms and, even then, only with Western help. This gives us an
188 Legvold, "Lessons from the Soviet Past," 21-22.
189 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London:
Longman, 2003), 178-185.
190 Ibid., 195-197.
191 Gerard Snel, "'A (More) Defensive Strategy': The Reconceptualisation of Soviet Conventional Strategy in the
1980s," Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 2 (March 1998): 205-239.
192 Brooks and Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War."
193 Miller Center Interview with Robert M. Gates, interview by University of Virginia Miller Center, July 23, 2000,
36-38. Also Central Intelligence Agency, "Gorbachev's Strategy for Managing the Defense Burden," April 1989,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sitcs/default/files/docuinent conversions/8980 I /DOC_0000499116.pdf.
194 Legvold suggests American policymakers still worried about a Soviet recovery in 1986-1987, before changing
course in 1988-1989; Legvold, "Lessons from the Soviet Past," 23-25, 27.
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opportunity to demand a high price on behalf of peace, stability, and freedom."' 95 In short, the
Soviet Union was losing ground to the United States, offering the United States an opportunity to
define the policy agenda as it saw fit.
By the time the Bush Administration came into office in January 1989, the view of a
declining USSR was well-established. Of Bush's seven principal advisors on foreign policy -
the "Core Group" of Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Chief of Staff John Sununu, and Vice
President Dan Quayle - Gates, Powell, and Baker all served in the Reagan Administration, while
Scowcroft served as an outside advisor.196 As Bush was Vice President for Reagan's two terms,
a critical mass of policymakers in the Bush Administration were privy to and agreed with the
Reagan-era assessments of the U.S.-Soviet competition. For instance, around the time Carlucci
described Gorbachev's need for Western help to overcome its problems, then-Deputy CIA
Director Gates offered that, "The Soviets' need to relax tensions is critical because only thus can
massive new expenditures for defense be avoided and Western help in economic development be
obtained."' 97 By early February 1989, Baker similarly argued that Gorbachev needed to cope
with an "era of stagnation" that limited Soviet policy options.198 Less than one week later, Bush
and Scowcroft launched a review of U.S. policy towards the USSR inspired by the realization
that "the pressures of a failing system at home and frustrated policies abroad" had caused the
USSR to focus on its internal problems and created "trends in US-Soviet relations [that] are, in
large part, favorable to us."199 So long as the United States maintained its economic health and a
strong military, the Soviet Union would continue to fall behind the United States. 200
1II. Coding & Predictions: Realist Decline Theory
This section codes the independent variables central to Realist Decline Theory and
derives predictions of U.S. policy in 1989. First, I argue that Soviet decline occurred in a bipolar
environment: although weaker than the United States, both the U.S. and USSR were significantly
stronger than other states and were the only two great powers. Second, I show that Soviet
military posture was robust throughout 1989. Not only did it station large forces throughout
Central and Eastern Europe, but it had the ability to deploy additional troops as needed from the
Soviet homeland to secure the region. Finally, given bipolarity and the Soviet Union's robust
posture, I predict the United States should adopt a strategy of Moderate Predation: I argue the
United States will maximize American power at the USSR's expense to improve American
security, but will use cautious means to avoid provoking a crisis with a declining but still potent
USSR.
A. Polarity of the System: Bipolar
195 Frank Carlucci to The President, "Scope Paper on December US-Soviet Summit," no date, Jameson Files, Box
92305, "Summit/Background Material," RRPL.
196 Miller Center, Interview with Scowcroft, 31-33.
197 Powell " Meetings with Gorbachev;" Gates, "Gorbachev's Gameplan."
198 Baker annotations on "U.S.-Soviet Relations," 10 February 1989, Box 108, Folder 2, Baker Papers, Seeley Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter BP).
199 George H.W. Bush, "National Security Review 3: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations," 15 February
1989, online at: http://bushlibrary.tanu.edu/research/pdfs/nsr/nsr3.pdf.
200 "JAB personal notes from 2/6/89 mtg w/POTUS & Others, WDC," 6 February 1989, Box 108, Folder 2, BP.
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Despite Soviet decline, Europe remained a bipolar system. As one NSC staff member
later put it, "We certainly still saw the Soviet Union as a peer." 201 Although Soviet growth was
stagnating, the USSR could call upon resources that dwarfed all other European actors save the
United States.
It is difficult to accurately measure the distribution of power in late Cold War Europe due
to unreliable data on Soviet capabilities. Although analysts at the time assumed that the Soviet
economy was roughly one-half the United States,202 information released under Gorbachev and
since the fall of the USSR shows this was an overestimate.203 Rather than half the size of the
American economy, recent scholarship suggests that the Soviet economy was between thirty and
forty percent that of the United States in the mid-late 1980s. 204 Thus, only by extracting
resources at an extremely high rate did the USSR compete with the United States for as long as it
did.
Ex post revelations of the true state of the Soviet state create two problems for measuring
the distribution of power. First, it suggests a disjuncture between what policymakers at the time
believed, and what ex post assessments reveal.205 Second, because the USSR collapsed shortly
after revelations of Soviet problems came to light, there have been few efforts to re-weight
Soviet performance and incorporate this data into a broader assessment of the European
distribution of power. This makes systematic data collection difficult.
To accommodate this situation, I use the best available economic data as a baseline,
before layering on additional indicators of Soviet capabilities. My goal is to triangulate among
sources and arrive at a holistic sense of what states were the principal players in Europe. Data
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Maddison's Statistics on the World Economy,
Congressional reports, and the scholarly literature suggests one overwhelming finding: despite
Soviet problems, late Cold War Europe remained bipolar.
I begin with Maddison's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dataset, which dovetails with ex
post analyses placing Soviet GDP between thirty and forty percent that of the United States.206
Applying the coding scheme discussed in Chapter Two, only the United States and Soviet Union
qualify as great powers in late Cold War Europe: only the United States and USSR had 1) at least
10 percent of the capabilities of the region, and 2) at least 25 percent the capabilities of the
strongest state therein (here, the United States). Table 3.2 illustrates the situation in 1989. At the
time, the United States controlled roughly forty percent of total European GDP versus fifteen
percent for the USSR (note that the distribution of capabilities was not so weighted in the
American favor since American power was diffused across North America, Asia, and Europe).
201 Interview with Philip Zelikow, 18 August 2011.
202 Central Intelligence Agency, A Comparison of the US and Soviet Economies: Evaluating the Performance of the
Soviet System; Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Economy in a Global Perspective.
203 For an overview of the data problems and revised estimates, see Anders Aslund, "How Small Is Soviet National
Income," in The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden, ed. Henry S. Rowen and
Charles Wolf (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), 13-62.
204 Abram Bergson, "How Big Was the Soviet GDP?," Comparative Economic Studies 39, no. 1 (1997): 1-14;
Anders Aslund, "Gorbachev, Perestroika, and Economic Crisis," Problems of Communism 40, no. 1-2 (1991): 18-
41.
205 Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, November 9, 15, and 16, 1989, American Economic Power:
Redefining National Securityfor the 1990's (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 117.
206 Maddison's GDP data is also the most systematic of available datasets and comports with what scholars have
been able to infer of the actual size of the Soviet economy. In the most thoughtful reconstruction of the disagreement,
Bergson suggests Soviet GDP may only have been between thirty-five and forty percent that of the United States in
1990. This estimate matches Maddison's data.
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In contrast, the next three largest economies in Europe (Britain, France, and West Germany)
each enjoyed between six and seven percent of European GDP. This situation was fairly steady
throughout the Cold War (Graph 3.3). Only an alliance among the majority of other states in
Europe could match the resources the United States or USSR could bring to the international
contest.
Table 3.2: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1989207
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
Share of Share of
State Sre of Strongest State State Sre of Strongest State
European GDP (S)European GDP (UA(USA) (USA)
USA 39.5 100 United Kingdom 6.5 16.5
USSR 14.1 35.7 France 6.9 17.5
West Geninany 6.8-9.0 1 7.2-22.8
Graph 3.3: State GDP as Percentage of European Total, 1950-1989
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Looking at the ratio of GDP between the United States and other states in Europe puts the
picture in starker terms (Graph 3.4). While the Soviet economy was less than 40 percent that of
the United States in the late 1980s, it was still more than 50 percent larger than West Germany,
Britain, or France. Moreover, as late as 1989, the United States and Soviet Union combined
accounted for nearly 54 percent of total European GDP, while the next three largest states
collectively accounted for only 20 percent. In short, the Soviet Union and the United States were
the big players in terms of gross capabilities, holding sufficient resources to threaten each other
but largely inured against other competitors.
207 Maddison only reports data for unified Germany, giving it approximately 9 percent of European GDP. However,
the 1987 CIA World Factbook shows FRG GDP was between seventy-five and eighty percent of the GDR and FRG
total. Using 75 percent as a rough estimate of the FRG share, Maddison's data shows West German GDP was
approximately 6.8 percent of the European total. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1987
(Washington: CIA, 1987).
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Graph 3.4: Long-Term European Distribution of Power, 1950-1989
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Adding other capabilities into the mix reinforces the view of a bipolar Europe. First, the
U.S. and USSR retained the largest populations in Europe (Graph 3.5). These demographic
bases provided the US and the USSR with the foundations upon which labor and economic
resources could be married for international, particularly military, purposes.
Still, given its larger economy, the United States should have been able to spend more for
international purposes, particularly on its military, than the Soviet Union. However, because the
Soviet Union was willing to suppress civilian consumption, the USSR mobilized proportionally
more resources on a per capita basis.2 As a result, where the U.S. spent approximately 6
percent of its GDP on the military, the USSR devoted 16 percent to comparable efforts.210 By
the late 1980s, CIA estimates thus put Soviet and American annual military expenditures on par
with one another, while total military expenditures from 1965 through 1989 were nearly identical
at $6.3 trillion for the USSR versus $6.1 trillion for the United States in 1988 dollars.2 1' Annual
and cumulative expenditures far exceeded those of other European states. 212
208 Population data from Maddison.
209 Depending on the sources used, Soviet per capita consumption ranged between one-fourth and four-fifths of U.S.
per capita consumption, even though Soviet per capita GDP ranged between one-third and one-half that of the
United States. This difference between per capita GDP and per capita consumption reflects government resource
extraction; Bergson, "How Big Was the Soviet GDP?," 3 Author calculations from the Penn World Tables (version
5.6) put per capita GDP at 42 percent of the U.S. total, and per capita consumption at 32 percent the U.S. total in
1989; William D. Nordhaus, "Soviet Economic Reform: The Longest Road," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 1990, no. 1 (1990): 288.
210 Frank Carlucci, Department of Defrnse Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1 989), Chart I.C.3, 46.
211 Noel Firth and James Noren, Soviet Deftnse Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 116, 119; General Accounting Office, U.S.-NATO Burden Sharing: Allies'
Contributions to Common Defense During the 1980s (Washington, DC, October 1.990), 11.
2 As with the size of the Soviet economy, there is a long-standing debate surrounding how much the Soviets spent
on defense; see Franklyn D. Holzman, "Politics and Guesswork: CIA and DIA Estimates of Soviet Military
Spending," International SecuritI 14, no. 2 (Fall 1989): 101-131; James H. Noren, "The Controversy Over Western
Measures of Soviet Defense Expenditures," Post-Soviet Affirs 11, no. 3 (1995): 238-276. However, even low-
range estimates of Soviet military spending show the United States and USSR far outspent other states in Europe
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Graph 3.5: Population in Europe, 1950-1989
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These resources were used to acquire substantial military forces. On one level, the Soviet
military was quantitatively the largest in Europe, while the Soviet industrial base could produce
advanced military equipment on a large scale.: American forces, however, were generally
better resourced, the equipment of higher caliber, and, because most military scenarios expected
the United States to defend against a Soviet attack, could count on the advantages of the defender
to offset Soviet quantitative superiority.2 14 Both forces were significantly larger and better
resourced compared to other European actors (Table 3.3).215 Equally important, the two
countries retained the largest and most diversified nuclear arsenals, holding both a majority of
nuclear warheads and redundant delivery options unmatched by other states (Tables 3.4 and 3.5).
Mirroring the economic and demographic situation, the Soviet Union and United States were the
main military players in late Cold War Europe.216
and does not affect the overall bipolar coding; see SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, 1988-2012,
http://wwvw.sipri.org/research/armaments/milx/milex_database (accessed March 2013).
213 Carlucci, Annual Report FY1990, 19-21.
214 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 72, 102; also John J.
Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security 7, no. 1 (July 1,
1982): 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat
Assessment," International Security 9, no. 3 (December 1984): 47-88.
215 In addition to the table, see Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary and Military Elffets ola Treaty Limiting
Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, January 1990), 7; Congressional
Budget Office, Budgetary and Military Efficts of a Treaty Limiting Conventional Military Forces in Europe
(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, September 1990), 8.
216 For similar conclusions on U.S.-Soviet parity, see Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central
Europe"; Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance"; Joshua M. Epstein, Conventional Force
Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990); Congressional Budget Office,
Budgetary and Military Effects (January 1990), 14; Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary and Military Eff'cts
(September 1990), 23.
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Select Conventional Military Assets, 1989
Ground Forces Infantry Personnel Tactical Aircraft
State (Active & Reserve) Tanks Fighting Carriers Artillery Tubes (fighters &
Vehicles attack)
USA 1850000 15992 4883 26480 5397 3205
USSR 4600000 53350 28500 30000 31500 4595
UK 410700 1290 200 3437 550 570
France 559500 1340 960 150 764 598
West Germany 1057000 5005 2138 856 1272 507
East Germany 370000 3140 1000 4350 1260 335
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1989 (London: IISS, 1990). Only army
forces are counted for ground forces and associated equipment.
Table 3.4: Nuclear Assets, 1989217
State Strategic Warheads Tactical Warheads
ICBM-delivered SLBM-delivered Air-delivered TOTAL TOTAL
USA 2,592 5,410 5,965 13,967 8,207
USSR 7,382 3,085 1,651 12,118 23,700
Britain - 96 (est.) - 96 (est.) 200 (est.)
France 18 80-96 28 126-142 268-284 (est.)
Table 3.5: Strategic Delivery Systems, 1989218
State Strategic Delivery Systems (launchers)
ICBM SLBM Aircraft
USA 1,000 592 311
USSR 1,379 949 160
Britain - 64 -
France 18 96 18
Finally, Europe's political geography reinforced the bipolar contest. In the abstract, both
the United States and Soviet Union were confined to the flanks of Europe: the United States was
separated from the continent by the Atlantic Ocean, while the Soviet Union was on the extreme
eastern fringe of the region. Each would have to traverse large distances to access major power
centers in Central and Western Europe. Critical to the American and Soviet presence in Europe,
therefore, were their alliance networks. The alliances - NATO on the American side and the
Warsaw Pact for the USSR - helped the two states to station large military forces in Europe,
overcome the geographic barriers to power projection on the continent, and organize the
resources of lesser states. Inversely, by threatening to withdraw their security umbrellas or
intervening in local politics, the two great powers could ensure smaller European actors adopted
217 American and Soviet forces from National Resource Defense Council (hereafter NRDC), Archive of Nuclear
Data, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp (accessed March 2013). British and French forces estimated
based on Robert S. Norris, "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals: Research Findings and Arms Control
Implications," Paper prepared for 4th ISODORACO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 26-30 April 1990, 8-9;
Charlotte Phillips Preece and James M. Freeman, British and French Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization,
Congressional Research Service Report 89-140 F, 2 February 1989; United Nations Department for Disarmament
Affairs, Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study (New York: United Nations, 1991), 17-18; NRDC, Archive of
Nuclear Data.
118 Ibid..
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Table 3.3:
policies they would otherwise avoid. In short, the alliance networks functioned as a force
multiplier that both facilitated and reinforced the bipolar competition. Map 3.1 illustrates the
geopolitical situation in the late 1980s.
Map 3.1: European Alliance Networks, late Cold War
B. Military Posture: Robust
Within the bipolar contest, the Soviet Union retained a robust military posture in 1989: it
could secure its position in Central-Eastern Europe against the U.S. The USSR's robust posture
encompassed two interlocking components. First, the USSR stationed large conventional forces
throughout the region. The Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) alone deployed 380,000
soldiers and 6200 tanks, while an additional 185,000 soldiers and 3200 tanks were stationed
elsewhere throughout Central and Eastern Europe.220 These forces provided the USSR a potent
instrument to advance its political objectives. Second, because states in the region were led by
Communist regimes allied with the USSR, Soviet forces enjoyed significant operational freedom.
Ensured of local backing, the Soviet Union could redeploy, reinforce, and sustain its forces in
either peace or war.-- Furthermore, it could call upon East European forces to operate alongside
222Soviet units when necessary in either peace or war. And, above all, the USSR could stage its
forces out of East European bases instead of operating from Soviet home territory. Simply put,
friendly regimes in the region guaranteed Soviet lines of communication and bases of operation,
2 Exploring European History and Heritage Project, "NATO-Warsaw Pact Map,"
littp://historiana.cu/sources/show/nato-warsaw-jact-rmap (last accessed March 2013).
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1989), 28-42 and
inset; for a general discussion of Soviet military policy in the period, see Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution:
Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). For a
pr6cis, see CIA, Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces, N IE 4-1-84, September
1989, vi
221 Vojtech Mastny, "The Warsaw Pact as History," in A Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History ofthe Warsaw Pact,
1955-1991, ed. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Central European University Press, 2005), 53.
Epstein, Conventional Force Reductions; Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the
Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," Armed Forces & Society 6, no. 2 (January 1980): 270-296.
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giving the USSR the capacity to maintain its position in the region in peacetime and sustain
combat operations in wartime.
The robust Soviet presence in the region carried three implications for the United States.
First, the Soviet Union might decide or be provoked into launching an attack. Soviet forces, as
many scholars observe, were optimized for offensive operations.223 In a crisis, forward deployed
forces could be reinforced to serve as the core of a Soviet offensive into West Germany. Due to
the size of forward deployed forces, it was possible in the worst case that the USSR could
mobilize and defeat NATO before the United States and its allies established a solid defense.224
Nor did Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 pledge to withdraw large numbers of Soviet forces from
Eastern Europe and reconfigure the remainder for defensive operations solve the problem. Even
after enacting these changes, Soviet forces in the region could be built up if a crisis with the
West mounted and eventually used to attack.225 Although NATO was more likely to defeat a
Soviet offensive given the longer warning times provided by the Soviet withdrawals, any
fighting risked devastating Central Europe and raised the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear
226
exchange. Hence, even a successful defense against the Pact might prove a pyrrhic victory. In
short, the USSR's robust posture gave it the option of responding to American actions with a
military offensive that, regardless of the specifics, might threaten American security.
Second, the Soviet Union could crack down on political unrest and internal turmoil in the
region. As events in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) demonstrated, the Soviet
Union could use its stationed forces to prevent East European Communist regimes from
liberalizing and threatening to leave the Soviet orbit. 2 2 7 Because the Soviet Union could direct
its military against states in the region, it could defeat any political movement, including any
backed by the United States, that might try to move a Soviet ally out of the Soviet bloc.
Finally, a crisis or war could emerge from a Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.
Several paths could lead to problems. American leaders might misperceive a Soviet crackdown
as a prelude to war, take steps that further ratcheted tensions, and induce a spiral of insecurity; in
extremis, Western forces placed on alert might end up fighting similarly alerted Soviet forces,
thereby risking an inadvertent conflict. Relatedly, American and/or West European leaders
might face domestic pressures to support East Europeans challenging Soviet influence. 22 8
223 Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe"; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Soviet
Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?," International Security 9, no. 4 (April 1985): 44-78; Jack L.
Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," International Security
12, no. 4 (April 1, 1988): 48-77.
224 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 68-128.
225 NIC NIE 11-14-89, "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the
1990s," February 1989; NIE 4-1-84, "Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces,"
September 1989; NIC, "Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals," M 89-10003, October 1989; NIC, "Soviet Theater
Forces in 1991: The Impact of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities," NIC M 89-10005,
November 1989. For a review of the changing warnings of war on U.S. military plans, see Lorna S Jaffe, The
Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993). Interviews with Generals Colin Powell and Lee Butler reinforced the point.
226 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation.
227 Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Univ of North Carolina
Press, 2003); Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and
New Findings," Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 2 (April 1998): 163-214; Mark Kramer, "The
Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine," in 1968: The World Transformed, ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert,
and Detlef Junker (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 111-162.
228 See, for instance, the discussion of the 1980-1981 Poland crisis in Caspar W. Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace:
Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1990).
66
Western injection into intra-Pact debates, however, could aggravate an already fraught situation
and risk escalation as the Soviets countered Western moves. On the Soviet side, meanwhile,
Soviet leaders might conclude that any American response suggested malign intentions. Worried
about a weakened position in Eastern Europe during or following a crackdown, they might
calculate it was better to launch a preventive war to salvage what they could of the Soviet
position, rather than await further unrest and Western aggrandizement. 229 Collectively, a
crackdown risked a broader crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations that could harm U.S. security.
C. Predictions
Given bipolarity and a robust Soviet posture, I argue that the United States should pursue
a Moderate Predation strategy. This strategy carries several observable implications. First,
American strategy will try to weaken the USSR. In practice, this means the United States will
attempt to improve its relative power at the USSR's expense while preventing a Soviet recovery:
the United States will both continue balancing the only great power threat to its security and try
to improve its relative position. Given a robust Soviet posture, however, cautious means will be
employed in order to avoid Soviet internal balancing. Thus, the United States will attempt to
identify the limits of Soviet tolerance and avoid going beyond that threshold: in essence, the
United States will try to slowly move the balance of power in its favor without posing an
immediate threat to the USSR. American military policy should therefore focus on gaining
military superiority through limited arms races and arms control proposals weighted in the
United States' favor. Diplomatically, we anticipate efforts to refuse Soviet proposals for
managing the consequences (e.g., in Eastern Europe) of Soviet decline; with American leverage
growing stronger as the USSR weakens, the United States should see no need to negotiate in the
short term when it could obtain a better deal in the future. Above all, policies that might
strengthen the USSR such as the provision of economic aid, diplomatic support, and military
assistance should be rejected.
Second, American policymakers will avoid intense means to undercut Soviet power.
Therefore, policymakers will try to avoid leaving the USSR totally isolated less the United States
seem to force the USSR into a strategic corner. Similarly, the United States should avoid
encouraging the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and forego opportunities to prey upon Soviet
allies in Eastern Europe. Finally, we expect to see policymakers struggling to square a circle,
namely, how to weaken the USSR without appearing to do so. Thus, if confronted with a choice
between 1) increasing American relative power but risking a Soviet backlash, or 2) foregoing
immediate gains but ensuring the USSR weakens over time while avoiding Soviet internal
balancing, the U.S. should pursue the second option.
Similarly, we expect to see stark rationales offered for U.S. behavior. One of the core
insights of Realist Decline Theory is that a rising state in bipolarity will prey on its declining
rival to eliminate future threats. Hence, American strategists should discuss the security benefits,
such as a reduced risk of war and fewer threats to American allies, resulting from a weakened
USSR. However, policymakers will also fear that too assertive of a stance might trigger Soviet
internal balancing. In their private analyses, they ought to justify less intense predation out of 1)
concern of triggering a hostile Soviet military or political response, and 2) the desirability of
maintaining a positive trend in U.S.-Soviet relations that allows the U.S. position to gradually
229As Eisenhower put it, a failed intervention might lead the Soviets "to resort to very extreme measures and even to
precipitate global war." United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957:
Volume XXV, Eastern Europe, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1970), 299.
67
improve. In short, policymakers will argue that playing for time and ensuring U.S.-Soviet
relations remain stable while the USSR weakens best advances U.S. security.
By extension, signs of the Soviet Union is preparing to launch a military operation should
lead to efforts to avoid Soviet internal balancing by reassuring the USSR. Although seeking to
weaken the USSR, policymakers will recognize that a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations might harm
American security and derail efforts to gain at the USSR's expense in the long-term. Thus, if it
appears the USSR is balancing, the United States will scale back predation to allay Soviet
concerns. These efforts, however, will be tactical moves to avoid an immediate crisis. Once the
threat of Soviet balancing recedes, cooperation should cease and predation resume.
IV. Alternate Explanations
The predictions from Realist Decline Theory are different than those offered by both
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. In this section, I code the independent
variables and derive predictions from both arguments.
A. Democratic Peace Theory
i. Coding Regime Type
By any standard, the United States was a democracy in 1989. Polity assigns it a
democracy score of 10, indicating fully open elections, leadership accountability, and widespread
civil and political liberties. 230 With a longstanding liberal-democratic ethos, I accept the Polity
score and code the United States as fully democratic.
The Soviet Union, however, was not a democracy in 1989. Polity assigns it a democracy
score of 1 for 1989, indicating almost no popular elections, leader accountability, or civil and
political liberties.2 3 1 This matches qualitative evidence. Historically, the Soviet Union enshrined
the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Soviet politics and banned
competing political organizations. In this system, not only did the CPSU maintain a monopoly
on power, but the organs of Soviet government were fused with CPSU functions. This limited
political accountability. Prior to 1988-1989, the USSR's prime governing body was nominally
the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. In theory, the Supreme Soviet was composed of
popularly elected representatives, who would vote amongst themselves to select a Council of
Ministers to run the Soviet government. In practice, however, the Communist Party dominated
Soviet decision-making by both selecting which candidates could run for the Supreme Soviet,
prohibiting more than one candidate for running for the same seat, and requiring candidates to be
CPSU members. As a result, Soviet politics hinged on CPSU internal deliberations and the
decisions of the CPSU leadership (Politburo): Politburo decisions would determine the position
of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and thus drive Soviet policy. Yet because the
Politburo was neither elected nor subject to government oversight, there was no way even in
theory to remove leaders from office and hold them accountable.
Despite this legacy, the Soviet political system was in flux by 1989 due to Gorbachev's
reforms. Over significant opposition, Gorbachev pushed to remake Soviet political institutions
and democratize the Soviet system. By late 1988, these efforts crystallized into plans to replace
230 Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2012), http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
231 Ibid.
232
2 For overviews of Soviet politics before Gorbachev, see Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002), 33-60; Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 101-114; Neil Robinson,
"Gorbachev and the Place of the Party in Soviet Reform, 1985-91," Soviet Studies 44, no. 3 (1992): 423-443.
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the Supreme Soviet with a popularly elected Congress of People's Deputies (CPD); CPD
representatives would be chosen from several competing candidates. The CPD itself would then
select and oversee a revised Supreme Soviet, which would in turn select a reformed Council of
Ministers. Because Gorbachev's plans also called for the CPSU leadership to be appointed to the
revised Supreme Soviet and created an independent judiciary, the reforms constituted meaningful
moves towards democratic institutions, variegated political choice, and political accountability.
Additional reforms provided for freedom of speech, assembly, and the press to ensure
institutional reforms were accompanied by political debate. By the time CPD elections were
held in March 1989, the Soviet system was reforming. Even if the USSR was not yet a
democracy, it was clearly moving in that direction.233
ii. Predictions from Democratic Peace Theory
Because the Soviet Union was not a democracy but was enacting democratic reforms,
Democratic Peace Theory predicts a democratic United States will face contradictory impulses.
On one level, the absence of Soviet democracy gives the U.S. reason to pursue predation. In the
absence of joint democracy, the United States has no reason to come to the USSR's aid, while
Soviet-American relations are likely to be fraught with misunderstanding and suspicion.
However, Gorbachev's domestic reforms should also give American policymakers pause before
increasing pressure on the USSR. With the Soviet government democratizing in the face of
significant domestic opposition, American predation might discredit Gorbachev's efforts by
showing that the reforms left the USSR vulnerable to its adversaries and empower Gorbachev's
opponents to reassert traditional Communist rule.
These incentives are likely to interact in complex ways. On balance, it would be
surprising if the Soviet reforms enacted over the course of 1988-1989 were enough to generate
American support for the Soviet Union: given the legacy of Communist rule, a few months of
institutional reform is unlikely to change American perceptions over night. Instead, given the
contrast of a non-democratic legacy and current reforms, American strategy should err on the
side of caution and be Moderately Predatory in 1989. However, we should also see American
policymakers monitoring the state of Soviet reforms and grappling with the implications of the
internal changes for Soviet strategy. As Soviet reforms take root, we expect American
policymakers to debate whether the reforms were constraining Soviet decision-making, fostering
liberal norms, and influencing Soviet strategy in line with democratic systems. In other words,
we expect American policymakers to grapple with whether the Soviet Union looked and acted
like a democracy.
By extension, American policymakers should emphasize the state of Soviet internal
politics when justifying American strategy. Where Realist Decline Theory predicts the primary
driver of American policy will be the security benefits accruing from weakening USSR and the
fear of Soviet internal balancing, Democratic Peace Theory suggests policymakers should
underscore the advantages of weakening a rival autocracy and to thus (to use Woodrow Wilson's
term) "make the world safe for democracy." However, once it became clear from mid-1989 and
233 For Soviet reforms, see Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War"; Brown, The Rise and Fall of
Communism, 481-521; McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution, 33-60; Ronald J. Hill, "The CPSU: From Monolith
to Pluralist?," Soviet Studies 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 217-235; John Gooding, "Gorbachev and Democracy,"
Soviet Studies 42, no. 2 (April 1990): 195-231; Aryeh L. Unger, "The Travails of Intra-Party Democracy in the
Soviet Union: The Elections to the 19th Conference of the CPSU," Soviet Studies 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 329-
354; Brendan Kiernan and Joseph Aistrup, "The 1989 Elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow,"
Soviet Studies 43, no. 6 (January 1991): 1049-1064; Vladimir N. Brovkin, "The Making of Elections to the
Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) in March 1989," Russian Review 49, no. 4 (October 1990): 417-442.
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the election of the CPD that Soviet reforms would be more than ephemeral, American
policymakers should acknowledge in their internal deliberations that the Soviet Union looked
increasingly liberal and its foreign policy increasingly driven by democratic processes. In sum,
even when pursuing Moderate Predation, American strategists should 1) acknowledge
Gorbachev's reforms, 2) monitor and debate the implications of the internal changes for Soviet
policy, and 3) justify their strategy by reference to the nature of Soviet regime type.
iii. Distinguishing between Similar Predictions
Still, there is the problem of distinguishing between Democratic Peace predictions and
Realist Decline Theory when U.S. strategists debate the expected effect of American strategy on
Soviet internal politics. American policymakers might expect U.S. predation to influence Soviet
domestic politics by empowering hardliners, threatening Gorbachev's hold on power, imperiling
Soviet efforts to reach a rapprochement with the U.S., and thus boomerang to affect American
security. In this situation, both Democratic Peace Theory and Realist Decline Theory expect
American policymakers to worry about the consequences of American predation on Soviet
internal politics, leading to problems in adjudicating between the theories.
I rely on a simple rule to resolve this problem. When American policymakers worry
about the effects of American strategy on Soviet internal politics because it will empower Soviet
hardliners and end Soviet efforts to democratize, I treat U.S. concerns as evidence in support of
Democratic Peace Theory. This approach takes Democratic Peace Theory at face value: because
the theory argues democracies are peaceful and cooperative whereas non-democracies are
threatening and hostile, evidence that policymakers are worried about ending Soviet internal
reforms that would otherwise change the nature of the state confirms democratic peace
arguments. Conversely, when strategists worry that U.S policy will lead to a conservative
backlash and increase the risk that the USSR will employforce that might threaten the United
States, this is evidence in support of Realist Decline Theory. This follows from Realist Decline
Theory's focus on the costs of Soviet internal balancing. In essence, distinguishing between the
predictions hinges on the logic undergirding U.S. policy. Rationales that focus on the
consequences for the Soviet system support the Democratic Peace, while rationales that focus on
Soviet military and the prospects of force being used against the United States support my
argument.
B. Institutionalist Theory
i. Coding Institutional Presence
The United States and Soviet Union were not embedded in the same institutions at the
start of 1989. Aside from the toothless Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE),234 the U.S. and USSR maintained separate alliance networks and espoused different
visions of world order. Instead, scholars highlighting the influence of international institutions
point to institution-like features of U.S.-Soviet relations that shaped American foreign policy.
The most important of these was the United States' integration into NATO that, although the
USSR was not party to it, generated effects similar to what would happen if the U.S. and USSR
were bound in the same organizations. NATO was decisive because, as Ikenberry describes, its
"norms of unanimity [. . .] made an aggressive policy by one country difficult to pursue" and
2 Even institutionalist scholars agree the CSCE was a weak institution; Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
"Introduction," in After the Cold War / International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, ed.
Joseph S. Nye, Stanley Hoffmann, and Robert 0. Keohane (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 3.
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235prevented the United States from taking advantage Soviet weaknesses in Eastern Europe.
Thus, by working through NATO, "the United States and the Western allies were successful in
signaling restraint to the Soviet leadership," indicating that Soviet "retrenchment would not be
exploited and [Soviet] fundamental interests would not be jeopardized." 236 In turn, credible
Western assurances helped Gorbachev overcome domestic opposition to reducing the Soviet
presence in Europe. Nye and Keohane make a related argument, suggesting that NATO helped
the United States justify its continued presence in Europe and sustained part of the political
status quo amidst the dislocations of 1989-1990. Although they do not say as such, their analysis
implies that the resulting stability in Western Europe provided a focal point around which U.S.
and Soviet expectations over the future converged and made diplomatic negotiations that much
237easier.
ii. Predictions
Thus, although only the United States was institutionally embedded in 1989,
Institutionalist Theory suggests this was sufficient to generate some of the benefits associated
with mutual institutional binding. The theory makes three core predictions about American
strategy in 1989. First, the United States should pursue a strategy of Moderate Support. Bound
by NATO, the United States should be prevented from pursuing predation by allies worried that
predation would trigger a crisis with the Soviet Union.23 Similarly, worried about losing its own
allies at a time when the Soviet threat providing NATO's raison d'etre was waning, the United
States should avoid further weakening the USSR and giving its allies reasons to loosen their
commitment to NATO. Combined, allied limits to American actions and fears of allied defection
should cause the United States to do nothing to further weaken the Soviet Union by adopting
Moderate Support.
Second, the United States should use NATO as the primary means of negotiating with the
USSR. We should see American policymakers coordinating and clearing their diplomatic and
military policies with their NATO allies, while working through NATO organizations when
negotiating with the USSR as diplomatic and military crises occur. Conversely, evidence that the
United States is trying to avoid being influenced by the NATO allies and bucking the preferences
of its NATO allies is strong evidence against institutional arguments.
Finally, we expect American policymakers to emphasize the restraining effects of
international institutions in their internal deliberations. We should see policymakers discussing
the importance of keeping NATO together by moderating American policy when its allies exert
pressure. Along similar lines, we expect policymakers to argue that if it were not for NATO
influence, then the United States would have pursued a different course. In the process, they
235 Ikenberry, After Victory, 219-220; see also Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of
Soviet Change," International Security 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991): 84-88, 108-109; Deudney and Ikenberry, "The
Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement"; Celeste A. Wallander and Jane E. Prokop, "Soviet Security Strategies
Toward Europe: After the Wall, with Their Backs Up Against It," in After the Cold War: International Institutions
and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, ed. Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993).
236 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Pushing and Pulling: The Western System, Nuclear Weapons and
Soviet Change," International Politics 48, no. 4-5 (July 2011): 517.
237 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "The United States and International Institutions in Europe After the Cold
War," in After the Cold War / International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, ed. Robert 0.
Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. 105-106, 120-
122; also Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Cold War After 20 Years: Reconsiderations,
Retrospectives and Revisions," International Politics 48, no. 4-5 (July 2011): 514-516.
238 Ikenberry, After Victory, 220-221.
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may also acknowledge the tradeoff suggested by institutionalist logics, namely, that by keeping
NATO together, they are being forced to buttress Soviet power and capabilities. In short, we
should see policymakers grappling with the effects of institutional binding as maintaining NATO
solidarity requires American policymakers to acknowledge and accommodate the preferences of
its allies by avoiding challenges to the Soviet Union.
V. American Policy and Soviet Decline in 1989
A. The Strategic Context
The Bush Administration came into office at a time when the Soviet Union, despite its
mounting weaknesses, was on the diplomatic offensive. Having engaged the second Reagan
Administration in carving out a series of nuclear arms control proposals and a diplomatic
rapprochement by signing the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and making
headway on a Strategic Arms Reduction (START) talks, the Soviet Union seemed to be making
a virtue out of necessity. By trading military reductions the USSR would had to make for
Western concessions in kind, American policymakers feared Gorbachev would undermine
Western efforts to balance the USSR. 239 This was dangerous. The USSR was expected to
remain "the dominant military power on the Eurasian landmass" and the principal threat to
Western Europe.240 Moreover, it remained unclear whether Gorbachev was sincerely interested
in ending the Cold War, or simply sought a breathing space to revitalize Soviet fortunes before
renewing competition.241 And, even if Gorbachev sought cooperation, there was no guarantee
242that his successors would be benign. In short, the USSR was declining, but it still threatened
the United States.
To prevent the USSR from using weakness to its advantage, Bush and his advisors sought
to maintain Western efforts to balance the USSR.243 These efforts were necessary for three
reasons. First, Western unity helped ensure the USSR could not recover from its decline. Short
of a domestic revolution, the only way the USSR could revitalize its fortunes was to trade arms
reductions and diplomatic concessions for Western goodwill that might translate into economic
244 loeto245
assistance. The United States looked to deny the USSR this opening.24 Second, the policies
ensured the United States remained active in European politics and available as a balancer of last
resort if the Soviet threat increased in the future. 246 Finally, they helped ensure that the U.S. was
prepared "to capitalize on the changes underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." 247
B. Military Policy: The CFE Talks, Moderate Predation, and Rationales
239 James Baker, The Politics ofDiplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 70.
240 Brent Scowcroft to The President, "The NATO Summit," 20 March 1989, Kanter Files, CF00779, "NATO
Summit - May 1989," GBPL.
241 Beschloss and Talbott, Highest Levels, 17. Also, Author interview with Brent Scowcroft, 3 August 2011; Author
Interview with Philip Zelikow, 18 August 2011; Author NSC official, 17 July 2012.
242 Ibid., 22, 25, 99.
243 James Baker, "Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President," 8 March 1989, Box 115, Folder 6, BP.
244 See the cable from Ambassador Jack Matlock in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas S. Blanton, and V. M. Zubok,
eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest: Central European
University Press, 2010), Doc. 45.
245 "JAB personal notes from 2/10-2/17/89 NATO Trip," 10 February 1989, Box 108, Folder 2, BP.
246 Interview with Scowcroft. Zelikow offered in an April 1989 memo that the United States must be prepared "to
maintain US ground and air forces, and a needed nuclear deterrent, in Europe so long as a Soviet military threat
exists;" see Philip Zelikow to Robert Gates, "NATO Summit," 13 April 1989, Kanter Files, CF00779, "NATO
Summit - May 1989," GBPL.
247 Scowcroft, "Your Trip to Europe."
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i. Early Military Concerns
This Janus-faced interpretation of the Soviet challenge colored the American approach to
the U.S.-Soviet military competition. The aforementioned nuclear arms deals, although a symbol
of political accord, seemed to threaten NATO military strategy. Because the INF treaty
eliminated ground-launched nuclear missiles ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers, it
removed one rung on the nuclear escalatory ladder and required stronger conventional forces to
maintain a credible deterrent. This was problematic, however, given a stagnant U.S. defense
budget and pressure for further cuts. 248 Alliance relations added an additional hurdle, as
domestic politics in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG) generated
pressure to reduce U.S. short-range nuclear forces (SNF) on top of the INF cuts. If SNF were
reduced, however, then NATO risked "denuclearizing" itself.249 Combined, policymakers
worried that the USSR could mobilize domestic opinion in the U.S. and FRG to obtain a political
opening to revitalize its fortunes. Without U.S. attention, a self-fulfilling cycle might emerge in
which arms reductions begot arms reductions, NATO was hollowed out, and the USSR was left
militarily dominant in Europe despite its decline.250
American concerns illustrate the logic of Realist Decline Theory. Despite the changing
distribution of power, the declining Soviet Union was still viewed as the principal threat to the
rising United States and needed to be contained. My argument also expects a state confronted
with a declining but military robust great power in bipolarity will balance the decliner in order to
1) deny it the opportunity from threatening the rising and 2) seek to gradually establish military
dominance. As I describe in greater detail below, these are borne out.
ii. Conventional Arms Control
To avoid competitive disarmament, the U.S. decided to make conventional force
reductions via the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations scheduled for March 1989
a priority, while slowing nuclear negotiations.251 If Soviet conventional forces were reduced,
then the United States would neither need to increase conventional forces nor worry about
NATO denuclearization.2 Rather than the pell-mell reductions American strategists feared,
trading U.S. cuts for Soviet cuts would allow for strategic reductions.
Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 UN speech upset American plans. As noted earlier,
Gorbachev's speech announced a large drawdown of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Six
divisions, 50,000 soldiers, 5000 tanks, and equipment necessary to sustain an offensive such as
bridge building equipment would be withdrawn, while the remaining forces reoriented to
emphasize defensive operations. Yet, despite Gorbachev's assurances to that the Soviet
withdrawals were made in good faith, the proposal worried the United States. Bush and his
advisors saw the proposal as a ploy to increase domestic pressure on the United States to disarm
while still leaving the USSR with quantitative superiority. Additionally, Gorbachev's proposal
went beyond the 5 percent reduction in forces the U.S. intended to float at the CFE talks,
248 "JAB personal notes from 2/6/89 mtg w/POTUS & Others, WDC," 6 February 1989, Box 108, Folder 2, BP.
249 "JAB notes from 4/24/89 mtg w/FRG FM Genscher & DM Stoltenberg," 24 April 1989, Box 108, Folder 4, BP.
Denuclearization refers to the separation of NATO conventional forces from a full-range of U.S. nuclear assets
providing a nuclear umbrella.
250 Miller Center Interview with Robert M. Gates, 22-23; Baker, Politics, 70-71, 92; George Bush and Brent
Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 43. These concerns only make sense if policymakers
held a paper tiger/feckless ally view of international relations.
251 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (Simon and Schuster, 2007), 462; Interview with Richard B. Cheney,
interview by University of Virginia Miller Center, March 16, 2000, 103.
252 Interview with Zelikow.
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meaning the U.S. would have found itself pressing for higher limits on stationed forces than the
Soviets actually held!25 3 The United States might then be seen dragging its feet, be compelled to
precipitously respond to Soviet proposals, and reduce U.S. forces below parity.
Once the CFE talks began, Bush and his advisors therefore sought to use the negotiations
to test Soviet intentions and see if they could instead lock-in U.S. military advantages. This
corresponds with Realist Decline Theory's prediction that a rising state in a bipolar system will
probe how far a declining state can be pressed without triggering a hostile reaction.
As preparatory talks began, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze floated the
idea of focusing the talks 1) "on reducing "the most destabilizing kinds and categories of arms,
such as attack combat airplanes [... .] tanks, combat helicopters" and other equipment; 2) capping
NATO and Pact forces 10-15 below the lowest levels held by either alliance; 3) creating a
limited armaments zone between the two alliance; and 4) negotiations on naval and nuclear
forces. 5 Although the Soviet proposal was asymmetric and meant the Pact would reduce
quantitatively more than NATO, inclusion of aircraft, helicopters, naval forces, and nuclear
assets, and the proposal of a demilitarized zone (which meant the FRG) seemed geared towards
weakening NATO. 56
iii. Cautiously Seeking Advantages and Rationale
In response, the United States considered three counteroffers. The first, advanced by
Baker, proposed eliminating all tanks from Europe on the grounds that tanks were needed for
offensive operations and their elimination would stabilize Europe. The second, offered by the
Defense Department, essentially played for time, arguing that the United States should do little to
respond to Soviet offers and let the negotiations slowly progress. This proposal assumed that
time was on the United States' side and the Soviets would eventually make concessions
conducive to U.S. security if the West simply held firm. Meanwhile, a third option designed by
the NSC proposed eliminating all American and Soviet ground forces from Europe. This plan
was intended to challenge Soviet control over Eastern Europe, as Scowcroft calculated that
NATO without American ground forces would still function, but the East European members of
the Pact would defect if Soviet forces left. Unlike the other proposals therefore, the NSC
approach was meant to directly shift the military balance in the United States' favor.25 7
All three options were rejected.25 8 The "no tanks" idea was never seriously considered.
The Defense Department proposal was out of step with Bush's desire to seize the initiative from
the Soviets, while the military argued that the NSC plan would leave Western Europe vulnerable
if Eastern Europe did not leave the Pact as hoped.259 What emerged instead was a middle course
designed to probe Soviet vulnerabilities and the USSR's willingness to make military
concessions to the United States. Leaving naval and nuclear weapons off the table, the plan
proposed moderate limits on tanks and armored personnel carriers, a 15 percent cut in combat
253 Richard Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 47-48.
254 The CFE talks were orchestrated between the two alliances, with force limits applying to the two blocs as a
whole. As the largest contributors to their respective alliances, bloc limits would mostly affect the United States and
USSR.
255 Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order, 48.
256 "Reaction to Shevardnadze Speech [at Ministerial Meeting in Vienna on CFE]," March 1989, Box 108, Folder 3,
BP.
257 Gates, From the Shadows, 461-462.
258 Ibid., 462.
259 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 43-45.
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aircraft and helicopters, and capping U.S. and Soviet forces at 275,000 troops each (10 percent
below U.S. levels). Not only would these personnel cuts only apply to the U.S. and USSR,
thereby leaving NATO with an overall manpower advantage, but the reductions were starkly
asymmetric. As Bush wrote to his foreign counterparts when ready to reveal the U.S. plan in
May, although the cuts "would represent approximately 20 percent of U.S. ground and air
combat power in the theater," 260 a 275,000 limit would also "require the Soviets to reduce their
forces in Eastern Europe by 325,000.",261
Thus, in exchange for limited cuts on the American side, the Soviets would reduce their
presence in Eastern Europe by over 50 percent. As the United States structured its forces for
qualitative supremacy versus the Pact's quantitative supremacy, the result would leave the
United States in a stronger position. Most directly, it would virtually preclude a Soviet offensive
against Western Europe. Equally important was the proposal's utility as a test of Soviet
desperation. As Scowcroft offered in May, the American plan takes "advantage of Gorbachev's
latest moves and then go[es] beyond them [. . .] It urges cuts in Soviet forces stationed in Eastern
Europe beyond the level Gorbachev is currently willing to accept [... .] Most of all, your proposal
dramatizes what should be evident: the United States does want a less militarized Europe." In
other words, not only would the proposal establish whether the U.S.-Soviet competition was
"entering a new, promising phase" in which the U.S. could set the policy agenda, but if carried
out might help end the division of Europe on American terms. Conversely, it was also a way of
keeping NATO together at a time when the West hoped "to capitalize on the changes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union." 263 This behavior and the underlying logic match Realist Decline
Theory predictions: at a time when the USSR was powerful but weakening, the United States
264tried to test Soviet limits and shift the distribution of power in its favor using cautious means.
Bush's proposal became the cornerstone of NATO's CFE approach following the May
1989 NATO Summit. Equally important, it helped deflect West German pressure to continue
nuclear reductions by mobilizing support for deferring nuclear negotiations until a CFE
agreement was in sight. With the NATO plan in place, the formal CFE negotiations began that
summer. Shortly thereafter, the 1989 East European revolutions made the CFE talks a dead
letter. With states in Eastern Europe moving to leave the Pact, Soviet military power was
reduced independent of an arms control agreement. Hence, instead of a forum to obtain Soviet
concessions, CFE became secondary to the diplomatic game of Soviet retrenchment. I return to
these issues below.
iv. Assessment: Military Policy
260 The overall cut represented 10 percent of U.S. forces, or roughly 30,000 troops. Because the U.S. kept about half
its personnel in combat units and the other half in support functions, however, the Administration could recast the
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74.
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Overall, U.S. military policy offers strong evidence for Realist Decline Theory, but
limited support for either Democratic Peace Theory or Institutionalist Theory. As my argument
predicts, the United States sought stability in U.S.-Soviet military relations while denying the
Soviet Union opportunities to arrest its decline. Military policy was integral to this approach.
The Bush Administration pursued a Goldilocks solution to the military problems at the time by
maintaining pressure on the USSR, avoiding initiatives that were obvious ploys to Soviet
security, and pressing for concessions that would move the military balance in the United States'
favor. Moderate Predation was evident in the asymmetric proposals floated by the United States
in the CFE talks, as the United States offered limited military concessions in return for
disproportionately large Soviet cuts. The goal, as internal documents reveal, was to shift the
military balance in the U.S. favor, while hopefully generating greater payoffs over time as East
European states were given opportunities to leave the Warsaw Pact.
On the other hand, intense means such as calling for wholesale troop withdrawals were
avoided as policymakers were leery of Soviet intentions and worried about remaining Soviet
capabilities. This matches the prediction that the United States will both continue balancing the
USSR to ensure its own security while avoiding steps that might directly threaten the USSR at a
time when Soviet posture remained robust. On balance, the U.S. tried to hold the military line in
the short-run while beginning a process that might eventually translate into a significant U.S.
military advantage. Conversely, and as my theory predicts, supportive endeavors such as
symmetric arms control agreements, acceptance of Soviet proposals, and allowing the USSR to
retain the strategic initiative were either ignored or rejected. Overall, the U.S. attempted to
maximize power at the USSR's expense, but to do so cautiously and prudently. As Baker aptly
notes in his memoirs, American policy sought "the kind of political effect we were looking for,
while not endangering us militarily."265
In contrast, there is only limited evidence for Democratic Peace Theory and no evidence
backing Institutionalist Theory. Democratic Peace Theory correctly predicts that the United
States pursued Moderate Predation. However, the rationales for American strategy had little to
do with the nature of Soviet domestic institutions. In reviewing hundreds of documents, there is
no evidence policymakers shaped military policy in response to the status of the Soviet regime or
due to Gorbachev's institutional reforms. In interviews, officials similarly argued that regardless
of Gorbachev's domestic reforms, the United States needed to shift the military balance in its
favor because there was no way of guaranteeing future Soviet leaders would be committed to
reforming Soviet society and cooperating with the United States. Framed differently, not only
did the United States discount evidence of Soviet democratization, but the underlying logic
behind conventional arms control centered on the desirability of changing the military balance in
the U.S. favor to hedge against an uncertain future. Thus, while Democratic Peace Theory
correctly predicts the type of U.S. strategy, it has problems explaining the underlying rationale.
Institutionalist Theory, on the other hand, fails this test. As noted, Institutionalist Theory
predicts that the United States should adopt Moderate Support due to the influence of NATO and
constraints imposed by U.S. allies. Just the opposite occurred. First, the United States pursued a
Moderate Predation strategy as the U.S. sought to use asymmetric arms control agreements to
make relative gains at the USSR's expense. There is no evidence the United States ever thought
of supporting Soviet proposals to limit East-West military competition. Rather, U.S. backing
was limited to proposals that would lock in American advantages.
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Second, the United States either ignored institutional pressures for a less predatory course
or worked around institutions entirely. On one level, American worries that the USSR would be
able to play NATO allies against one another to lower military competition prompted the United
States to try to keep NATO together by pressuring its allies to continue balancing the USSR. At
the same time, pressure from NATO allies to pursue additional arms control talks (such as the
German push for nuclear reductions) were resisted: far from becoming more supportive due to
allied pressure, the United States pursued predation despite intra-alliance opposition. The history
also shows the United States formulating its CFE proposal independent of its allies, and only
informing them of the U.S. position afterwards. Thus, rather than open itself up to allied
pressure as Institutionalist Theory predicts, the United States worked outside of NATO channels
to determine its position, before introducing the plan to its allies when ready. 266 If anything, the
United States used NATO as an accessory to predation it was going to pursue one way or another
than as a mechanism for formulating and restraining its ambitions. Far from helping the U.S.
and USSR reach a cooperative agreement, arms control talks were hostage to broader U.S.
calculations of the Soviet threat and distribution of power.
C. Diplomatic Policy: Rumblings in Eastern Europe and the Search for Stability
i. Overview
Conventional force reductions were important because they were expected to shift the
military balance in the United States' favor and produce political dividends in Eastern Europe.
By the time of the May CFE proposals, however, it was increasingly clear that the political
benefits in Eastern Europe were being overtaken by events as political unrest grew in Poland and
Hungary, before spreading to East Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. By the fall of
1989, Poland and Hungary were led by non-Communist governments while the East German
government was tottering. The American response to these changes also showcases the
Moderate Predation strategy adopted by the United States and provides further evidence
supporting Realist Decline Theory. This section discusses initial developments in Poland and
Hungary, while the following section discusses events in East Germany in the fall of 1989.
ii. Early Efforts to Managing Change
The possibility of change in Eastern Europe was on the U.S radar screen from early 1989.
Events in Poland and Hungary were the drivers, as the collapse of the Polish and Hungarian
economies forced ruling Communist regimes to consider liberal reforms to spur economic
growth and stabilize society. Problems in East Germany were a second but potentially more
important issue, as declining Soviet power raised the possibility that the GDR and FRG might
reunify and upset the European status quo. These developments raised the possibility that local
unrest could turn violent and trigger a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
Recognizing the risk, Bush authorized former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to
explore a modus vivendi with the Soviets early in 1989.267 As presented to the Soviet leadership
on 16-18 January, the plan called for the United States to pledge to avoid encouraging unrest in
Eastern Europe in return for a Soviet pledge to let the states liberalize and foreswear a
crackdown. In effect, the Soviets would loosen their hold on the region while the United States
agreed not to try to pull these states out of the Warsaw Pact.268 Gorbachev was receptive, and so
was the United States. Indeed, Baker went so far as to publicly praise the proposal as "worthy of
266 Gates, From the Shadows, 463-464.
267 Beschloss and Talbott, Highest Levels, 13-18.
268 Transcripts of Kissinger's conversations are in Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in
Europe, 1989 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), Docs. 36 & 37.
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consideration" reasoning that, "'If progress did not continue to be made along the lines of Eastern
Europe opening up [. . .] if there was a reversal, or if you had anarchy and a reaction by the
Soviets [. . .] it would be much more appropriate in my view to look at the possibilities of the
proposal." 269 Although Kissinger's plan failed, the fact that U.S. policymakers were willing to
explore the plan suggests a serious desire to avoid a crisis with the USSR even at the expense of
270
opportunities to rollback Soviet power. This conscious effort to avoid maximizing power if
doing so threatened one's security with a militarily robust adversary is in line with Moderate
Predation and Realist Decline Theory.
iii. Cautiously Backing Reforms
By spring, Polish and Hungarian reforms had advanced to a critical point. In February,
Hungary endorsed the idea of a multiparty system and by March backed competitive and free
271
elections. Polish progress was even more dramatic, as "Roundtable" talks between the Polish
government and the Solidarity opposition culminated in April in a series of agreements that 1)
created a representative legislature; 2) promised free and fair elections; 3) legalized Solidarity; 4)
inaugurated economic and legal reforms; and 5) created a Polish presidency (which, it was
understood, would be filled by Communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski).m Thereafter, the
questions became: what, if anything, would the United States do to encourage Polish and
Hungarian reforms, and how, if at all, would the United States use the changes to its advantage
vis-a-vis the USSR? Given that the United States had bankrolled Solidarity in an effort to
undermine the Warsaw Pact throughout the 1980s, these were no idle questions.
As Realist Decline Theory predicts, the United States demurred on the chance to
intensely challenge the USSR in Poland and Hungary. The U.S. instead opted to pursue cautious
change to slowly move Poland and Hungary out of the Soviet orbit while limiting the U.S.
challenge to the Pact's integrity. Specifically, the U.S. refused to trumpet the defeat of the
Communist regimes, avoided providing extensive aid to reformers that might be interpreted as
inserting U.S. influence into the region, and ultimately took steps to shore up Communist
governments in order to reassure the Soviets. This was especially true for Poland, which, by
virtue of Poland's greater importance to the Warsaw Pact, attracted more attention than Hungary;
accordingly, I focus most of the following analysis on Poland.
a. Limited Public Support
First, American policymakers resisted using the signing of the Roundtable agreement on
5 April to call for "a new beginning for all of Eastern Europe" in which Communist regimes
would be replaced by liberal democracies and an end to the Cold War via the spread of freedom
and democracy to the Soviet sphere of influence.273 Despite internal pressure for a public
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statement to this effect, Bush issued a less grandiose announcement praising Poland for its
"historic step towards pluralism and freedom which we hope will eventually take Poland far
from totalitarianism and towards a better political and economic future." This limited the
American focus to Poland and separated change in the rest of the Pact from Polish
developments. Asked, for example, whether the Roundtable might be a model for elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, Bush avoided endorsing the idea of further change within the Soviet sphere,
arguing: "No two Eastern European countries are the same. [. . .] I would say that the roundtable
development there in Poland is very positive, [. . .] But what it means to the other Eastern
European countries, [... .] I simply can't tell you." 27 5 These themes repeated on 17 April when
Bush outlined U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe writ large during a speech in Hamtramck,
Michigan. Echoing his earlier remarks, Bush argued that "If Poland's experiment succeeds, then
other countries mav follow [emphasis added]" and claimed, without specifics, that the United
States dreamed "of the day when Eastern European peoples will be free to choose their system of
government." Rather than using Poland's reforms as a way of pushing for greater change, Bush
narrowly expressed hope for eventual reforms in Warsaw Pact states. 276 In sum, instead of using
the Polish reforms to issue a broader challenge to Soviet authority, the United States avoided
signs of meddling in Soviet allies.
b. Minimal Financial Aid
American circumspection also meant minimal financial support for Polish and Hungarian
reforms. At a time when Poland needed $1 billion to service its foreign debt and Solidarity
sought $10 billion to help Poland liberalize its economy, the United States avoided these
277
commitments.277 Instead, Bush promised a limited plan emphasizing rescheduling Poland's debt,
lowered tariffs on Polish goods, and loans for private businesses.278 This approach continued
while Polish and Hungarian reformers pressed for greater assistance in advance of Bush's visit
Hungary and Poland in July.2 79 Before the trip, East European democratic leaders argued that
the absence of Western support could breed popular frustration with liberalization's failure to
produce immediate economic benefits, and imperil the reform process. The United States
ignored these efforts.280 Irrespective of East European problems, there would not be "a new
Marshall plan," as Bush told Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.281 Rather, Bush's visit
coincided with a limited plan for $100 million (not $10 billion) in direct U.S. aid for Poland and
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282World Bank loans of $325 million; Hungary received a $25 million grant. Even in retrospect,
Scowcroft labeled these measures "embarrassingly meager"283 given what U.S. Ambassador
John Davis called "the opportunity [. . .] to lead with concrete steps to reinforce our values and
our interests." 284 Equally important, Bush passed on pleas from Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to
funnel U.S. aid to Poland through Solidarity. This effort would signal U.S. support for further
reforms and give Solidarity a bargaining advantage in efforts to move Poland away from
Communist rule, but also constitute American interference in Polish affairs. Bush, uncertain
whether Walesa "understood all the details of what he was showing me" and having told
Jaruzelski that he did not want to meddle in Eastern Europe, rebuffed Walesa.285
iv. Slowly Removing Communists from Office
Still, the clearest indicator of Moderate Predation and American concerns over the Soviet
response emerged that summer as the United States debated how to address Poland's onrushing
political reforms. It was one thing to avoid beating one's chest as reforms began. By Bush's
July visit, however, Poland was on the verge of toppling the Communist regime entirely.286 Such
a move would threaten Poland's fidelity to the Warsaw Pact and upset the status quo.
In early June, free elections resulted in an overwhelming defeat for the Polish
287Communists as Solidarity won all but one of the available seats in the Polish legislature. The
results discredited the Polish Communist party and threw into doubt whether Jaruzelski could
garner sufficient support to be elected Poland's president. This threatened the stability of
Poland's reforms as participants in the Roundtable (including Soviet observers) assumed that
Jaruzelski would serve as Poland's president under the new system.288 Moreover, elements of
Solidarity were exacerbating the dilemma by calling for a Solidarity member to serve as prime
minister and form a government, effectively taking control of Poland even if a Communist
remained the titular head of state.289
If ever an opportunity to rollback Communist influence and Soviet dominance in Poland
were to arise, this was it. All the United States had to do was call for both sides to acknowledge
the results of Poland's elections, encourage Jaruzelski's retirement, and support calls for a
decreased Communist role in government. Ambassador Davis' 27 June cable hinted at the
opportunity, noting that by encouraging Poland's liberalization and calling for its "peaceful
reintegration" with the rest of Europe, the U.S. would help create "a Poland which is achieving a
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greater degree of independence from the USSR and which is very unlikely ever to become an
adversary". 290
In fact, the United States did the opposite and refused to push the Communist leadership
from power. Even before Bush's trip, Ambassador Davis explained to Solidarity members how
they could (and perhaps should) simply be absent the day a vote on president was taken, thus
guaranteeing Jaruzelski the two-thirds votes necessary to be elected President.29' Not only is this
effort counterintuitive when considering what the U.S. might have done if it wanted to challenge
the Soviet presence in Poland, but the fact that the United States was Solidarity's primary backer
throughout the 1980s makes the U.S. choice even starker: the U.S. government effectively told a
democratic movement it had nurtured to vote their opponents into office! These efforts
continued during Bush's July visit. Meeting with Jaruzelski, for instance, Bush urged Jaruzelski
to run for the presidency while worrying that, "his refusal to run might inadvertently lead to
serious instability." He repeated this point when meeting with French President Francois
Mitterrand shortly afterwards.292 Bush also stressed American support for the status quo,
averring that, "he would do nothing to complicate the difficult and delicate job that Poland and
Jaruzelski face [. . .] he would avoid rhetoric which would complicate the situation [. . . and]
noted that the United States would contribute positively to the reforms while stopping short of
interference." Above all, the United States pledged not use the changes in Poland "to place
strains on the Soviet alliance., 293 By the time Bush departed, he had underscored American
support for cautious change that would not threaten the Pact's integrity.294
Eight days later, Jaruzelski was elected president, with Solidarity members either missing
the vote or abstaining as per Davis' suggestions. 295 Unfortunately, this only triggered a second
crisis as the Polish Communist Party proved unable to create a ruling coalition and Solidarity
leaders maneuvered to form a non-Communist government. 296 By mid-August, tension was
rising as Solidarity refused to include Communists in their proposed government. Although the
situation soon resolved, the United States again showed that it was willing to buttress the status
quo rather than push for change. Most notably, responding to a Communist complaint that 1)
Solidarity was refusing to meet with the Communist leadership and 2) being encouraged by the
U.S. in these efforts, Baker cabled Davis to encourage Solidarity to cooperate with the
Communist party and "keep all lines of communication open." 297 This helped resolve the
standoff. By the end of August, Poland was led by Jaruzelski as President of Poland, Solidarity
member Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister, and had a coalition government including both
Solidarity and the Communist party.298 Where it seemed Polish Communists were being evicted
that spring, American efforts helped broker deals that left Polish Communists better off than
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would otherwise have been the case. In the process, and as Bush's July comments showed, the
United States reinforced Polish-Soviet ties rather than maximizing American power.
v. Rationales for Moderate Predation in Poland and Hungary
In short, there is strong evidence that the United States pursued Moderate Predation as
American policymakers confronted the prospect of massive changes in the Soviet alliance
system. The question is why. In particular, if Realist Decline Theory is correct, we should find
evidence that American policymakers 1) recognized that weakening the Soviet hold on Poland
and Hungary would advance U.S. security, but 2) worried that doing so might trigger Soviet
intervention and a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. In contrast, if Institutionalist Theory is correct,
we should see American allies pressuring the United States to avoid roiling the European status
quo by intensely preying on the Soviets, while Democratic Peace Theory predicts predation was
a way of ending the non-democratic influence of the USSR in Eastern Europe.
a. Benefits of Predation
On balance, the evidence supports Realist Decline Theory. First, as expected, Polish and
Hungarian reforms were seen as a way of weakening Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and
producing a net security gain for the United States. 99 As Scowcroft later argued, the United
States sought to "give preferential treatment to those satellites which were the most vigorous in
undertaking internal political and economic reforms [i.e., Poland and Hungary]" because "this
would further encourage the governments of Eastern Europe toward reform with the hope of
reaching our long-term goal offreeing the region as a whole [emphasis added]" from Soviet
control. Put another way, encouraging East European reforms was a way of "getting Soviet
troops reduced or removed" at a time when U.S. and Soviet forces still confronted one another in
Central Europe.30 By March 1989, this view solidified into recognition that the changes in
Poland and Hungary meant, "the region had become a potential weak link in the solidarity of the
Soviet bloc." 301 Encouraging Polish and Hungarian reforms would therefore advance U.S.
security by walking back Soviet power. Hutchings captures this thinking in his memoirs,
writing:
Eastern Europe was what [the Cold War] was all about. The Cold War was [.
.] the product of Soviet conduct, above all Soviet domination of Eastern Europe
and forward deployment of more than half a million Soviet forces in the heart of
Europe. The Cold War began in Eastern Europe, and it was there that it had to
end [. .] "Eastern Europe" was thus shorthand for several related objectives:
self-determination in the region, Soviet military withdrawal from the heart of
Europe, a shift toward more cooperative international behavior, and above all an
end to a worldview that demanded a ring of "satellite" states on key Soviet
borders.
The American focus on "internal liberalization" in Poland and Hungary was thus the initial salvo
in an effort to test the integrity of the Soviet bloc. 302 If successful, it was possible that the
division of Europe would end and "the Soviet army of occupation" go home. 303 This effort
might also, as Robert Gates has noted, "have an influence in the Soviet Union itself' by
increasing pressure on Gorbachev to liberalize, but even this issue was sublimated by the more
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300 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 38-43; Miller Center Interview with Robert M. Gates, 24.
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304pressing desirability of shifting the military balance against the USSR. Simply put, Poland
and Hungary could catalyze a broad challenge to Soviet influence over its satellite states and
undermine its alliance network.305
b. Costs of Soviet Internal Balancing
However, the debates over Poland and Hungary also show American policymakers
worried that intense U.S. means to this end could trigger a crisis, up to and including the Soviet
use of force. This again matches what my theory predicts. As early as February, Bush critiqued
plans to "influence the situation in Eastern Europe," worrying that events "might turn violent and
get out of hand" by generating "an internal crackdown [. . .] or a Soviet backlash." 306 The
problem, as Scowcroft noted, was that it was impossible to assess where Soviet redlines fell. 307
American aggrandizement therefore risked triggering intervention akin to the Soviet invasion of
Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, all of which led to crises and tension in U.S.-Soviet
relations. 308 Additionally, intervention might end Soviet liberalization and precipitate renewed
Soviet-American competition; as Matlock cabled from Moscow, a "Soviet decision to intervene
militarily to put down disorders in Eastern Europe would of course mean the end of reform in the
Soviet Union" at a time when "the potential [military] threat to the West" remained
unchanged.309
Thus, as the United States responded to the Roundtable Agreement, policymakers sought
to avoid antagonizing the USSR by steering "events in productive directions, but at a speed
Moscow could accept." 310 Speaking with West Berlin Mayor Walter Momper in April, for
instance, Bush emphasized that the approach presented in Hamtramck was intended to "have no
anti-Soviet cast to its policies." 3 1 1 Similarly, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs told a gathering of NATO leaders shortly after the Roundtable
accords that "we recognize the risks of instability and have no interest in encouraging it."312
And, as East European reforms proceeded, the U.S. ensured that its public rhetoric "didn't
threaten the Soviet Union, [. . .] didn't say [to the Eastern Europeans] that it's them [the Soviets]
or us;" the goal was to avoid being "too bombastic."313
These concerns became more pronounced during Bush's July trip, partly driven by tacit
Soviet warnings.3 14 As Bush prepared to depart, Gorbachev hinted that challenges Soviet
authority by seeking the overthrow of Communist regimes would be "a course toward
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confrontation, if not worse." 315 Kohl had carried a similar message to Bush a few weeks earlier,
noting that Gorbachev "does not want destabilization in Europe, because this would mean
disruption in the USSR as well" and supported ongoing processes in the region.316 This
suggested the Soviets preferred slow-going change and might be unable to tolerate more radical
steps. More pointedly, Davis cabled from Warsaw that if Solidarity won a resounding victory in
the upcoming Polish elections (as occurred) "military responses could not be ruled out," thereby
risking violence, calls to leave the Pact, and pressure for Soviet intervention.317
Even without these warnings, East European reforms worried American policymakers.
As my argument predicts, U.S. policymakers recognized that they could not know whether
Soviet tolerance would last and where Soviet redlines fell. As Hutchings recounts, "the most
that could be safely assumed was that Moscow welcomed democratic changes in principle, but
remained wary about them in practice." 318 The question became "would the Soviets move
militarily [.. .] and if that happened [... .] whether that would cause the kind of repression we had
seen in Eastern Europe before." 319 As Scowcroft emphasized:
Let's take a particular case, like Poland [. . .] President Bush visited Poland in
1989, and we were very careful not to have any big public events because what
we feared... I remember when Nixon went there and there were almost
riots. That's the last thing we wanted, because what we didn't want was either
Gorbachev to have to turn hard, or the [. . .] hardliners in the Kremlin kicking
out Gorbachev. So we wanted the pace of events to be underneath their radar
screen. And don't accelerate. Keep them at a pace that will not force a reaction
by the Soviets. Of course, we didn't know what that pace was. But that was our
goal.3 20
At a time when the Soviets were retrenching, the last thing the United States wanted to do was
give the Soviets reason to change course. "You don't want," as Bush announced in June, "to over
exhort; you don't want to over promise; you don't want to rally people to levels of political
activity that might cause repression." Ultimately, the United States recognized that it had
"tremendous differences with the Soviet Union" that required U.S. policy to be "guided by a
certain sense of caution."321
c. Linking Costs and Benefits to Strategy
To this end, the United States redoubled efforts to reassure the USSR by downplaying
U.S. interest in European reforms, avoiding interference in the internal affairs of Pact members,
and foregoing calls for radical domestic changes. Again, this logic best matches the expectations
of Realist Decline Theory. Speaking to reporters before the July trip, Bush emphasized that "the
last thing we ought to do is appear to be dictating and fine-tuning the political processes in these
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countries. I have a respect ... .] for the internal affairs of another country." There points were
raised in press conferences throughout June and July, as members of the Administration praised
Soviet tolerance and emphasized the United States did not wish to intervene in the domestic
affairs of other countries.323 Policymakers also used private meetings with foreign counterparts
to assess Soviet reactions and underscored American circumspection. Meeting with Jaruzelski,
for example, Bush asked whether Gorbachev worried that the United States sought to evict
Soviet forces from the region. When the Polish leader responded affirmatively, Bush reiterated
that, "he had not mentioned the troop withdrawals to be more contentious," and would not
"'stick a finger' in Gorbachev's eye." 324
Nor was this just show for leaders in the Pact. Meeting with Mitterrand after the July trip,
Bush offered that a "crackdown [in Poland] would bring chaos, which would lead to
intervention." 325 Rather, he believed "Jaruzelski was probably the best candidate" to lead Poland
since he could broker the necessary deals to avert violence. And during the August standoff over
the composition of Poland's government, U.S. policy was again driven by consideration of the
Soviet reaction. As Scowcroft argued, "Moscow still had large forces in Eastern Europe and we
did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union with Soviet freedom at stake. Our public posture
was therefore very restrained [. . . saying] only that the President 'would encourage' the
formation of a non-Communist government." 326
vi. Assessment: Change in Poland and Hungary
On balance, the outcome and logic of American policy in Poland and Hungary support
Realist Decline Theory. As my argument predicts, the United States adopted Moderate
Predation in order to undercut Soviet power, yet was simultaneously constrained by concerns of
a dangerous and problematic Soviet counter-reaction if intense means were used towards this end.
American behavior is all the more striking in light of 1) the decline in Soviet power writ large, 2)
the reduction of Soviet offensive military capabilities following Gorbachev's 1988 UN speech,
and 3) Solidarity's successes in Poland; given these trends, the United States seemingly had the
purview to adopt a more predatory strategy. Instead, American policymakers discounted Soviet
statements and evidence of changing Soviet military doctrine to focus on residual Soviet military
strength and the consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations if that power were used to arrest change
in Eastern Europe. Although American strategy looked to take advantage of cracks in the Soviet
bloc, intense means of doing so were avoided due to worries that the Soviets would use
remaining capabilities to internally balance and penalize American predation. Not only could the
USSR stage a crackdown, but doing so might lead to a crisis, escalation, and inadvertent war
between the United States and USSR; over the longer term, it might also lead to a
remilitarization of the U.S.-Soviet contest. To avoid these costs, American policymakers enacted
a policy that limited the intensity with which the U.S. undercut Soviet power and made gains at
the Soviet expense. While still seeking to roll back Soviet power and gain at Soviet weaknesses,
the U.S. preferred to let these gains occur slowly so as to avoid provoking the USSR. This
behavior and the rationales offered are what Realist Decline Theory predicts a rising United
States will do when facing a declining, but militarily robust, Soviet Union in bipolar Europe.
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In contrast, there is virtually no evidence in support of Institutionalist Theory. Again,
Institutionalist Theory predicts 1) a Moderate Support strategy emerge in response to the
restraining influence of NATO allies, while 2) American policymakers recognize that NATO
unity required the U.S. to forego power maximizing behavior when pressured by its allies.
Neither prediction pans out. Not only did the United States prey upon the USSR rather than
pursue support, but a review of the academic literature, memoirs and documentary record, shows
American diplomatic policy was just that - American. There is no evidence the interests of U.S.
allies either accounted for or determined U.S. policy. As with military policy, American
diplomatic policy was formulated in-house and independent of NATO.
Finally, the diplomatic game over Poland and Hungary provides only limited evidence
for Democratic Peace Theory. As the theory predicts, the United States adopted Moderate
Predation. Moreover, policymakers occasionally spoke and justified policies as if the logic of
Democratic Peace Theory was at hand. Gates' argument that evicting the Soviets from Eastern
Europe could have positive spillover effects on Soviet reforms is emblematic. Overall, however,
Democratic Peace Theory is at best an incomplete explanation for U.S. diplomatic policy
towards Poland and Hungary in 1989. First, although American policymakers occasionally
spoke as if they hoped the changes in Eastern Europe would positively affect Soviet reforms,
efforts to weaken the Soviet hold on Poland and Hungary were also founded on concern that
Gorbachev's reforms would not last. Thus, even while monitoring Soviet reforms, the U.S. acted
on the desire to shift in the military balance in its favor while it had the opportunity. In this,
American predation was founded on a desire to establish a stronger position for a future round of
competition with the USSR; the desire to avoid damaging and if possible helping Gorbachev at
home was driven more by a desire to maintain the opportunity to prey on the USSR while it
could than on any sincere desire to help the USSR democratize as an end unto itself. Moreover,
American policy on a day-to-day basis seems to have focused much more on the state of U.S.-
Soviet strategic competition than on any particular interest in the state of Soviet domestic politics.
The stability of the Soviet regime and Gorbachev's reforms may have lurked in the background,
but the evidence presented above shows a far greater interest in the overall military and strategic
competition with the USSR than with the Soviet domestic game. This accords better with Realist
Decline Theory than Democratic Peace Theory.
D. Diplomatic Policy: Managing German Reunification, Fall 1989
i. Overview
By September, Poland and Hungary had stabilized. Now, however, the stability of East
Germany came into question, thereby raising the possibility of a push for German reunification.
Reunification was a double-edged sword for the United States. On the one hand, NATO
members had long been formally committed to reunification, though in practice, major NATO
members including Britain and France were opposed to this possibility and sought to deny or
delay the outcome as long as possible. At the same time, eliminating the Soviet presence in
the GDR would be a major setback to Soviet military power and the USSR's ability to threaten
Western Europe. On the other hand, the GDR constituted the "jewel of in the [Soviet] imperial
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crown" and the cornerstone of the USSR's alliance system. The USSR would therefore be
acutely sensitive to signs of predation.32 8
With both large costs and benefits, Realist Decline Theory predicts the United States
should err on the side of caution by adopting Moderate Predation. Evidence that the Soviets are
disinclined to let Germany reunify should be taken seriously and the means used to challenge the
GDR's independence kept cautious. In contrast, Democratic Peace Arguments suggest that the
United States will pursue Moderate Predation, but do so with one eye fixed on predation's effects
on Soviet internal politics: signs that American policies are weakening Soviet liberalization will
limit the intensity of U.S. predation. Meanwhile, Institutionalist Theory predicts Moderate
Support as the United States responds to the pressures of NATO allies and its own incentive to
keep NATO together in the face of a diminishing Soviet threat to "reassure" the USSR and avoid
trying to pull the GDR out of the Soviet orbit (thereby destroying the Warsaw Pact).
ii. Early Reunification Debates
German reunification was on the American foreign policy agenda from early 1989. By
March, the NSC argued that, "the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be
the fate of the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]" in part because "the Germans suffer the
most from Europe's divisions." Although the United States could not "promise immediate
political reunification," it could still "offer some promise of change.",329 By the May 1989 NATO,
this translated into rhetorical backing for reunification without substantive steps to make
reunification a reality. Indeed, Scowcroft advised Bush to be "careful not to get out in front of
[West Germany] in calling for German reunification, since Germans inside and outside the
government strongly feel that a high profile position may compromise the careful, incremental
movement that is already underway."33 0
American goals, however, were largely defensive. As Gorbachev scored public relations
victories, talk of reunification was a way of bolstering the FRG's commitment to NATO. Notes
prepared for Baker before the NATO Summit make the point, arguing that "there's no doubt the
issue [reunification] is coming back. The real question is whether Gorbachev will grab it first (or
else the Germans will grab it) [. . .] We need to move out ahead in a way that establishes a
Western anchor for this process." 331 The NSC came to similar conclusions, recommending that
Bush prevent the FRG from pursuing "detente [. . .] devoid of a security dimension" while
"encouraging "trends that will further cement Bonn's Western ties" in order to neutralize
reunification as a possible Soviet weapon.332
By September, however, East European developments placed this effort under duress.
That month, the Hungarian government began dismantling border checkpoints separating it from
neutral Austria. This allowed East Germans, legally barred from emigrating, to slip over the
Hungarian-Austrian border and make their way to Western Europe. Thousands of East Germans
utilized this route, generating a crisis within the Pact as GDR leader Erich Honecker demanded
Hungarian authorities close the border crossings and the Hungarian government refused.333
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Pressure subsequently mounted in the GDR for reforms akin to those in Poland. As domestic
troubles increased, Honecker tried to convince Gorbachev to support a crackdown. Gorbachev
refused, and Soviet forces remained in their barracks as political unrest escalated. 3 34
The Soviet refusal pulled the "lynch pin [sic]" out of the GDR situation.335 Protests
escalated and the political crisis deepened. Egon Krenz replaced Honecker and began a series of
domestic reforms. 336 These reforms had barely begun, however, when a GDR spokesman's
confusion over new travel regulations led to the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November
1989. Immediately, the question became whether the opening of the Berlin Wall presaged
moves towards German reunification and, if so, on what terms.
iii. Initial American Strategy: Minimize Change
American policymakers constantly assessed U.S. objectives and options in the run-up to 9
November. Reflecting the spring debates, many policymakers did not want the United States to
change course: cautious and minimal support for eventual reunification was preferred in order to
"avoid the turmoil that would be attendant with German reunification." 338 A major State
Department report in mid-October underscored the continuity, arguing "our overriding German
objective is the maintenance of a democratic FRG, firmly tied to the West [. . .] Publicly, we
should continue to express our support for reunification [. . .] without getting out in front of
mainstream West German leaders." Bush's public statements followed this advice. Speaking
with reporters in September, for example, Bush acknowledged that "I think there is in some
quarters a feeling [. . .that] a reunified Germany would be detrimental to the peace of Europe [. .
.] I don't accept that at all." 339 He repeated these points in an interview with the New York Times
on 24 October.340 In any case, American options for changing the status quo were limited by the
Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. As the State Department report concluded, Soviet leaders
appeared willing to "use force to prevent the collapse of a Communist East German State," and
would "insist upon a fully separate GDR, with undisturbed political and security links to
Moscow" even if the GDR government collapsed. 34 1 The CIA was more explicit, arguing that
reunification could only happen through a combination of Western cooperation, GDR
liberalization, and "Soviet acquiescence."3 None of these conditions were plausible at the time.
iv. Supporting Self-Determination, Avoiding Reunification
334 Analyses of the GDR-Soviet back and forth can be found in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 31-34; for
Gorbachev's efforts to encourage the GDR to reform rather than launch a crackdown, see Masterpieces ofHistory,
Doc. 88.
3 Scowcroft, Interview with Oberdorfer, 1.
336 Sarotte, 1989, 35.
337 Ibid., 35-47.
338 Miller Center Interview with Brent Scowcroft, 81; Gates, From the Shadows, 483.
339George Bush, "The President's News Conference in Helena, Montana," 18 September 1989, online by Gerhard
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The events of 9 November only reinforced the U.S. preference for Moderate Predation.
The weeks following the opening of the Wall saw the United States take few steps to push
reunification and several efforts to slow change. Speaking with Mulroney shortly after the Wall
opened, Bush asked the Canadian leader to tell Gorbachev that, "I [Bush] am feeling a lot of
domestic political pressure to stand on the Berlin Wall and 'beat my chest'. I have avoided doing
anything like this because I have wanted to hold down the emotions here in the U.S. so as to
have a good atmosphere" in U.S.-Soviet relations. In effect, Bush tried to reassure Gorbachev of
the priority placed on a stable U.S.-Soviet relationship rather than efforts to take advantage of the
GDR situation.343
Internal assessments of U.S. options in the aftermath of 9 November underscored these
points. The first such study on 11 November argued the United States could either 1) let the
West Germans set the pace of events and move towards reunification, 2) back a Four Power 344
intervention to "regulate the process," or 3) emphasize the principle of German self-
determination.345 As Zelikow and Rice report, Bush was "advised to choose a passive policy"
and endorse the third option. 346 The logic was spelled out in a lengthier study completed before
the 2-3 December 1989 Malta Summit between U.S. and Soviet leaders. Written by a senior
interagency group, the report identified three U.S. strategic priorities surrounding the
reunification debate.347 First, the U.S. needed "to assure that the political, economic, and
security ties which link the FRG to its Western partners be maintained". Second, it needed to
promote "economic reform and democratization within the GDR." Finally, the U.S. needed to
ensure "the continued process of reform throughout the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union" and "that whatever new relationship develops between the two German states occurs
peacefully."
The United States could thus countenance a range of outcomes vis-a-vis Germany,
running from maintenance of two separate states to reunification; it was too early to settle upon a
single outcome. Procedurally, however, the U.S. needed to decide whether to 1) support a Four
Power initiative to control the situation; 2) defer to events on the ground and the FRG; or 3)
emphasize German self-determination. Of the three, the first approach would be most conducive
to Soviet security, but would "legitimize a Soviet role and veto" when trends were moving in the
United States' favor. 34 8 Indeed, the United States had already rejected a Soviet call on 10
November for Four Power talks to help prevent "unforeseeable consequences" from arising and
spiraling out of control. 349 The second approach would be most problematic for the Soviets by
excluding them from the decision-making process. The third approach, however, was acceptable
as it neither accelerated nor slowed the course of events, while allowing the United States to
argue that "if the German people seek unity through peaceful means [. . .] we believe Germany's
343 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada," 17 November 1989.
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345 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 404, n32.
346 Ibid., 112.
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348 This echoed a State Department recommendation that the U.S. should avoid "Four Power intervention [. .. to]
avoid a Soviet veto"; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 405, n32.
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neighbors, including the Soviet Union, need not be concerned by such a prospect." The United
States went with the third option.
As my argument predicts, the U.S. looked to cautiously challenge the USSR. On one
level, it preyed on the USSR by avoiding Four Power talks and denying the USSR opportunities
to sustain its presence in the GDR. Yet by the same token, the U.S. avoided encouraging
reunification, upsetting the status quo, and directly challenge the core Soviet security interest in
Europe. American policymakers were content with 1) letting the Soviet situation decay over
time and 2) ensuring the Soviets could not salvage their position while 3) avoiding intensely
revisionist steps.
v. Early Rationales
There was a stark, security-driven rationale for U.S. policy: as Realist Decline Theory
predicts, the United States was worried over a possible Soviet military crackdown and therefore
reluctant to push change in the GDR. With the fate of the GDR the central Soviet security
concern, American policymakers were driven by fear of a Soviet backlash if the United States
pushed reunification too hard. At a time when the Soviets could forcefully stop change in the
GDR, and coupled with Soviet warnings that reunification threatened to destroy "the post-war
realities of Europe," American concerns are precisely what my theory predicts: the rising state in
a bipolar system was kept in check by fear of war with the decliner.3 5 0
Two days before the Wall opened, Scowcroft received a copy of an interagency study
entitled "GDR Crisis Contingencies." The report warned that, "in the event of severe internal
unrest in the GDR, our overriding objective should be to prevent a Soviet military intervention,
which could and probably would reverse the positive course of East-West relations for many
years to come. More than that, it would raise the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet military
confrontation" as Soviet intervention in the GDR was "among the World War III scenarios for
which U.S. and NATO planners have been preparing for decades." 35' Reflecting this logic, Bush
was reluctant to embrace developments in the GDR, reasoning that "I had to anticipate
Gorbachev's reaction - and that of his opponents [. . .] this was not the time to gloat abut what
many in the West would interpret as a defeat for Gorbachev [. . .] my mind kept racing over a
possible Soviet crackdown." As the Soviets were suffering a political defeat, Bush avoided
actions that might force the USSR's hand and militarize the situation. 35 2  This echoed
Scowcroft's reasoning, as "thus far [Gorbachev] had accepted the changes in Eastern Europe and
overcome resistance to them among his military and the [CPSU]. Our question was whether he
would, or could sustain the loss of East Germany" as "the reflexive reaction of [Gorbachev's
political opposition] would be to fight reunification tooth and nail to protect the remnants of the
Soviet security bulwark in Eastern Europe." 35 3 Thus, on the same day Bush asked Mulroney to
carry a reassuring message to Gorbachev, he explained to Kohl that the U.S. sought to "stay
calm" because "The euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of forcing unforeseen action in
the USSR or the GDR that would be very bad."354
vi. Slouching Towards Reunification: The Searchfor Soviet Assurances & Rationales
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Nor was Moderate Predation just show. Events in late November and early December
demonstrated that the United States limited efforts to prey on the USSR even as other options
were available. This first became clear in the run-up to the Malta Summit of 2-3 December.
Only five days before the Summit began, Kohl surprised policymakers by announcing a
"Ten Point Plan" to reunify Germany.355 Kohl's plan was the first to outline a path to
reunification, but came as a shock to the United States. Kohl both failed to forewarn the U.S.
even as his plan made no mention of NATO, suggesting an FRG willingness to ignore the U.S.
and negotiate with the Soviets as FRG interests dictated. 56 Additionally, it was difficult to know
how the USSR would react to reunification formally appearing on the policy agenda. Kohl's
initiative presented the U.S. with a dilemma: should it endorse its ally's initiative and take a
more assertive stance on reunification, or distance itself from Kohl's effort?
As Realist Decline Theory suggests, the United States used limited means and refused to
back the FRG until reassured that the Soviets would not react violently if the United States
changed course. This effort and American concerns are clear given developments between
announcement of the Ten Point Plan on 28 November, and Bush's endorsement of the plan
during a meeting with Kohl on 3 December. As Scowcroft argues, the 3 December meeting
constituted "the decisive step" in U.S. backing for a reunification, as the United States blessed
Kohl's reunification scheme. 35 7 Why, however, did the United States delay six days before
supporting Kohl? After all, there were at least six opportunities between 28 November and 3
December for the United States to back the FRG, including a conversation between Bush and
Kohl on 29 November;358 Bush's press conference immediately after the call; 35 9 Baker's press
briefing on 29 November;360 a cable from Baker on 30 November outlining the approach State
Department personnel should take when briefing allies on U.S. policy; 3 61 an interview by Baker
on the morning of 3 December; 362 and a joint press conference by Bush and Gorbachev on the
3 Sarotte, 1989, 72-75.
356 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 196-197. Kohl had consulted with Soviet officials before announcing
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"exhibited little [. . . anxiety that] the Russians could lure the United States' most important European ally by
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afternoon of 3 December. 363 Each time, however, American officials refused to endorse the Ten
Point Plan. Only during the meeting with Kohl on the evening of 3 December did American
policy change. Why the delay and subsequent change?
Central to the 3 December endorsement were Soviet assurances during the Malta Summit
that they were not inclined to suppress change in Eastern Europe, and would not see American
support for reunification as a threat. As Realist Decline Theory predicts, the run-up to the
Summit saw American leaders worried that moves towards reunification would be beyond the
limits of Soviet tolerance and trigger a crackdown, military crisis, and the return of U.S.-Soviet
competition.364 The 7 November "GDR Crisis Contingencies" memo was the most explicit, but
the NSC also addressed the issue to argue that "destabilizing developments in Germany could
represent a threat" to "the continued process of reform" in the USSR 365 and empower
conservatives ready to "fight reunification tooth and nail to protect the remnants of the Soviet
security bulwark in Eastern Europe."366 Thus, the United States needed to "continually reassure
[the Soviet Union] that we are not seeking to destabilize the situation in the GDR or the Warsaw
Pact."367 More directly, the CIA concluded on 27 November that pressure for reform in the GDR
could result in "anti-Soviet violence might occur that might force [Gorbachev] to intervene
militarily." 368 And after the release of Kohl's plan, Scowcroft forwarded Bush a memorandum
warning that Gorbachev opposed reunification because it would "rip the heart out of the Soviet
security system." To that end, Gorbachev would use all diplomatic options to prevent
reunification, and could "still use force to stop unwelcome events" even if doing so discredited
perestroika. The American assessment was straightforward: the Soviet Union's "unequivocal"
demand was the continuation of "political realities of the postwar era, namely, the existence of
two German states." 369 Gorbachev himself warned Bush against reunification, stating, "People
have died eating unripened fruit." 370 As the U.S. prepared for Malta, therefore, one of its
primary goals was to stress to Gorbachev "our interest in reform through peaceful, democratic
process [sic], and to remind Gorbachev that a violent crackdown (in Eastern Europe as well as
the USSR) would inevitably harm our relations." 371 In short, the United States fixated on the
dangers of the Soviet use of force either independently or resulting from Gorbachev's
displacement. Notably, although American policymakers focused on the state of Soviet domestic
politics as Democratic Peace Theory would argue, the overwhelmingly concern on the possible
363 George Bush, "Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session
With Reporters in Malta," 3 December 1989, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
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Soviet use of force irrespective of whether Gorbachev or one of his opponents ruled the Soviet
Union aligns more closely Realist Decline Theory.
Gorbachev's actions at Malta, however, calmed American apprehensions. In meetings on
2-3 December, Gorbachev and Bush jostled over change in Eastern Europe and German
reunification. Although Gorbachev critiqued Kohl for being "in too much of a hurry on the
German question," he also affirmed that, "peaceful change is the way. Our position is non-
interference."37 In further discussions, Gorbachev expressed displeasure at the prospect of
reunification but also asserted that "the times we live in are of great responsibility," suggesting
the Soviets would themselves be reticent to forcibly stop German developments. 373 As he
ultimately argued, "our view is that we should do everything within the Helsinki context,"
referring to the Helsinki Accords banning change in European borders through force. 7
Collectively, the Malta Summit signaled Soviet recognition that the use of force would be
disastrous for U.S.-Soviet relations.
The talks immediately affected U.S. policy. Meeting Kohl after the Malta Summit, Bush
hinted at the changing American assessment of the risks of a crackdown, telling Kohl,
"Gorbachev's chief problem is uncertainty. I don't want to say he went 'ballistic' about
[reunification] - he was just uneasy. We need a formulation which doesn't scare him, but moves
forward." Gone were fears of automatic violence voiced before the Summit, replaced by a more
limited acknowledgment that the Soviets were "uneasy." American policy now changed as Bush
told Kohl that the United States would support reunification and the Ten Point Plan.375 Although
the U.S. and its allies still needed to "avoid things which would make the situation impossible for
Gorbachev" before "the Soviet divisions [in Eastern Europe] pull back," the United States would
376now work with the FRG to push the Soviets out of Germany. This was the decisive shift in
U.S. policy, as speeches by Bush and Baker over the next week affirmed the U.S. and FRG
would work side-by-side against the USSR. 377
The decision to side with Kohl was critical.3 78 By 3 December, the USSR was not along
in opposing reunification as France and Britain echoed Soviet calls to avoid German unity and
maintain two German states. In backing Kohl, Bush thereby challenged both the Soviet Union
and bucked the influence of American allies; even sustained allied opposition to reunification
voiced during a NATO heads of state meeting on 4-5 December was unable to alter the
American position. 379 This underlines the importance of the 3 December decision. Given
opposition to reunification from many quarters, the United States could have reasonably rejected
Kohl's plan. American policymakers had a strong argument that the risks of reunification
outweighed the benefits, and the West Germans would have to accept closer ties with a still-
independent GDR. As many West Germans themselves did not expect reunification within their
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lifetimes, this still could have been sold as a gain for Germany and a milestone on the road to
reunification. That American policymakers rejected this approach suggests the predatory nature
of U.S. strategy.
vii. Last Grasps of Soviet Military Power: Post-Malta Policy and Rationales
Almost immediately, Soviet opposition to reunification spiked. Despite the Malta
assurances, the USSR railed against reunification on 4-6 December and emphasized the need to
preserve both the Pact and NATO (and thus two German states). 380 Gorbachev's critique was
pointed, telling FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Perhaps [Kohl] thinks that his
melody, the melody of the march, is already playing, and he is marching to it."381 More
worrisome, Soviet military forces in East Germany were placed on alert on 7 and 8 December.
Although the alert came amidst political protests in the GDR, American officials "could not
exclude the possibility that they might be preparatory to a Soviet-led effort to impose martial law
and restore Communist rule" that would trigger "an international crisis."382
The next day, the Soviet Union again proposed a Four Power meeting to address German
development. Reflecting the nascent anti-reunification coalition, Britain and France seconded
the Soviet proposal. Most interesting, however, the United States also agreed to Four Power talks.
This was a striking turn. Despite the 3 December agreement with Kohl, the United States threw
the FRG under the proverbial bus. It also meant a change in U.S. policy "settled since mid-
November, against invoking Four Power intervention to regulate German internal
developments."383 As noted above, American policymakers had previously rejected Soviet calls
for Four Power talks; why now agree to a meeting? After all, Franco-British-Soviet cooperation
meant the Soviets might have a way to preserve their ally. Why the change in U.S. policy?
The change in U.S. policy is puzzling for Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist
Theory. At the time, there was no spike in opposition to Gorbachev or threat to Gorbachev's
reforms. Similarly, the Four Power talks were an option available throughout 1989, yet the U.S.
had previously refused to accede to Soviet pressure to utilize the institution. Realist Decline
Theory, however, offers a possibility. Given Soviet invectives at the time, I predict U.S.
policymakers to agree to the talks as a way of assuaging Soviet concerns and reducing the risk of
Soviet intervention. In other words, there should be a security motivation for the American shift.
At the same time, bipolar competition means the United States should try to prevent the USSR
from using Four Power talks from asserting control over reunification. The U.S. will therefore
try to sabotage the nascent Franco-British-Russian coalition and prevent the talks from helping
the USSR to regain control over East European developments.
Both predictions are borne out. As Bush and Scowcroft acknowledge in their memoir,
American concerns over Soviet military action determined the U.S. position on Four Power
talks:
Our inclination was to decline outright [. . .J The Soviets, however, insisted that
there could be violence in the GDR, in which case they "would be obliged to use
380 Ibid., 134-137; Masterpieces of History, Docs. 113 & 114.; Hans Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House
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force." We were sufficiently concerned about what they might do that we were
not prepared to be obdurate about a meeting.384
In other words, the United States consented to the meeting to avoid a Soviet crackdown and its
attendant risks.385 Again reflecting the Goldilocks position sought by the United States, Baker
told reporters that, " reunification was not just a German issue but one to be decided in
consultation with Bonn's NATO allies, its neighbors and the Soviet Union." 3 86
Yet even if the United States was willing to assuage Soviet concerns when the situation
appeared hairy, the Soviets could not be allowed to block reunification. American policymakers
recognized that Franco-British-Soviet cooperation was the Soviet Union's best option short of
force to ensure Germany's continued division. As the NSC offered before Malta, "Moscow's
most likely diplomatic approach is to try and blunt the impact of change in the GDR by
solidifying international support for two German states. Betting that there is little true
enthusiasm for German reunification in the West - particularly in France and Britain - the
Soviets would take every opportunity to stabilize the existing system of alliances."387 Because
the Four Powers retained an internationally recognized right to oversee German developments,
Franco-Soviet-British cooperation risked isolating the United States and letting the USSR control
events in Germany.
In response, the United States tried to prevent the Soviets from using Four Power
diplomacy to buttress their strategic position.388 After Gorbachev issued the call for Four Power
talks, the U.S. worked to limit the scope of the meeting. Baker successfully lobbied the British
and French to focus the meeting on developments in Berlin as opposed to Germany writ large,
thus preventing the Soviets from stymying American and FRG steps towards reunification.389
When the Four Powers met on 12 December, therefore, Moscow's opportunities were already
constrained by U.S. action.
viii. U.S. Strategy Dilemmas at the End of 1989
By late December, the diplomatic dance over reunification led the NSC to recommend
the United States "slow down artfully the unification process this year and bring some order and
predictability to it - for our sake as well as Gorbachev's." As Hutchings and Blackwill wrote,
the prospect of rapid reunification would force the Soviets into a corner:
Gorbachev clearly would not support a peace settlement that would ratify a united
Germany in NATO. Whether stated openly or not, his aim would be the
reunification of Germany under conditions of neutrality and substantial
demilitarization. The new Germany Gorbachev would have in mind could
remain in the European Community but not NATO [. . .] In private
communication with you, Gorbachev could make it clear that his political
survival, and that of the democratization process sin the USSR, was at stake.
This arrangement, he might stress, was Moscow's last and best offer. With the
FRG and GDR leaderships, Gorbachev might state or imply that the alternative
was Soviet military intervention in the GDR to reimpose firm control, with all
that meant for the future of Germany and East-West relations.
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Slowing the process was a way of preventing Gorbachev from facing these choices. In doing so,
it would also prevent the FRG from having to choose between reunification and NATO
membership, as American officials were not confident the FRG would sacrifice the former for
the latter, and worried this would allow the Soviets to salvage their position. Although
Scowcroft rejected the NSC proposal, no new American push for reunification immediately
followed. As Realist Decline Theory expects, Moderate Predation left the United States focused
on exploiting cracks in the Soviet alliance network, but doing so without imperiling U.S.-Soviet
relations writ large.390
As 1989 drew to a close, American policy towards the Soviet Union was wrapped up in
the debates over German reunification. Having begun the year trying to prevent the Soviets from
seizing the German Question, the United States ended the year seeking to cautiously end GDR
independence and "rip the heart out of the Soviet security system." Predation was alive and well.
Still, the United States remained sensitive to Soviet concerns as predation was limited to what
policymakers felt the Soviets could tolerate. Meanwhile, suggestions that the USSR might use
force led the United States to walk back its policies and reassure the USSR. American strategy
focused on weakening the USSR in Eastern Europe, but doing so prudently and with the utmost
effort to avoid directly threatening Soviet security.
Scowcroft recognized this duality, writing to Bush in late December that, "increasingly
because of the German problem, the Soviets are pushing - successfully - for the widest possible
diplomatic engagement in Europe". 39 1 Although the United States wanted to reduce Soviet
power, it was unclear how it could do so when the Soviets retained the military capacity to block
or penalize American action. Kohl's Ten Point Plan envisioned the GDR surviving long enough
to join a confederation with the FRG en route to a unified state, and the U.S. had plans in the
works to provide aid to East Germany in order to help it linger on. 3 92 With the Soviets opposing
reunification, however, American policy risked "shoring up [Gorbachev's] long term objectives
in Europe": it was possible American efforts to revise the status quo without antagonizing the
Soviets might give the Soviets leverage over American policy such that the U.S. would end up
allowing the Soviets to remain in Eastern Europe.39 Although United States wanted to
maximize power at the USSR's expense, it remained unclear how far it could or would go for the
privilege.
ix. Security via Rollback
One outstanding question remains: why did the United States side with the FRG in the
debates over German reunification at all? Having shown that the Bush Administration acted
cautiously for fear of triggering a crisis, why did the U.S. embrace reunification at all? If Realist
Decline Theory is correct, we expect American policymakers to temper worries of a Soviet
crackdown with arguments that pushing reunification was a way of advancing U.S. security by
rolling back Soviet power and advancing American security. In contrast, Democratic Peace
390 Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft, "Responding to a Soviet Call for a Peace Conference" and accompanying
memorandum to The President, undated, Hutchings Files, CF01414, "German Reunification 2+4," GBPL. For
dating, see Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 383, n56.
391 Scowcroft, "Diplomacy for a New Europe."
392 Robert Hutchings, "PCC On U.S.-GDR Relations," 11 January 1990, Hutchings Files, CF01414, "German
Reunification 2+4," GBPL.
393 Harvey Sicherman to Dennis Ross, "Disquieting Signs in U.S. Policy," 4 January 1990, Box 176, Folder 9, BP;
Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "1990," 19 January 1990, Blackwill Files, CFOO 182, "German Reunification
11/89-6/90 [1]," GBPL.
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Theory suggests the United States will prey on the USSR because of worries about the
threatening nature of the Soviet regime while monitoring the state of Soviet domestic politics;
because Institutionalist Theory predicted the United States to pursue Moderate Support, it does
not offer hypotheses about the rationale behind U.S. predation and I exclude it from this
discussion. On balance, the results support Realist Decline Theory.
On the one hand, the fall of the Berlin Wall and pressure for reunification presented an
opportunity for the United States to reduce the Soviet threat. Because the GDR represented the
"crown jewel" of the Soviet empire, reunification would undermine the integrity of the Warsaw
Pact and hinder the USSR's ability to sustain its military and political threat to Western Europe.
So long as reunification did not also mean a reunified Germany outside NATO, the United States
would find itself able to influence European affairs free from the constraints imposed by the
other superpower. Hutchings makes the point well, arguing that from "the perspective of core
interests, we [. . .] had much to gain from the prospect of a strong, democratic, and united
Germany". 394 Another NSC official made a similar argument in an interview, proposing that the
American decision to push reunification was a conscious choice to take advantage of the fact that
the United States had won the Cold War. The only way for the Soviets to retain influence in
Eastern Europe without a crackdown was for the United States not to exploit the collapsing
Soviet position. This was a step policymakers were unwilling to take. 395
Indeed, helping the USSR retain its presence in Eastern Europe never even occurred to
senior officials. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the State Department argued the United
States needed to prepare for "dramatic changes in East Germany which literally could alter the
map of Europe" and "ensure that our current policies on the issue of reunification [... .] maximize
our longer term leverage." If this occurred, the United States should capitalize on the situation by
preserving Germany's ties to NATO while pushing reunification.396 Significantly, reunifying
Germany while preserving its links to NATO would mean that the perennial Cold War debate
over German alignment would be resolved in the United States' favor. As then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs James Dobbins argued, "it was up to [the Soviets] to
protect their interests [. . .] we didn't have to negotiate with ourselves on their behalf." Instead,
"there was an opportunity" to make "fundamental geopolitical changes" in the United States'
favor.397 At the end of the day, rollback via reunification presented a window for the United
States to eliminate the Soviet threat to Western Europe on propitious terms. 398 As the United
States looked at the issue, it proceeded from the conviction, "that the German Question is best
answered on Western terms." 399
Democratic Peace Theory, in contrast, does not fare as well. On the one hand, the United
States certainly pursued predation while occasionally worrying about the effects predation would
have on Gorbachev's hold on power and "the continued progress of reform" in the USSR and
Eastern Europe. This matches a core democratic peace argument. However, the balance of
discussions focused foremost on the strategic advantages of weakening the Soviet hold in Europe,
rather than on how this would affect Soviet domestic politics or prospects for democratization.
394 Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 97. Hutchings reaffirmed this perspective in interviews with the author.
395 Interview, NSC Official, 12 July 2012. Another NSC official argued, "I didn't think the Cold War regime in
Europe was a fundamentally sound and stable condition," such that pursuing reunification and ending the division of
Europe was a way of bringing stability by transforming the "regime." Interview with Zelikow, 18 August 2011.
396 Seitz, "Future of Germany."
397 Interview with Dobbins, 14 November 2011.
398 This perspective was emphasized by multiple NSC and State Department officials.
399 Hutchings, "Responding to Calls,"
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Nor does there seem to have been discussion one way or another of whether preying upon the
Soviet Union was advantageous for the sake of improving the security of Western democracies
against the non-democratic threat posed by the USSR. Admittedly, it could be the case that the
notion of the USSR as a threat because it was non-democratic was so ingrained that
policymakers simply did not need to state the logic in these terms; still, the available evidence
shows policymakers thinking in purely power-security terms without any reference to Soviet
domestic politics or regime type in any form. Although not definitive, these results accord better
with Realist Decline Theory than Democratic Peace Theory.
x. Assessment: German Reunification, Fall 1989
Overall, Realist Decline Theory performs well in explaining U.S. policy vis-a-vis the
USSR in the early debates over German reunification. As expected, there is significant evidence
that Moderate Predation emerged out of an effort to undercut Soviet power without triggering
violence and the Soviet use of force. Indeed, the oft-voiced concerns over whether Gorbachev
could tolerate American efforts to promote change in East Germany are telling: at every step of
the way, American policymakers looked over their shoulders to ensure that efforts to undercut
Soviet control over its premier European ally would not generate blowback for the United States.
And as predicted, American policy inched forward as policymakers concluded they might be
able to press the Soviets a bit harder, but retreated as necessary when the Soviet threat of force
appeared to be in the offing. Ultimately, Realist Decline Theory provides a good tool to explain
the course, logic, and outcome of American policy vis-a-vis the USSR in the early debates over
German reunification,
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory, however, do not fare as well. The
case provides limited support for Democratic Peace Theory. As the theory predicts, the United
States pursued Moderate Predation on the German issue. In the process, American policymakers
occasionally monitored Soviet internal politics and debated how U.S. policy would affect the
stability of the Soviet regime. Overall, however, evidence for the theory is less than clear-cut.
Although American policymakers occasionally considered Soviet domestic politics when
shaping their policies, the more consistent calculation emphasized the desirability of taking
advantage of Soviet weakness irrespective of what the nature of the Soviet regime entailed.
Moreover, aside from the period immediately surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall, American
concerns over the state of the Soviet government seem to have faded away as policymakers
emphasized the desirability of exploiting Soviet weaknesses because the United States had a
window of opportunity to do so; after an initial period of evaluation, there is no evidence that
American policymakers paid attention to the nature of the Soviet regime or its ongoing internal
battles when shaping U.S. policy. Finally, the ups and downs in the U.S. effort to prey on Soviet
weakness in East Germany (epitomized by the pre- and post-Malta debates over backing the Ten
Point Plan) are difficult to explain using Democratic Peace Theory, as they were driven by a
straightforward calculation of whether the USSR, acting like any great power, would defend its
ally. Because of these divergences from what the theory predicts, I code the episode as offering
mixed support for Democratic Peace Theory.
Institutionalist Theory, on the other hand, fails the test. The theory predicted the United
States would enact a Moderate Support strategy due predominately to pressure from American
allies. This was patently not the case. Moderate Predation, rather than Moderate Support,
emerged as the United States strove to take advantage of Soviet weakness. More importantly,
the process by which the United States went about preying on the USSR contradicts
institutionalist logic: although subject to allied pressure to reign in American goals and means
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(most notably at the NATO meeting following the Malta Summit), the United States resisted this
pressure. Instead, the United States sided with the FRG, the only one of its allies seeking to
undercut Soviet security, in further weakening the USSR. In effect, the United States bucked
allied efforts to restrain its strategy rather than accede to it. In sum, the outcome and process of
U.S. policy over East Germany contradict institutionalist expectations.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
A. Summarizing the Results
Overall, Realist Decline Theory provides a more powerful explanation of American
strategy towards the Soviet Union in 1989 than its competitors. As noted, given bipolar decline
where the USSR retains a robust military posture, my argument makes three core predictions
about American policy. First, the United States should adopt a predatory strategy. Given the
opportunity to try and shift the distribution of power in its favor by undercutting the USSR, it
should do so. That said, American strategy should be only moderately predatory and marked by
a "go slow" logic and the use of cautious means that probe but do not test Soviet tolerance for
change. Second, signs of Soviet opposition to American policies should lead the United States to
reassure the Soviet Union and limit signs of predation; put differently, concerns over Soviet
internal balancing and of a war with the USSR should lead to American circumspection. Finally,
American policymakers should emphasize the desirability of making gains at the Soviet expense,
but also underscore their reluctance to do so at the risk of fostering Soviet internal balancing
either via Soviet revisionism or a Soviet revival.
All three predictions are borne out. In both military and diplomatic policy, American
strategists sought to reduce the Soviet threat to the United States by weakening the Soviet Union.
Both CFE talks and policy towards change in Eastern Europe were thus designed to undercut the
Soviet foothold in the region and limit the challenge posed to the United States. Successful CFE
negotiations, as noted, would undercut the Soviet military threat to Western Europe and could
encourage political change in the Soviet sphere. Prying Poland and Hungary from the Soviet
grasp would undermine the integrity of the Warsaw Pact, serve as a catalyst for further change in
the region, and might even prevent the Soviet Union from staging military forces on or through
these states. Above all, supporting change in the GDR and eventually backing German
reunification were ways of tearing the heart out of the Warsaw Pact: ending the existence of two
separate German states would generate immense pressure on the USSR to withdraw from
Eastern Europe. If reunification could then be obtained on Western terms, American victory in
the Cold War would be even starker by 1) integrating the whole of Germany into American
alliance system, 2) asserting American dominance over Western and Central Europe, and 3)
directly reversing the major Soviet security gain from the Second World War, namely, the
projection of Soviet power and influence into Central Europe. Given the early Cold War crises
that resulted from the back and forth between the U.S. and USSR over Germany's alignment,
this result would be a clear-cut American victory and unparalleled Soviet defeat.
The inverse is also true. American policymakers gave little or no thought to supporting
the Soviet Union and preserving its military power or presence in Eastern Europe. Not only did
the United States take advantage of apparent weaknesses in the Soviet position but the United
States systematically rejected or neutered Soviet proposals that might translate into a strong or
continued Soviet presence in Europe. Thus, Soviet CFE proposals were rejected, policymakers
never considered not challenging Soviet influence in Poland and Hungary, and the decision to
back reunification was made despite a recognized Soviet preference for a two-state solution. The
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Germany situation is also instructive as Soviet efforts to buttress their position by engaging in
Four Power negotiation were either opposed or subverted by American action. Ultimately, the
United States hunted the Soviet bear.
Still, there were limits to American efforts as the United States pursued Moderate
Predation. To summarize the preceding, American military policy was designed to cautiously
shift the military balance in the United States' favor rather than intensely challenging Soviet
military power. Similarly, instead of encouraging rapid change in Poland and Hungary,
American policy looked to cautiously back change in those countries to permit long-term
political reforms and gradually remove the Soviet footprint. To this end, the U.S. encouraged the
Poles to adopt positions that avoided outright challenges to Poland's fidelity to the Pact and
limited efforts to push extensive reforms that might be seen to threaten the Soviet alliance
network. Above all, when confronted with events in the GDR, the initial American preference
was to do little to accelerate change and instead simply try to avoid a Soviet crackdown.
Although this eventually morphed into American backing for reunification, the United States 1)
refused to endorse the process until it was clear a more assertive American stance would not
trigger a U.S.-Soviet crisis, and 2) remained highly attentive to Soviet security concerns even
afterwards. In short, American strategy throughout 1989 was geared towards cautious predation.
Finally, there is strong, if mixed, evidence that the rationales for American policy accord
with Realist Decline Theory. Baldly stated, the United States favored cautiously preying upon
the USSR to avoid Soviet internal balancing. With military policy, the American preference was
to use the CFE talks to reduce the Soviet military presence and lock in a strengthened American
military position in Europe. On the other hand, taking a more ambitious stance in conventional
arms control and calling for a complete Soviet and American military retrenchment from Europe
was unacceptable because it might allow the USSR to establish military dominance on the
continent if the USSR recovered. As expected, American policy was driven in large part by
concerns over Soviet balancing and future Soviet behavior and capabilities. That said, a second
rationale voiced in the CFE negotiations is somewhat at odds with Realist Decline Theory: as
noted earlier, part of the logic behind U.S. policy was a worry that if the United States was not
seen responding to Gorbachev's peace initiatives, then the USSR might be able to trade military
reductions for Western concessions that might also facilitate a Soviet revival. In other words,
rather than limiting the degree of U.S. predation, the concern with Soviet internal balancing also
led the United States to engage in the CFE talks in order to prevent the USSR from using CFE to
aid their recovery. This concern is not fully in agreement with my argument.
Nevertheless, the mixed evidence in military affairs is offset by overwhelming evidence
that Moderate Predation in Eastern Europe was driven by a desire to avert Soviet revisionism.
As American policymakers contemplated change in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, there
was a constant tension between the logic of predation and the desire to avoid antagonizing the
USSR. The solution was to err on the side of caution. As demonstrated, American policymakers
selected policies they believed would exceed Soviet forbearance, reassured the USSR as
necessary, and only moved forward when they believed the USSR would tolerate a more
assertive American stance. Meanwhile, indications that the United States was approaching a
Soviet red line led to efforts to walk back American policy. This was clearest in the summer
debates over retaining Jaruzelski as Polish President and ensuring Communist participation in the
Polish government, the effort to avoid pushing reunification after the Berlin Wall opened, and
the December decision to bow in the direction of Four Power talks as the prospect of an
intervention mounted. As expected, given the robust Soviet military posture, American behavior
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set into a pattern of cautiously attempting to make relative gains at the Soviet expense, but
circumscribing even these efforts when they appeared to cause a crisis with the USSR. In the
choice between power maximization and security maximization, the United States pursued the
former when possible but accepted the latter as necessary. On balance, the logic behind U.S.
behavior seems strongly in line with Realist Decline Theory.
Other theories do not fare as well. As shown, the case provides only limited evidence for
Democratic Peace Theory. Democratic peace arguments made three core predictions about the
case. First, the United States should pursue a Moderate Predation strategy. Second, American
policymakers should justify the resultant strategy in terms of the benefits of weakening an
expressly non-democratic rival. Finally, American policymakers should carefully monitor the
reforms in the USSR while shaping and altering American in response to Soviet developments.
The strongest evidence for Democratic Peace Theory comes from the outcome of the case, as the
United States indeed pursued Moderate Predation. Additional evidence comes from the fact that
policymakers occasionally spoke of the advantages of pushing Gorbachev towards a fuller
embrace of democracy and, immediately after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, emphasized the
desirability of not weakening Gorbachev's hand at home. The weight of evidence, however, still
shows American policymakers preying upon Soviet weaknesses for the sake of reducing the
Soviet military threat to the United States. On balance, American policymakers shaped
American strategy in response to the Soviet threat to the United States in pure military-strategic
terms, and emphasized the desirability of weakening the USSR as a great power challenger to
the United States, rather than a non-democratic challenger to the United States. Moreover, U.S.
strategy was insensitive to internal reforms in the USSR as American policymakers decided on
Moderate Predation before the viability of Gorbachev's reforms became clear, and sustained the
strategy regardless of oscillations in Soviet domestic politics and institutions. Overall, the case
provides mixed and limited evidence for democratic peace precepts; Realist Decline Theory
offers a stronger explanation.
Finally, Institutionalist Theory fails the case. At no point in the debates over military
policy, change in Poland and Hungary, or change in East Germany, did the United States pursue
a Moderate Support strategy. More importantly, the United States proved willing every step of
the way to buck the influence of its NATO partners and operate outside of NATO constructs
when doing so would help undercut Soviet power and security. Simply put, American
policymakers neither responded nor worked through institutional mechanisms. Realist Decline
Theory proves a stronger explanation.
B. Conclusion: Looking Forward
The United States adopted a strategy of Moderate Predation in 1989. As Soviet decline
began to tell, American policymakers sought to walk the fine line between rolling up the Soviet
empire in Eastern Europe, and encouraging the USSR to use its remaining capabilities to
internally balance against American predation. This strategy proved resilient even in the face of
changes to Soviet military doctrine, internal reforms in the USSR, and even the pressure from
NATO allies. As the next chapter shows, however, it would not survive one final change: the
collapse of Soviet military posture in the winter of 1990. Once Soviet decline became a rout and
Soviet military posture shifted from robust to weak, American predation increased. The United
States sought to use cautious means to eliminate the USSR as a great power in 1989, but once the
threat of Soviet internal balancing was removed, the United States went for the geopolitical
jugular.
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Chapter Four:
Soviet Decline and American Strategy, Part II:
Extreme Predation in 1990
I. Introduction
Chapter Three presented the first test of Realist Decline Theory against its competitors by
examining American strategy towards the declining Soviet Union in 1989. I demonstrated that
my argument both explains the case and offers more analytic traction than alternate explanations
drawn from Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. The results lend support to
the notion that a repaired version of realism can be used as a theory of foreign policy and explain
the relationship between rising and declining great powers.
This chapter continues testing Realist Decline Theory by looking at American strategy
towards the USSR in 1990. As noted in the preceding chapter, the case revolves around a central
puzzle: why, having adopted Moderate Support in 1989, did the United States shift to Extreme
Predation in 1990? As in the late-1989 debates, American strategy mainly involved the outcome
of German reunification and thus the fate of the Soviet alliance system, political influence, and
military reach in Europe. In contrast to the cautious diplomatic and military policies adopted to
manage change in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the circumspection shown when Soviet opposition
spiked, 1990 saw the United States 1) adopt maximalist diplomatic and military positions
seeking to integrate the whole of reunified Germany into NATO, and 2) disregard signs of Soviet
opposition to this effort. Simply put, American strategy fixed on preying on Soviet weakness to
the greatest extent possible, achieving outright victory in the Cold War by integrating all of
Germany's economic and military potential into the American orbit, blocking Soviet efforts to
salvage their position, and obtaining "U.S. preeminence" by getting the Soviets out of Germany
and moving the United States in.40
Extreme Predation is all the more puzzling given conventional historiography and
political science interpretations of U.S.-Soviet relations during the German reunification process.
In the most-cited historical study, Zelikow and Rice present German reunification as a story of
successful Soviet-American cooperation. The United States, in this view, helped assuage Soviet
concerns over the future of a reunified Germany, and the Soviet Union gracefully accepted the
loss of East Germany and Germany's reunification within NATO. 40 1 This benign interpretation
of Soviet-American relations dominates the political science literature as well, as is particularly
prominent in democratic peace and institutionalist arguments. Haas, for example, argues that
Gorbachev's effort to liberalize the Soviet system, partly by building democratic institutions,
helped engender trust and cooperation between the United States and USSR from 1989 onward,
suggesting the United States adopted a strategy of Moderate Support.402 Institutionalist scholars,
particularly Ikenberry and Deudney, are even more explicit. 403 In this view, the institutionalized
character of the American order, aided by the creation of ad hoc institutions to manage the
400 Sarotte, "Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence."
401 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 366-370.
402 Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War."
403 Deudney and Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement"; Ikenberry, After Victory, 228-230;
Robert B. Zoellick, "An Architecture of U.S. Strategy After the Cold War," in In Uncertain Times: American
Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey Legro (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011), 26-43.
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German reunification process, helped the United States understand Soviet security concerns vis-
a-vis reunification, moderate American demands in response to Soviet concerns, and pursue a
supportive rapprochement with the declining Soviet Union. The argument presented in this
chapter challenges each of these perspectives by showing that American policymakers shaped
American strategy to exploit Soviet weaknesses, offered the USSR no quarter once the Soviet
military threat was off the table, and reunified Germany in NATO to incorporate a period of
American hegemony in Europe.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four parts. Following this introduction, I code
the variables central to Realist Decline Theory and derive predictions. Next, I code the variables
for the alternate explanations and deduce a series of rival hypotheses; please note that, having
elaborated on the coding of the variables in the preceding chapter, I eschew a lengthy discussion
to emphasize only the variables that changed between the start of 1989 and 1990. Third, I
review American diplomatic and military policy vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union in 1990 in the context
of German reunification, tracking hypotheses, assessing predictions, and summarizing the
evidence along the way. Finally, I summarize the results and preview the following chapters.
II. Realist Decline Theory: Coding & Predictions
A. Polarity: Bipolar
The polarity of the international system did not change between 1989 and 1990.
Although the United States continued to gain on the Soviet Union in relative terms, the system
remained bipolar (Table 4.1) as the United States and USSR continued to far outpace other states
in Europe in overall capabilities. Indeed, there was even a chance that Gorbachev's reforms
might eventually help the Soviet Union begin to recover from its ongoing economic problems.
Drawing on these resources, the Soviet and American militaries remained the largest and most
diverse in Europe. Even after the Soviet military cutbacks announced in 1988-1989 and the
ongoing arms control talks, the USSR and United States remained the preeminent military actors
on the continent.40 4
Table 4.1: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1990405
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
Share of Share of Share of Share ofStat European GDP Strongest State State European GDP Strongest State
(UA)(USA)
USA 40.1 100 United Kingdom 6.5 16.3
USSR 13.8 34.4 France 7.1 17.7
_ 1_ West Germany 6.6-8.8 16.5-22.0
Finally, both the American and Soviet alliance networks remained officially intact.
Despite American concerns that the Soviet peace offensive and debates over German
reunification might undermine Western unity, NATO began the year a solid foundation for
American power projection into Europe. On the Soviet side, meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact
clearly ended the year in a state of flux. Not only had Poland and Hungary continued to
liberalize, but November and December 1989 saw the collapse of Communist governments in
404 Figures available via International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: IISS,
1990).
405 Author calculations, from Maddison dataset.
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Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria while East Germany faced mounting pressure on the
Communist regime. 406 By the start of 1990, non-Communist governments held power in the
majority of Warsaw Pact member states, and East Germany was moving towards liberalization as
the reformist Hans Modrow replaced the conservative Krenz as GDR Prime Minister.4 07 Amidst
these changes, however, none of the states officially ended their relationship with the Warsaw
Pact and USSR. As shown with Poland, the prospect of a Soviet client leaving the Pact was
believed to be a likely trigger for a Soviet intervention. As a result, no Soviet client formally
renounced ties to the Pact even amidst the unrest in Eastern Europe and the Pact remained
officially together.408 As I show in the following section, however, formal adherence to the Pact
did not prevent significant changes to the Soviet military position in Central and Eastern Europe.
B. Military Posture: Weak
Unlike polarity, Soviet posture underwent a profound shift in the winter of 1990 as it
shifted from Robust to Weak. This change had three elements. First, the political changes in
Eastern Europe raised the bar for a Soviet-led military crackdown. Although the available
documentary record is sparse, it is reasonable to conclude that the result of the East European
revolutions was a situation in which Soviet forces would need to suppress highly mobilized
populations throughout the region in order to retain pro-Soviet, Communist governments. Doing
so would be significantly more difficult than stopping political reforms in just one country, as 1)
non-Soviet forces could not be relied upon to help in the operations, 2) local security forces
might actively oppose Soviet moves, 3) local populations would likely rally to the non-
Communist regime's defense, and 4) forces would be scarce as Soviet assets would be tied down
throughout the region as opposed to just one or two countries. Collectively, political change on
the ground undercut the USSR's ability to stage a crackdown.
Second, and closely related to the preceding, the collapse of Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe threatened the Pact's conventional military position. With political changes
underway in Eastern Europe, the USSR could no longer count on other members of the Warsaw
406 Standard works on the political changes in Europe include Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York:
Random House, 1990); Jacques Ldvesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jacques L6vesque, "The East European Revolutions of 1989," in
The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 311-332; Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification (Washington,
D.C: Brookings Institution, 1993); Jon Elster, ed., The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism,
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Sebestyen, Revolution 1989;
Konstantin Pleshakov, There Is No Freedom Without Bread!: 1989 and the Civil War That Brought down
Communism, 1st ed (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009); Domber, "Skepticism and Stability"; Arend
Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91," Journal
of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 207 -223; Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification,
the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Ren6e De Nevers,
Comrades No More: The Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Koslowski
and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change"; Mark Kramer, "The Demise of the Soviet Bloc," Europe-Asia Studies 63,
no. 9 (2011): 1535-1590; Mark. Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions
Within the Soviet Union (Part I)," Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (2003): 178-256; Mark Kramer, "The
Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 2)," Journal of Cold
War Studies 6, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 3-64.
407 Sarotte, 1989; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 144-160.
408 See, for instance, the proclamations of fidelity to the Pact by member states in October and November 1989 in
Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991
(Central European University Press, 2005), 655-664.
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Pact to fight against the United States and NATO.449 Moreover, given that a Pact-NATO
confrontation might involve serious damage to Eastern Europe, Moscow presumably could not
rely on members of the Pact to allow Soviet personnel and material to transit to the front lines in
times of war. Hence, Soviet lines of communication and supply were now in doubt.41 4
Above all, key members of the Warsaw Pact began to negotiate for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Pact member territory. As early as mid-November 1989, the new Hungarian
government expressed interest in "accelerat[ing] the speed of Soviet troops withdrawal"
announced as part of the 1988 Soviet military reductions.4p, However, withdrawal plans moved
into high gear when the Soviets announced in mid-December that all Soviet troops stationed
abroad would be withdrawn "by the year 2000".4 Sensing an opportunity, Hungarian and
Czechoslovak leaders instead called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territory by
the end of 1990 and the Pact's transformation into a purely "political" organization. 413 Strikingly,
where previous moves by Soviet allies to withdraw from the Pact's military arrangements
resulted in Soviet intervention, the Soviets agreed to negotiate. By late January, official
negotiations began for a Soviet withdrawal within two to five years.414 Around the same time,
Polish leaders copied their Czechoslovak and Hungarian counterparts and similarly pressed for a
Soviet removal. Although Soviet withdrawal from Poland would separate the USSR from East
Germany, strand the main body of Soviet forces in East Europe in the GDR, and require any
campaign against the West to begin from Soviet home territory, Soviet policymakers again
agreed to negotiate. 415 The process culminated in mid-March when Hungary and
Czechoslovakia signed agreements for a Soviet withdrawal by the end of 1991; Poland reached a
similar agreement in the fall.4 16
409 MemCon, Kohl, 3 December 1989.
410 NIC, The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact, April 1990, NIC M90-10002, 10.
411 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), "Horn Compares Reforms in USSR, Hungary," 19
November 1989.
41 Reuters, "Soviets Say Cutback In Military Spending Will Be 8.2% in '90," New York Times, 16 December 1989;
Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with President Francois of France," 16 December 1989.
413 Alan Riding, "Hungary Seeks Withdrawal Of Soviet Forces in Two Years," New York Times, 19 January 1990;
FBIS, "Dobrovsky: Soviet Troop Withdrawal in 1990," 9 January 1990; FBIS, "Officials on Temelin, Soviet
Withdrawal, Germans," 11 January 1990; FBIS, "Nemeth on CEMA Reform, Kaifu Visit," 13 January 1990; FBIS,
"Dienstbier Ends Visit, Gives News Conference," 15 January 1990; FBIS, "Calfa Discusses Economy, Soviet
Withdrawal," 27-28 January 1990;
414 Mastny and Byrne, Cardboard Castle, 666-667. Also FBIS, "Horn on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks," 2
February 1990; FBIS, "USSR Favors European Troop Withdrawal in 5 Years," 30 January 1990.
415 The withdrawal from Poland was complicated by Poland's desire to use the prospect of a lingering Soviet troop
presence to obtain a border treaty from the FRG. Nevertheless, unofficial talks began on 12 February. Joanna A.
Gorska, Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy Toward Russia, 1989-2009 (Plymouth: Lexington
Books, 2010), chap. 2. Also FBIS, "Walesa Demands Soviet Troop Withdrawal," 18 January 1990; FBIS,
"Jaruzelski Supports Soviet Troop Withdrawal," 13 February 1990; FBIS, "Spokesman Details Jaruzelski Stand on
Germany," 13 February 1990; FBIS, "Mazowiecki News Conference," 21 February 1990.
416 Garthoff, The Great Transition, 413; Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order, 55-57; Sarotte, 1989, 263,
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Combined, the weak Soviet posture in Eastern Europe altered the situation facing the
United States. First, the absence of Soviet control over states in Eastern Europe virtually
proscribed a Soviet conventional attack against NATO. Without secure lines of communication
and with Soviet troops beating a fast retreat from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union would be
unable to launch or sustain an attack across the inter-German border. That is, not only would 1)
the Soviet Union be unable to reinforce forward deployed forces in the GDR to successfully
break through NATO defenses, but 2) any Soviet attack would first have to fight its way from
Soviet territory across Eastern Europe (akin to World War Two), thereby giving the West
significant time to mobilize and strengthen defenses. As a result, the Soviet Union's offensive
combat power in Eastern Europe was virtually eliminated by the changes of early 1990 and the
Soviet Union's ability to respond to American predation by launching "World War Three" was
severely limited. In short, the Soviet Union's weak posture virtually eliminated the possibility of
the USSR responding to predation with a conventional attack against the West that threatened
American security.
Second, the risk of a crisis or inadvertent war emerging from a Soviet intervention in
Eastern Europe was reduced. Previously, and as noted in the prior chapter, a Soviet crackdown
in Eastern Europe risked triggering a crisis between the United States and Soviet Union: the
United States might misperceive a Soviet crackdown as the precursor to an attack, while the
USSR might face preventive war motivations if it believed the West was interfering in the
domestic affairs of its allies. Now, with the barriers to a Soviet crackdown growing and Soviet
forces retreating from the region, these risks were reduced. On the one hand, the fact that the
Soviet Union might be hard pressed to subdue change in their client states meant that it was
unlikely the Soviets would also be able to launch an attack. Hence, the risk of the United States
misperceiving a crackdown as a precursor to a war was limited. On the Soviet side, meanwhile,
opposition to the Soviet military presence, insecure lines of communication, and troop
withdrawals meant that the Soviet capacity to escalate was reduced. Even if preventive war
motivations were present, and even if the Soviet Union perceived (rightly or wrongly) Western
intervention in the affairs of its allies, its ability to take military steps to oppose Western action
was limited.
C. Predictions
Given bipolarity and a weak Soviet posture, I predict the United States will adopt a
strategy of Extreme Predation. This strategy carries several observable implications. First, the
goal of American strategy will be on weakening the Soviet Union and improving the United
States' relative position at the Soviet Union's expense. Second, because the Soviet Union's
weak posture means the USSR cannot threaten costly internal balancing, the United States will
use intense means to prey upon the USSR. Thus, where in 1989 the United States tried to prey
on the USSR without antagonizing or appearing to threaten the USSR, now the United States
will take advantage of every political and military opportunity to weaken the USSR and
strengthen the United States' hand; in essence, the United States will try to revise the status quo
in Europe as without any regard for Soviet concerns using any and all means at its disposal.
Diplomatically, this means the United States will attempt to actively isolate the Soviet Union and
foster an anti-Soviet coalition to prevent the USSR from "breaking out" of its weakened position.
Militarily, meanwhile, we expect the United States to seek military superiority over the United
States by stripping the Soviet Union of allies and rolling back Soviet military power, to limit the
USSR's ability to wage war, threaten, or coerce the United States.
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As part of the transition from Moderate to Extreme Predation, I predict American
policymakers will monitor the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. Policymakers will
watch for signs that Soviet posture is weakening by monitoring the size, quality, and freedom of
maneuver of Soviet forces. Recognition that Soviet forces are under duress and in the process of
withdrawing will be the signal for the start of Extreme Predation. In response, American
policymakers will revise the prior assumption that intensely predatory means will imperil United
States security and conclude the time is now right for American opportunism. Extreme
Predation will follow from this conclusion.
Once this conclusion is reached, I expect American demands and pressure on the Soviet
Union to constantly escalate. In the absence of a Soviet military able to punish American
predation, American policymakers will see no need to limit the ends and means of American
strategy. Thus, Soviet concessions and signs of weakness will be met with additional American
demands and efforts to further adumbrate Soviet capabilities. In the process, American
policymakers will disregard Soviet opposition to American actions: where Soviet warnings in
1989 that the United States was approaching a Soviet redline prompted the U.S. to scale back its
actions and reassure the USSR, now American policymakers will no longer treat Soviet warnings
as credible, ignore Soviet complaints, and continue the offending action. In effect, I expect
American policymakers to not only take advantage of every sign of Soviet weakness to improve
the United States' relative standing, but actively try to create new opportunities to gain at the
USSR's expense at a time when the USSR cannot penalize American actions. Hence, if
confronted with a choice between 1) immediately increasing American relative power but risking
Soviet opposition, or 2) foregoing immediate gains but ensuring the USSR weakens over time,
the U.S. should pursue the first option. Simply put, with American relative advantages growing
and the Soviet Union's ability to impose costs on the United States eliminated, the U.S. has both
reason and opportunity to pursue maximalist positions regardless of Soviet opposition.
Finally, and as before, we also expect clear rationales offered for U.S. behavior. Realist
Decline Theory proposes that a rising state in bipolarity will prey on its declining rival to
eliminate potential threats to its security. All that prevents the riser from doing so is the prospect
of internal balancing by the decliner. However, with the Soviet Union holding a weak posture,
the cost of Soviet balancing is obviated. Thus, in their private analyses, policymakers will justify
intense predation of the USSR as a way of 1) creating unfettered American dominance on the
continent, and 2) taking advantage of the opportunity created by Soviet weakness. Simply put,
American policymakers should acknowledge the advantages of pushing the USSR out of Eastern
Europe and express enthusiasm at the prospect of doing so while facing ineffective Soviet
opposition. By extension, they will also underscore the need to prevent the USSR from
salvaging its position in Europe by denying it political and military opportunities to recover from
its problems. The prospect of the Soviet Union doing so will be seen as a challenge to incipient
American dominance in Europe, the American victory in the Cold War, and thus a problem to be
opposed with the full-range of American diplomatic and military capabilities. On balance,
American policymakers will be striving for outright victory over the USSR and will not allow
the Soviet Union to upset American plans.
11. Alternate Explanations
The predictions from Realist Decline Theory differ from those offered by both
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. In this section, I code regime type and
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identify relevant international institutions while deriving predictions from each competing
explanation.
C. Democratic Peace Theory
iv. Coding Regime Type
The United States remained a democracy in 1990, with a Polity score of 10.417
Meanwhile, although the Soviet Union was not a democracy in 1990, it was in the process of
rapidly liberalizing. Where, Polity assigned it a democracy score of 1 in 1989, it scored a 3 in
1990 as Gorbachev's domestic reforms took root. Indeed, despite conservative opposition, 1989
saw Gorbachev sustain his drive to liberalize the Soviet system as the Congress of People's
Deputies took office, Soviet political competitions continued, and freedom of speech mounted.
While the Soviet Union was not yet a democracy, it was well on its way as the reforms begun in
1988-1989 took hold and deepened. As Mark Haas concludes, "the institutional checks and
balances on governmental power that were in place in the Soviet Union by 1989 would make
highly confrontational foreign policies very difficult for any one group of Soviet leaders to
realize." 418
v. Predictions from Democratic Peace Theory
It is difficult to say what Democratic Peace Theory predicts of American strategy in 1990.
On one hand, because the USSR was still not fully democratic in 1990, the theory suggests a
rising democratic United States should continue preying upon a declining, non-democratic USSR.
On the other hand, Mark Haas, in the most systematic test of democratic peace arguments as an
account of American strategy at Cold War's end, concludes that Soviet democratization efforts
were central to the United States' decision to pursue cooperative relations with the Soviet Union;
as Haas puts it, Soviet domestic reform "helps explain Bush's strategy of negotiating with
Gorbachev. The president predominantly tried to settle various out- standing Cold War disputes
by trying to reassure the Soviets rather than coercing them with America's power superiority." 419
Thus, even though the USSR was not a democracy in 1990, scholars working in the democratic
peace tradition imply the United States adopted Moderate Support as Gorbachev's reforms
strengthened and deepened in 1990. This divergence between what a strict reading of
Democratic Peace Theory seems to predict and what scholars in the democratic peace literature
argue points to an underlying ambiguity in the political science literature.
On balance, it seems that Haas is correct and Democratic Peace Theory predicts a
Moderate Support strategy. Even if the USSR was not fully democratic in 1990, it had taken
major strides in that direction and maintained these efforts in the face of significant domestic
opposition. The fact that the USSR's Polity score went from 0 in 1988 to 3 in 1990 is a
testament to changes that constrained the autocratic powers of the Communist Party, forced the
Soviet leadership to pay increasing attention to the will of the people, and meant that any future
Soviet leader would be unable to rule by fiat; if anything, the Polity score likely understates the
changes in the USSR.420 Moreover, although it might be possible for the United States to
discount the Soviet democratization effort in 1989, the logic of Democratic Peace Theory implies
that Gorbachev's continued support for democratic change throughout the dislocations of 1989
should be recognized by the U.S. and cause a change in American strategy away from Moderate
Predation and towards some kind of supportive strategy; otherwise, the theory loses much of its
417 Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012.
418 Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War," 173.
419 Ibid.
420 Haas, "The United States and the End of the Cold War," 161-170; Beschloss and Talbott, Highest Levels, 20-22.
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ability to explain the consequences of domestic regime change. Thus, Democratic Peace Theory
suggests a relatively rising United States should try to sustain and deepen the Soviet reform
process by cooperating with the declining USSR. To do so, it should offer the Soviet Union
limited economic and military assistance, while de-escalating military competition with the
USSR and engaging in symmetric arms control in order to limit the American threat to Soviet
security. The United States may also offer the Soviet Union token political backing when the
USSR tries to retain influence in Europe, for example, rhetorically backing Soviet efforts to
retain a foothold in Eastern Europe. In short, Moderate Support for a declining USSR will see
the U.S. use limited means to preserve the USSR as an increasingly democratic great power.
By extension, American policymakers will emphasize Soviet reforms when justifying
American strategy. Where Realist Decline Theory expects the primary driver of American
policy will be the security benefits accruing from eliminating the USSR as a competitor at a time
of Soviet military weakness, Democratic Peace Theory suggests policymakers will underscore
the advantages of helping the Soviet Union stabilize and continue its domestic reforms by
cooperating in ending the Cold War. Conversely, policymakers will also discuss the problems
that would result if Soviet reforms were undone and thus underscore the need to help Gorbachev
by supporting the USSR. This logic also implies that indications that American policy is causing
problems for Soviet reforms will lead the United States to change course and try to preserve
Soviet liberalization: signs that American policy is making it less likely Soviet domestic reforms
will succeed will lead American decision-makers to move away from the offending actions. As
before, American strategists should 1) acknowledge Gorbachev's reforms, 2) monitor and debate
the implications of the internal changes for Soviet policy, and 3) justify their strategy by
reference to the desirability of ensuring Soviet regime type continues along a democratic path.
D. Institutionalist Theory
i. Coding Institutional Presence
A major change in the U.S.-Soviet institutional relationship occurred in 1990. Although
the two states were not embedded in the same institutions at the beginning of the year, the winter
of 1990 saw the two sides create an ad hoc institution known as the "Two Plus Four" talks to
manage the process and security consequences of German reunification.42 Resulting from
Anglo-American-FRG consultations in early February, the Two Plus Four talks (referring to the
"two" Germanies and the "four" allied powers from World War Two) ostensibly created a forum
for the states involved in reunification to resolve outstanding security issues as reunification
advanced.42 At least in theory, the talks thus provided a forum in which the United States and
USSR were bound to one another, could exchange information, and bargain as changes in
Europe proceeded. In particular, Ikenberry flags the institution's role in providing the USSR
"voice opportunities" to press the United States and its allies for assurances that Soviet security
interests would be preserved and respected.423 By creating the first institution embedding the
U.S. and USSR, the Two Plus Four significantly increased the degree of institutional binding
linking the United States and Soviet Union per the standards of Institutionalist Theory. Coming
421 Policymakers sometimes referred to these as the Six Power talks; the terms are interchangeable. Please also note
that I use the terms Two Plus Four "talks" and Two Plus Four "process" as synonyms.
422 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 176-182; Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen Twigge, eds., Documents on
British Policy Overseas, Series 3, Volume 7: German Reunification, 1989-1990 (New York: Routledge, 2010), chap.
2.
423 Ikenberry, After Victory, 224.
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on top of the United States' integration into NATO, the Two Plus Four added another major
constraint to American strategy at Cold War's end.
ii. Predictions
With United States and Soviet Union now embedded in the same institution and with the
United States still bound by NATO, Institutionalist Theory suggests the United States should
pursue Moderate Support.42 Due to its NATO ties, the United States should still be prevented
from preying on the USSR by allies 1) concerned that predation might trigger a crisis with the
Soviet Union, and 2) worried that predation resulting in a reunified Germany will threaten their
own security.42 More important, however, are Soviet voice opportunities and U.S.-Soviet
institutional binding created by the Two Plus Four. Because the U.S. was bound to the USSR in
an institution that gave the USSR opportunities to communicate its preferences to the U.S., the
United States is expected to acknowledge and respond to Soviet demands by adopting policies
making "the final settlement [on Germany] more acceptable" to the Soviets. The goal here is to
sustain U.S.-Soviet cooperation and rapprochement by sustaining the Two Plus Four process and
using it to improve U.S.-Soviet relations over the long-term. Combined, pressures on the United
States by NATO allies such as Britain and France, coupled with Soviet opportunities to use the
multilateral format of the Two Plus Four to press for American concessions, will produce an
"overall Western policy toward Moscow that [is] more conciliatory than confrontational" and
show the Soviets "that their concerns about unification would be addressed."426
By extension, the United States should use the Two Plus Four as the primary mechanism
for negotiating German reunification and the future of Europe with the USSR. We should see
American policymakers coordinating, bargaining, and managing the USSR primarily through
Two Plus Four meetings and mechanisms. Policymakers, in effect, will take the Two Plus Four
seriously and try to utilize it as the primary venue for assessing Soviet interests, meeting Soviet
demands, and assuaging Soviet concerns; this follows from the notion that institutions provide
negotiating venues and information-transmission mechanisms that help states peacefully manage
change in the international system. Thus, we should see American policy changing in response
to Soviet concerns made clear through the Two Plus Four process as American policymakers
receive new information about Soviet interests and concerns.42 Put differently, if Two Plus Four
helped the United States conciliate the USSR, then we should see the United States adopting
goals and utilizing different means in response to Soviet demands communicated through the
Two Plus Four to best assuage Soviet concerns.428 On the other hand, evidence that the United
States is trying to avoid being influenced by the Two Plus Four, ignoring Soviet preferences
communicated through Two Plus Four mechanisms, and bucking the restraining influence of the
other states in the Two Plus Four (or NATO) is disconfirming evidence for institutionalist
arguments.
Finally, we expect American policymakers to emphasize the restraining effects of
international institutions such as NATO on U.S. policy in their internal deliberations, as well as
discuss the importance of meeting Soviet concerns and conciliating the USSR via the Two Plus
4 24 Deudney and Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement," 42, 47; Deudney and Ikenberry, "Pushing
and Pulling," 516-517. Because the U.S. and USSR were not bound together before Soviet decline began, we do
not expect the Extreme Support that Institutionalist Theory predicts can result from long-standing, binding
mechanisms - the ad hoc nature of the institutions here cuts against their power to affect U.S. strategy.
425 Ikenberry, After Victory, 220-221.
426 Ibid., 223; Dennis Ross, Statecraft (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 41.
427 Ikenberry, After Victory, 229-230.
428 Ibid., 230-231.
110
Four process. On the former, we expect policymakers to underscore the importance of
maintaining NATO unity by acceding to the moderating influence of its allies when states such
as Britain and France exert "moderating" pressure. 4 29 On the latter, policymakers should
emphasize the importance of keeping the Soviet Union engaged in the reunification process to
legitimate the result and discuss the need to offer the USSR sufficient concessions to obtain this
outcome. In doing so, policymakers are also expected to acknowledge the implicit tradeoff
suggested by institutionalist logics, namely, that by working through the Two Plus Four, the
United States is buttressing Soviet power in a way that would not exist absent the institution.43
Overall, we should see policymakers grappling with the effects of institutions as American
policymakers accommodate Soviet preferences and acknowledge that the United States' ability
to maximize power at the USSR's expense is prohibited due to institutional binding.
IV. American Strategy and Soviet Decline in 1990: Extreme Predation
A. Background: Overview of U.S. Strategy
Moderate Predation dominated American strategy in 1989. By the end of January 1990,
however, American policy changed gears and shifted towards Extreme Predation. The strategic
change occurred as Soviet military power crumbled and Soviet posture in Eastern Europe shifted
from robust to weak. This shift had two consequences for the United States. First, it freed U.S.
policymakers from fearing the consequences of Soviet opposition if American policy became
intensely predatory. Even if the Soviets wanted to oppose U.S. actions, they could no longer
effectively do so. Second, it isolated the United States and Europe from domestic changes in the
Soviet Union. As we have seen, one of the major constraints on American policy was the fear
that an overly aggressive policy vis-d-vis Eastern Europe would result in Gorbachev's removal
from office and a Soviet crackdown. Now, with Soviet military power in retreat, the reassertion
of hardline rule in the USSR would carry fewer consequences for the United States as the USSR
could not renew Cold War military competition in the near future even if it wanted. With the
fear of war and military tensions adumbrated, American policymakers could intensely prey on
Soviet interests. As I show below, given the exigencies of a bipolar competition, American
policy was propelled by a desire to hedge against a future Soviet recovery while incorporating
U.S. hegemony in Europe.
One caveat is in order. Unlike 1989, where U.S. policy towards the USSR was a
multifaceted enterprise involving separate military and diplomatic tracks, American policy
towards the USSR in 1990 was defined by the U.S.-Soviet debates over German reunification.43'
Because these debates fused together diplomatic and military issues, I analyze U.S. strategy
towards the USSR by looking at the ins and outs of the German reunification debates. This is
not to minimize other U.S.-Soviet debates in 1990, but rather to acknowledge, as one NSC staff
member argued, that issues surrounding CFE, START, and fostering new international
institutions were means to reinforce the deals surrounding German reunification.4 32 Although
this breaks with the prior analytic structure, the discussions surrounding German reunification
429 Ibid., 223, 227-229.
430 Zoellick, "Two Plus Four: The Lessons of German Unification," 21; Deudney and Ikenberry, "The International
Sources of Soviet Change," 108-109.
431 An anecdote underlines the point. A colleague of Robert Blackwill told the author that while Blackwill was the
senior NSC staff member responsible for Soviet affairs, he would get up every morning in this period and ask "How
can I help Germany reunify?" The story is telling: here was the senior agent of the U.S. government responsible for
the entirety of U.S.-Soviet affairs defining his job in terms of German reunification.
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retain enough shared features with my coding scheme and analytic framework that it is still
possible to code U.S. strategy and assess its underlying motives. Future work, however, should
attempt a finer grained assessment.
B. Accelerating Reunification
i. Dilemmas Early in 1990
As 1990 began, American policy towards the USSR and German reunification was stuck
in a halfway house. Since the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, American policy had
moved towards a cautious embrace of reunification in order to prey on Soviet weaknesses.
Soviet opposition, however, appeared to stymie more intense predation. As the events following
the Malta Summit showed, the United States could not take advantage of the GDR collapse
without risking a Soviet backlash, the risk of which gave American policymakers pause.
Moreover, the tacit Soviet position on what might make reunification acceptable - namely, a
neutralized and demilitarized Germany that could not threaten its neighbors, with reunification
accompanied by changes in Germany's links with NATO - threatened American interests as it
weaken the U.S. alliance system and undercut the American presence in Europe. 433 And to top
things off, Britain and France remained uncomfortable with the prospect of reunification.
Combined, the Franco-British-Soviet positions meant that a coalition that could support either
the continued existence of the two German states or a lengthy reunification process was a
possibility.
In contrast, the FRG pushed for an even speedier reunification than previously imagined.
Continued political and economic unrest in the GDR encouraged Kohl in mid-December to seek
ways of accelerating the timetable initially envisioned in the Ten Point Plan and quickly create a
reunified state.435 The first step was pushing for early elections in the GDR that would
presumably return a pro-reunification government. From there, the FRG would pursue
reunification "as fast as the international traffic would bear."436 By late January, this process
was in full swing as GDR elections were moved up from May to March.
The diverging international positions left the United States in another bind and triggered
a reassessment of American policy. 437 On the table were three options. First, the United States
could try to sustain Moderate Predation. This might be difficult, but it might also successfully
carve out a middle ground to slow the Germans down and somewhat appease the Soviets, British,
and French. Second, the United States could shift course and, recognizing ongoing international
opposition and Kohl's greater assertiveness, agree to Franco-British-Soviet demands that
reunification be significantly slowed or halted. Finally, the United States could make common
cause with the FRG, speed up reunification, and accelerate the destruction of the USSR's main
European ally.
ii. Shifting to Extreme Predation
As Realist Decline Theory predicts in a bipolar contest with a declining state holding a
weak military posture, the United States chose the third path and pursued Extreme Predation.
43 Interview with NSC Official, 12 July 2012; CIA, "Analysis of Shevardnadze's Seven Questions on German
Unification," 29 December 1989, Hutchings Files, CF01414, "German Reunification," GBPL.
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Martin," 15 December 1989, Scowcroft Files, 91116, "German Unification (December 1989)," GBPL; Sarotte, 1989,
100.
43 Sarotte, 1989, esp. 85, 99-100.
436 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 159.
437 Ibid., 159-160; Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 107-108.
112
The strategy was driven by the desirability of rolling back Soviet power and denying the Soviets
an opportunity to sustain the position in Eastern Europe. Having expressed interest in December
in slowing reunification, U.S. strategists now resolved to speed up the process. A late January
memorandum from Hutchings and Blackwill is illustrative, arguing that, "Whatever Bonn's
formal position, it is clear that it wants reunification to happen fast, not slowly, and around an
increasingly detailed blueprint. We should not oppose but rather support these goals."4 38
Conversely, trying to slow the process or siding with the Franco-British-Soviet coalition risked
isolating the FRG. In turn, FRG isolation would increase the attractiveness of a bilateral Soviet-
German deal and allow Gorbachev to press Kohl for "a substantially demilitarized Germany
under conditions of neutrality, or at least of a Germany out of NATO."4 39 Such an outcome
would challenge NATO unity and limit the American ability to coerce concessions from the
USSR at a moment of Soviet weakness.440 Instead, American policymakers concluded that it
was better to work with the FRG, limit Soviet options to pressure an isolated FRG, and undercut
the Soviet alliance network. This is in line with Realist Decline Theory's expectation that a
rising state in a bipolar contest will prey on a declining great power in order to establish
unipolarity and eliminate the decliner as a threat.
Yet why, having worried in December that reunification would exceed Soviet tolerances
and threaten the stability of U.S.-Soviet relations, did the United States decide to not just endorse
reunification but accelerate the process? As my argument predicts, the shift in U.S. strategy
occurred because American policymakers came to see Soviet military posture as weak rather
than robust, thus leading policymakers to discount the costs of intense predation. Although late
January saw Hutchings and Blackwill flag the possibility that the Soviets might seek a bilateral
FRG-USSR deal as the last option "short of a military intervention" - suggesting the Soviets
could still stage a crackdown - others in the NSC had already concluded that the Soviet use of
force was a dead letter.44' Most importantly, as the United States contemplated accelerating
reunification, Blackwill tasked Rice with assessing what the Soviets would do if the United
States "hit the accelerator." Her reply on 23 January is instructive: "I believe [. . .] that the
Soviets would not even threaten the Germans. Within six months, if events continue as they are
going, no one would believe them anyway." 442
Within a few days, even this assessment was phased out. By 1 February, reports arrived
of mounting domestic opposition to Gorbachev and "rumors" that Gorbachev was resigning from
the Soviet leadership. There was at least some chance that his conservative opponents might
take control of the Soviet state. Yet where the U.S. worried throughout the fall that a different
Soviet leader might use force in Eastern Europe, the NSC now concluded that, "the Soviet Union
is probably unable to reextend [sic] its tentacles into Eastern Europe". In this new situation, the
best course for American policy was different than the position even in December: "Turmoil in
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Moscow [. . .] argues powerfully for moving forward quickly on resolving the German question
and concluding CFE. The quicker the new European order is in place, the more effective will be
the quarantine of Eastern Europe from the probable collapse of perestroika." 443
C. Creating an Exclusive Process: Diplomatic Isolation and Extreme Predation
From late January onward, American policy settled onto Extreme Predation: American
strategists moved to intensely prey on Soviet vulnerabilities and disregarded Soviet opposition
by seeking to reunify Germany and place the reunified state in NATO. This process began in
early February as the Administration, having decided to support rapid reunification in NATO,
had to decide how this result would come about. In this section, I review the ways in which the
United States enacted Extreme Predation by isolating the USSR in the diplomatic process;
subsequently, I review the extremely predatory terms under which the U.S. backed reunification.
i. Early Options
Given continuing political fragmentation in the GDR, by late January Soviet leaders no
longer appeared to be opposing reunification. With the U.S. and FRG committed to reunification,
attention shifted from whether Germany should reunify to the terms under which reunification
would occur. This was the most important issue for the United States. With Soviet troops "fast
being pushed out of the region," only clever diplomacy could salvage the Soviet political and
military presence in Central and Eastern Europe.444 In turn, whether the Soviets could pull off
this gambit affected American diplomatic strategy, as the choice of process would determine
whether the various actors (particularly the USSR) would see their demands met at the
bargaining table.445
At the time, three options were available for negotiating German reunification. First, the
Soviets continued to press for a Four Power agreement on German reunification. This approach,
as noted, was undesirable from the American perspective because it would give the Soviets a
veto over German reunification if the results did not meet Soviet demands. The second option,
espoused by the FRG, was bilateral FRG-GDR talks. This approach would formally exclude the
USSR from the process, but might in practice provide a sop to the USSR. Given Soviet interests
in and formal oversight over the GDR and the fact that many FRG politicians seemed inclined to
grant concessions to the USSR (such as the demilitarization of former GDR territory) if the
Soviets allowed a speedy reunification, American analysts saw a possibility that a bilateral FRG-
GDR process would be accompanied by a bilateral FRG-USSR deal on Germany's future
security arrangements. As the NSC concluded, this approach risked "a growing danger of
unilateral or preemptive West German concession on the future of a unified Germany. Even
NATO membership may be negotiable." 446
Finally, the Soviets might call a pan-European peace conference under the auspices of the
CSCE.447 A pan-European peace conference was also risky for the United States as it would
maximize the number of players in the negotiating room and the range of issue up for discussion.
The USSR might then capitalize on fears of a reunified Germany voiced in Britain, France,
Poland, and elsewhere, and give the Soviets leverage in obtaining a "substantially demilitarized
Germany under conditions of neutrality or at least of a Germany out of NATO."448
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Faced with similar choices in the fall between isolating the USSR from the reunification
process or coordinating with and reassuring the USSR to ensure the Soviets did not feel
threatened, American policymakers erred on the side of coordination and reassurance. Now, the
United States again faced similar choices: it could either 1) permit formal Soviet oversight over
the reunification process and reassure the USSR, or 2) formally exclude the USSR from the
process. Which way would the United States swing?
In fact, American policymakers rejected all of these options as overly conducive to Soviet
interests and injurious to American opportunism. Breaking with prior efforts to temper
predation and avoid antagonizing the USSR, American policymakers took the lead in pushing a
speedy reunification and effectively isolating the Soviets from the negotiating process. For all
intents, American policymakers led the way in organizing an anti-Soviet coalition.
ii. Isolating the USSR. Structuring the Two Plus Four Talks
This effort began the last week of January as U.S. strategists formulated plans for what
became known as the "Two Plus Four" talks for managing the reunification process. As designed
by the United States, the "two" (meaning East and West Germany) would negotiate with the
express purpose of unifying the country, while the "four" (meaning the four allied powers from
World War Two) certified the results. First developed by the State Department, the plan was
proposed to Genscher at the start of February. After Genscher's approval, it was then vetted with
Soviet leaders, and subsequently approved by British, French, East German, and other members
of the international community on 13 February.449 By the middle of the month, a new
international institution was in place to manage German reunification. 450 As I show below,
however, the Two Plus Four was a strategic legerdemain by the United States: created with the
ostensible goal of helping the players see their strategic aims met at the bargaining table, the
talks were designed to ensure the Soviets left Germany as directly and with as few concessions to
Soviet security as possible.
Making this argument provides a particularly hard test of Realist Decline Theory against
Institutionalist Theory. A number of institutionalist scholars, as well as participants in the talks,
praise the Two Plus Four process for offering the USSR "voice opportunities" to communicate
Soviet interests to Western leaders, and helping the United States and its allies to credibly
address to Soviet concerns. The resulting back-and-forth nominally produced Soviet acceptance
451of a reunified Germany inside of NATO. In this view, Two Plus Four was created and utilized
by American policymakers as a way of "signaling restraint" to the USSR and meeting at least
452some Soviet security concerns. In contrast, if, as my theory expects, a potential unipole will
449 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 178-182.
450 Ikenberry cites the Two Plus Four talks in several places as evidence that the institutional and highly permeated
character of Western order helped reassure the Soviets. In his work, he also quotes James Baker referring to the Two
Plus Four process as a "quasi-institutional arrangement." I therefore take institutional arguments at face value and
accept the Two Plus Four as an institution. Ikenberry, After Victory, 228-231, 246.
451 Ikenberry is the most vocal; see ibid., 238-241. see also; Zoellick, "Two Plus Four: The Lessons of German
Unification"; Frank Elbe, "The Diplomatic Path to German Unity," Bulletin on the German Historical Institute 46
(Spring 2010): 33-44; Zelikow and Rice, as well as Hutchings, also suggest the Two Plus Four process helped
assuage Soviet concerns and contributed to a speedy reunification; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, esp. 366-
367; Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 137-140; For a contrasting view, see Robert D. Blackwill, "German
Unification and American Diplomacy," A ussenpolitik 45, no. 1 (1994): 211-225.
452 Deudney and Ikenberry, "The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement," 47; Deudney and Ikenberry, "Pushing
and Pulling," 347. Deudney and Ikenberry point to the liberal character of the West, of which Western institutions
are a key facet, in helping reassure the Soviets that their security needs would be met. Although not specifically
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maximize power at a declining state's expense when the declining state can no longer defend
itself, then we expect to find the Two Plus Four talks created not to give the USSR voice
opportunities that the United States would respond to, but to limit Soviet influence just to voice
opportunities that policymakers could ignore. In the absence of a Soviet coercive threat, we
expect American policymakers to design the talks to isolate the process from Soviet pressure
while maximizing American control over the outcome.
Internal documents and discussions strongly support Realist Decline Theory and
contradict institutionalist arguments. The empirical record shows that the United States created
and worked through the Two Plus Four not to accommodate Soviet concerns, but rather to
insulate the process from the USSR as much as possible. Although Baker assured Soviet leaders
in his February talks that the Two Plus Four process reflected a desire to "take into account
Germany's neighbors" and avoid an American "unilateral advantage in this process," private
discussions reveal a substantially different logic. 4 53 Speaking with Kohl on 13 February, for
example, Bush and Kohl agreed that the process could not begin until after East German
elections returned a pro-reunification GDR government. Otherwise, as Bush put it, earlier Two
Plus Four talks "would open the way for any of the Four to cause mischief' by giving the Soviets
a partner in the discussions to lobby for Western concessions to the USSR.454  The NSC
elaborated on the point a few days later, proposing the United States "should try to delay any real
discussion of security arrangements in [the Two Plus Four] until the GDR is so weak that the Six,
in fact, dissolves into Five as Germany unites." Put differently, the United States would wait
until the Soviets, faced with the dissolution of their ally, had no way of opposing reunification on
whatever terms the United States desired. Furthermore, because the goal was to limit "the
degree to which [the process] threatens our interests," the United States needed to "keep the
focus of the Six Power talks as limited as possible - dealing only with the legal issues related to
the end of Four Power rights, the consequences of the absorption of the GDR into the FRG, and
the issue of what becomes of [NATO] forces on the territory of Germany's eastern half." Soviet
pressure to widen the talks to cover "Germany's membership in NATO," on the other hand,
would be resisted by playing to American strengths, namely: "the GDR's imminent collapse,"
Kohl's desire to keep Germany in NATO, and "Moscow's lack of real leverage." 45 5
The State Department reached even balder conclusions. 456 Notably, a briefing paper for
Baker's initial consultations with Bush on how the Two Plus Four process would operate
explained that, "given the process of unification, the task for the 4 powers is to manage the
focused on the Two Plus Four talks, the notion that the Soviets were reassured in part by the institutional character
of the West while Germany reunified suggests the Two Plus Four talks were important to Western reassurance.
45 Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary Baker, President Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze," 9 February 1990,
Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA. See also Memorandum of Conversation (Second One-on-One), "Secretary Baker,
Eduard Shevardnadze," 9 February 1990, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA.
454 Memorandum of Conversation, "Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of
Germany," 13 February 1990 (3 PM conversation).
45 Brent Scowcroft to The President, "Preparing for the Six Power German Peace Conference," no date [cover sheet
gives 14 February 1990], Rice Files, CF00716, "German Unification," GBPL; Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft,
"Preparing for the German Peace Conference" 14 February 1990, Blackwill Files, CFOO 182, "German Reunification
11/89-6/90 [1]," GBPL.
456 The NSC and State Department skirmished over the purpose of the talks. The NSC wanted to limit their scope
and purpose; some in the State Department wanted them to be a real negotiating venue. As the Two Plus Four talks
went forward, it became clear that the NSC approach had won and the Two Plus Four were neutered. Zelikow and
Rice, Germany Unified, 193-194. Also Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "State Department Papers on Two
Plus Four Talks," 23 February 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [1]," GBPL.
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dissolution of their rights and to obtain an expression of secure borders of Germany. The six
[sic] should not make decisions as a group." Although the talks might include discussion of
issues such as NATO membership and German military forces, underlying this discussion would
be recognition "that the ultimate authority to make decisions rests with the sovereign German
state" and whatever FRG-US deals were reached outside the Two Plus Four forum; Two Plus
Four itself was immaterial. "For example," the paper continued, "we want to take the position
Germany will be free to retain its NATO membership, but we can also discuss with the Soviets
the merits of this membership." In other words, the U.S. could attempt to justify its decision to
the Soviets in the Two Plus Four, but American goals would be pursued and interests advanced
irrespective of Soviet feedback.45 A subsequent report for Baker was clearer still. Against
concerns that the Two Plus Four might lead to discussion of security issues such as NATO
membership, Zoellick argued that, "because Two Plus Four is a discussion, not a negotiation, the
others can raise what they want to raise. We are not committed to responding at all if we don't
want to [emphasis in original]." The "bottom line" was that the talks committed the United States
to discuss "[only] those things we want to talk about."4 58
Equally important was what would happen if the USSR tried to press for Western
concessions by limiting Germany's relationship with NATO. In this scenario, "the process
[gives] us additional support (the UK and France) on keeping a united Germany in NATO
[emphasis in original] . It would also diminish the risk of Gorbachev successfully limiting the
FRG's link to NATO: because the USSR would "have more leverage to make this case
bilaterally," negotiating through Two Plus Four would minimize Soviet opportunities to obtain
the results it sought by affording the U.S. oversight of the process and the ability to rally the
FRG, Britain, and France against Soviet moves. Ultimately, Two Plus Four might help
Gorbachev deflect domestic opposition by claiming the USSR was working with the West in
"managing the German issue," but it provided the USSR "little real control" over the process.460
iii. Forging an Anti-Soviet Coalition
American efforts to isolate the Soviet Union went beyond structuring the Two plus Four
to isolate the USSR and included efforts to isolate the USSR diplomatically within the talks.
This again contradicts Institutionalist Theory arguments that the Two Plus Four bred American
support for the USSR, and also casts doubt on Democratic Peace arguments that the United
States pursued a Moderate Support strategy. Instead, the results buttress Realist Decline Theory
predictions that a rising United States will intensely prey on the USSR at every available
opportunity. Having decided that the best use of the Two Plus Four was to isolate the USSR, the
U.S. used a meeting with Kohl on 24-25 February to obtain FRG agreement to the diplomatic
plan. This was a critical step, as Kohl had yet to explicitly endorse keeping a reunified Germany
fully in NATO and might still be open to a bilateral FRG-Soviet deal.4 1 To this end, the United
45 James Baker, "Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President," 16 February 1990, Box 115, Folder 7, BP.
458 Robert Zoellick to James Baker, "Two Plus Four: Advantages, Possible Concerns, and Rebuttal Points," 21
February 1990, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA. The report lacks an author, but citation information can be found
in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 431, n28.
459 Zoellick, "Two Plus Four."
460 Aside from the items cited above, see Blackwill, "State Department;" Draft Cable (annotated by Blackwill),
"Two Plus Four Consultations," 6 March 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2],"
GBPL; Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, "Discussions with State on Plans for Two Plus Four Meeting on March
14," 9 March 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2]," GBPL.
461 Sarotte, 1989, 121. Brent Scowcroft, "Meetings with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl," 24 February 1990,
Hutchings Files, CF01414, "German Reunification [1]," GBPL; Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "The
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States pursued what Scowcroft termed "two key goals" for the meeting, namely: 1) "a Kohl
commitment to firm German membership in NATO, including continued integration of German
forces in the NATO command," and 2) "agreement on how to manage the Two Plus Four
negotiations on Germany to minimize Soviet ability [sic] to weaken Germany's membership in
NATO." 462
Bush was equally clear during the actual meeting. As he told Kohl early on, the United
States did not want "the Soviets to use this mechanism as an instrument to force you to create the
Germany they might want." The key, therefore, was American-German agreement that a
reunified Germany was to remain in NATO, fully integrated with the command structure. The
U.S. and FRG could then pressure the Soviets to accept the offer as constituted in Washington
and Bonn.463 On the other hand, if the U.S. and Germany accepted Soviet calls for "an [early]
engagement in Two Plus Four talks," then talks might well "stimulate the Soviets to interfere" in
the reunification process.464 Kohl concurred, agreeing on the need to both keep Germany fully in
NATO and to prevent the Soviets from pressing for early Two Plus Four talks that might allow
the Soviets to influence the terms of reunification.
Underlying the discussion was a belief that if the U.S. and FRG circled the wagons
against the USSR, then a speedy reunification on Western terms was very likely. The notion was
not a multi-year reunification process, but rather aiming to "finish the Two Plus Four this year"
irrespective of Soviet opposition.465 After all, the GDR elections were expected to produce a
pro-reunification government, such that reunification on whatever terms the FRG sought was
going to happen fast. Once the Americans signed the FRG up to the U.S. agenda, Soviets
attempts to use the Two Plus Four talks to place conditions on the process would simply cause
the Soviets to find themselves opposing a unified Germany wedded to maintaining its NATO ties
and backed by the United States. Either the USSR would play along with the United States and
Germany, or it would find its position overrun by onrushing events.
Thus, what emerged from the 24-25 February meeting was agreement on a coordinated
U.S.-FRG strategy towards rapid German reunification in NATO and with countervailing offers
from the USSR rejected out of hand.466 This basic agreement came to shape the U.S. approach to
the Two Plus Four. Throughout March and April, the USSR pressed for the start of Two Plus
Four negotiations at the Ministerial level to address the issues surrounding German reunification.
Yet not only did the United States reject calls for a Ministerial meeting, but when lower-level
officials met, the United States coordinated with the FRG, UK, and France beforehand to ensure
that the meetings solely discussed the "procedure" of the talks rather than the substance of
467 to coordinate beforehand with American allies became moreGerman reunification. EffortstocodntbeoeadwtAmranlisbcme oe
important over time. By meeting with the FRG, Britain, and France before dealing with Soviet
officials, American policymakers were able to present the USSR were a series of fait accompli
Beginnings of the Big Game," 7 February 1990, Blackwill Files, CFOO 182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [1],"
GBPL.
462 Scowcroft, "Meetings with Kohl."
463 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 211-212.
464 Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,"
24 February 1990.
465 Ibid.
4 66 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 214-215.
467 Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, "Discussions with State on Plans for Two Plus Four Meeting on March 14," 9
March 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2]," GBPL.
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that blunted Soviet efforts to break out of their diplomatic isolation.468 Coordination also
ensured that U.S. preferences dominated the discussions. Bush outlined this plan to British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher in April, explaining, "I understand that the Two Plus Four will next
be discussing their agenda. This is a very important subject, and I want to be sure you and I are
seeing this in the same way. Before each Two Plus Four session, we should carefully make sure
that our two countries, French, and the FRG, have identical positions." After all, "We think the
Two Plus Four should concentrate on how to give the existing Four Power rights and
responsibilities Berlin and Germany as a whole, so that a united Germany can be fully sovereign
like other European states;" in contrast, "the Soviets will want to use the Two Plus Four to
interfere with Germany's sovereign rights and hosting Western forces the current FRG."
Organized Western action was the best way to blunt Soviet efforts and isolate the USSR.469
This approach continued even as the U.S. and FRG finally agreed to a Ministerial
meeting in early May, six weeks after the GDR elections returned a pro-reunification leadership.
To ensure the USSR could not even attempt to influence the terms of reunification, U.S. and
FRG officials concluded, as Zelikow and Rice offer, "that Moscow had to be convinced, beyond
any doubt, that the Soviet Union was isolated diplomatically" and "to achieve this isolation,
Western solidarity had to be complete." 470 There was also a coercive element to this approach,
because if the Soviets tried to break out of their isolation and oppose the U.S.-FRG effort, the
U.S. and FRG stood ready to ensure that there "would be a deterioration in the smooth, stable
relations so essential to the benign international environment in which the Soviet leaders could
concentrate on domestic reform." 47' Simply put, if the USSR attempted to oppose the American
party line, then the United States would renew Cold War-style competition at a time when the
Soviet leadership counted on a relaxed international environment.47
iv. Limiting the Mandate
Following from American efforts to isolate the USSR in the diplomatic game of German
reunification was American opposition to broadening the Two Plus Four mandate to cover a
wider array of security issues. 473 This matches Realist Decline Theory's predictions that the
United States will limit opportunities for the USSR to recover from its weakness, while
contradicting institutionalist and democratic peace claims that the United States will
accommodate and try to support Soviet concerns. As far back as February, the United States
sought to limit the Two Plus Four mandate to simply "work[ing] out the details of giving up Four
Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole, not the issue of Germany's
468 Robert Zoellick to Secretary Baker re Quad Meeting Discussion of German Unification and Two-plus-Four,"
undated [sometime on or around 14 March], Rice Files, CF00721, "2+4 Germany #3 [2]," GBPL; George,
"Tightrope."
469 Memcon, "Meeting with Thatcher," 13 April. See also Bush's conversations with Kohl and Mitterand on 18 and
19 April, respectively, for additional discussion of the need for coordination.
470 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 246.
471 Ibid. For a related discussion, see B.P. Hall, "Security Issues in the Two-Plus-Four," 5 April 1990, Blackwill
Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2]," GBPL.
472 At this point, Gorbachev faced increasing domestic opposition from conservatives and military leaders. The
Soviet economy was also tanking, leading Shevardnadze and Gorbachev to seek foreign aid. Thus, with Gorbachev
under duress at home and the USSR on the economic skids in general, American leaders had military, political, and
economic levers they could pull if Soviet opposition mounted; Bush-Kohl conversation on 24 February; "Memcon
from 3/14/90 mtg with USSR Financial Minister Pavlov," 14 March 1990, Box 108, Folder 15, BP; Sarotte, 1989,102.
473 Harvey Sicherman to Dennis Ross and Robert Zoellick, "Our European Strategy: Next Steps," 12 March 1990,
Box 176, Folder 14, BP.
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full membership in NATO." 474 Despite Soviet pressure, the American position did not change;
this conforms to the realist prediction that the United States will ignore Soviet opposition to
intense predation given the absence of a Soviet military threat. By 12 March, American
policymakers resolved that the Two Plus Four mandate should be constrained: the talks could
decide matters related to relinquishing Four Power rights and could also consider the shape of
German border, but would otherwise be circumscribed. 475 As Table 4.2 illustrates, the security
issues that the Soviets might want to address (for example, the relationship of reunified Germany
to NATO, the fate of military forces on GDR territory, and the size and shape of the German
military) could at best be discussed in the forum. Decisions on these issues, however, would all
be made outside of the Two Plus Four.476 Hence, the more the USSR tried to work through the
Two Plus Four process, the more it would be wasting its time and the more United States could
advance its interests in other forums. This belies the institutionalist prediction that the Two Plus
Four caused the United States to assuage Soviet concerns. Ultimately, American opposition to a
broader mandate was such that the U.S. even sought to prevent discussion of the FRG-NATO
relationship in the Two Plus Four. As Bush notably told Thatcher in mid-April, "We need to be
as clear as we can about the things the Two Plus Four should not decide" such as "Germany's
membership in NATO."4 77
474 "Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom," no date
[content indicates on or before the 24 February meeting with Kohl], Scowcroft Files, 91116, "German Unification
(February-March 1990)," GBPL.
47 At the time, Poland was worried that Germany might try to re-acquire historically German territory ceded to
Poland at the end of World War Two. Ensuring that disputes relating to the territorial changes in 1944-1945 would
not morph into a row in the new Europe was therefore a hot-button issue. The issue had a bizarre quality to it,
however, as Kohl was willing to publicly renounce German claims to Polish territory, the Poles protested a bit too
much, and the Americans seemed overly interested in rapidly settling the matter. In retrospect, the debate appears to
be related to the Soviet effort to retain a foothold in Europe. If the border issue remained unresolved, then the USSR
might be able to play off Polish fears of Germany to entice the Poles into retaining a Soviet military presence on
their territory. As odd as it sounds, some Polish officials expressed interest in such a deal (perhaps as a way of
pressuring the U.S. and FRG to resolve the matter).
476 Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, "The Two Plus Four Agenda," 12 March 1990, NSC PA Files, Doc. No.
9001938, GBPL. Again, I am indebted to Zachary Roberts for providing this document. See also the State
Department papers prepared at this time, especially Roger George to Dennis Ross and Bob Zoellick, "The Two-
Plus-Four Tightrope," 12 March 1990, Rice Files, CF00712, "2+4 Germany #3 [1]," GBPL.
477 Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain," 13 April
1990. This followed an interagency recommendation that the United States work with the FRG, Britain and France
to ensure that "the Soviets do not make a Two-Plus-Four consensus on the security parameters of a united Germany
a quid pro quo for agreement to a peace settlement"; B.P. Hall, "Security Issues in the Two-Plus-Four," 5 April 1990,
Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2]," GBPL.
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Table 4.2: The Two Plus Four Mandate: March 1990478
Issue Role of Two Plus Four Talks
Four Power Rights, including Berlin Could Decide Issue
Borders Could Decide Issue
NATO Relationship to GDR Territory Could Not Address Issue
Soviet Troops in GDR Could Discuss Issue
Nuclear Weapons in FRG Could Not Address Issue
Germany Alliance Membership Could Not Address Issue
Prohibition on German Could Discuss IssueNuclear/Chemical/Biological Weapons (NBC)
Size of German Army Could Not Address Issue
German Forces in GDR Territory Could Discuss Issue
Also informative are the results of a private meeting between Baker and Shevardnadze
the night before the Two Plus Four Ministerial meeting in May. Shevardnadze argued that Two
Plus Four should be a "decision-making body" that took its time to address "complex issues"
such as the development of pan-European security institutions and arms control. Baker, in
response, countered that the U.S. saw the talks as a "steering group" predominately geared
towards discussing the security consequences of German reunification; the only topics that could
be decided were those related to Four Power rights and borders. 479 At the moment when the
Soviets sought to use the Two Plus Four talks in the manner they were ostensibly designed,
American policymakers rejected the Soviet effort.4 80 However, this was simply the culmination
of an American effort to isolate the USSR in place since February. In an apt summary, Policy
Planning staffer Harvey Sicherman argued it was better "to call two plus four the 'two by four'
because it represents in fact a lever to insert a united Germany in NATO whether the Soviets like
it not [emphasis added]."48 ' By the time the USSR agreed to the terms of reunification in July,
the USSR had been stymied for half a year in using diplomacy to pursue any other course.
v. Assessment: Diplomatic Policy
Overall, American diplomatic policy offers significant evidence in support of Realist
Decline Theory. As my theory uniquely predicts, the United States adopted Extreme Predation
after coming to the conclusion that the USSR could not defend Eastern Europe following the
events of late 1989 and early 1990. It did so by structuring the diplomatic negotiations over
German reunification to deny the USSR the opportunity to salvage influence in East Germany
while fostering an anti-Soviet coalition that maintained Soviet isolation within the talks. At the
same time, the United States rejected repeated Soviet efforts to broaden the mandate of the Two
Plus Four discussions in ways conducive to Soviet power and security. Simply put, the United
States used the institutions nominally created to reassure and assuage Soviet concerns as an iron
glove with which to wield an iron fist. In this, American policymakers remained fixed on the
desirability of moving the Soviets out of East Germany and oriented all American diplomatic
478 Adapted from Zelikow, "Two Plus Four Agenda."
479 Baker, Politics, 245-246. Also USDel Secretary in Germany to SecState in DC & White House, "Memorandum
for the President: My Meeting with Shevardnadze," 4 May 1990, available online at
littp://foia.state.gov/SearchCoIIs/CoIIsSearch.asp.
480 Robert Zoellick to Secretary Baker, "Background on Two-Plus-Four for Namibia Meeting," 16 March 1990,
Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA.
481 Sicherman "Our European Strategy."
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efforts to pursue this objective regardless of the costs; Soviet opposition to this goal and the
intense means used in the pursuit thereof made not a dent in American strategy. Considering
Soviet opposition to Moderate Predation in the fall of 1989 led American strategists to walk back
American policy and reassure the Soviets when Soviet opposition spiked, the intense American
pursuit of a weaker USSR matches what my theory predicts when the declining pole of a bipolar
system holds a weak posture. On balance, Realist Decline Theory provides an apt account of
U.S. diplomatic policy.
Conversely, and although the evidence is less clear-cut, the results do not support
Democratic Peace Theory. First, American diplomatic policy was predatory rather than
supportive. Rather than try to help the USSR and respond to Gorbachev's reforms of the Soviet
system, American policy fixed on walking the USSR out of Eastern Europe irrespective of
changes to the Soviet domestic system. Second, there is only limited evidence that American
strategists paid attention to the state of Soviet domestic politics. Although policymakers
occasionally opined that the Two Plus Four process might give Gorbachev a prop to use against
domestic critics, this argument appears secondary to hard-headed calculations of U.S. security
and military power. Instead, the balance of internal deliberations shows the United States
focused on improving American security by undercutting the security position in Europe rather
than anything having to do with Soviet domestic politics. This also matches a common-sense
counterfactual: if the United States was primarily concerned with protecting Gorbachev against
domestic critics and ensuring the success of Soviet reforms, then American policymakers should
have avoided preying upon the Soviets and isolating them in the diplomatic process to deprive
Gorbachev's critics of ammunition in the first place! As it stands, the outcome of U.S.
diplomatic policy and the underlying logic do not match Democratic Peace Theory predictions.
Finally, the results cast serious doubt on institutionalist arguments. As formulated by
Ikenberry and others, Institutionalist Theory predicts the United States should adopt a Moderate
Support strategy. Driven by allied pressure and bound to the USSR in the Two Plus Four, the
United States is expected to emphasize the desirability of helping meet Soviet security demands
while responding to Soviet security concerns raised in the Two Plus Four process; ultimately, the
Two Plus Four itself is expected to become a self-fulfilling cycle as the USSR and US use the
institution to breed cooperation and support, leading to a mutual stake in the status quo and
further rapprochement. As shown above, however, the United States worked to avoid these
outcomes. Not only did the possibility of allied pressure drive the United States to structure the
Two Plus Four to avoid a possible Anglo-Franco-Soviet coalition, but the United States sided
with the one ally (West Germany) seeking the most predatory outcome vis-a'-vis the USSR.
Having done so, American policymakers further worked 1) to block Soviet efforts to use the Two
Plus Four as a forum to actually negotiate the security issues surrounding German reunification,
and 2) to delay the start of Two Plus Four negotiations so as to weaken the Soviet hand. And
where necessary, American strategists emphasized the desirability of channeling security issues
outside the Two Plus Four framework to ensure the USSR could not influence the results.
Above all, policymakers were willing to sidestep or ignore Soviet opposition to the USSR's
isolation even when communicated through the Two Plus Four channel. These are hardly the
outcomes one expects if the institutions provided the USSR "voice opportunities" and
encouraged the United States to reassure the USSR. Ultimately, neither the outcome nor process
of U.S. diplomatic policy accords with Institutionalist Theory.
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D. "You Haven't Seen a Leveraged Buy-Out Until You See This One": Extreme Predation and
American Military Dominance 482
i. Overview
Aside from the diplomatic process, the United States also ensured that the terms of
German reunification offered the Soviet Union no opportunity to salvage their position in
Eastern Europe. This process helped establish U.S. military dominance. The preceding
discussion highlighted the American effort to insolate the Soviet Union and neuter the Two Plus
Four talks to increase the chances that a reunified Germany remained in NATO and the bulk of
Europe's war-making potential fell into the American camp. If, however, Realist Decline
Theory is correct, then we should also find that the United States 1) rejected alternate Soviet
formulations that might protect Soviet security and power, and 2) expanded the scope of
American ambitions as Soviet posture shifted.
This is another hard test of Realist Decline Theory against Institutionalist Theory in
particular. As noted, institutionalist scholars argue that the United States responded to Soviet
"voice opportunities" created by the Two Plus Four and adopted positions conducive to the
maintenance of Soviet power and security. Although I found little evidence above that the U.S.
designed the diplomatic process to give or respond to Soviet voice opportunities, it may still be
the case that the United States responded to those Soviet demands that emerged in the
negotiations and that this reassured Soviet decision-makers. If so, then we should find evidence
that the United States agreed to meet Soviet demands voiced in the Two Plus Four, made
concessions to Soviet concerns, and that the U.S. and Soviet bargaining positions converged
during the course of the talks. Conversely, if Realist Decline Theory is correct, then we expect
to find the United States both refusing to concede to Soviet interests, and increasing American
demands now that the United States could not be balanced by the Soviet Union. Finally, if
Democratic Peace Theory is accurate, then we should find the United States trying to support the
USSR while emphasizing the increasingly democratic nature of the Soviet Union in the process.
ii. Escalating Means and Ends
a. Keeping NATO Alive
American leaders came into the discussions over German reunification with one
irreducible objective: keep the FRG in NATO. Whether that meant a reunified Germany in
NATO or the continued division of the country, this objective remained a constant in American
calculations. Thus, just as the State Department proposed in October 1989 that, "our overriding
objective is the maintenance of a democratic FRG, firmly tied to the West," so did the NSC
propose in February 1990 that "the principal objective of the United States is a united Germany
fully in NATO, subordinating its forces to the integrated NATO military command." 483
Continued West German fidelity to NATO was the sine qua non of American military policy as
Soviet power tottered. Outside of this objective, however, American goals remained ill-
defined.484
Resolving this ambiguity while protecting the FRG-NATO link was crucial. Because the
FRG remained NATO's linchpin, setting the terms of reunification would affect the American
482 The quote is Baker's in marginalia from Zoellick, "Two Plus Four."
483 Seitz, "Future of Germany;" Scowcroft, "Meeting with Kohl."
484 Zelikow and Rice note that at the end of January, the United States was still debating "what outcomes for NATO
were acceptable?" Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 165. See also Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft,
"Message to Kohl," 8 February 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [1]," GBPL,
and Baker's comments in the 25 February memcon with Kohl.
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military presence in Europe. Bush had already used his State of the Union address to propose
lower CFE manpower limits of 195,000 troops each for the U.S. and USSR in an effort to "lock
in" the Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe.485 This proposal was heavily asymmetric,
as Soviet forces would be capped at nearly 360,000 troops below their pre-negotiation level,
while U.S. forces would drop by less than 100,000.486 Because the U.S. proposal also excluded
30,000 U.S. troops in Britain, CFE would give the United States quantitative as well as
qualitative superiority in Europe (235,000 U.S. troops, versus 195,000 Soviet).487
Much would therefore depend on the terms of reunification. If the U.S. could ensure a
reunified Germany remained firmly in NATO with no limits on the NATO military presence in
the reunified state, then the United States military edge might be assured. Conversely, if the
Soviet pulled the FRG out of NATO or established "some weaker form of association for
Germany with NATO," then the USSR could prevent an outright American victory in the Cold
War. As the NSC offered in mid-February, under such conditions, the Soviets "might figure that
it would be long before pressures from the Germans and within the U.S. Congress would force
4A88
the size of the American presence [in Europe] down and eventually out as well." Ensuring
that reunification protected West Germany's membership in NATO was therefore critical to
protecting the looming American military edge. Reflecting the fluid situation, Scowcroft had the
NSC detail a range of possible security outcomes from German reunification. As rank ordered
from the perspective of U.S. security on 5 February (Table 4.3), these varied from a
"neutral/nonaligned/demilitarized Germany" that was out of not just NATO but also the
European Commission (EC) (the worst option), to "Germany in NATO" in which "forward
defense extends to the Oder-Neisse [i.e., the German-Polish border]" and "U.S. nuclear weapons
remain" (the best option).489
485 Memorandum of Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with President Mitterand of France," 27 January 1990.
For background, see Gates, From the Shadows, 486-487.
486 Falkenrath, Shaping Europe's Military Order, 61-63.
487 Shevardnadze essentially agreed with Bush's plan during the 13 February Ottawa Summit; Falkenrath, Shaping,
63-64; also "JAB Notes from 2/11-2/13/90 Open Skies Conf., Ottawa, Canada," Box 108, Folder 14, BP.
488 Scowcroft, "Six Power Peace Conference."
489 Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "German Unity: Variations on the Theme," 5 February 1990, Rice Files,
CF00716, "German Unification," GBPL.
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Table 4.3: Rank Ordered Range of Possible German Outcomes, 5 February490
Option Details
1) Germany in NATO Forward defense and nuclear weapons remain.
2) Germany in NATO with GDR territory demilitarized Otherwise as above.
3) Germany in NATO but outside military command (like
France) *"Beginning with this scenario, the current structure Otherwise as above.
of transatlantic security begins to change fundamentally."
4) Germany in NATO but no U.S. nuclear weapons
a) Current GDR territory militarized
b) Current GDR territory demilitarized
5) Germany in NATO, GDR Territory demilitarized, no U.S. Allied conventional forces remain, U.S. nuclear guarantee
forces continues.
6) Germany-U.S. bilateral security arrangements
Germany out of NATO, no U.S. nuclear weapons, GDR
a) U.S. and Allied conventional forces remain territory demilitarized. Western European Union (WEU)
b) Allied but no U.S. conventional forces remain remains.
c) No stationed forces
7) German-French and -British bilateral security
arrangements
No U.S.-German security relationship. WEU remains.
a) Stationed French and British conventional forces
b) No stationed forces
8) WEU
a) Stationed French and British conventional forces
b) No stationed forces
9) European Defense Force
a) All CSCE No WEU.
b) European CSCE (no U.S., USSR, Canada)
10) Neutral/aligned Germany Aligned politically but not militarily with West. EC. No
WEU. German forces severely constrained.
11) Neutral/nonaligned Germany German forces severely constrained. EC. No WEU.
12) Neutral/nonaligned/demilitarized Germany No military forces.
b. Escalation Begins
Over the month of February, the United States walked its demands up this menu of
options. As Realist Decline Theory predicts, American predation escalated in the absence of a
credible Soviet military deterrent. This is striking because at the start of the month, it seemed
that the United States would face problems simply preventing the USSR from creating a neutral
Germany. At the time, Soviet leaders demanded that a reunified Germany leave NATO, and
West German leaders appeared willing to accommodate Soviet interests if it meant the Soviets
would back reunification. As such, West German officials floated proposals for a neutral
Germany, for the demilitarization of GDR territory following reunification, and even
incorporating both the Pact and NATO into "new cooperative security structures." 49 1 With
domestic pressures mounting, Kohl appeared willing to accept a circumscribed FRG-NATO
relationship. To American analysts, it seemed a real possibility that NATO might be weakened
490 Blackwill, "Variations on the Theme."
491 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 174-175.
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by Soviet pressure in the course of German reunification. Thus, American officials scrambled to
simply protect the FRG-NATO link.492
Within one week, however, American escalation began. In a change from the moderately
predatory approach in 1989, American officials took the lead in pushing the FRG to ignore
Soviet demands for German neutrality post-reunification while blocking plans that might limit
reunified Germany's connection to NATO. Considering these plans 1) involved eliminating the
cornerstone of Soviet security in in Europe, 2) integrating the majority of Europe's war potential
into the U.S. alliance system, and 3) that debates over these matters had triggered a series of
U.S.-Soviet military crises in the early the Cold War, American efforts are indicative of the
extremely predatory nature of U.S. strategy.493
This process started following meetings between American and FRG officials on 1-2
February. During these talks, American and German officials agreed on a modified version of a
plan initially proposed by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher: German leaders pledged that "the
new Germany would remain in NATO," while American leaders agreed that NATO would not
expand into the former GDR.494 All parties might have benefitted from this plan. Germany
would reunify, the Soviets would be reassured by de facto keeping their former ally out of
NATO military arrangements, and the U.S. would retain a strong connection Europe. In and of
itself, this agreement thus seemed to meet the minimum American requirement for a
reunification deal as reunified Germany remained in NATO and the military command minus
GDR territory survived intact.495
With what seemed a viable proposal in hand, Baker left for talks with Soviet leaders on
7-9 February. During these discussions, Baker previewed the FRG-U.S. plan and promised that
"there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction [. . .] to the east."4 96 It was also possible
that, "there will be in de-militarized Eastern part of Germany [sic]" and he could guarantee that,
"there would be no NATO forces in the Eastern part of Germany."4 97 Gorbachev responded
favorably to Baker's proposals, allowing that expansion of the "zone of NATO" would be
unacceptable to the USSR. 498 Although Gorbachev refused to agree to the deal at the time, the
Baker-Gorbachev meeting seemed to produce a tentative quid pro quo: the Soviets could count
on limits to NATO's political and military presence in the former GDR if they agreed to
reunification within NATO writ large.499 A path towards reunification appeared to be within
reach.500
Almost as soon as the quid pro quo was on the table, however, the nascent deal came
under attack. In Washington, the NSC challenged the idea of a de fanged former GDR existing
outside NATO. In the NSC's assessment, all of reunified German territory should be in NATO
and NATO jurisdiction extend eastward. Otherwise, a sizable portion of reunified Germany
492 Scowcroft, "Strategy for Unification."
493 See again Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace.
494 SecState, "Baker/Genscher Meeting;" Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 176. For a view that ignores the
German concessions, see Elbe, "Diplomatic Path," 37.
495 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 176-177.
496 Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting w/USSR Pres. Gorbachev & FM Shevardnadze, Moscow, USSR," 9
February 1990, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA.
497 Memorandum of Conversation, "Memcon from 2/9/90 meeting w/USSR FM Shevardnadze, Moscow, USSR," 9
February 1990, Soviet Flashpoints, Box 38, NSA.
4 98 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 183.
499 Mark Kramer, "The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2
(2009): 39. I disagree with Kramer's interpretation of the Baker-Soviet meetings.
500 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 239-240.
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would be militarily denuded and theoretically vulnerable to attack. 50 ' This represented the first
escalation of the American position. Rather than just preserving the FRG link to NATO, the
United States now demanded NATO jurisdiction cover the former GDR, and that some kind of
NATO military presence exist on GDR territory. Facing NSC pressure, the best that Bush was
now willing to offer was an undefined "special military status" for former GDR territory.0 2 This
change was conveyed to Baker in Moscow, who backed away from his prior position by
announcing that, "you will have the GDR as part of [NATO] membership."503 Thus, at a time
when the USSR still sought to keep Germany outside of NATO, the U.S. now demanded the
whole reunified state enter the alliance in some form.504
c. American-West German Divergence: The U.S. Escalates, the FRG Follows
Unfortunately, the Baker-NSC debate opened a gap between the American and West
German positions. Baker's departure from Moscow coincided with Kohl's arrival for talks with
the Soviet leadership. Baker sent a letter to Kohl summarizing his initial agreement with
Gorbachev before the White House sent Kohl a second letter with the revised, "special military
status" offer. With confusion over the American position reigning, Kohl opted to pursue the first
(Baker) proposal and promised Gorbachev that, "naturally NATO could not expand its territory
to the current territory of the GDR." As he had with Baker, Gorbachev seemed interested in the
idea but would not formally commit. Instead, he asked whether Germany could "perhaps be
nonaligned, like India."50 5 Kohl demurred, but left the no-expansion offer on the table.
By late February, therefore, American policymakers found their efforts to keep a
reunified Germany in NATO had led to an unfortunate place. The Soviets remained opposed to
reunification inside of NATO, seeking instead neutrality or non-alignment. Meanwhile, efforts
to entice the Soviets into an agreement by allowing a special status for the GDR threatened to be
the first step into loosening the link between Germany and NATO.50 6 This was particularly
worrisome given the breach in the American and West German positions, as the FRG supported
the "no eastward expansion" pledge more amenable to Soviet security and the United States
backed the "special military status" formulation that would move the former GDR into NATO.50 7
Thus, either the United States would need to back down, meet the FRG position, and reassure the
USSR, or it would have to pull the FRG towards its position and confront the USSR together.50
501 Brent Scowcroft to The President, "Message to Kohl," 8 February 1990, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German
Reunification 11/89-6/90 [1]," GBPL.
502 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 179-190; Sarotte, 1989, 120-125.
503 Quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 184.
504 On 30 January, Blackwill forwarded Scowcroft a report arguing that all of Germany should be in NATO, but it
took until mid-February for its recommendations to be acted upon; Scowcroft, "Strategy for German Reunification;"
Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 418, n25.
505 Quoted in Sarotte, 1989, 112-113.
506 Ibid., 125.
507 Ibid,, 121.
508 Scowcroft, "Meetings with Chancellor Kohl." It is worth noting that on 21 February, the State Department listed
seven issues it believed the Soviet leadership would need before conceding German reunification. None of these
affected the core American goal of pushing the Soviets out of Germany, keeping the Americans in the reunified
country, and sustaining NATO. These issues were: 1) no NATO forces in the GDR, 2) a transitional period for
Soviet troop withdrawals, 3) limits on German forces in the GDR, 4) no German possession of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons, 5) resolution of German border issues, 6) reduction in the size of the German army, and 7) the
promise of economic cooperation with the FRG. Of these issues, the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh only affected
the FRG and would serve American interests (e.g., the U.S. did not want the FRG to acquire nuclear weapons). The
second issue was a practical matter as the USSR could not absorb the returning troops too quickly. The first and
third issues, meanwhile, would still leave the U.S. in a commanding position in Europe and ensure NATO's ability
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Faced with similar choices in 1989 between taking a more assertive stance against the
USSR and moving ahead of German and Soviet leaders, or avoiding positions that might
antagonize the USSR, American policymakers erred on the side of caution. Now, however, the
United States did the opposite. As Realist Decline Theory predicts, a rising United States
confronted with a weak USSR sought to intensely prey on the USSR by enlisting the FRG in the
U.S. plan to expand NATO into the GDR irrespective of Soviet concerns. Equally striking, the
United States pursued this policy even thought other options were available as, aside from the
FRG plan, Baker advocated letting Soviet troops stay in East Germany indefinitely as a way of
meeting Soviet concerns.5 09
Nevertheless, when Bush met with Kohl on 24-25 February, American officials sought
and obtained FRG agreement to a plan that went beyond even the "special military status"
proposal.5 10 This included 1) "full membership of a unified Germany in NATO, including
participation in its military structures," 2) the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on
German territory, and 3) continued deployment of U.S. conventional forces in Germany. 51 The
West Germans also agreed that NATO "jurisdiction" would extend to the former GDR, and that
FRG troops would defend GDR territory; these steps killed the Genscher-Baker plan.5 12 As for
proposals for Soviet forces to remain in the GDR, Kohl and Bush agreed that, "It wouldn't work
to have the Soviet group of forces in East Germany remain there indefinitely." Instead, there
would be a "transition" period during which Soviet forces would withdraw. 13 Subsequent
discussions refined the deal - notably, U.S. short-range nuclear forces would be reduced,
Germany would forego nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and the size of the
German army would be capped - but the February meeting was the turning point in forging an
intensely predatory American-West German front.
Thus, having begun February struggling to keep Germany in NATO, the month ended
with American policymakers having garnered German agreement to something just short of the
best possible outcome for the United States.5 15 Furthermore, and in contrast to Institutionalist
to defend the reunified state up to the Polish border. In short, these concessions were not really concessions as they
would leave the United States with its first-best option in Germany. I return to these themes below; Zoellick, "Two
Plus Four."
509 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada," 24 February 1990.
510 Scowcroft, "Meetings with Kohl."
511 Partial summaries are found in Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, "Talking Points for Presidential Calls to
Foreign Leaders about His Meetings with Chancellor Kohl," 26 February 1990 and "Points to be Made in Telephone
Calls with Foreign Leaders," Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [2]," GBPL. See also
the Memorandums of Conversation with Kohl on 24 and 25 February.
512 Memcon with Kohl, 25 February.
513 Memcon with Kohl, 24 February.
514 Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft, "Options for Handling the Cancellation of the Follow-on-to-Lance Program,"
5 March 1990, Scowcroft Files, 91116, "German Unification (February-March 1990)," GBPL; Bush and Scowcroft,
World Transformed, 263; "JAB notes from 4/4/90 mtg. w/FRG FM Genscher @ Dept of State," Box 108, Folder 16,
BP.
515 There is a good question as to how Kohl and the FRG were signed up to the American agenda so rapidly. Sarotte
sees the West Germans as wedded to the American agenda even before the fall of the Wall; former policymakers
including Zelikow, Rice, Hutchings, Baker, and Scowcroft see the outcome as the result of artful American
diplomacy. Although beyond the scope of this study, I believe the answer has more to do with tacit American
coercion. As shown, the United States was the one major player in Europe not opposed to German reunification.
Thus, if West Germany hoped to reunify without triggering a major international crisis, West Germany needed to
keep the United States happy. By throwing down a series of demands vis-d-vis the USSR, the United States
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Theory, American escalation occurred despite Soviet opposition and allied efforts to obtain a
more generous deal for the USSR, rather than because of any restraint on the American side.
Unlike the months before and immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United
States took the lead in overturning the European status quo by pushing the GDR's integration
into NATO and ensuring U.S. military dominance. Bush's remarks on the new U.S. position are
instructive: "The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany's relationship with NATO.
What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that! We prevailed
and they didn't. We can't let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat."5 16
iii. Blocking Soviet Counteroffensives
Once this deal was decided upon, the Soviet Union was unable to alter the American
agenda. Here, American behavior contradicts both Institutionalist Theory and Democratic Peace
Theory, both of which predict the United States should be sensitive to Soviet opposition to
American plans and modify U.S. strategy accordingly. Instead U.S. strategy matches best
Realist Decline Theory's expectation that, with the decline of the bipolar rival at hand and the
Soviets lacking the military wherewithal to balance, the United States will strive to prevent any
effort that helps the Soviet Union protect its position in Eastern Europe while maximizing U.S.
power.
Gorbachev challenged the U.S.-FRG strategy beginning a few days after Kohl's
departure. In a lengthy phone call, Gorbachev pushed against Bush's claim that a reunified,
democratic Germany would not threaten the USSR, arguing, "But then if that is so, if you believe
a united Germany would not be a threat -- why do Western countries want to incorporate them
into one alliance? If we find that this would negatively effect [sic] the Soviet Union, we would
have to think long and hard about it."517 In response, Bush simply noted that, "we believe a
united Germany need not be an aggressive force or threat [... reunification in NATO was useful]
to guard against uncertainty and instability."518 With little subsequent movement by the United
States to meet Soviet concerns, 519 Shevardnadze took an even more hardline stance in subsequent
meetings with Baker. Now, the Soviet Union denounced the idea of a reunified Germany in
NATO and called for the creation of a new, pan-European security institution to replace both
NATO and the Pact that would 5resumably allow Soviet forces to remain in Eastern Europe or
create a demilitarized Germany. 0 Baker, echoing Bush, remained noncommittal.
Soviet desperation for military and strategic concessions mounted that spring. Soviet
domestic politics were polarizing as conservatives and reformers butted heads over the future
political and economic system of the Soviet Union itself. In the process, Shevardnadze and
Gorbachev came under increasing attack from within the Soviet government; it seemed that the
essentially told West Germany what it would take to buy American agreement: the United States would support
German reunification only under restrictive conditions that, by extension, ensured the United States would continue
to dominant German security policy and limited the chance reunified Germany would act as an independent great
power. Not coincidentally, this would preclude Germany from challenging future American dominance in Europe.
In short, the United States and Germany struck a grand bargain, as the United States would allow Germany to
reunify and Germany would sign up to the American security order. Zelikow and Rice (166) are right that
"American preferences [could] not be forced on Bonn." However, they could be strongly encouraged.
5 16 MemCon with Kohl, 24 February.
517 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the
Soviet Union," 28 February 1990.
518 Ibid.
519 As noted above, this was the period in which the Soviets tried without success to begin Two Plus Four talks.
520 USDel Secretary Namibia to SecState, "My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze," 20 March
1990, available online at http://foia.state.ov/SearchColls/ColsSearci.asp; Baker, Diplomacy, 235.
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Soviet leadership was being forced to adopt increasingly hardline positions as conservatives
accused Gorbachev and his colleagues of compromising Soviet security.m Yet where similar
indications in November-December that American policy was driving the Soviet leadership into
a corner led the United States to reassure the USSR, now the United States maintained Extreme
Predation. Although Shevardnadze and Gorbachev ended efforts to obtain a non-aligned
Germany, repeated Soviet calls for 1) continued Four Power oversight of Germany after
reunification, 2) a pan-European peace conference, and 3) Germany's admission to both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, elicited no movement in the American position. 522 After one such back
and forth in April, Baker recorded his sense of the difficulties created by Soviet domestic politics,
noting that "In my three day Ministerial [with Shevardnadze .. .] progress was harder to come by
than at previous ministerials." Reflecting skepticism over an improvement, he went on to remark
"we've had better! We'll probably have worse."5 23 Thus, when the Two Plus Four ministers
finally met in early May and Shevardnadze again proposed retaining Four Power rights after
German reunification and the creation of a new European security system, the American
rejection fit into a broader policy in place that spring.5 24 Shevardnadze also hinted at the
conservative backlash, warning that "if others [e.g., the U.S.] attempt to put us into a restricted
condition in matters of our security, then this will lead to a situation [. . .] where the degree of
our political flexibility is severely limited." Again, American policy did not budge.5 25
iv. Adding Insult to Injury
a. The Nine Assurances that Didn't Assure
Having blocked Soviet initiatives, the U.S. and FRG worked to sustain momentum for
reunification and to pressure the USSR to recognize it had no.option but to concede to Western
demands. 26 Along the way, the United States continued to deny concessions to a Soviet Union
whose position in Europe was in tatters and domestic scene was fragmenting. 52 7 This again
suggests the extremely predatory nature of U.S. strategy: even with the Soviets beating a rapid
retreat from Europe, a relatively rising United States continued to press its advantage.
The endgame began in mid-May. To catalyze Soviet movement towards the American
position on Germany, Baker used a visit to Moscow to offer the Soviets "nine assurances" on the
future of a reunified Germany in NATO (Table 4.4, left column). Scholars working within the
institutionalist tradition see these assurances as "steps that the West would be willing to take to
meet Soviet security concerns" that reflected both the U.S. willingness to meet Soviet concerns
raised in the Two Plus Four and the American effort to sustain U.S.-Soviet cooperation within
528the negotiations2. In actuality, Baker and the State Department decided on six of the nine
assurances as far back as February (tellingly referred to as a "leveraged buy-out" of the Soviet
position) before the Two Plus Four talks had begun; the other three "assurances" came from
521 National Intelligence Council, "Primary Soviet Objectives for the Summit," 24 May 1990, Burns Files, CFO 1308,
"POTUS Meeting with Gorbachev, May 31, 1990 - June 3, 1990 [1]," GBPL; also Bush and Scowcroft World
Transformed, 275; Baker, "Memorandum for the President" 17 May.5 2 2 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 244.
523 "Talking Points on Ministerial For Cabinet Meeting," 9 April 1990, Box 108, Folder 16, BP.
524 Baker, "My Meeting with Shevardnadze," 5 May 1990; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 248-249.
525 "Shevardnadze Intervention at Two-Plus-Four Ministerial, May 5, 1990," Zelikow Files, CF01354, "Files 436,
Six Power Conference [1]," GBPL.
526 As Baker put it, the USSR's concession to the American position was driven foremost by "the reality [that]
German unification was imposing itself, and Moscow was being left behind;" Baker, Diplomacy, 253-254.
527 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 274-276.
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policy deliberations that winter (Table 4.4, right column). Thus, and contrary to institutionalist
claims, the assurances did not concede any of the core issues sought by the Soviets that spring
related to the future German relationship with NATO.52 9 Unsurprisingly, Gorbachev dismissed
Baker's effort and insisted that a final settlement "would have to say that Germany would not
have the right to remain in NATO."5 30
Table 4.4: Comparing the Nine Assurances to pre-Two Plus Four Plans
1990531 State Department Plan, mid-February (theNine Assurances, May "Leveraged Buy Out" Plan)
1) Capping German Army size "Bundeswehr reductions"
2) Aceleatin SN negtiatons[not in State Dept. plan, buit raised during Bush-2) Accelerating SNF negotiations Kohl February meeting]
3) German renunciation of NBC "No German possession or production" of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons534
4) No NATO forces in GDR for transition period "No NATO forces in the GDR"; "special
provisions for German troops in the GDR"
5) Transition period for Soviet withdrawal "delayed Soviet troop withdrawals from the
GDR"
[not in State Dept. plan, but raised by Baker in
6) Transforming NATO politically December; proposed by NSC in January;
interagency plans begun in March]535
7) Settling German borders "legally binding commitments on borders"
[not in State Dept. plan; Baker raised issue in
8) Developing CSCE December and January; interagency discussions
begun in March] 5 36
9) Developing German-Soviet economic relations "German economic benefits for the Soviets"
Bush therefore did not expect "a breakthrough" with Gorbachev as the Soviet leader
visited in late May for the Washington Summit.537 Though recognizing a positive meeting could
boost Gorbachev against his domestic critics, this did not mean the United States would offer the
529 Sarotte, 1989, 163-164.
530 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 274.
531 Summarized from Baker, Politics ofDiplomacy, 250-251.
532 Zoellick "Two Plus Four."
5 Memcon with Kohl, 24 February.
5 Baker pitched this point to Gorbachev during his 7-9 February visit.
535 Baker raised the political transformation of NATO in a December 1989 speech; Zelikow and Rice, Germany
Unified, 142-143. As far back as 19 January, Blackwill had also argued, "We should get underway as soon as
possible a NATO Wise Men's study on the future of the alliance, before events in Europe make such an effort beside
the point;" Blackwill, "1990." On plans to "transform" NATO, see the documents enclosed under Reg
Bartholomew, "Memorandum for the Thursday Group," 12 March 1990, Wilson Files, CF00293, "NATO - Future
[1] [6]," GBPL. Notably, this meeting also took place before the first Two Plus Four Ministerial.
536 James Baker, "Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President," 24 January 1990, Box 115, Folder 7, BP;
Bartholomew, "Memorandum for the Thursday Group" and attached.
537 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany," 30 May 1990.
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Soviets concessions on German reunification. 538 Thus, Bush again rejected a Soviet proposal for
German neutrality by arguing, "NATO is the anchor of stability." Baker's efforts also went
nowhere, as a restatement of the nine assurances led Gorbachev to repeat his own request for
dual German membership in NATO and the Pact.539 Instead, the major change resulting from
the May discussions was a Soviet concession that reunified Germany had the right to choose its
own alliance. This meant that a reunified Germany could choose to join NATO if it wanted and
the USSR would not oppose the move.540 In one swoop, the Soviets conceded the fundamental
principle dividing the American and Soviet positions without any corresponding movement on
the American side.
b. Denying Economic Aid
The Soviet concession was not just capitulation to American pressure, however.
Although Western obstinacy played a role, Gorbachev's move was also part of an effort to trade
security concessions the USSR would likely have to eventually offer for Western economic aid.
At the time, the Soviet leadership desperately sought foreign economic assistance to subsidize
food imports and to help stabilize a Soviet economy in free-fall. 541 Kohl had previously told
Bush the Soviets desired economic aid in return for their concessions on Germany, to which
Bush pejoratively replied, "you've got deep pockets."5 42 The FRG did, and it provided the
USSR substantial aid that winter. Now, Gorbachev looked to the United States to organize
international assistance to the USSR as part of the Houston Economic Summit scheduled for
early July.5 4 3 In fact, two weeks before Gorbachev's visit to Washington, Gorbachev sent a
message to Bush, alerting him that the USSR would be requesting a $15-20 billion loan to "tide
[the USSR] over" during the transition to a market economy. Therefore, if security issues
topped the Soviet agenda, then economic concerns were bubbling just beneath the surface as
American officials recognized the USSR sought to trade concessions on Germany for American
help on the latter.
Yet despite Gorbachev's effort to trade guns-for-butter, Bush pocketed the Soviet
concessions on NATO without reciprocating economically. This behavior is particularly
problematic for Democratic Peace Theory, as the U.S. eschewed steps that would help sustain
Soviet liberalizing reforms and support Gorbachev's political position. Moreover, by pocketing
Soviet concessions without replying in kind, it contradicts the notion that democracies bargain in
a "spirit of fairness." However, the policy makes sense in light of Realist Decline Theory. As
my argument predicts, the United States had no incentive to trade Soviet security concessions for
Western economic assistance, particularly since this aid might be used to help the USSR recover
538 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 277-279; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone
Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany," 30 May 1990.
539 Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, The Washington/Camp David Summit 1990: From the Secret Soviet,
American, and German Files, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 320, Doc. 11, available
online at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB320/.
540 Sarotte, 1989, 167.
541 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 273, 276-277.
542 Memcon with Kohl, 24 February; Sarotte, "Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence" discusses FRG aid to the USSR.
543 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 300. Baker's notes from the meeting contain an extensive listing of
economic issues; "JAB notes from 5/18/90 mtg. w/Pres. Gorbachev, The Kremlin, Moscow," Box 176, Folder 14;
see also NIC, "Primary Soviet Objectives;" Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Call from
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and pose a threat in the future; in pursuing Extreme Predation, American policymakers
disregarded anything that might buttress the Soviet position.
Therefore, even as Gorbachev wrote to Bush emphasizing the "rapprochement between
East and West" and seeking "to talk about working out long-term agreements on large-scale
credit and investment cooperation," Bush prepared to reject the Soviet proposal.545 Already in
May he told Kohl that the prospect of large-scale aid was unacceptable due to a Soviet
crackdown in the Baltics; in July, he argued that Soviet aid to Cuba made American assistance
impossible.546 When the Houston Summit convened, the United States thereby opposed French
and German efforts to provide assistance to the Soviet Union. If anything, the United States
attempted to use Western economic aid as a lever to further weaken the USSR. As Bush argued
during the meeting, decisions on aid to the USSR would be influenced by "Soviet steps to reduce
the proportion of their economic output devoted to the military" and "Soviet decisions to provide
foreign aid to regimes that consistently act contrary to the objectives to the international
community of states." 547 In effect, the United States escalated again: with the Soviets having
conceded on Germany in the hopes of garnering American economic support, Bush upped the
ante to make support conditional on the Soviets cutting their military spending and ending
assistance to their allies. By the time the Summit concluded, all the Soviets obtained was a
promise of "observer" status in international economic organizations such as the IMF, pledges of
"technical assistance" to help the USSR transition to a market economy, and the promise of a
joint IMF-World Bank study on the state of the Soviet economy. 548
v. Endgame
Having agreed that Germany could join NATO, with hopes of trading guns-for-butter
dashed, and with the FRG and GDR moving closer together daily, Gorbachev settled the
remaining issues. During a series of bilateral FRG-USSR meetings in July, Gorbachev tried to
concede the remaining American and West German demands. A reunified Germany would be a
fully sovereign nation and allowed to enter NATO provided there were a three-year transition
period for Soviet forces to withdraw, and so long as "NATO military structures" did not extend
to former GDR territory. Still, the West Germans pushed back. Rather than a permanent pledge
against NATO expansion into the GDR, the FRG insisted this limit would only hold so long as
Soviet troops remained; once Soviet forces were out, German forces allocated to NATO could
come in and extend NATO defenses to the Polish border. Gorbachev agreed, the deal publicized,
and 12 September set for a formal conference in which the Four Powers would relinquish their
rights. 549
Despite the deal, the United States was not done preying. As 12 September approached,
NSC members moved to modify the West German-Soviet agreement. Although Gorbachev and
545 Translated letter from Gorbachev to Bush in Burns Files, CF01487, "GB-Gorbachev Correspondence [3]," GBPL.
546 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany," 30 May 1990; Memorandum of Conversation, "Bilateral Meeting with German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl," 9 July 1990.
547 Memorandum of Conversation, "First Main Plenary Session of the 16th Economic Summit of Industrialized
Nations," 10 July 1990; "Aid to USSR," 9 July 1990, Box 109, Folder 3, BP.
548 Brent Scowcroft, "Points to be made on NATO and Economic Summits at Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Meeting, June [sic] 12, 1990," 11 July 1990, Scowcroft Files, 91120, "SNF - July 1990," GBPL.
549 Hutchings, American Diplomacy, 137-139; Sarotte, 1989, 177-186. In a testament to the exceptional deal, Rice
forwarded the email reporting on the FRG-USSR deal to Scowcroft with the annotation, "Kohl did very well
w/Gorbachev on this one [emphasis in original];" White House Situation Room, "Further Kohl Comment on
Gorbachev Talks," 16 July 1990, Gordon Files, CFO 1646, "[Helmut] Kohl - July 1990," GBPL.
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Kohl agreed FRG forces allocated to NATO could move into the GDR after Soviet troops
withdrew, the United States now sought for forces from any NATO member to enter former
GDR territory.550 Furthermore, because many American artillery systems and aircraft were "dual
use" systems (able to fire either conventional or nuclear rounds) Scowcroft pressed to allow
dual-use systems on former East German territory. In return, the United States pledged, as
Zelikow and Rice offer, "that they would not move their nuclear weapons east into the former
GDR."5 5 1 With the date of the signing approaching, Soviet officials conceded the issues. The
deal was done.5 52
For all the drama surrounding the withdrawal of the USSR from its keystone ally, the
signing itself received scant notice. Less than one month after the July meeting between
Gorbachev and Kohl settled the terms of German reunification, Iraq invaded Kuwait and touched
off the 1990-1991 Gulf War. As the world's attention turned to the Middle East, events in
Europe moved to the backburner. The American focus was therefore elsewhere for the critical
months of August 1990 - February 1991 as the Soviet Union, having retrenched from Europe as
its relative capabilities declined, began to fragment internally. By the time the United States
reengaged with European affairs, Soviet decline affected the internal stability of the USSR itself
and compelled another shift in American strategy. I briefly return to this issue in Appendix C.
vi. Assessment: Military Policy
American military policy in 1990 again provides strong support for Realist Decline
Theory while posing problems for democratic peace and institutionalist arguments. As Realist
Decline Theory uniquely predicts, the United States adopted a strategy of Extreme Predation. By
integrating a reunified Germany entirely into NATO, the United States ensured the destruction of
the Soviet alliance system, guaranteed the United States could keep its military forces in Europe
in the post-Cold War environment, and moved all the major military players in Europe (minus
the USSR) into the American camp on American terms. In the process, one of the central
concerns of the Cold War in Europe - namely, the terms under which Germany could reunify -
was resolved entirely in the United States' favor. As predicted when the USSR held a weak
posture, the United States not only embraced the goal of eliminating the threat posed by the only
other great power in the system, but used intense means to this end by organizing an anti-Soviet
front to ensure the USSR could not obtain a better outcome for itself. Moreover, no Soviet
opposition could block American efforts: in contrast to the situation in 1989, American
policymakers discounted Soviet opposition when rolling up the Soviet presence in Eastern
Europe. This shift in the intensity of the means employed is precisely predicted by Realist
Decline Theory, and provides strong confirming evidence.
In contrast, Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory do not fare well. On
one level, both of the competing arguments predict the United States should have adopted a
Moderate Support strategy; this was not the case. More importantly, the causal mechanisms
postulated by the arguments were not met. Democratic Peace Theory takes a double hit. On the
one hand, concerns that Soviet democratic reforms and Gorbachev's leadership would be
imperiled if the United States did not meet Soviet concerns over the future of Germany simply
led American policymakers to continue preying on the USSR. Rather than respond to Soviet
550 Sarotte, 1989, 191; Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft, "German Unification: New Problems at End-Game,"
27 August 1990, Hutchings Files, CF01414, "United Germany [2]," GBPL.
551 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 356. One can imagine the limited credibility this pledge likely had in
Soviet eyes.
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demands and bargain in a "spirit of fairness," the United States took advantage of Soviet
weaknesses and Soviet concessions to sustain intense predation. Equally important,
policymakers justified American strategy as a way of ensuring the Soviet Union, regardless of
who led the state or the nature of its regime, would be unable to challenge American security
either now or in the future. Policymakers indeed recognized that Gorbachev's reforms were
fundamentally transforming the Soviet regime - and decided the solution was to shift the
strategic balance in the United States' favor because 1) the reforms left the Soviet Union
vulnerable, and 2) subsequent internal changes in the USSR might not leave the USSR as
vulnerable. Extreme Predation, in other words, was pursued independent of the nature of the
Soviet regime as intense efforts to weaken the USSR remained a constant despite changes in
Soviet regime type, the possibility of Soviet reforms sticking, and worries these reforms might
not last. On balance, U.S. strategists seem to have decided to pursue Extreme Predation, and
then tried to justify the policy by referencing different aspects of the Soviet regime (e.g., its
present composition, its future status) as needed.
Institutionalist Theory faces even more problems with the causal process. As noted,
institutionalist arguments expect the United States to cooperate and support the Soviet Union due
to 1) allied pressure, and 2) the desirability of responding to Soviet "voice opportunities" created
by the Two Plus Four. None of these processes emerged. As discussed above, the United States
took the lead in pulling its allies along in Extreme Predation. Rather than accept, e.g., West
German plans for a reunification scheme that would keep the GDR partially out of NATO, the
United States instead pressed the FRG to go along with American plans to integrate all of
Germany into NATO and expand NATO military structures eastward. Far from being restrained
by its allies, the United States made its allies ancillaries to Extreme Predation. Meanwhile,
arguments that the Two Plus Four process bred American support for the USSR fail in multiple
dimensions. Not only did the United States repeatedly deny or block Soviet demands
communicated both within and outside of the Two Plus Four for a more limited NATO role in
reunified Germany, but the terms that the United States were willing to offer ("the Nine
Assurances") were set before the Two Plus Four process even began. It is therefore difficult to
claim that the institutions ostensibly used to manage German reunification affected American
policy, as there is no evidence that American policy shifted following their establishment or in
response to Soviet concerns raised therein. Rather, then United States set predatory goals and
decided upon intense means independent of these structures and maintained these ends and
means irrespective of Soviet pressure. Baldly stated, institutions had no effect on American
military policy vis-a-vis German reunification and the USSR.
E. Rationale: Why Kick a Sick Bear?
Yet why, having ended 1989 pursuing Moderate Predation, did the United States adopt
Extreme Predation in the winter and spring of 1990? What rationales did policymakers offer for
American strategy in this period? Realist Decline Theory proposes that a declining state will be
intensely preyed upon by a relatively rising great power in a bipolar environment when the
declining state cannot secure its interests. Under these circumstances, the rising state's goal is to
maximize power at the declining state's expense in order to reduce or eliminate great power
threats to its security. Thus, the rising state will both 1) seek unipolarity and an environment free
of other great power constraints, while 2) focusing on ensuring today's weak declining state
cannot pose a future threat. We therefore expect American policymakers to argue that U.S.
predation is a way of creating security for the United States by hedging against a possible Soviet
challenge in the future while incorporating the benefits of dominance in Europe. In the process,
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because a weakly postured declining state is unable to defend its interests, the rising state can
discount the possibility of security consequences resulting from its predation. Therefore, we also
expect U.S. policymakers expressing ambivalence and a lack of concern if and when Soviet
leaders oppose American actions.
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory, on the other hand, make divergent
arguments. For Democratic Peace Theory, what matters is the newly democratic nature of the
Soviet regime and the sustainability of Gorbachev's reforms. Though the theory predicted a
strategy of Moderate Support, its causal processes might still be confirmed if we see U.S.
policymakers carefully 1) monitoring the state of Soviet democracy and 2) shaping American
policy in response to whether the Soviet leadership seemed responsive to the democratic
pressures postulated by democratic peace logic. For Institutionalist Theory, on the other hand,
we expect to find evidence of U.S. policymakers arguing that the United States adopted the
policies it did in order to 1) accommodate the preferences of NATO allies and 2) respond to
Soviet pressures within the Two Plus Four process. Though the theory, like Democratic Peace
Theory, predicted Moderate Support, we might still find confirming evidence if American
policymakers believed they were taking steps to sustain and deepen institutionalized cooperation
with the USSR.
In line with prior tests, the results provide strong in support of Realist Decline Theory
and relatively little evidence backing democratic peace or institutionalist arguments. Simply put,
American policymakers focused primarily on the gains to American security that would accrue
from maximizing American power at the Soviet Union's expense. Any effects this effort had on
international institutions or Soviet domestic politics was secondary, while the American
willingness to respond to regime or institutional pressures was purely ancillary to hard-headed
power and security calculations.
i. Security as Power
Throughout the winter and spring of 1990, American policymakers saw a distinct
possibility that the USSR, although it was weak today, might not be hapless in the future. There
were particular concerns that with the Soviets being evicted from Eastern Europe, the Soviet
military might begin "throwing its weight around" to influence Soviet foreign policy, or
Gorbachev might otherwise "get thrown out" of office. Either situation cause a "real reversal" in
Soviet foreign policy as the USSR tried to remilitarize its foreign policy and take a hardline
stance against change in Europe by pouring its remaining resources into competing with the
United States. Bush "got a glimpse" of what this might look like as opposition to Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze mounted in the spring, and the results suggested a possible return of Cold War
conditions sometime in the future. s The United States therefore needed to establish as
dominant of a position as possible for a potential future U.S.-Soviet standoff by moving all of
Germany into NATO.
Bush's conversation with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd in January 1990 is
illustrative. As Bush explained, the United States would work to "seize the opportunity to make
things better for the world" by taking advantage of "change in Eastern Europe." This required,
however, American efforts to remain in Europe since "there could be a reversal in the Soviet
Union." 554 This would be problematic because, as Bush elaborated in February "Even if [. .
5 Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada," 11 April 1990. See
also the 13 April discussion between Bush and Thatcher and the 19 April discussion with Mitterand.
5 Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom," 29
January 1990. These concern were confirmed in a series of interviews with former officials.
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the Soviet Union withdraws all its troops from Eastern Europe, it will still remain far and away
the most powerful single military power on the continent, backed by a credible deterrent." 5 5
Baker made similar points, rejecting Soviet calls for a demilitarized Germany by telling
Shevardnadze, "there is a concern that even if you pull your troops back behind the Soviet border,
you will still be a major land power and demilitarization could be a mistake [for the West]." 56
Instead, placing a unified Germany in NATO would help ensure that "U.S. troops in Germany
[.. .] backed by a credible deterrent [.. .] continue to preserve the security of the West."5 57 After
all, Europe faced a period of "unpredictability" and, as Mulroney offered, "we could be back to
where we were three years ago three years from now." There was a need to "preserve stability"
by walking the USSR out of the GDR and moving the entire reunified country fully into
NATO.558 Ultimately, at a time when the United States remained "concerned about the Soviets,"
there remained a need to "keep a strong defense" by keeping the FRG in NATO and avoid
demilitarizing any part of reunified German territory. 559 Otherwise, there would be a "break" in
NATO defenses some future adversary (presumably the USSR) could exploit and create an
66 ,560
"unstable situation for [the] future." Walking NATO into East Germany was a hedge against
these risks.56'
ii. Seeking Dominance
The inverse was also true, as American policymakers sought to push the Soviet Union out
of Central and Eastern Europe in order to enjoy the benefits of a dominant position in Europe.
This corresponds with one of the core process predictions of Realist Decline Theory. Already at
the start of February, Rice argued that at a time when the USSR was unable to defend Eastern
Europe, conflict between conservatives and liberals in the USSR "argues powerfully for moving
forward quickly on resolving German question [. . .] The quicker the new European order is in
place, the more effective will be the quarantine of Eastern Europe from the probable collapse of
perestroika."5 62 In other words, the United States decided that its security would improve if it
eliminated the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and could thereby inure Europe from a Soviet
threat; ironically, the U.S. was interested in doing so even before it was clear whether Gorbachev
would remain in power and Soviet reforms stick.
The rest of the NSC and State Department reached similar conclusions. Even after
Gorbachev survived the challenge to his leadership and perestroika, Sicherman argued in a
memorandum that ultimately reached Baker that, "we can see already the outlines of the new
Europe, with Germany inside NATO, a drastically reduced military problem and a revived
'active buffer' [i.e., Eastern Europe] between the Germans the Russians." The memorandum
went on to discuss that it was strongly in the U.S. interest to attain these ends by pressuring the
USSR vis-d-vis German reunification and engaging the states of Eastern Europe to ensure these
5 George Bush, Letter to Kohl, 8 February, Blackwill Files, CF00182, "German Reunification 11/89-6/90 [1],"
GBPL.
556 Baker, Memcon, Meeting with Shevardnadze, 9 February.
557 Bush, Letter to Kohl, 8 February.
558 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada," 24 February 1990.
559 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, "Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom," 24 February 1990.
560 "JAB notes from 4/4/90 mtg. w/FRG FM Genschr @ Dept of State," Box 108, Folder 16, BP.
561 There were a mix of reasons, but security was among the most important; State Department official, Email
Correspondence with Author, April 2013.
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countries moved outside the Soviet orbit.563 The same basic logic was reflected in Zoellick's
aforementioned report on the Two Plus Four process, noting that the forum was attractive
because it gave the Gorbachev "little real control" over the process or outcome of German
reunification, while guaranteeing that the Soviets were in the United States' "tent" and subject to
American pressure and oversight. 6 4 And while preparing for the late February meetings with
Kohl, Scowcroft pushed Bush to pressure the FRG into accepting "a historic bargain: Kohl's
pledge not to alter the form and substance of Germany's security commitments to NATO in
exchange for a U.S. promise that the Two Plus Four process will not interfere with German
unity." This bargain would help attain the objective of "a united Germany fully in NATO,
subordinating its forces to the integrated NATO military command, willing to host American
forces, and to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil" - in other words, a situation of
American military dominance. 565 In such an environment, the United States would be able (as
Blackwill and Scowcroft had argued a few weeks earlier) "to set the shape and character of a
united Germany and of the future structure ofEuropean security [emphasis added]." 66
On the other hand, this process needed to be shielded from Soviet interference and
attempts to win at the bargaining table what the USSR had failed to obtain otherwise, namely, a
reduced American presence in Europe. As noted throughout the preceding, the United States
was most concerned that Soviet pressure would lead to an attenuated FRG-NATO relationship.
If this occurred, then the United States would forfeit "the prime assets that have made the United
States a postwar power and thus have a devastating effect on the U.S. ability to influence Europe
in ways that protect our political, commercial, and strategy interests."5 67 Compounding the
problem were concerns that the combination of Soviet weakness and European fears of a
reunified Germany would translate into European support for schemes that would demilitarize or
neutralize Germany and pull it out of NATO. Unless the United States asserted itself, the FRG
might therefore opt "for a weaker form of NATO association, perhaps withdrawing from the
integrated military command." And if this occurred, NATO would be "finished as a viable
security institution," American influence over European security would be severely
circumscribed, and the Soviets would have managed to undercut American power in Europe
568despite Soviet weaknesses. Preventing this situation, underlining the fact the United States had
"won the Cold War," and blocking Soviet moves to salvage their security position by
undercutting American power in Europe was therefore central to the American agenda.569
Ultimately, as Bush told Kohl, the United States could not let the Soviets "clutch victory
from the jaws of defeat."5 70 Sicherman put the logic well in a March memo, averring, "Having
agreed at a weak moment to [German reunification], the Soviets subsequently recovered their
nerve" and were trying to slow or shape the outcome. "Realistically," however, "the Soviets
cannot hope for our (or German) cooperation such schemes unless we blunder or the Germans
563 Harvey Sicherman to Dennis Ross and Robert Zoellick, "Our European Strategy: Next Steps," 12 March 1990,
Box 176, Folder 14, BP.
564 Zoellick, "Two Plus Four."
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569 Interview, NSC official, 12 July 2012.
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falter." So long as the U.S. pressed reunification, the United States would end the Cold War in a
dominant position.571
iii. Soviet Military Power: Weak Soviet Posture as American Strategic Opportunity
But why did the United States not fear the costs of exploiting Soviet weakness? After all,
nearly 400,000 Soviet troops remained in East Germany, and as late as November and December,
policymakers feared the consequences of a crackdown if the United States preyed upon the
USSR too much. Because my argument emphasizes the costs that a rising state may face if a
declining state internally balances using the military forces at its disposal, assessing whether the
American assessment of the Soviet military threat shifted in this period and how this affected
American strategy is a critical test of the internal logic of Realist Decline Theory. If the theory is
correct, then the weak Soviet posture in place from January-February should be reflected in
American calculations as policymakers discount the prospect of the Soviets actually using force
in response to American predation: the prospect of the Soviet use of force should not be seen as
credible. In other words, in response to questions such as "why didn't you worry about the
security consequences of predation at this time," we expect policymakers to respond, "because
we didn't need to."
Proving this point is difficult, as it requires policymakers to discuss their lack of concern
for a possibility that was unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, policymakers occasionally hinted that
they saw few military costs or consequences even if the Soviets opposed American moves.
Although imperfect measures of U.S. rationales, two pieces of circumstantial evidence support
the argument.
First, as policymakers debated the prospect of taking an extremely predatory stance vis-a-
vis the USSR in the winter of 1990, strategists attempted to assess how the Soviets would
respond to U.S. predation. Almost unanimously, they came to the conclusion that the Soviets
could not oppose American behavior. As noted earlier, Rice offered the earliest reassessment of
Soviet posture, concluding in late January that even if the United States accelerated reunification,
"the Soviets would not even threaten the Germans. Within six months, if events continue as they
are, no one would believe them anyway." In other words, and as expected, policymakers argued
that the United States could speed up reunification because the likelihood of the Soviets using
force to forestall this situation was much reduced. 2 A few days later, Blackwill and Hutchings
more directly argued that if USSR tried to oppose American plans to accelerate reunification, the
United States should respond by reminding "Gorbachev that his troops are being fast pushed out
of the region anyway." The United States, in other words, had no reason to concern itself with
Soviet opposition. 73
By the start of February, Rice went even further than her prior analysis in arguing that
because the Soviet Union was "unable to reextend its tentacles into East European [sic]," the
United States could move to "quarantine" Eastern Europe from the USSR and help states in the
region move out of the Soviet orbit. 7 4 By the end of February, Bush himself argued that the
only way Soviet military forces could remain in the GDR was if the United States "acquiesce[s]
in or advocate[s] Soviet troops remaining in Germany." This would require the United States to
pass on its own reunification-within-NATO agenda, something he would not do. In effect, Bush
argued that the United States was not going to buttress Soviet power, and the Soviets lacked the
"7 Sicherman, "European Strategy."
572 Quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 160.
573 Hutchings, "Breakfast with Kissinger."
5 Rice, "Showdown in Moscow?"
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tools to convince the United States to move away from intense predation.5 7 5 In a testament to the
sense that the United States need not account for Soviet concerns when Soviet posture was weak,
Scowcroft concluded his briefing for the 24-25 West German visit by offering:
In the final analysis, Soviet leverage to influence the fate of Germany is marginal,
however much Moscow complains. Stalin and his successors set as their
principal goal for European security in the postwar era the fractioning of the
FRG's ties to NATO. Adeneauer said no. The West did not give in to Moscow's
demands when the Soviets were strong; hopefully Kohl will agree at Camp David
that we should certainly not do so now when the Soviet Union is weak. 5 76
In short, at a time when Soviet posture was weak, the United States could choose to ignore
Soviet demands and concerns as it saw fit.577
The second piece of evidence comes from internal American deliberations those times in
the spring when the Soviets blustered and threatened consequences if the U.S. did not walk back
its reunification policy. Three moments were particularly notable: a Baker-Shevardnadze
meeting on 3 April, the first Two Plus Four Ministerial at the start of May, and a meeting
between Baker and the Soviet leadership in mid-May.578 At all three time, Soviet leaders
appeared to oppose reunification and took what Blackwill called "very tough" positions.579 Yet
where similar bluster and swaggering in the fall and winter led to American concerns over a
possible Soviet crackdown, intervention, or revitalization, now these concerns were absent.
After the 3 April meeting, for example, Baker reflected on the conversation by noting,
"On Germany, I again stressed the European stability [. . .] virtually requires a united Germany
in NATO. While the Soviets have not yet accepted this position, their position is evolving".
Rather than emphasize any costs stemming from Soviet opposition, the American analysis
emphasized Soviet movement towards the American position. 580 Similarly, after Shevardnadze
railed against reunification under NATO in the Two Plus Four Ministerial and pushed for
continued Four Power oversight of Germany post-reunification, Baker reported with equanimity
that "the further we get in our discussions [. . .] the more difficult the issues become to resolve."
Missing, in other words, was any sense of an impending crisis or need to walk back U.S.
positions. 58 1 And when Gorbachev and Shevardnadze argued for German neutrality in mid-May,
in Baker's view, "I felt they [the Soviet leaders] trusted us and the German leadership and
oftentimes seemed on the verge of accepting Germany in NATO, only to have their political
sense or historical memories pull them back."5 8 2 In sum, even when the USSR vocally opposed
U.S. policy, American policymakers either disregarded or never even considered the
consequences resulting from Soviet opposition. This dynamic contrasts markedly with the
experience in the fall, when U.S. policymakers repeatedly discussed the dangers that would
accompany American involvement in Eastern Europe or East Germany. The disappearance of
575 Memcon with Mulroney, 24 February.
576 Scowcroft, "Meetings with Kohl."'
577 Interviews with NSC staff members reinforced this perspective.
578 Baker, Diplomacy, 239-252, and Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 268-276.
579 Blackwill hand annotation dated 7 May 1990 on "Shevardnadze Intervention at Two-Plus-Four Ministerial," 5
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582 Baker, Diplomacy, 252.
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such concerns and accompanying recognition that the Soviet Union lacked options to retaliate
against the United States matches what my theory predicts American decision-makers should
discuss when faced with a weakly postured Soviet Union.
iv. Assessment. Rationales
In sum, and although there is not perfect evidence available, the rationales offered for
U.S. policy in 1990 track more with what Realist Decline Theory predicts than either of its
competitors. First, and as Realist Decline Theory uniquely predicts, American policymakers saw
German reunification as an opportunity to gain at the Soviet expense once Soviet posture shifted.
At a time of Soviet weakness, American policymakers argued that the U.S. could and should take
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Soviet collapse. Here, maximizing power at the
Soviet expense was good both as an end unto itself - as a way of incorporating American
unipolarity - and as a way of hedging in case of renewed competition with the USSR. Second,
American policymakers sought to shield this process from Soviet interference. With the USSR
holding a weak posture, only diplomatic negotiations would salvage the Soviet position and
prevent the U.S. from enjoying the fruits of Cold War victory. So long as the United States did
not "blunder" (as Sicherman put it) and accept Soviet demands, it could significantly
circumscribe Soviet threat and be able to dominate Europe freed of other great power constraints.
As Realist Decline Theory expects, a rising United States preyed upon a weakly postured USSR
as a way of maximizing its own power and hedging against a Soviet return, all while denying the
USSR opportunities to salvage its power and security.
Finally, and although the evidence is less voluminous, I argue there is sufficiently strong
evidence that the United States took such extensive advantage of the USSR because
policymakers actively recognized the USSR could not impose security costs upon the United
States. As noted earlier, proving this point is difficult. Nevertheless, the available evidence
shows Rice, Hutchings, Blackwill, Scowcroft, and others arguing that with Soviet military forces
weak and retrenching, the USSR's complaints could be ignored or sidestepped; Scowcroft's
argument that the Soviets could not be allowed to claim victory in the German reunification
debate at a time when they were being pushed out of Eastern Europe is particularly telling.
Likewise, American analyses when the Soviets did try to oppose American predation in the
spring suggests virtually no American concern that the Soviets would or could use force in this
effort, meaning that unless the United States inadvertently caved at the diplomatic table, Cold
War victory would be within reach. This situation is the diametric opposite with the U.S.
response in 1989, when similar whiffs of Soviet opprobrium triggered extended debates over
how to reassure the USSR and walk back American demands. Overall, I argue this prediction is
also confirmed in the case.
In contrast, there is at best limited evidence for democratic peace arguments. On one
level, policymakers occasionally spoke as if they worried that the nascent Soviet democracy
might be overturned in the near and undoubtedly paid attention to the state of Soviet domestic
politics. Moreover, American strategists sometimes argued that the United States should try to
make life as easy for Gorbachev as possible in the face of his domestic critics; this was clearest
in Zoellick's argument that the Two Plus Four helped give Gorbachev political cover against his
domestic critics. However, the rationales offered for American strategy do not match
Democratic Peace Theory more broadly. Specifically, American strategists argued the United
States should prey on the USSR rather than support a fellow democracy. More importantly,
these arguments did not vary even as Soviet domestic politics changed: strategists argued that the
United States should take advantage of a weak Soviet Union because Gorbachev might be
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displaced, and they argued the U.S. should take advantage of the USSR even after Gorbachev
remained in office because U.S. security would improve. Moreover, despite recognizing that
American predation was causing Soviet liberal reformers to face growing criticism at home,
policymakers such as Baker and Scowcroft never proposed changing course; the benefits of
placing "a united Germany fully in NATO" and ensuring U.S. preponderance in Europe were too
stark to give up irrespective of what happened in the Soviet Union. In sum, despite some
evidence that American strategists saw advantages to keeping Gorbachev in power and Soviet
democracy moving forward, the broader thrust of American policy stressed the advantages of
weakening the USSR. I therefore code this as only offering partial evidence in support of
democratic peace logic.
Finally, there is virtually no evidence supporting Institutionalist Theory. The available
documentary record not only suggests a hard-headed focus on the advantages of weakening the
Soviet Union to ensure American dominance irrespective of Soviet opposition, but a desire to
work around allied pressure and available institutions to avoid being tied down by the USSR.
Indeed, just as Zoellick praised the Two Plus Four for denying the USSR "real control" over
reunification, he also underscored the American intent to sidestep its putatively binding functions,
arguing, "Two Plus Four is not an event or a formal negotiation [... .] it is simply 'a process of
incremental consultations."' 583 This suggests much of American policy was driven by desire to
avoid being tied down by the Soviets in ways that could limit American predation, a point further
suggested by Bush's argument that the Soviets could not be allowed to "clutch victory from the
jaws of defeat" and other NSC analyses in the winter and spring. And, as shown, American
policymakers argued the United States could not give in to allied pressure to offer the Soviet
Union a relatively better deal than would otherwise be the case because it would limit NATO and
constrain the American presence in Europe. In short, rather than being limited by institutions or
allied pressure, American policymakers consciously avoided acceding to allied pressure or
working through institutions for fear they might prevent or limit American dominance as victory
in the Cold War approached.
V. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summarizing the Evidence
Overall, American policy in 1990 provides strong evidence for Realist Decline Theory
and very limited evidence for its democratic peace and institutionalist competitors. As noted
earlier, my argument makes three core predictions about American strategy when faced with a
declining USSR in a bipolar system where the USSR state holds a weak military posture. First,
and as in 1989, the United States should adopt a predatory strategy. Given the opportunity to
maximize power at the declining USSR's expense, the United States should do so. However,
and in contrast to 1989, the United States should pursue an Extremely Predatory strategy in
which the United States uses intense means to weaken the USSR. That is, the United States will
try to eliminate the USSR as a great power (overturning the European status quo in the process)
even if doing so consumes substantial resources and involves political risks to the United States.
In the process, signs of Soviet opposition to American policies should have no effect on U.S.
policy: given the absence of a Soviet military able to impose costs for American predation, U.S.
policymakers have no reason to scale back American objectives. Finally, American
policymakers should emphasize the desirability of making gains at the Soviet expense while
underscoring the USSR's lack of political and military options.
583 Zoellick, "Two Plus Four." Underlining is Baker's.
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As noted throughout the chapter, all three predictions are borne out. In the military and
diplomatic debates surrounding German reunification, American strategists sought to rollback
the Soviet Union. Whether it came to isolating the USSR diplomatic in the Two Plus Four talks
or imposing ever-greater demands on the USSR on the military and political terms of German
reunification, American policy was designed to undercut Soviet control over its cornerstone ally
in Europe. This would have the effect of undermining the Warsaw Pact writ large. Moreover, in
the process of killing the USSR's alliance system and walking back Soviet power to the Soviet-
Polish border, the United States would be able to establish its own political and military
dominance in Europe. By definition, this would give the United States the wherewithal to
influence European politics free from the Soviet threat. In seeking German reunification on
wholly Western terms, in other words, the United States pursued unipolarity and looked to
maximize its relative power by significantly reducing the threat posed by the only other great
power in the system.
The inverse is also true. As demonstrated above, policymakers not only refused to
countenance a supportive approach to the USSR, but actively looked to prevent other states from
adopting policies that 1) would assist the Soviet Union, and 2) could prevent the U.S. from
preying on Soviet weaknesses. This is part and parcel with the extremely predatory strategy
predicted by my argument: not only did the United States take advantage of every possible sign
of Soviet weakness, but it pushed as hard as it could to obtain ever-greater Soviet concessions.
In the language of military campaigns, American strategists looked to tear a hole in Soviet lines
and exploit the opening by pushing ever harder for German reunification on terms ever-more
conducive to American security (and pernicious to the Soviets' own). We thus find American
policymakers not just moving the terms under which Germany could reunify further up the menu
of options, but we also see policymakers refusing to 1) walk back these demands, despite 2)
opposition from the USSR, and 3) coordinating with the FRG and other states in Europe to
ensure the Soviet Union would not have opportunities to undermine this policy. Simply put,
American policymakers, faced with a militarily weak declining adversary in a bipolar system,
rapidly set out a series of maximalist demands that would irrevocably undercut the Soviet
Union's strength in Europe, and undertook a series of diplomatic maneuvers that pressured the
USSR to accept these demands by denying the USSR alternatives.
Finally, there is strong evidence that the rationales for American policy are in line with
Realist Decline Theory. As shown, American policymakers justified preying on the USSR as a
way of improving the United States' position at the USSR's expense and building a much
stronger U.S. position in Europe. In doing so, policymakers expressly argued this would help the
United States confront the USSR if Soviet power revived, while also establishing American
dominance in Europe and ending the Cold War on purely American terms. In effect,
policymakers recognized maximizing American power at the USSR's expense could bring about
unipolarity, and they sought to encourage this outcome. In the process, the available evidence
shows U.S. strategists arguing the United States could (and should) pursue this policy because of
Soviet military weaknesses. Given the Soviet inability to defend Eastern Europe and threaten to
penalize American predation, American decision-makers saw that they had a perhaps-fleeting
window of opportunity to gain at the USSR's expense: if, as NSC staff members argued, the
Soviet Union opposed American actions, then Gorbachev could just be reminded that his forces
were being pushed out of Eastern Europe anyway, and the United States could do near as it
pleased. While this strategy still required the United States to structure the diplomatic
negotiations in order to prevent the USSR from using diplomacy to challenge American
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objectives, American policy did not need to check itself for fear of the security consequences
from Soviet opposition.
The competing explanations, on the other hand, receive substantially less support from
the case. As before, Democratic Peace Theory receives limited backing from the record of U.S.-
Soviet relations in this period. Democratic peace arguments made two core predictions about the
case. First, the United States was expected to respond to the increasingly credible reforms in the
USSR by adopting a strategy of Moderate Support. Second, it predicted that U.S. policymakers
would monitor the state of Soviet reforms and justify the shift in American strategy (compared to
that in 1989) by reference to the increasingly liberal USSR. Yet although the case shows
American policymakers paid attention to the changes in the Soviet regime, neither the outcome
of nor rationale for U.S. strategy in this period match democratic peace expectations. Not only
did the United States pursue a strategy of Extreme Predation, but American policymakers
expressly did so despite Gorbachev's reforms. The latter development is critical: American
strategy remained extremely predatory irrespective of whether Gorbachev's reforms appeared to
be taking hold, appeared to be under duress, or anything in between. As noted above,
policymakers fixed on Extreme Predation and maintained this policy independent of anything
Gorbachev did at home. On the whole, the case provides very limited (almost no) support for
Democratic Peace Theory.
The case provides even less evidence for Institutionalist Theory, which fails a strong test:
because institutionalist scholars hold up U.S.-Soviet relations in 1990 as the epitome of what
binding institutions can do to improve great power politics, we expected to find abundant
evidence for the outcome and processes identified by institutionalist arguments. This was not the
case. As noted earlier, the theory predicted that the United States would adopt a strategy of
Moderate Support, respond to pressure from NATO allies, and work with the USSR through the
Two Plus Four process to address Soviet security concerns. None of these predictions were
upheld. First, the United States pursued Extreme Predation. Second, it ignored allied efforts to
offer the USSR a better deal during the reunification process than American policymakers felt
appropriate and instead pressured NATO allies to accept American efforts to offer the USSR no
opportunity to salvage any influence in Eastern Europe. Third, the United States structured the
institutions nominally intended to manage reunification so as to isolate and block Soviet effort at
retaining some control or influence in a reunified Germany. Finally, the United States avoided
negotiating in any substantive sense through the same institutions for fear of being pressured to
cut the USSR a better deal than the United States could obtain outside institutional forums.
Simply put, the United States not only adopted a strategy that is the opposite of what
Institutionalist Theory predicts, but transformed the structures that institutionalist theory claims
restrained American ambitions into ancillaries to U.S. predation. On balance, Institutionalist
Theory fails this test.
B. Conclusion
Combined, Chapters Three and Four demonstrated that Realist Decline Theory provides a
powerful explanation for rising state strategy towards declining great powers. As shown by
American strategy towards the declining Soviet Union in 1989-1990, the United States carefully
calculated the costs and benefits of preying on the USSR, concluding that American security
would be improved by pushing the USSR from the great power ranks. However, this strategy
underwent a major shift between 1989 and 1990. In the first period, the United States used
cautious means to weaken the USSR because the robust Soviet military threatened to impose
large costs upon the United States if the U.S. preyed too intensely. Conversely, 1990 saw the
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United States intensely prey on the USSR as Soviet posture shifted from robust to weak and
created a window of opportunity for the United States to make significant power gains without
fearing the costs of Soviet internal balancing. Overall, American strategy towards the USSR
varied in the manner predicted by my argument, while the processes match what the theory
predicts if the combination of system polarity and the declining state's military posture drive
rising state behavior.
Having demonstrated that Realist Decline Theory outperforms competing explanations in
bipolar systems, the next two chapters test my theory against decline in a multipolar system. I do
this by examining American and Soviet strategy towards the declining United Kingdom in 1945-
1949. Given change in the United Kingdom's military posture, variation in the type of ruling
regime in the different countries, and different degrees to which the states were institutionally
bound to one another, the postwar decline of the United Kingdom provides another good venue
to test my arguments against competing accounts. The results, as I demonstrate in the following
pages, provide additional evidence that Realist Decline Theory is a good explanation for rising
state strategy towards declining great powers.
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Chapter Five:
The Decline of the United Kingdom and Great Powers Relations, Part I:
Moderate Support in 1945-1946
I. Introduction
The preceding empirical chapters tested Realist Decline Theory against its institutionalist
and democratic peace competitors by examining U.S.-Soviet relations during the late Cold War.
After examining rising state-declining relations in a bipolar system, I found that Realist Decline
Theory offers more explanatory power than alternate explanations. Faced with a declining
Soviet Union in a bipolar system, a relatively rising United States preyed on the USSR and
increased the degree of predation as the Soviet Union's ability to defend itself faltered. Rather
than responding to shifts in Soviet domestic institutions or the influence of institutions, American
policymakers fixed their eyes on the security implications of Soviet decline and shaped
American policy in response to Soviet military capabilities.
The next two chapters continue testing my argument by evaluating a recent case of
multipolar decline, namely, the postwar decline of the United Kingdom from the end of World
War Two until Britain finally exited the great power ranks in 1949. To do so, I examine the
strategies adopted by the relatively rising United States and, to a lesser extent, Soviet Union. I
divide the case into two parts. The current chapter examines American and Soviet pursuit of
Moderate Support in 1945-1946, while the following chapter focuses on the American shift to
Extreme Support and the Soviet move to Extreme Predation in 1947-1949.
Like the Soviet case, Britain's decline is a good venue for evaluating Realist Decline
Theory against alternate explanations. As I show, the United Kingdom's decline led to 1)
changes in British military posture even as the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom
2) differed in their regime type, and 3) were collectively embedded in a series of de facto
institutions. Thus, the more we find American and Soviet policy moving in response to changes
in British military posture rather than domestic political or institutional factors, the greater
confidence we have in my argument. To this end, I derive and test separate predictions from the
competing theories against the historical record.
A. The Puzzle
The empirical core of this chapter revolves around two historical puzzles coming out of
American and Soviet behavior in 1945-1946. First, why did the United States do little to arrest
Great Britain's decline at a time when American policymakers worried about possible Soviet
domination in Europe and wanted a strong Britain to play a major role in postwar Europe? In
other words, why did the United States pursue Moderate Support in 1945-1946? Scholars have
long noted that postwar Anglo-American relations were initially fraught with ambivalence and
ambiguity.584 Simply put, the United States wanted a strong Britain, yet by reducing military
cooperation, limiting economic assistance, and circumscribing diplomatic support, the United
States did little to help Britain arrest its slide. American policies thereby left Britain increasingly
unable to fulfill the role desired of it. American strategy was disintegrated: keeping Britain
strong enough to balance the USSR required intensive American means to revitalize British
fortunes, yet American policy focused on free-riding, buck-passing, and playing for time. What
explains the United States' Moderate Support?
584 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership; Anderson, Cold War.
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The second puzzle involves Soviet policy in the immediate postwar period. Conventional
wisdom treats the Soviet Union as a predatory state in early Cold War Europe, interested in
exploiting British weakness and American disengagement to expand in the postwar power
vacuum. 585 New research, however, challenges this perspective. With access to former Eastern
bloc archives, recent scholarship increasingly suggests the Soviet Union was cautious and
focused more on preserving Soviet gains from the war than on challenging British security and
threatening British power. This meant that while the USSR sought to expand in parts of Europe,
areas that were known to be central to British security were off limits; as former Soviet Foreign
Secretary Maxim Litvinov, in a report prepared at Stalin's request, argued in early 1945, "the
maximum sphere of influence for the Soviet Union can be defined as Finland, Sweden, Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Slav countries of the Balkans, and also Turkey. The
British sphere can certainly embrace Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece." 86
The USSR, in other words, was willing to leave Britain in control of Western Europe and thereby
help preserve it as a European great power. Like the United States, the USSR also adopted a
Moderate Support strategy in 1945-1946. I try to explain the source and logic of this behavior.
B. Problems with Existing Arguments and Contribution of Realist Decline Theory
Existing theories, as I show below, provide only partial explanations for American and
Soviet behavior. With Britain and the United States liberal democracies and the Soviet Union
anything but, Democratic Peace Theory expects 1) the United States to support the weakening
United Kingdom, because of 2) worries of losing a fellow democracy in a hostile world, while 3)
the USSR pursues predation. Although the theory correctly predicts American support, it cannot
explain why the Soviet Union also avoided trying to weaken the United Kingdom. Additionally,
American policy is far from a slam-dunk in favor of democratic peace arguments as there is
significant evidence that joint Anglo-American democracy was of secondary importance to
American strategy than hard-headed calculations about the distribution of power.
Institutionalist Theory confronts similar problems. Britain, the United States, and Soviet
Union were not embedded as a group in formal, binding international institutions before Britain's
decline. That said, there were de facto international institutions that seem to meet the standards
used by scholars in other cases. First, Anglo-American wartime cooperation, involving joint
economic and military planning with extensive bureaucratic integration, is probably as close any
two states have ever found themselves bound to another's fortunes and is a good proxy for
binding international institutions. Second, the approaching end of the war saw the United States,
United Kingdom, and other states join together to create the Bretton Woods system of
international economic institutions to revive and stabilize the global economy; although not
focused on security affairs, the resulting International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) may have generated spillover effects by
587giving the United States a significant stake in Britain's success as a great power. Finally,
efforts to institutionalize wartime Anglo-American-Soviet ministerial meetings by creating the
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) can be seen as a de facto institution on par with the Two
Plus Four talks. Although CFM formed concurrent with Britain's decline and was therefore only
585 Gaddis, We Now Know, 22-37.
586 Quoted in Alexei Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Reconstruction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During
World War Two," in The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons
(London: Macmillan, 1996), 13.
587 Ikenberry, After Victory, 172-191; G. John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement," International Organization 46, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 289-321.
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weakly institutionalized, it offered a regular venue for the United States, USSR, and United
Kingdom to negotiate diplomatic and military deals. Combined, de facto institutional presence
suggests both the United States and USSR should pursue supportive strategies towards the
United Kingdom.
As with Democratic Peace Theory, these predictions match the outcome of the case but
miss much of the process. As I show below, American strategy was supportive despite
American efforts to end or circumvent wartime Anglo-American integration, while American
calculations had little to do with the benefits of sustaining Britain's role in extant institutions.
The same is true for the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union adopted Moderate Support, it
did so despite Soviet efforts to work around ad hoc institutions and for strategic reasons that had
little to do with the desirability of sustaining Britain's institutional presence. Ultimately,
Institutionalist Theory is at best an incomplete explanation.
In contrast, Realist Decline Theory provides a powerful tool to understand the case. As I
show below, Britain declined in 1945-1946 while holding a robust military posture. Not only
were British forces occupying Germany, but other troops were present in Greece, Italy, and
Austria, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) maintained a strong bomber and fighter force in and
around Europe. The combination of multipolar decline and Britain's robust posture left
American and Soviet policymakers facing difficult decisions. First, there were downsides to
preying on the United Kingdom as 1) Britain might internally balance (especially vis-a-vis the
USSR), 2) one of the other great powers came to Britain's aid, and/or 3) Britain was lost as a
future ally. At the same time, support was attractive as a way of 1) avoiding British balancing,
2) "bidding" for British friendship, and 3) avoiding pushing Great Britain into alignment with
another major actor. Still, Britain's robust posture gave the United States and Soviet Union
pause before acting on incentives for support. For the United States, Britain's robust posture
meant the UK might entrap it into a war with the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, Britain's
robust posture threatened Soviet security, while raising the risk that a misunderstanding between
the two states might escalate; until the threat were reduced, the USSR had no reason to work too
hard for British friendship and some reason to see how Britain's fortunes played out. In both
cases, Moderate Support emerged as both great powers tried to preserve the United Kingdom as
a possible ally and avoid costly balancing while avoiding intense means to these ends because of
Britain's robust capabilities.
C. Contribution of the Argument
The argument advanced in the next two chapters stands on its own as a contribution to
Cold War historiography. On one level, there is an extensive literature examining Anglo-
American relations during and immediately after the Second World War. This scholarship,
however, tends to focus on economic relations between the United States and Britain,
particularly emphasizing efforts to create a multilateral trading and financial system for the
postwar world; military and security issues receive second billing.588 In contrast, a second
literature on the origins of Soviet-American rivalry is more focused on the security dynamics of
588 Randall Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1990); Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the
Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (New York: Clarendon Press, 1956); Ikenberry, "A World Economy
Restored"; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe,
1947-1952 (Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36, no. 2 (April 1,
1982): 379-415.
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the postwar system.589 This work, however, only tangentially examines American and Soviet
expectations surrounding Britain's role in postwar Europe and how changing expectations of the
structure of the European system affected American and Soviet behavior. Both literatures,
meanwhile, have struggled with only limited insight into Soviet strategic calculations. 59' This is
understandable as Soviet records were unavailable until recently, but a burgeoning literature has
made significant progress assessing Soviet strategy.59' Yet because scholars are still grappling
with the what of Soviet policy, Soviet policy has yet to be compared to and assessed in light of
what we know of American strategy and the changing distribution of power. Collectively,
existing research provides important insights into American and Soviet policy, but there remains
the need to compare these behaviors in light of Britain's changing fortunes.
The two chapters addressing Britain's decline help fill this empirical hole. Drawing from
secondary sources, memoirs, and American and British primary documents, I attempt to show
that American and Soviet strategic calculations were similar immediately after the war when it
came to managing Britain's role in the postwar distribution of power. Both states emphasized
the security benefits that would come from a strong Britain while recognizing the substantial
risks from weakening Britain any further. Although American and Soviet strategists had
different reasons for this behavior, the effect was the same: both rising states were more alike in
a core aspect of their foreign policies than is often realized. In turn, finding that both states were
broadly supportive of the existing distribution of power in Europe poses problems for the post-
revisionist synthesis on the origins of the Cold War. Rather than seeing wartime cooperation
between the U.S., Britain, and USSR ending because of "Stalin's insistence on equating security
with territory," my analysis suggests the Cold War was more the result of a security dilemma and
spirals of insecurity.592 Both the United States and USSR could accept multipolar Europe, but
neither could tolerate the threat the other seemed to pose to the stability of this system. With
Britain weakening, the United States feared losing Britain as an ally and bulwark against the
USSR; the Soviet Union worried a weakening Britain would turn to the United States and an
Anglo-American alliance isolate and threaten Soviet security. Ultimately, efforts to prevent
these developments led to miscalculations, misperception, and spirals that helped spur the Cold
War standoff as Britain fell down and from the great power ranks.
D. Outline of Chapter
'8 Gaddis, We Now Know; John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
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University Press, 1999).
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28, no. 2 (June 1985): 497-515; David Reynolds, "The 'Big Three' and the Division of Europe, 1945-48,"
Diplomacy and Statecraft 1, no. 2 (1990): 111-136; For a partial exception, see Gaddis, We Now Know, 15-25.
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University Press, 1995); Vladimir 0. Pechatnov, The Big Three After World War I: New Documents on Soviet
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds in six parts. Following the Introduction, I describe
Britain's decline in the mid-1940s and present evidence that American and Soviet strategists
recognized the trend. Next, I code the polarity of the system and British military posture in order
to generate predictions from Realist Decline Theory. With these in hand, I then code the
variables for Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory and delineate a series of
competing predictions. I subsequently test the various predictions against American policy in
1945-1946, before doing the same for Soviet strategy; along the way, I weigh and assess the
evidence. Finally, I summarize the results and preview the following chapter.
II. Identifying British Decline
Identifying the sources of Britain's decline is an academic cottage industry. Depending
on one's definition of decline, scholars see British decline beginning in the mid-1800s, the late-
1800s, the early 1900s, the interwar period, and various points after World War Two.5 93 In fact,
seeking a definitive start to Britain's decline is a chimera. Because power is relative, Britain's
fortunes hinged on the success and failure of its peers. And because Europe was convulsed by
conflicts through the middle of the twentieth century that saw some great powers victorious and
others defeated, British relative power fluctuated. Thus, the country experienced several
declines as well as several relative rises.
This chapter looks at Britain's relative decline immediately after World War Two. In my
assessment, Britain's postwar decline marked the end of the United Kingdom as a great power.
If the 1956 Suez Crisis, which many scholars see as the embodiment of the United Kingdom's
fall from the great powers, emphasized Britain's losses since the interwar period, the power shift
itself occurred in 1945-1949.594 As I show, not only did British capabilities quickly wane in this
period, but British security became hostage to the policies of the United States and Soviet Union.
Britain's fall was the immediate result of the Second World War. After holding roughly
twenty percent of overall great power capabilities in the interwar period, Britain lost ground
during and after the conflict (Graph 1). I focus on the postwar period for three reasons. First, the
need to defeat Germany and Japan obscured Britain's growing problems during the war. Second,
and relatedly, the drive for victory prevented the United States and USSR from focusing on the
consequences of the changing distribution of power. Finally, and as the statistics outlined below
show, Britain punched above its material weight in the conflict, producing a sizable proportion of
allied material and supplying a large percentage of combat forces even after it approached
economic and military exhaustion. This willingness to go the extra strategic mile boosted the
sense of British power in the eyes of Soviet and American officials. As William Fox, who
coined the term "super-power" in 1944 and included the United Kingdom in his original list,
later explained, Britain's "leadership in the first years of the war - the years of United States
neutrality, military weak- ness, and political immobilization - made it hard [... .] to assign a lower
postwar status to a gallant and fully mobilized Britain than to Johnny-come-lately United
593 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Donald Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in
Britain's Place, 1900-1975 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Gooch, "The Weary Titan: Strategy
and Policy in Great Britain, 1890-1918," in The Making of Strategy, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and
Bernstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the
Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); David Reynolds, "From
World War to Cold War: The Wartime Alliance and Post-War Transitions, 1941-1947," The Historical Journal 45,
no. 1 (March 2002): 212-213.
594 For a review, see Kyle Elliot Haynes, "Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment"
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States." 9  It was only after "the smoke of battle had cleared away," that "it became obvious that
only two powers were according each other first-ranking status."596
Graph 5.1: Change in the European Distribution of Power, 1939-1950
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Two factors drove Britain's postwar decline. First, the conflict left Britain worse off than
before the war in absolute terrns.597 As Hathaway argues, "having begun the war with a net
creditor position of approximately £3500 million [approximately $14 billion], Britain would end
it as a debtor with liabilities of roughly £2000 million."98 To finance the debt while repairing
converting the economy to a peacetime footing, Britain needed to raise revenue.59 9 However,
there were few options to obtain the necessary funds. Income from foreign investments fell as
$4.5 billion of overseas holdings were sold to finance the war.6 (" British exports were only one-
third the prewar volume and unlikely to recover in the near future as there was no money to pay
for raw materials.601 Moreover, even if goods could be produced, selling them abroad was
problematic: few of Britain's prewar trading partners could afford to buy British goods due to
their own bankruptcy, while the United States could be supplied from U.S. sources. 602 At a time
when exports needed to grow by fifty percent simply to pay for the prewar level of imports,
59 William T.R. Fox, "The Superpowers Then and Now," International Journal 35, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 421; also
William T.R. Fox, The Super-powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union (New York: Harcourt, 1944).
596 Fox, "The Superpowers Then and Now," 417.
5 William Hitchcock, The Struggle f1r Europe: The Turbulent 1-istory of a Divided Continent, 1945-2002 (New
York: Doubleday, 2003), 48.
59 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership, 25. British GDP was approximately £9.9 billion, or $40 billion. British GDP
from Bank of England, "Thee Centuries of Data,"
http://www.bankofengland.co.iik/publications/Pages/other/monetary/m preadinglistf.aspx (accessed April 2013).
599 Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Econonmic Policy 1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1985), 6--8.
600 Author's calculation from Ritchie Ovendale, The English Speaking Alliance (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1985), 18.
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Britain's prospects were bleak.603 In short, Britain ended the war virtually bankrupt. Without
economic revival, the country would have to limit spending to avoid economic collapse.
Second, the war stimulated the growth of American and Soviet capabilities. These
changes forced a weakened Britain to confront growing international competitors. The United
States emerged from the war in a dominant economic position. Already wealthier than the
United Kingdom in 1939, the American economy nearly doubled during the war, even as the
United States emerged as the world's largest creditor.604 American industrial capacity also
surged. Although the country only entered the war late in 1941, it produced more than three
605times the number of tanks and twice as many combat aircraft as the U.K. Meanwhile, the
American military grew to nearly twelve million soldiers and sailors by 1945, versus just over
five million for Britain, surpassed Britain to become the premier naval power (Table 5.1), and
60
ended the war as the only state with nuclear weapons. 06 If Britain after the war was weaker than
when conflict began, the United States emerged stronger in both absolute and relative terms.
Table 5.1: Naval Stren gth of the Great Powers (Total Combat
Year UK US USSR
1938 286 348 176
1945 388 694 312
Ships) 607
The war likewise sped development of Soviet capabilities.608 Admittedly, the war
devastated much of the USSR following the June 1941 German invasion. Precise wartime figures
are unavailable, but scholars agree that war left the Soviet Union poorer and facing a daunting
recovery.609 However, aggregate wealth belies the wartime surge in capabilities. 610 Despite, for
instance, losing much of its territory and population in the German attack, Soviet iron and steel
603 John Maynard Keynes, "Our Overseas Financial Prospects," in Rohan Butler and M.E. Pelly, eds., Documents on
British Policy Overseas, Series 1, Volume 1: Conference at Potsdam, July-August (London: Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1984), 27-37. (hereafter DBPO 1:1)
604 R. Elberton Smith, United States Army in World War II: The Army and Economic Organization (Washington,
DC: Historical Division, Dept. of the Army, 1959), 1-7; Irving Brinton Holly, United States Army in World War:
Buying Aircraft: Material Procurementfor the Army Air Forces (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Dept. of the
Army, 1962), 555.
605 Mark Harrison, "The Economics of World War II: An Overview," Working Paper (University of Warwick, 1998),
29, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/public/ww2overviewl998.pdf; S. N.
Broadberry, "Comparative Productivity Levels in Manufacturing Since the Industrial Revolution," Structural
Change and Economic Dynamics 6, no. 1 (1995): 75.
606 For overviews of American military performance in World War Two, see Kent Roberts Greenfield, United States
Army in World War II: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Dept. of
the Army, 1947); Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the
Second World War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1963); Harrison, "Overview," 29.
607 Totals include aircraft carriers (minus escort carriers), battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Totals
taken from M. Epstein, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook, 1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), 46-50, 502, 1291.; M.
Epstein, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook, 1946 (London: Macmillan, 1946), 52-55, 512, 1222. British totals exclude
Dominion forces.
608 Mark Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-
1945'," Economic History Review 41, no. 2 (May 1988): 184, 186.
609 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 21-25; V. M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in
the Cold Warfrom Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 2-4.
610 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 362-363.
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production remained close to prewar levels during the conflict. 61 More tellingly, Soviet
industrial potential was double the prewar figure by 1953, meaning the country emerged from
the war strong enough to make good wartime damage and continue growing. In contrast, British
industrial capacity grew by less than 50 percent.612 Armaments production tells a similar story.
By the end of the war, the USSR had produced more than twice as many tanks as the United
Kingdom, twenty five percent more artillery pieces, and twenty percent more combat aircraft.613
And before hostilities ended, the Soviet military had more than twice as many men under arms as
Britain and developed sufficient military acumen to defeat the German Army (a task that had
614eluded Britain throughout the war). Because the Soviet defeat of Germany also led to the
projection of Soviet power into Central Europe, Victory in Europe Day left the United Kingdom
facing a militarily dominant and economically surging Soviet Union.
British policymakers recognized the change in their country's fortunes.615  Given the
growth of British competitors and Britain's own problems, British officials from Churchill
downward increasingly wondered "How could the British Commonwealth, as the third of the
three Great Powers, match the power and influence which would be wielded after the war by
Russia and the United States?" 1 6 Britain, the Foreign Office concluded, was "numerically the
weakest and geographically the smaller of the three great powers." It therefore needed to
increase its strength "not only diplomatically, but also [in] the economic and military spheres" to
protect its interests and security in the postwar world.617 Otherwise, Britain would become, in
the words of one senior official, "Lepidus in the triumvirate with Mark Antony and Augustus."61 8
American and Soviet officials also recognized the change. As early as 1944, American
strategists concluded that "the British Empire will emerge from the war having lost ground both
economically and militarily [ . . ] as a military power, the British Empire [. . .] will be in a lower
category than the United States or Russia."6 1 9  Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy
underscored the point, telling Secretary of State Cordell Hull that, "several developments have
combined to lessen [Britain's] relative military and economic strength and gravely impair, if not
preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent." 620 Soviet
officials reached similar findings. Early Soviet planning for the postwar world, for instance,
assumed that Britain would emerge from the war "impoverished and weakened.'' 62 1 Elaborating
on the point in 1944-1945, former Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov that "The current war will
result in a great disturbance of not only the European but the global balance of power, which will
611 Author's comparison of Soviet iron and steel production in 1940 to production in 1944 (the last full year of the
war), from Correlates of War NMC Database.
612 Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980," Journal ofEuropean Economic History
11 (Fall 1982): 299.
613 Harrison, "Overview," 30.
614 Ibid., 29.
614
615 Ovendale, Alliance, 6; Anderson, Cold War, chap. 2-3.
616 Cabinet Office, "Review of the World Situation," 3 April 1945, CAB 65/50/2, National Archives (hereafter NA).
617 Orme Sargent, "Stocktaking After VE-Day," 11 July 1945, DBPO 1:1, 182. Also Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin:
Foreign Secretary (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3-45.
618 Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Orme Sargent, quoted in Anderson, Cold War, 84.
619 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944: Volume , General (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 702, hereafter FRUS; also Woods, Changing, 256-257.
620 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Conference at Malta and
Yalta (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 265.
621 Quoted in Pechatnov, Big Three, 5.
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especially affect England" due particularly to surging American capabilities. Simply put, the
United Kingdom ended the war as a great power, but a weakening one.
III. Realist Decline Theory: Coding the Independent Variables and Predictions
A. Balance of Power: Multipolar
Despite British weaknesses, Europe was a multipolar system following the war. Britain
might be declining, but it was not dead and could still mobilize extensive resources that exceeded
those of most other European actors. With Germany conquered and France recovering from
wartime occupation, only the United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet Union had the
necessary political, economic, and military organization to affect each-other's security.
This argument differs from standard structural accounts depicting postwar Europe as a
bipolar contest dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although historians often
note that the postwar world saw Britain playing a major role in European affairs, political
scientists tend to gloss over significant British capabilities in the immediate postwar period that
made Europe multipolar.623 Waltz, for example, characterizes the postwar period as a bipolar
system, while Ikenberry's analysis of the post-1945 peace settlement focuses on the United
States' use of its "overwhelming" resources to integrate most of Western European into the
American security order. 624 Yet although multipolarity quickly gave way to bipolarity, these
works overstate the case. As Fox noted at the time, Britain still qualified as a great power: not
only did Britain have capabilities developed before and during the Second World War, but
Soviet wartime losses and the United States' decision to 1) demobilize after 1945, and 2) divide
its resources between Europe and Asia, left the European distribution of power less starkly
weighted in the Soviet and American favor than often appreciated.625 Recent work by Avey
suggests the point, arguing that, "British capabilities alone approached Soviet capabilities
immediately after the war." 626 Although a bipolar system eventually developed, it did so only
after Britain fell from the great power ranks.
Because Soviet GDP figures in this period are unreliable, I identify the European great
powers beginning with the Correlates of War (COW) Composite Index of National Capabilities
(CINC). Because CINC scores are reported for all states in the international system, I modified
the source data to derive just the relative capability shares held by independent states in Europe
plus the United States.627 Furthermore, although I begin the discussion of U.S. and Soviet policy
from 1945, I am only able to code Britain's decline from 1946 onward: because 1945 saw
military demobilizations and industrial policies change as the war ended, the CINC scores for
1945 are imprecise. Given additional qualitative evidence of Britain's relative losses once the
622 Quoted in ibid., 12; also Roberts, "Lost Peace," 40-45.
623 Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World, 1945-1949: The View from the Foreign Office," in Power in
Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950 (New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1986), 9-25; Reynolds, "Division of Europe"; Jan Melissen and Bert Zeeman, "Britain and Western Europe, 1945-
51: Opportunities Lost?," International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 81-95.
624 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Ikenberry, After
Victory, chap. 6; also Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World
Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, chap. 7.
625 Fox, The Super-powers; for a sense of the American division of labor and demobilization, see John C. Sparrow,
History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, DC: Center for Military History,
Department of the Army, 1952), 265-280, 301.
626 Avey, "Confronting Soviet Power," 159-164; Wohlforth, Elusive Balance, 65 .
627 I emphasize independent states: because Germany and Austria were occupied and could not play an independent
role in great power politics, I exclude their capabilities from the calculation.
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United States and USSR entered the war, I believe this is a minor issue and does not affect the
results. In what follows, I use the European CINC scores as a baseline, before adding in
additional metrics.
The CINC scores suggest the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom qualified
as great powers after the war, as they held 1) at least ten percent of European aggregate
capabilities, and 2) at least one-fourth the aggregate capabilities of the strongest state in the
system (here, the United States). Table 5.2 shows the results. By 1946, the United States held
approximately forty-four percent of all capabilities in Europe against eighteen percent for the
Soviet Union and fifteen percent for the United Kingdom. Although Britain was the weakest of
the three, it was nearly as strong as the Soviet Union and roughly one-third the size of the United
States solely on points. Focusing on ratios of capabilities and comparing the United Kingdom to
other states in Europe reinforces the point. While Britain was only one-third the size of the
United States, it held nearly four times the capabilities of France and five times those of Italy.
Thus, not only was Britain in a different league than the other states in Europe, but not even an
alliance among the remaining states (excluding the United States and Soviet Union) could match
British capabilities. Britain may not have been able to bring the same resources to bear as the
USSR and U.S. in all circumstances, but it remained a major player.
Table 5.2: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1946
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
CINC Score (% total % of Strongest CINC Score (% total % of
State European State (USA) State European Strongest
capabilities) capabilities) State (USA)
USA 43.8 100 France 4.4 17.4
USSR 17.7 40.4 Italy 3.1 7.1
UK 14.7 33.6
Economic and military figures from the war the also suggest Europe's multipolar nature.
Because war helps reveal the true distribution of power, focusing on statistics from an all-out
conflict such as World War Two provides additional information about relative capabilities in
the immediate postwar world. At the height of the war in 1943-1944, for instance, the United
States spent approximately $76 billion on combat munitions (e.g., tanks, small arms, ships,
aircraft), the Soviet Union $30 billion, and Britain approximately $22 billion (Table 5.3). These
figures produce nearly the same distribution of power as the CINC scores, with the United
Kingdom holding approximately three-quarters the resources as the USSR and between one-
fourth and one-third those of the United States.628 Similarly, British aircraft production in 1943-
1944 totaled approximately one-third the American and two-thirds the Soviet totals. In combat,
meanwhile, Britain contributed approximately one-fourth the number of combat divisions as the
United States (11 vs. 41) in northwest Europe by mid-1944, a majority of the amphibious
equipment used to invade France 629 , and approximately one-third of all military personnel in the
628 Including German production, Britain produced approximately fifteen percent of all combat munitions. For an
overview of British production and mobilization during the war, see Central Statistical Office, Fighting with Figures
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995).
629 Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, United States Army in World War II: Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1943-1945 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Dept. of the Army, 1968), 214, 329, 837; Charles B.
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Anglo-American forces on the continent in the 1944-1945 campaigns.630
Table 5.3: Value of Combat Munitions (billions 1944 $)631
Year UK US USSR
1942 9 20 11.5
1943 11 38 14
1944 11 42 16
Table 5.4: Aircraft Production (in 1000s) 632
Year UK US USSR
1939 7.9 5.9 10.3
1940 15 12.8 10.6
1941 20 26.2 15.7
1942 23.7 47.8 25.4
1943 26.2 85.9 34.9
1944 26.5 96.3 40.3
1945 12.1 49.8 20.9
Table 5.5: Wartime Tank and Self-Propelled Gun Production (in 1000s) 63 3
Year UK US USSR
1939 0.3 ._.
1940 1.4 ._.
1941 4.8 0.9 4.8
1942 8.6 27 24.4
1943 7.5 38.5 24.1
1944 4.6 20.5 29
1945 2.1 12.6 20.5
Table 5.6: Combat Forces in Europe, 1944-
1945634
Date Military Personnel in Europe UK Forces as
United States United Kingdom % of Total
October 31, 1944 1,401,165 771,267 37
May 31, 1945 2,639,377 907,553 26
MacDonald, United States Army in World War I: The Last Offensive (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Dept.
of the Army, 1973), 297.
630 Forrest C. Pogue, United States Army in World War II. The Supreme Command (Washington,: Historical
Division, Dept. of the Army, 1954), 542-543, Tables 7, 9.
631 Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II," Military Affairs 10, no. 1
(Spring 1946): 75.
632 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 3 54.
633 Harrison, "Overview," 30.
634 Pogue, as cited.
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Postwar political developments reinforced European multipolarity. By early 1946,
American demobilization left the United Kingdom with the second largest army on the continent
(Table 5.7). Although Britain, the USSR, and the United States were each limited in the degree
to which they could generate combat power, the comparatively large size of the British force
635provided the nucleus for a significant postwar European presence. More importantly, Britain
ended the war working alongside the United States, USSR, and (later) France to occupy
636Germany. Britain was thus guaranteed 1) a military base of operations in Europe, and 2) a seat
at the table alongside the United States and Soviet Union as the three began organizing future
European security arrangements and Germany's role therein. Furthermore, because the British
occupation zone included the Ruhr Valley - the heart of German industrial potential - the United
Kingdom controlled arguably the critical piece of real estate for any country interested in either
reviving German power or ensuring Germany remained demilitarized.637 Because determining
Germany's future role in Europe would be a core issue of Soviet, American, and British postwar
negotiations, European political geography reinforced Britain's centrality to European security
affairs.
Table 5.7: Forces Stationed in Europe, 1946-1947638
Date Forces in Europe
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
June-July 1946 335,000 441,300 unk
winter 1946-1947 200,000 253,000 unk
June-July 1947 160,000 >220,000 1,665,000
Note: British and Soviet figures exclude air forces. Does not include forces based at
home.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the United Kingdom was as strong as the United States
or Soviet Union. Clearly, the U.S. and USSR were pulling away from the United Kingdom in
the great power game. All three states, however, retained sufficient capabilities to affect one
another's security and European politics writ large.639
635 Cristann Gibson, "Patterns of Demobilization: The US and USSR After World War Two" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Denver, 1983), chap. 5; Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," International
Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982): 110-138; James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1945-
1947 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 98-104; Julian Lewis, Changing
Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-47 (London: Routledge, 2002), xix-xciv.
636 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 3-65.
637 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War
(London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 20.
638 American figures from Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, 321; European Command, Occupation Forces in
Europe Series: The First Year of Occupation (Frankfurt am Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European
Command, 1947), 160; Earl F. Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, DC:
Center for Military History, Department of the Army, 1975), 423; Soviet figures from Gibson, "Patterns of
Demobilization," Table 3, 309. British figures estimated from Defence Committee, "Appendix 'A': Strength of
Armed Forces at 30 June and 31 December 1946 as Comparison of Manpower Requirements," 15 February 1946,
CAB 131/2; Defence Committee, "Size of the Army at 31st December, 1946," 15 July 1946, CAB 131/3; Defence
Committee, "The Strength of the Army, December 1946-March 1947," CAB 131/3. British figure for June-July
1947 estimated by subtracting withdrawal figures in Defence Committee, "Strength of the Armed Forces," 2 August
1947, CAB 131/4.
639 By 1944-1945, Soviet planners desired that "the USSR to become sufficiently strong to fear no aggression in
Europe and Asia, and so that no power or combination of powers [. . .] could event hint of such aggression." This
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B. British Posture: Robust
Within multipolar Europe, Britain retained a robust military posture for the first two years
after the war: it could secure its position in Central and Southern Europe while countering threats
to the United Kingdom itself. The United Kingdom's robust posture had two components. 640
First, military forces were designed to maintain a British foothold in Europe (particularly
Germany) while defending the air and sea lines of communication in and around the continent.64'
Second, Britain structured its military to deter potential opponents from threatening British
security by delineating a defensive perimeter in Europe and preparing to wage a long war against
aggressors if attacked. I deal with each component in turn.
First, Britain maintained a strong base of operations in Europe and ensured the lines of
communication in and around Europe. Access to Germany and maintenance of the British Zone
of Occupation was particularly important given Germany's location, industrial capacity, and
population. To that end, Britain poured military resources into sustaining a large force of at least
4 divisions in Germany. These forces were joined by additional troops based in Austria, Italy,
and Greece (Table 5.8).
Table 5.8: British Land Forces in Europe, July 1946642
Location Force
Germany
Armored Divisions 1.33
Infantry Divisions 2.33
Occupation Divisions 1
Armored Cav Regiments 5
Personnel Total 126,800
Southeast Europe (Italy, Greece, Austria)
Armored Divisions I
Infantry Divisions 3
Occupation Divisions 2
Armored Regiments 2
Personnel Total 137,250
These forces protected Britain against two threats. With Germany occupied and the USSR
exhausted, British policymakers saw little chance of another great power war in the immediate
future.643 Instead, proximate threats came from domestic challenges in war-tom Europe. First
period was estimated to take at least 10 years. Considering that Britain was the only other organized military force in
Europe or Asia in 1945, Soviet plans suggest that the UK could still harm the USSR; Filitov, "Problems," 6-8.
640 Most of the following is derived from Julian Lewis' work on postwar British strategy. Lewis' volume is virtually
a day-by-day guide to strategy debates during and immediately after the war based upon extensive archival research.
It remains the standard volume for postwar British defence policy. Lewis, Changing Direction.
641 See analysis in Defence Committee, "Draft White Paper on Defence" and annex, 13 February 1946, CAB 131/2;
Defence Committee, "Minutes of a Meeting Held at No. 10 Downing Street on Monday, 15 April 1946," CAB 13 1/1.
Hereafter, I refer to Defence Committee Meeting Minutes as DC, MM, with date as noted; records of the entire
Cabinet listed as CAB, MM.
642 Defence Committee, "Size of the Army at 31st December 1946," 15 July 1946 CAB 131/3. July 1946 was
chosen as an illustrative point late in the 1945-1946 period.
643 Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum on the Size of the Armed Forces," 13 February 1946, CAB 131/2.
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was the prospect of a rapid German recovery and the return of German militarism as had
occurred after 1918. Maintenance of a large garrison in Germany obviated this problem. The
second risk was that a hostile power (most likely the USSR) might gain influence in strategically
vital areas of Europe by moving into a power vacuum or by backing local proxy groups that
would seize power. Particularly important was retaining control of Germany, Italy, and Greece,
as Soviet influence in the whole of Germany would decisively shift the distribution of power in
the USSR's favor, while the loss of Italy and Greece would threaten the Mediterranean lines of
communication. By keeping sizable forces in these areas and using them to suppress local
movements, Britain ensured that vital areas would not fall into the hands of hostile actors.
The second aspect of Britain's robust posture resulted from preparations to fight a long war
against great power aggressors. Although no direct great power challenge seemed likely in the
near-term, British planners could not foreclose the risk in the future. To hedge against this
possibility, the British military focused on preparing its remaining air, sea, and land forces to
serve as the nucleus for the larger forces that would be mobilized following the outbreak of
644hostilities. Aside from the forces deployed to Europe, British planners focused on developing
the technology, personnel, and organizations that would enable the country to fight another
world war.645 To that end, British war plans called for standing forces in Europe to defend as
long as possible as far forward as possible before withdrawing to the British home islands as
646necessary. In the interim, air power based around the Mediterranean and from the United
Kingdom would attrite an opponent's industrial and military base as best it could, while Britain
and its allies mobilized for a lengthy conflict. 647 Britain might not be able to defeat the USSR or
a revived Germany on its own, but it could threaten punishment such that foreign leaders would
think twice before aggressing. In essence, Britain's postwar military functioned as a deterrent:
standing forces would delineate a defensive perimeter and serve as a tripwire, while the
country's resources mobilized for a drawn-out struggle.648
British posture posed problems for both the Soviet Union and the United States. These
were starkest for the Soviet Union. Because British and Soviet forces were in close contact, a
mishap could lead to miscalculation and a new war. Not only would the USSR be forced to
confront British air attacks on the Soviet Union, but a war threatened American intervention and
nuclear attacks against the Soviet homeland. 649 Furthermore, it might prevent the USSR from
consolidating its position in Eastern Europe and the western districts of the USSR itself at a time
when the Soviet Union faced local insurgencies opposed to Communist rule.650 Hence, any
diversion of Soviet forces from internal security or a British effort to support local groups
threatened Soviet security.
Second, and relatedly, British crackdowns on local political movements might cause
644 See, e.g., DC, MM 8 March 1946.
645 Lewis, Changing Direction, 257. To this end, Britain introduced a peacetime draft in mid-1946.
646 Ibid., 172. Also Chiefs of Staff, "Strategic Position of the British Commonwealth," 2 April 1946, CAB 131/2.
647 Ibid., 257-276, 325.
648 DC, MM 5 April 1946; Defence Committee, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," 13
March 1946, CAB 131/2.
649 On worries over Anglo-American balancing against the USSR, see Pechatnov, "Soviet Union," 94-95; for
nuclear worries, see D. Holloway, "Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic
Bomb, 1939-45," Social Studies of Science 11, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 183-184.
650 Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (Cambridge University Press,
2010); Lindsey O'Rourke, "Secrecy and Security: U.S.-Orchestrated Regime Change During the Cold War" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2013), 156-157; Evangelista, "Stalin's Army," 116.
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rivalry and conflict. By 1944-1945, the British military was already helping the Greek
government suppress Communist insurgents, and there was no reason British forces elsewhere in
Europe could not do the same. 651 Although British actions would prevent local governments
from falling under the sway of a hostile power, they also carried risks for the USSR. First,
because the United Kingdom might blame the USSR for local insurgencies, Britain might
retaliate against perceived Soviet aggrandizement.652 Although a British attack on the USSR was
implausible, Britain could still take hardline positions against the USSR in Germany while aiding
anti-Soviet groups in Eastern Europe. British actions would then set the stage for a Soviet
retaliation and an Anglo-Soviet crisis. At the same time, British action against local Communists
supported might engage Soviet prestige and credibility, and lead the USSR to take military
action on their behalf.
Britain's posture also threatened the United States, albeit in a different manner from the
USSR. On one level, American planners were both wedded to preventing any one state from
dominating Europe akin to Nazi Germany. They did not, however, want to maintain a large U.S.
military presence in Europe for this privilege, with Roosevelt announcing that American troops
would be gone from Europe "within two years." British military efforts threatened to undo these
plans. Given Britain's robust posture, the risk of escalation, rivalry, and/or war with the Soviet
Union was high. Yet because British forces were strong enough to deter aggression but not
strong enough to defeat a dedicated attack, an Anglo-Soviet contest risked seeing the USSR
overrunning continental Europe. This, in turn, would require American intervention, undoing
efforts to keep Europe out of any one state's control and America out of Europe. So long as
Britain retained a robust posture, the United States risked being chain-ganged into conflicts it did
not want.
C. Predictions
Given Britain's robust posture in a multipolar system, I predict that both the United States
and Soviet Union will pursue a strategy of Moderate Support. Several observable implications
follow. First, both the United States and Soviet Union will try to preserve the United Kingdom
as a great power. Irrespective of British concerns to the contrary, both the US and USSR should
try to avoid pushing the United Kingdom from the great power ranks by passing on opportunities
to pick off British interests, undercutting British capabilities, and limiting threats to British
security. However, given the United Kingdom's robust posture, cautious and prudent means will
be employed. Thus, efforts to protect the United Kingdom will be limited to generic statements
of political, military, and diplomatic support, moderate economic assistance, and efforts to
reduce the decliner's defensive burden by de-escalating arms races rather than advancing alliance
offers. By extension, American and Soviet policymakers will constantly seek signs of British
weakness, and attempt to avoid steps that might cause further problems - we expect consistent
efforts to monitor Britain's health as a great power. In essence, both the U.S. and USSR will try
to avoid making life any harder for the United Kingdom at a time when it is already on the
geopolitical ropes, but not do much to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power at
significant cost or risk.
Furthermore, we expect policymakers to offer clear rationales for American and Soviet
behavior. At Realist Decline Theory's core is an argument that rising states in multipolarity 1)
651 Stephen G. Xydis, "America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947," Political Science Quarterly
78, no. 4 (Winter 1963): 581-596.
652 British policymakers, for instance, saw the Greek insurgency as a Soviet bid for influence; Alan Bullock, Ernest
Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 337-340.
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fear being balanced, and 2) try to avoid isolation if balancing occurs. Combined, these
mechanisms create an incentive to support the decliner and avoid the costs of predation. Thus,
strategists in both the Soviet Union and United States should emphasize these tradeoffs: they are
expected to discuss their recognition that support is a way of retaining alliance options while also
avoiding the costs of internal balancing (by the United Kingdom) and external balancing (if the
United Kingdom attracts other great power allies). However, policymakers will also recognize
the dangers of coming to Britain's aid so long as the Britain holds a robust military posture. In
private discussion and analyses, they will justify avoiding intense means of support out of 1)
worries of the decliner's own ability to counterbalance, and 2) worries of entrapment and chain-
ganging. Indeed, the desirability of avoiding entrapment and British chain-ganging may be
particularly important, as it implies Soviet and American policymakers may adopt Moderate
Support for the signal it sends to the other side: if either the United States or USSR were to
intensely support a robust declining Britain, then the other rising power may fear its impending
isolation and begin counterbalancing.
By extension, American and Soviet policymakers will monitor Britain for signs its posture
is changing from robust to weak. Evidence of such a shift will cause American and Soviet
policymakers to alter their strategies and use intense means to aid the United Kingdom.
Strategists will also justify intense support on the grounds that 1) Britain might be lost as a future
ally, and 2) worries that other great powers might expand at a very weak Britain's expense and
become a significant threat.
Finally, evidence that Britain is beginning to internally or externally balance will lead to
efforts to reassure the United Kingdom. On one level, American and Soviet policies may
inadvertently weaken Britain and appear predatory. This may lead Britain to balance against the
source of the problem, potentially confronting the United States with an Anglo-Soviet grouping
or the Soviet Union with an Anglo-American grouping. At the same time, Britain may try to use
its remaining resources to confront the source of the problem, potentially triggering diplomatic
standoffs and military crises. Both the United States and USSR should be on the lookout for this
behavior and try to stop it by ending the offending policies. In effect, evidence that Soviet or
American action is causing Britain to balance will lead to changes in American or Soviet strategy
that reassure Britain and preserve Britain as a potential ally by "bidding" for British quiescence.
IV. Alternate Explanations
Realist Decline Theory's predictions differ from those advanced by Democratic Peace
Theory and Institutionalist Theory. Here, I code the independent variables and derive
predictions from both arguments in sequence.
E. Democratic Peace Theory
i. Coding Regime Type
Both the United States and United Kingdom were democracies at the end of the Second
World War. Polity assigns both states a democracy score of 10, indicating fully democratic
institutions. This matches popular conceptions of the United States and United Kingdom as the
world's leading democracies at the start of the Cold War. Indeed, the two were arguably the
only Western democracies to survive the rise of Communism in the 191 Os, rise of Fascism in the
1920s and 1930s, and the travails of the Second World War intact. Having weathered these
storms without changing their governing regimes (evidenced by stable Polity scores for the
preceding decade), I accept the Polity scores and code both states as democracies.
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The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was a non-democracy. Polity assigns it a
democracy score of 0, indicating no democratic institutions, civil liberties, or leader
accountability; this score was also stable over the preceding decade. This matches basic
intuitions about the nature of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. As often reported, Stalin
went to great lengths to eliminate potential opponents to his leadership at the head of the
Communist Party.611 Coming on top of the suppression of non-Communist parties after the
Russian Revolution, Stalin's purges left the USSR devoid of political opposition. Stalin
effectively ran the state as a personalized autocracy, and the system was sufficiently stable that
Stalin's rule remained intact despite wartime dislocations. With the Communist Party
entrenched and Stalin dominant, I code the USSR as a non-democracy.654
ii. Predictions
Under these conditions, Democratic Peace Theory makes divergent predictions for the
United States and Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. First, the United States is
expected to adopt a Moderate Support strategy. The United States is expected to want to
preserve a fellow democracy against the non-democratic threat posed by the Soviet Union. I
predict American policymakers will justify aid to the United Kingdom in these terms,
underscoring the attraction of protecting a fellow democracy against a rising non-democratic
challenge; conversely, U.S. strategists will underline the dangers of Britain falling to non-
democratic forces and the United States standing alone as a democratic bastion if U.S. support is
not forthcoming.
In the process of providing this aid, we also expect Anglo-American negotiations to be
conducted smoothly. There should be few misunderstandings between the two sides as common
democratic institutions make it easy for policymakers in both states to assess the distribution of
power and for the United States to recognize Britain's need for U.S. support. Moreover, because
democracy facilitates bargaining in a "spirit of fairness," we expect the two sides to reach a
mutually-acceptable bargain, with few recriminations or accusations of cheating along the way.
Above all, we expect to see widespread backing for support of the United Kingdom within the
United States as a wide swath of citizens and decision-makers recognize that support for the
United Kingdom is in the United States' democratic best interest - there ought to be a fairly
strong consensus that the common democratic heritage compels the United States to assist the
United Kingdom at a time of weakness.
In contrast, the theory predicts Moderate Predation will emerge between the Soviet Union
and United Kingdom. Due to the different regime types between the two states, all the factors
predicted to cause American support for the United Kingdom will push the Soviet Union in the
other direction. Thus, Anglo-Soviet relations will be marked by misunderstanding and
miscommunication as the two sides misinterpret each-other's interests and power. The result
will be Anglo-Soviet rivalry. This, in turn, will lead the Soviet Union to see an advantage in
weakening the United Kingdom in order to reduce the British threat to the Soviet Union and
advance Soviet security. Missing, in other words, will be the ease of bargaining, communication,
and incentives to preserve the United Kingdom as a strong great power expected in the Anglo-
American dyad. There should therefore be a progressive breakdown in Anglo-Soviet relations,
and the Soviet Union watch for signs of British weakness in order to advance the Communist
cause and weaken the leading democratic state in Western Europe; insofar as we can get inside
653 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
654 A good primer is Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Vital'evich Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin And the Soviet Ruling
Circle, 1945-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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Soviet decision-making, we expect Soviet policymakers to justify and rationalize Soviet policy
in these terms. Conversely, there should be few signs of Soviet interest in helping the United
Kingdom survive as a democratic great power. Indeed, signs that the Soviet Union is interested
in cooperating with the United Kingdom and ignoring the divergent nature of the British regime
is problematic for Democratic Peace Theory and offers disconfirming evidence.
F. Institutionalist Theory
i. Coding Institutional Presence
The United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom were not jointly embedded in the
same highly developed international institutions before Britain began to decline. However, three
bilateral or de facto institutions may plausibly be treated as substitutes.
First, Anglo-American wartime collaboration may be seen as a bilateral institution that
was as close as two states have ever been to mutual institutional binding. Beginning in 1941, the
United States and United Kingdom established a bevy of bilateral mechanisms to coordinate the
war effort. On the military side, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Combined Munitions
Assignment Board, Combined Planning Staff, Combined Military Transportation Committee,
and Combined Intelligence Committee oversaw allied military strategy and mobilization. The
boards had offices in London and Washington staffed by senior officers empowered to make
decisions on core military topics. The military boards were jointed by civilian institutions to
oversee economic mobilization, including the Combined Production and Resources Board,
Combined Raw Materials Board, and Combined Food Board; the Combined Policy Committee,
meanwhile, would help develop nuclear technology and weapons. 5 6 As a group, the combined
boards saw the United States and United Kingdom surrender decision-making powers to
organizations outside of either's unilateral control. Given the depth of institutional coordination
and bilateral decision-making procedures in a high-stakes wartime environment, I treat the
combined boards as a de facto institution binding that should influence American strategy after
1945.
Second, scholars such as Ikenberry and Ruggie see international financial institutions
established by the 1944 Bretton Woods conference as core elements of the "liberal order" created
657by the United States towards the end of the war. While the Soviet Union remained outside
these institutions, and although they focused on ensuring free trade by promoting international
currency convertibility, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are seen to have played a critical role in postwar
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European security affairs. As Ikenberry describes, Bretton Woods institutions helped create
what Truman called an "economic peace" among the great powers in which "conflicts would be
captured and domesticated in an iron cage of multilateral rules, standards, safeguards, and
dispute resolution procedures." By fostering economic interdependence and providing a forum
for political leaders to meet in a multilateral setting, the institutions helped "manage economic
and political change" and laid the foundation for deeper forms of cooperation in the future."s8
And although the IMF and IBRD were only starting up in the mid-1940s, their formation
required significant expenditures of time and political capital by American policymakers.
Combined, the IMF and IBRD presumably gave the United States a stake in the institutions'
success and bound the United States to Britain's ability to participate therein.
Finally, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union agreed to institutionalize
regular meetings of their respective foreign ministers via a "Council of Foreign Ministers"
(CFM). CFM represented an effort to perpetuate wartime consultation and coordination. The
Yalta Summit Protocol emphasized the formal nature of the commitment, declaring that,
"permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign
Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet [... .] about every three or four months". 659 Headquartered
in London, CFM's immediate task was to draw up peace treaties with Germany and the other
European Axis powers. However, the subsequent Potsdam Protocol also allowed that "Other
matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member
Governments." 660 Taken together, the Potsdam and Yalta Protocols suggest American, British,
and Soviet policymakers envisioned a formal mechanism by which the three could meet and
resolve disputes in a cooperative manner. In this, the CFM process was as institutionalized as
the Two Plus Four talks discussed earlier. Because leading institutionalist scholars consider Two
Plus Four to have produced effects akin to what we would see in a more institutionalized setting
by facilitating the flow of information, extending the shadow of the future, and providing a
forum for negotiation, I likewise consider the CFM a de facto institution.
As a group, Anglo-American bilateral cooperation, Western financial institution building,
and Anglo-American-Soviet efforts to perpetuate wartime collaboration indicate that each of the
great powers in 1945 had some kind of institutional links to one another. To be clear, these
institutions were relatively weak, were only partially operational before Britain began to decline,
and only loosely meet the criteria suggested by Ikenberry and others. However, because
Institutionalist Theory itself suggests ad hoc and de facto institutions of the type here can
produce many of the effects of more formal institutions, I argue these institutions should
generate benefits akin to what even more binding institutions would yield. Put differently, if
American membership in NATO and the Two Plus Four talks were, per institutionalist
arguments, sufficient to generate American cooperation and restraint in the face of Soviet decline,
then wartime collaboration, institutionalized ministerial summits, and international financial
institutions should produce at least as much benign rising state behavior.
ii. Predictions
Given these conditions, Institutionalist Theory predicts both the United States and Soviet
Union will pursue strategies of Moderate Support. Bound to the United Kingdom through
658 Ikenberry, "Woodrow Wilson, The Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism," 16-17; also
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several different mechanisms, both states are expected to see the status quo as worth preserving
and try to sustain institutionalized cooperation. However, they are also likely to see this dynamic
as threatened by growing British weakness. Thus, policymakers in both the U.S. and USSR will
respond by providing diplomatic support and military aid to the United Kingdom with the
express purpose of helping preserve the institutional status quo. In the process, they should
utilize extant international institutions. In the American case, the availability of the combined
boards, Bretton Woods institutions, and CFM provide several pathways to channel support and
signal an interest in preserving the United Kingdom; we expect to see American policymakers
readily working through these institutions to aid the United Kingdom, while bargaining over the
terms of American assistance through these venues. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was
only bound to the United Kingdom via the CFM. However, because the CFM was created with
the express purpose of sustaining wartime cooperation, it should readily serve to breed Soviet
support and engagement with the United Kingdom. Therefore, we should find Soviet
policymakers turning to the CFM as the prime venue to negotiate the terms of Soviet assistance
and support for British interests, while simultaneously helping the Soviet Union understand the
precise nature of British problems and the steps the USSR could take to buttress British power.
Above all, in the process of coming to Britain's aid, American and Soviet strategists
should emphasize the utility of institutions in understanding and responding to British problems.
That is, if institutions provide the functional advantages claimed, then we should find
policymakers underscoring the attractiveness of working through institutional mechanisms and
the benefits thereof. Simultaneously, strategists should discuss how the information and insights
provided by institutional channels helped them better cooperate and support the United Kingdom.
This also implies they should discuss their worries of a breakdown in institutional cooperation if
support for the United Kingdom were not forthcoming- in other words, senior decision-makers
are expected to emphasize the attractiveness of the institutional status quo and their worries that
the status quo might be undone if Britain were not supported. Overall, American and Soviet
strategists are expected to recognize the advantages of sustaining great power cooperation via
extant international institutions, emphasize the problems that would result if institutions were to
collapse, and therefore adopt and a Moderate Support strategy.
V. American Strategy and British Decline, 1945-1946
This section begins the analysis of rising and declining state relations in multipolar
settings. It does so by assessing the course and outcome of American strategy towards the United
Kingdom in 1945-1946 and weighing the results against predictions from the competing theories.
The following section continues the analysis by assessing Soviet strategy.
A. An Overview of American Strategy: Moderate Support
As predicted by all three theories, the United States adopted a Moderate Support strategy
towards the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1946. American policymakers sought to keep Britain
a great power, but avoided intensive means to this end. On balance, however, I find more
support for Realist Decline Theory than Democratic Peace Theory or Institutionalist Theory, as
American policy was driven more by the desire to 1) keep Britain strong while 2) avoid exposing
the United States to the problems that could result from too close of an association with a
military robust United Kingdom, than 3) anything related to common regime type or institutional
binding. This is clear from the constituent parts of the strategy.
The early postwar period saw the United States disassociate itself from tight wartime
cooperation with the United Kingdom. This behavior is somewhat puzzling for Democratic
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Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory: absent a change in regime type or failure of extant
institutions, we do not ex ante expect the United States to reduce the level of support to the
United Kingdom at a time of British weakness. Nevertheless, this is exactly what the United
States did. American policymakers looked to foster a postwar system in which the United
Kingdom and USSR were primarily responsible for European security while the United States
either dissociated itself from European politics or stood on the sidelines to adjudicate disputes
between the two. This approach required the United States to maintain cooperative relations
with both the British and the Soviets. The United States therefore avoided British efforts to
enlist the United States in an Anglo-American alliance and reduced the size of its commitment to
Europe in an effort to buck-pass and free-ride on British largesse. Equally important, British
efforts to obtain American aid in reconstructing the British economy fell on partially deaf ears:
America was willing to provide limited loans to Britain, but not enough to revive the British
economy.
Realist Decline Theory's explanatory power is clear given the causal processes
underlying American strategy. First, the multipolar nature of Europe meant the United States
saw the United Kingdom as a useful potential ally in both containing Germany and hedging
against the Soviet Union. American policymakers therefore argued Britain could not be allowed
to fall from the great power ranks. At the same time, Britain's robust military posture meant U.S.
strategists saw little need to come to Britain's aid. Britain appeared capable of handling its own
security against near-term threats from the Soviet Union, even as American officials worried that
Britain was attempting to chain-gang the United States into a commitment to Europe the United
States did not seek. The resulting distrust and uncertainty, added to the fact that intense
American support for the United Kingdom might antagonize the Soviet Union, hindered more
intensive forms of U.S. assistance.
B. The Strategic Context of British Decline
World War Two altered the strategic map of Europe. By the end of the war, Europe's
two offshore powers (the United States and United Kingdom) faced an indefinite commitment to
the continent due to the occupation of Germany. Equally important, the Soviet Union was
ensconced in Central-Eastern Europe. With Germany conquered and France devastated, the end
of the war left a power vacuum in Europe that created opportunities for great power cooperation
and rivalry.
This situation lent itself to complex strategic calculations. On one level, the United
States, United Kingdom, and USSR were determined to prevent a German resurgence that could
again threaten European security. 661 However, the fact that the Soviets, Americans, and British
each controlled a portion of Germany also meant that unless the German issue was handled
cooperatively, each could end up threatening and threatened by the others. First, if great power
cooperation broke down and any of the three established sole control over Germany, then that
state would be able to mobilize Germany's substantial economic and military potential for its
own political purposes. Second, if great power cooperation broke down and Germany was
divided, then at least two of the great powers could find themselves engaged in a sustained
661 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, chap. 1; James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem,
1943-1954 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), chap. 2.
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662rivalry in the heart of Europe. Combined, there was significant room for miscalculation, and
mismanagement in great power relations.
In this fluid environment, British policymakers focused on preventing any one state from
dominating the continent. With Germany occupied, the Soviet Union seemed the most likely
663source of problems. However, because the USSR was absolutely stronger than the United
Kingdom, the United Kingdom would be hard-pressed to offset Soviet capabilities. Left to its
own devices, Britain would need to commit an increasingly large share of increasingly scarce
capabilities to occupying Germany, denying German resources to the USSR, and balancing
Soviet adventurism elsewhere. 664 While viable in the short-term, the strategy courted long-term
disaster as it promised an exhausting Anglo-Soviet rivalry that the weakening United Kingdom
could not sustain.665
British policymakers therefore sought a firm American commitment to postwar Europe
and American support for the United Kingdom.666 Churchill was focused on this issue from mid-
1943, telling colleagues that, "Germany is finished, though it may take some time to clean up the
mess. The real problem now is Russia. I can't get the Americans to see it.'' 667 With American
backing, the United Kingdom would gain an ally to balance possible Soviet aggrandizement
while helping prevent Germany's re-emergence. 668 Equally important, American aid could be
used to revive the British economy, reconstruct Western Europe, and ultimately reconstitute a
continental balance of power that would give Britain strategic flexibility.669 The United States
appeared the surest route to guarantee British security.670
C. Diplomatic Policy: A British Dream Deferred
American strategists were having none of Britain's plans. Rather than accept British calls
for intensive American aid to Britain, the United States initially tried to distance itself from
Europe and limit American diplomatic, military, and economic support for the United Kingdom.
In short, it pursued Moderate Support. The American approach assumed that Britain, although
declining and facing acute economic problems, would quickly recover from wartime damage to
function as one of the three poles in postwar Europe. 671 This section examines the diplomatic
and economic side of the Anglo-American relationship, before turning to the military
relationship in the next section.
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As the war in Europe ran down, the United States tried to dissociate itself from the
continent while relying on the USSR and United Kingdom to maintain European security.
American plans laid down before the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam conferences envisioned a spheres
of influence settlement for Europe.672 Eastern Europe would fall into the Soviet orbit, while
Western Europe remained an Anglo-American domain.673 Germany, meanwhile, would be
674divided in order to avoid great power discord over the future shape of the German state.
Division would be particularly useful in preventing an Anglo-Soviet rivalry at a time when, per
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), "the greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and
Russia would seem to grow out of either nation [. . .] seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe
to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." 675 It would also help
dampen Soviet concerns of an Anglo-American front directed against the USSR that might breed
discord and mistrust between the wartime partners.676
In theory, a spheres of influence settlement was conducive to British power and
security.677 By giving the Soviets free rein in the East while keeping part of Germany and
Western Europe out of the Soviet camp, the likelihood of Anglo-Soviet rivalry would be
diminished and the British need to balance the USSR reduced. Nevertheless, the specifics of the
American plan posed problems for the United Kingdom. British policymakers wanted the
Anglo-American sphere of influence to be more American than Anglo and warned of "grave
dangers which would arise with the withdrawal of American troops from Europe." 678 American
policymakers, however, planned for the sphere to be more Anglo than American. From 1943
onward, the Roosevelt Administration resisted British plans to commit American power to
postwar Europe. In Roosevelt's ideal, the "Four Policemen" (meaning the three great powers
plus China) would instead be responsible for security within their respective areas of operation.
Britain would thus have primary responsibility for Western Europe:
"In as much as the United States is approximately 3,500 miles removed from
Europe, it is not its natural task to bear the postwar burden of re- constituting
France, Italy and the Balkans. This is properly the task of Great Britain which is
far more vitally interested than is the United States. The United States will be
only too glad to retire all its military forces from Europe as soon as this is
feasible." 9
American air and naval forces might come to Europe's assistance in a pinch, but in general
"England and the Soviet Union would have to handle the land armies in the event of any future
threat to the peace." 680
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To make a break with Europe, the United States needed Soviet support for a spheres of
influence solution. Gaining Soviet support, in turn, required resolving the future of Germany
and avoiding the perception of an Anglo-American front directed against the USSR."' As the
United States pursued these goals in 1945, it eschewed a coordinated strategy with the United
Kingdom; notably, the effort to distance the United States from a closely integrated, democratic
ally is the opposite of what both Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory predict.
Before both Yalta and Potsdam, for example, American policymakers refused to meet with their
British counterparts to agree on joint Anglo-American positions to use against the Soviets.682
Equally important, the substance of the negotiations often saw the United States cooperate with
the Soviets more than the United Kingdom and kept "Britain from establishing any arrangement
that would protects its vital interests."683 At Yalta, for instance, the United States went along
with Soviet efforts to set a figure on German reparations ($20 billion overall, with $10 billion for
the USSR) rather than accept British efforts to leave the matter for later negotiation pending the
revival of the postwar European economy.684 Potsdam similarly saw the United States and
Soviet Union negotiate reparations without the British before presenting Britain with "take it or
leave it proposals." 685 Summarizing the drift in Anglo-American relations in 1945, Ambassador
Joseph Davies concluded that British leaders were "basically more concerned over preserving
England's position in Europe than in preserving [great power] Peace," sought to use American
power for that purpose, and were therefore opposed to American efforts to distance themselves
from European affairs. 686
However, efforts to distance the United States from the United Kingdom did not mean
the United States ignored and isolated Britain. Indicative of Moderate Support, the United States
also looked to limit further losses to British power. First, American backing for a spheres of
influence solution put the Soviets on notice: any hostile designs they might have on Western
Europe (and thus British power and security) would be met with American opposition. This
corresponds with my theory's prediction that the United States will back the United Kingdom for
fear of aggrandizement by other relatively rising states. Secretary of State James Byrnes, who
presented the most detailed spheres of influence solution at Potsdam, underlined the point when
agreeing with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's query whether a plan to divide Germany meant
"each country would have a free hand in their own zones and would act entirely independently of
the others." A "free hand" in the respective spheres cut both ways. By signing the Soviets
up for a spheres solution, the United States established its interest in the fate of Western Europe
and signaled it would not tolerate Soviet action in the Western orbit that, by definition, would
threaten Britain. Furthermore, by pushing to divide Europe into separate camps, the United
States reduced the likelihood that the Western powers would find themselves in a rivalry with the
USSR. This, in turn, would limit the risk of Britain exhausting itself balancing the USSR
following an American withdrawal.
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American officials also moved over the course of 1945-1946 towards helping Britain
reconstruct its economy. To be clear, this policy developed in fits and starts. In the immediate
weeks after the war, American policies were actually partially responsible for British economic
dilemma as the United States cancelled Lend-Lease assistance following Japan's August 1945
surrender over substantial British opposition; at a basic level, the American decision to ignore
input from and terminate cooperation with a democratic ally embedded in the same institutions is
puzzling from the perspective of democratic peace and institutionalist arguments. At the time,
American policymakers justified the move on the grounds that Lend-Lease was designed to help
the United Kingdom participate in the war effort.689 Nevertheless, the move contravened Anglo-
American wartime agreements to continue assistance into the postwar period to subsidize 1) the
occupation of Germany, and 2) help the British economy get back on its feet.690 In cancelling
Lend-Lease, British reconversion plans were left in the lurch and British policymakers
confronted a worsening balance of payments problem.
Still, plans for a British-dominated sphere required Britain to remain strong enough to
take the lead in Western Europe.691 As Realist Decline Theory predicts, once it became clear
that American policy was hurting Britain, American policymakers moved to assist Britain's
recovery and led to Anglo-American talks for a postwar British aid package.692 The talks and
final deal reflected the United States' Moderate Support strategy. British officials arrived in
Washington in September 1945 seeking a $6 billion grant to defray $14 billion in debt and an
expected deficit of $5.3 billion in 1946-1948 alone. 693 Arguing that its indebtedness stemmed
from having prosecuted the war without respite for six years, the UK wanted the United States to
repay British wartime resolve with postwar assistance.694 American officials, on the other hand,
desired Britain's recovery, but believed that Britain was exaggerating the extent of its economic
problems. They worried that unqualified American aid would allow Britain to delay making the
pound convertible into dollars ("sterling-dollar convertibility") to the detriment of the Bretton
Woods agreements; this disagreement over the basic facts of the situation is in tension with
Institutionalist Theory, which predicts Anglo-American institutional channels should provide
significant information that would help facilitate American support for the United Kingdom.695
American officials therefore insisted on narrower terms. Instead of a $6 billion grant, the most
the United States was initially willing to offer was a $3 billion loan at commercial rates with an
added rider that Britain make its currency convertible from mid-1947.696 Britain, in turn,
protested that 1) $4 billion was the minimum needed for short-term reconstruction, and 2)
sterling convertibility would lead to a run on the pound and exacerbate British financial
problems.697
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Faced with this standoff, American officials moderated their positions.698 They still
insisted on sterling convertibility and a loan. However, the terms of the loan came much closer
to Britain's initial request. Rather than treat the loan as a commercial transaction, the United
States offered a $3.75 billion loan at two percent interest repayable over 50 years. Interest would
also be deferred for five years.699 These were generous terms from the American perspective:
the interest rate was below market, and the amount of the loan greater than the initial U.S.
offer. 700 Equally important, the loan allowed Britain to suspend interest payments in years when
it suffered a trade deficit. Thus, unless British trade grew and the economy recovered, Britain
would effectively receive the grant it initially demanded.01 On balance, the United States split
the difference between its initial position and Britain's. Seeking to help the British economy
without substantial cost or risk to American objectives, the United States eventually backed
positions that tried to protect the British economy from any further harm.702
Moderate Support continued into 1946 even as tensions mounted between the Soviets on
one side and the United States-United Kingdom on the other.703 Amidst rising Soviet-Western
antagonism, Britain's economic problems worsened. By the spring of 1946, British
policymakers were looking to save money by reducing Britain's foreign footprint. The only
major savings could be found in Germany, where maintaining the British Occupation Zone cost
E80 million per year in non-military expenses alone.704 British officials therefore decided in
May to seek American backing in fusing the French, British, and American zones of occupation
into a single administrative unit. Ideally, fusion would 1) reduce British costs, and 2) help
Germany recover so that the occupation would cost less. American support was crucial because
only the "full and continued financial and military support of the United States" would enable
the Western zones to function as the single economic and administrative unit intended.70 5
Nevertheless, the United States refused the British approach through the spring.706
Although fusing the Western zones was a logical outgrowth of the spheres of influence strategy,
American backing would cause a break in Soviet-American relations and prevent the United
States from withdrawing from the continent.70 7 As we expect from Realist Decline Theory, the
United States avoided assisting Great Britain when doing so threatened relations with the Soviet
Union. Only in July 1946, after the failure of the Paris CFM meeting convinced the United
States that the USSR was unlikely to facilitate a speedy American exit from Europe, did the
United States shift towards the British position. Speaking to the assembled British, French, and
Soviet foreign ministers at the CFM, Byrnes offered to join the American zone with any other.708
698 For growing U.S. recognition of British problem, see United States Department of State, FRUS 1945:
Commonwealth, 141-142.
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Britain jumped at the offer, but even this did not translate into intense American support. Instead,
the resulting negotiations saw the United States hold to a strict interpretation of joint
responsibilities and refuse to assume more than 50 percent of the combined costs of the Anglo-
American occupation zone. Despite British protestations that the occupation was eating into
British dollar reserves - including the $3.75 billion loan - American officials refused to budge.
Hence, and as Hathaway observes, "the benefits which the fusion brought Great Britain were
[. . .] little more than the fortuitous byproduct of an action taken largely for other reasons." 709
There was still no consistent American interest in backing the United Kingdom.
Nor did additional Soviet-American antagonism reorient Anglo-American relations. As
Trachtenberg observes, 1946 was the year in which the Cold War began to take shape.710
Particularly important were perceived Soviet threats to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, as the resulting
crises convinced American policymakers of Soviet hostility and the impossibility of Soviet-
American cooperation.711 However, Soviet threats were even more direct challenges to Great
Britain, as Iran, Turkey, and Greece were regarded as British protectorates and critical to
Britain's postwar security: 712 British influence in Greece and Turkey anchored British military
power in the Mediterranean, while Iran was the world's (and Britain's) major oil supplier. 713
The American response to the crises is therefore demonstrative of U.S. policy towards the United
Kingdom writ large.714
Reviews of the crises can be found in a number of sources.7 " For the sake of brevity, I
focus on overall American behavior across the cases. In each crisis, Britain warned the United
States of a perceived Soviet threat to British interests. In contrast to the predicted ease of
information sharing and cooperation within institutionalized relationships and among democratic
dyads, my -research suggests American officials initially questioned the threat or delayed
responding; only in the face of substantial British pressure did the United States come to agree
with British positions and pressure the Soviets to stop their activities.716 Some American actions,
such as the joint Anglo-American demarche demanding Soviet withdrawal from Iran, were
coordinated with the United Kingdom.7 1 7 Others, including the deployment of naval forces in a
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show of support for Turkey, were unilateral moves.718 Regardless, British policymakers
welcomed indications of American political backing and pushed to translate episodic support
into a permanent Anglo-American alliance and to have the United States take up British
responsibilities in protecting the areas.719 Yet through the end of 1946, American officials
refused an explicit statement of support for the United Kingdom and of commitment to defend
British security.720 Even as the United States began considering additional aid to Greece and
Turkey in the face of continued Soviet pressure, American officials concluded that "it seems
preferable for Great Britain to assume the obligation of providing military equipment and
munitions whenever necessary" to both.721 The United States, in other words, would only act if
the United Kingdom proved unable to do so. The American effort to buck-pass and the failure of
ready cooperation despite mutual democracy and an institutionalized relationship is more in line
with Realist Decline Theory than Democratic Peace Theory or Institutionalist Theory.
D. Military Policy
American military policy paralleled diplomatic policy. To sustain a spheres of influence
strategy, American wartime diplomacy committed the United States to a rapid withdrawal from
Europe after the end of the war. After Roosevelt's death, Truman embraced this approach.72
Initially, the United States sought a rapid withdrawal to free-up units for the fight against Japan.
After Japan's defeat, however, U.S. retrenchment accelerated to meet public demands for
conversion to a peacetime footing and effort to avoid entrapment to avoid entrapment with a
perfidious, imperial United Kingdom; notably, the notion of the United Kingdom as
untrustworthy and not fully democratic contradicts democratic peace predictions.723 The
resulting drawdown of American forces was therefore even more rapid than initially planned.
Where the United States had nearly 3.1 million troops in Europe in spring 1945, it had 335,000
troops in theater one year later, while those that remained were in a low state of readiness. 2
The American withdrawal occurred despite British opposition. British leaders viewed
maintenance of American military forces in Europe as the best way of deterring Soviet threats to
Europe and preventing Britain from engaging in a potentially futile effort at balancing the
725Soviets. American strategists disagreed. Not only did American policymakers question the
necessity of balancing the USSR, but if a fight came, then American military strategy was
726premised on a modified version of its strategy in World War Two. As Ross details, through
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1946 U.S. planners believed that any great power war would begin with a fight between Britain
and the Soviet Union. 727 In Europe, British forces and available West European units would
delay Soviet troops as long as possible. This would end in Soviet forces overrunning the
continent, but would give Britain a window to mobilize.728 In the Middle East, meanwhile,
British units would stage a fighting retreat before lengthy Soviet supply lines forced a halt. It
was only at this point, after Britain absorbed the immediate Soviet attack, American air and
naval forces would deploy to Britain's aid. In particular, U.S. air power would stage from bases
in Britain, Iran, and Egypt to strike at Soviet industrial and military targets. This would
eventually attrite Soviet strength and, if needed, pave the way for an amphibious assault on the
Soviet Union itself to force a capitulation. 729 Until this point, however, the United States would
remain outside Europe.
Contrary to what Institutionalist Theory expects for a highly institutionalized Anglo-
American relationship, Britain occupied an uneasy place in U.S. war plans. Instead, it better
matches one of the core predictions of Realist Decline Theory, namely, that the United States
will try to avoid an automatic commitment to the United Kingdom so long as Britain retains a
robust posture. First, rather than sustain an Anglo-American military alliance that would
automatically commit the United States to help Britain, American strategy remained opaque on
whether the U.S. would intervene in a timely manner to actively defend Britain and West
European security. This approach left Britain to bear the initial Soviet attack.730 Moreover, with
Western Europe conquered and assigned to Soviet control, Britain would be subject to Soviet air
attacks and confront the prospect of even more damage to the British Isles than had occurred in
the 1939-1945.731 Second, although the United States might intervene at some point, Britain
could not be confident over the level or timing of the U.S. commitment. 732 This might allow the
USSR a window to gain at Britain's expense (if it could coerce Britain or achieve victory before
the U.S. intervened), and required British strategists to act as if the United States might not get
involved.733 Finally, because American intervention might be contingent on Britain making a
good showing against the Soviets, British policymakers felt compelled to 1) keep Soviet forces
out of Western Europe for as long as possible, and 2) preserve air bases in the Middle East that
could strike the Soviet Union. 734 Collectively, American strategy left Britain on the horns of a
dilemma: not strong enough to defeat the USSR in battle, it nevertheless needed to balance
intensely to deter the USSR short of war and hold out long enough to garner American support if
hostilities erupted. At a time of British weakness, American military strategy therefore did just
enough to offer Britain some hope for the future without reducing Britain's military burden.
Three other American decisions in 1945-1946 suggest American Moderate Support for
Britain and buttress Realist Decline Theory. First, the United States significantly reduced the
activities of the combined boards following Germany's surrender, and effectively terminated
727 Ross, American War Plans, 31.
728 Ibid., 7,
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joint military coordination altogether after Japan's surrender. 735 This decision contradicts a core
institutionalist insight, namely, that once the United States and United Kingdom are
institutionally bound to one another, they should try to sustain the status quo. Just the opposite
occurred. British efforts to restart military coordination were rejected as American military
planners told their British counterparts that "Matters relating to post-war armies are [. . .] not
susceptible to combined military commitments. Any arrangements which the British wish to
make on these subjects are beyond the urview of the United States Chiefs of Staff and should be
taken up on the governmental level."
The decision to reduce Anglo-American cooperation was a strategic move by American
policymakers to avoid the appearance of Anglo-American front against the USSR.737 This
follows Realist Decline Theory's prediction that rising states will avoid intensive means of
support if doing so threatens to isolate, antagonize, and cause a rivalry or war with another great
power. In practice, escalating Soviet-American antagonism over Greece, Turkey, and Iran in late
1945-1946 compelled U.S. military planners to reach out to their British counterparts and restart
staff talks.738 However, these activities occurred in secret and appear to have been an
independent decision by the U.S. Joint Chiefs not sanctioned by Truman and his advisors. 7 39 As
such, it remained opaque the extent to which the United States was committed to preventing
740other states from pressuring Britain and trying to gain at the United Kingdom's expense.
Ultimately, it was only in the midst of the Greek and Turkish crises in late 1946 that Truman
agreed to a British proposal to restart Anglo-American military planning.74' Yet even then,
"there was no commitment by the United States to come to Britain's assistance if war broke
out."742 On balance, the waxing and waning of Anglo-American military planning is indicative
of Moderate Support and Realist Decline Theory: by limiting the Anglo-American military
relationship even at a working level, the United States limited the degree to which Britain could
depend on the United States, the extent to which the United States was committed to protecting
Britain, and the risk of offending the USSR.
Second, as the United States acquired overseas military bases after the Second World
War, it avoided bases in and around Europe. Despite pushing for basing rights and access to
facilities in South America, the Pacific, Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the subcontinent, the
nearest American bases to Europe were planned for Iceland.743 By virtue of this system, the
United States would not find itself automatically committed to a fight in Europe and could
decide whether to come to Britain's defense. The dilemma posed by the ambiguous American
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commitment to Britain continued as British planners could not count on American assistance,
weakening deterrence. American behavior thus poses problems for Democratic Peace Theory
because it left a fellow democracy vulnerable to coercion by a non-democratic Soviet Union. It
also contradicts Institutionalist Theory's expectation that embedded rising states will avoid
passing the military buck to a declining state that leave a declining state increasingly weak,
vulnerable, and thus susceptible to incentives for defection.
Finally, the United States moved in 1945-1946 to limit British access to nuclear weapons
and nuclear technology. At a time when nuclear weapons and technology were regarded as the
scientific and technological frontier, American efforts to limit British access to the resource
epitomizes Moderate Support: rather than use the most intensive means to support Britain, the
United States avoided a costly commitment.
American nuclear policy in 1945-1946 was a change from wartime arrangements.
Previously, Britain and the United States collaborated in developing nuclear technologies and the
first nuclear weapons, and used the combined boards to help coordinate their activities.744
Collaboration culminated in a 1943 agreement that, "Full collaboration between the United
States and the British Government in developing [nuclear technology] for military and
commercial purposes shall continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint
agreement."' 5 Immediately after Japan's surrender, however, Truman imposed a moratorium on
sharing nuclear information with foreign countries, including Britain, arguing that, "it was
important to retain the advantage which possession of the bomb has given us." 6 Seeking the
expected full-partnership, Attlee insisted on a meeting with Truman to resolve the issue.
Meeting in November 1945, the two sides reached an agreement pledging "full and effective
cooperation in the field of atomic energy" and promised to continue wartime technological
boards to develop nuclear knowledge.747 In practice, however, the November agreement had
little effect on American policy: the United States was willing to share "basic scientific
principles" that were well known to scientists, while denying "practical know-how" in
developing nuclear technology and weapons.748 By mid-1946, even this cooperation faltered as
remaining members of the Combined Planning Committee "reported difficulties in getting
scientific and technical information from the Americans." 749 Subsequent passage of the 1946
McMahon Act, which classified all nuclear technical information as a "born secret," punctuated
the end of Anglo-American nuclear sharing. 750 These results contradict institutionalist
arguments suggesting that the high levels of Anglo-American institutionalization should sustain
military cooperation postwar; they also pose problems for democratic peace predictions
suggesting the United States and United Kingdom should bargain in a "spirit of fairness" -
meaning, the United States is not expected to renege on wartime nuclear deals. They confirm,
however, Realist Decline Theory in showing that rising states avoid intensive support with
declining states that retain a robust posture.
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American policy posed problems for Britain. British policymakers had counted on
nuclear weapons to offset Soviet manpower and industrial advantages. 751 Furthermore, at a time
when nuclear weapons were the cutting edge of science and technology, nuclear cooperation was
expected to be an entry into deeper Anglo-American military and political cooperation.7 5 ' With
nuclear cooperation at a standstill, both options were stymied. Instead, Britain began to pursue
an independent nuclear program starting in late 1945-1946, using what resources it spare to
acquire nuclear weapons even though the "task would both much longer and more costly" absent
American collaboration. 7 53 As predicted by my theory, a Moderate Support strategy emerged
that saw limited degrees of American nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom alongside
efforts to avoid deeper forms of collaboration. 75 4
E. Rationales
American policymakers offered two sets of arguments in support of their Moderate
Support strategy. The first argument was made most prominently in the debates over the British
loan and held that the United States needed to support Britain to give life to the Bretton Woods
institutions, ensure the IMFs viability, and revive global trade. This reasoning corresponds with
Institutionalist Theory's prediction that policymakers will support a declining state to ensure the
viability of multilateral institutions, and was most prominent among members of the State and
Treasury Departments in 1945-1946. Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton, who played a
critical role in generating support for a loan to Britain, summarized this perspective in a note to
Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson, arguing that "the British financial problem is [. . .] the greatest
present barrier to rapid progress towards free multilateral payments and [. . .] the ultimate
success of our economic foreign program. Hence, as he later wrote, "the main purpose [of
aid . . .] is to ensure that the loan brings about the maximum development of trade on a non-
discriminatory basis" by fostering economic multilateralism via Bretton Woods.756 Truman
subscribed to this logic as well, writing in his memoirs that peace and prosperity "were best
served by the elimination of artificial barriers to trade" and the best means to this end was for the
United States "to provide financial assistance for two or three years of transition" to economic
multilateralism. 757 This required the United States to give sufficient aid that Britain would be
able to participate in Bretton Woods, but not so much that Britain could take American aid,
recover its financial position, and then shirk on implementing the Bretton Woods accords. 758 Aid
to Britain, as Leffler writes, was a way of "weaning [Britain] to a multilateral world order". 759
However, the need to create and sustain international institutions was a minor
consideration. More important were U.S. security calculations and the desire to 1) preserve the
United Kingdom as a potential ally in Europe without 2) finding itself chain-ganged into a
conflict with the Soviet Union. This follows Realist Decline Theory's predictions that
multipolarity breeds support out of the need to preserve future alliance options, while also
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752 Barker, Between, 28.
7 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership, 215.
754S. J. Ball, "Military Nuclear Relations Between the United States and Great Britain Under the Terms of the
McMahon Act, 1946-1958," The Historical Journal 38, no. 2 (June 1995): 439-454.
7 Fredrick Dobney and Will Clayton, Selected Papers of Will Clayton. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971),
147.
756 Quoted in Woods, Changing, 358.
757 Truman, Memoirs 1945, 478, 480; also Acheson, Present at the Creation, 132-133.
758 United States Department of State, FRUS 1945: Commonwealth, 145-147.
759 Leffler, Preponderance, 63.
177
causing the rising state to wait for the changing distribution of power to erode a decliner's ability
to threaten the riser's security. Moreover, and as my argument predicts, policymakers were
aware of and framed their arguments in reference to these tradeoffs.
Even as the financial deal with Britain was forming, Acheson justified aid to Britain by
noting that the cancellation of Lend-Lease, "knocked the financial bottom out of the whole allied
military position." At a time when the situation in Europe remained unsettled, it would have
been better to continue Lend-Lease until Britain could assess its postwar requirements and
convert to a peacetime economic and military footing; Britain needed American aid to help
stabilize postwar Europe.760 George Kennan similarly concluded, in Woods' description, that,
"Moscow was counting on an economic struggle between the United States and United Kingdom
to weaken the capitalist world." In response, State Department officials began to argue that
financial aid to Britain was necessary to rebut the Soviet plan and prevent "an even more
adventurist policy by Moscow." 761 Members of Congress were blunter still, with Representative
Christian Herter explaining to Clayton that "economic arguments in favor of the loan are on the
whole much less convincing.. .than the feeling that the loan may serve us in good stead in
holding up [. . .] a nation whom we may need badly as a friend because of impending Russian
troubles." 762 Ultimately, American aid would both help Britain organize the Western sphere and
tied Britain over until the point where it could resume a leading role in European politics. 7 63
The security logic for supporting Britain was equally clear outside of the loan
negotiations. In the run-up to the Potsdam conference, Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy
argued that a war between the USSR and Britain would result in the Soviet conquest of Europe.
This would be unacceptable to the United States and would require efforts to "defend Britain." 764
By 1946, The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, forerunner of the National
Security Council) was even clearer, offering, "if Soviet Russia is to be denied the hegemony of
Europe, the United Kingdom must continue in existence as the principal power in Western
Europe economically and militarily. The U.S. should therefore explore its relationship with
Great Britain" and provide assistance as necessary "within the framework of the United
Nations."765 Leahy, refining his earlier views, also warned that "defeat or disintegration of the
British Empire would eliminate from Eurasia the last bulwark of resistance between the Untied
States and Soviet expansion" and required the United States to prevent further losses to British
power. Leahy's argument was later codified in U.S. plans.766 Ultimately, a classified 1945 study
by a group of international relations scholars captured the argument well. Despite Britain's
decline, it was a "necessity to support the British position in Europe" precisely because "every
accretion in British [. . .] strength reduces the burden on the United States in the postwar period"
and maximizes the assistance Britain could provide in a future war against either Germany or the
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USSR. Thus, "a decision to regard the continued existence, prosperity, and strength of an
independent, democratic, and friendly Great Britain" was "a vital interest to be defended." 767
However, too much support for Britain was problematic. As Realist Decline Theory
predicts, U.S. policymakers worried that intense American support for a militarily robust Britain
would antagonize the USSR and chain-gang the United States into a sustained rivalry with the
Soviet Union. Not only would this risk involving the United States in an unwanted war, but it
would stymie plans to withdraw from Europe and help keep the peace by adjudicating between
Soviet and United Kingdom. Leahy's 1945 analysis of Anglo-American-Soviet relations is
instructive. While arguing that the United States should "exert its utmost efforts [... .] to promote
a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia, and ourselves," the analysis ends with a
stark warning:
The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would
seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up it strength, by
seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage [. . .] of her
potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to
present Russia with any agreement on such matter between the British and
ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in a train of events
leading to the situation we most wish to avoid [i.e., a collapse in Soviet-
American relations]. 768
In short, the United States needed to avoid intensely supporting for fear of appearing to foment
an Anglo-American axis targeting the Soviet Union.
Leahy was not alone in making this argument. Before Potsdam, Ambassador Davies
warned Truman that British policymakers were trying to mobilize "American manpower and
resources to sustain Britain's 'lead' in Europe." Unless the United States desired a break in
Soviet-American relations, the United States needed to avoid following the British line.769 And
later in 1946, former Vice President and Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace counseled that
the U.S. "must not let British balance of power manipulations determine whether and when the
United States gets into war" with the USSR. 770 The United States would back Britain, but it
needed to do so cautiously lest support for Britain spoil Soviet-American relations.
Nor did a rising Soviet threat itself drive America into Britain's arms. Even as Soviet-
American relations worsened in 1945-1946, analysts ranging from State Department bureaucrats
to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to presidential advisor Harry Hopkins warned Truman
against "British balance of power machinations in Europe and [. . . Britain's] obvious desire to
enlist American might in the creation of a solid bloc opposing the Russians."7 7 ' Even if, as
analysts began to fear from mid-1946 onward, the USSR was committed to expanding its power
where and when it could, an overly intense American commitment would deepen Soviet-
American hostility and draw the United States into an Anglo-Soviet contest that would poorly
serve American interests. At a time when Britain retained sufficient capabilities to deter Soviet
predation, it was important for the United States not to commit itself to a course of action that
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would exacerbate Soviet-American problems and propel the United States permanently into
Europe. Towards this end, the State Department recommended in April 1946 against "a blank
check of American support [. . .] for every interest of the British Empire." Instead, American
support for Britain should occur "only in respect of areas and interests [ . .] vital to the
maintenance of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of nations as a great power"
and be limited to moderate economic and political backing, with military assistance to be
provided only "as necessary." 772 Otherwise, and as the 1945 scholars study argued, "where
British diplomatic activity menaces Soviet-American relations, the divergence of British and
American policies should be made clear": the United States would not tether its cart to the
British horse if doing so threatened Soviet-American relations. 773
F. Assessment
American strategy towards the United Kingdom in 1945-1946 provides evidence for all
three theories examined in this project. Overall, however, Realist Decline Theory outperforms
its competitors. On the one hand, Democratic Peace Theory, Institutionalist Theory, and Realist
Decline Theory each correctly predicted the United States would adopt a Moderate Support
strategy that saw the United States use cautious means to buttress Great Britain as a great power.
As shown, this strategy encompassed limited economic and military assistance, as well as
generic signs of American diplomatic support that stopped short of an Anglo-American alliance.
Additionally, and as the above pattern suggests, American support for the United Kingdom was
episodic - rather than consistent American support for Britain, American engagement and
cooperation with the declining United Kingdom was spotty as British officials often had to cajole,
entice, and implore their American counterparts to come to Britain's assistance. Even then, this
effort failed to engender the substantial economic assistance, military backing, and nuclear
cooperation British strategists (and some American officials) concluded Britain needed to remain
a great power in the postwar system. Overall, the United States was willing to help Britain, but
not at significant material or political cost to the United States.
However, the course and logic of American strategy provides evidence against
institutionalist and democratic peace arguments while offering much additional evidence in
support of my theory. Institutionalist Theory has difficulty explaining why American support for
the United Kingdom emerged despite the drawdown of Anglo-American institutionalized
cooperation. At a basic level, Institutionalist Theory sees institutions as self-sustaining
mechanisms to sustain great power cooperation amidst changes in the distribution of power. As
shown, however, the United States eliminated many of the Anglo-American combined boards
that were the primary basis of Anglo-American institutionalized cooperation after the end of the
war. Afterwards, the United States either worked around or sidelined those that remained by
refusing to coordinate military plans through the Combined Chiefs of Staff or share nuclear
technology as called for in wartime agreements through joint technical boards.
Nor do institutions seem to have provided the two sides significant information about the
distribution of power and helped the two parties negotiate. Despite the institutionalized wartime
relationship and the postwar creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, Anglo-American
economic cooperation was stymied by debates over the strength of the British economy and the
credibility of British claims to weakness. Indeed, it was only as worries over what a weak
Britain would mean for British security that policymakers overcame reluctance to backstop
Britain's economy. If anything, American worries that Britain was trying to avoid embracing the
772 United States Department of State, FR US 1946: General, 1170.
73 Dunn, Security Policy, 10. Also Woods, Changing, 358; Ovendale, "European Cold War."
180
Bretton Woods regimes led the United States to limit support for Britain, stymie the negotiating
process, and drive hard bargains to ensure Britain had no choice but to embrace American
policies. And as tensions mounted with the Soviet Union in 1945-1946, American policymakers
denied British requests to coordinate policies and take a firm stance against the Soviet Union,
despite Anglo-American binding via the CFM. In short, there is little evidence that American
policy towards the United Kingdom was either driven by or filtered through the institutions that
might have bred American support for the declining United Kingdom.
Democratic Peace Theory faces similar problems. Democratic Peace Theory predicted
the United States and United Kingdom would readily reach an understanding in which the United
States supported British security and protected British power: thanks to the transparency of
democratic regimes, Britain should have easily been able to signal its power and interests to the
United States, while the United States quickly responded to preserve a fellow democracy. Due
to the common set of liberal values and norms shared by democracies, the theory also expected
widespread popular and political backing in the United States for supporting Britain. None of
these predictions were borne out. On one level, Anglo-American bargaining over American
economic and military assistance was fraught with misunderstanding and misperception. In both
economic and military negotiations, American officials remained suspicious of British
motivations and, in the economic arena, believed British policymakers were overstating their
weaknesses. This discord meant that the United States was leery of supporting Britain and did so
only under duress: economic aid only emerged when it appeared British weakness would hinder
American security, while the limited military cooperation witnessed only developed as crises
with the USSR erupted in 1946. Ultimately, Anglo-American discord left British policymakers
feeling the United States was overly stringy with its embrace of British interests, while American
policymakers felt British demands were excessive. The transparent interactions, community of
interests, and easy bargaining that are supposed to mark democratic relations are missing.
Realist Decline Theory, on the other hand, performs well. As noted, it correctly predicts
the outcome, namely, a strategy of Moderate Support. More importantly, it captures both the
logic undergirding American behavior and the suspicions underlying Anglo-American relations.
As the theory predicts, American strategists wanted to preserve Great Britain as a great
power. This goal was intimately connected with American plans to withdraw from the continent
as expeditiously as possible and thus to rely upon Britain to take the lead in managing West
European security. To obtain this end, the United States provided Britain with limited economic
aid via the Anglo-American loan, revised or avoided actions (such as the cancellation of Lend-
Lease) that obviously undercut British power, and committed American military power on an ad
hoc basis to protect British security when another state appeared on the verge of gaining at the
USSR's expense. And as it became clear that American withdrawal plans might not be enough
to sustain cooperation among the wartime allies, American policymakers came to recognize that
protecting Britain was necessary to keep Britain as a potential ally against the Soviet Union in
case of another war. It was also believed necessary to keep Britain out of the Soviet camp lest
the USSR have free rein to dominate Europe. Thus, the United States sought to prop up British
capabilities.
Nevertheless, the United States was unwilling to use intense means in pursuit of this goal.
As my theory predicts, the United Kingdom's robust military posture left American
policymakers worried that too close of an association with the United Kingdom would threaten
and antagonize the Soviet Union by appearing to form an Anglo-American front against the
USSR. This might lead to rivalry, war, and hinder efforts to limit the American role in Europe.
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Equally important, intense support might give rise to perverse British incentives as the United
Kingdom used American backing to protect the remnants of the British Empire, or took an
overly-assertive stance against the USSR on the belief that Britain had a blank check of support
against the USSR. At a time when Britain was militarily strong enough to deter but not defeat
the USSR, and given the American desire to avoid a World War Three, avoiding sustained and
intense American backing seemed the best way to limit and/or rein in British ambitions. Thus,
with the United Kingdom seeking an intense American commitment and the United States
looking to avoid this responsibility, Anglo-American relations were subject to significantly more
tension and ambivalence than is often appreciated. Overall, concerned with Soviet sensitivities
and recognizing that a firm American commitment to a militarily robust United Kingdom could
rebound to the United States' disadvantage, American strategists looked to square the circle by
using cautious means to protect the United Kingdom. Both the outcome and process match my
argument.
VI. Soviet Strategy and British Decline
The preceding section provided evidence that Realist Decline Theory outperforms
competing accounts in explaining American strategy towards the United Kingdom in 1945-1946.
This section continues testing my argument by assessing its claims against alternate explanations
vis-a-vis Anglo-Soviet relations. Given the divergence in Anglo-Soviet regime type, this is a
particularly hard test for Democratic Peace Theory against my argument. Due to the limited
array of sources on Soviet policy, however, I break with the prior analytic structure by treating
diplomatic policy, military policy, and rationales together rather than individually.
A. Soviet Strategy: Moderate Support
The early Cold War is often portrayed as a Soviet-American clash borne of Soviet
aggrandizement. Seeking to expand its power, the Soviet Union ostensibly threatened Western
Europe, challenged Southeastern Europe, and initiated military crises looking to improve the
Soviet position. This view dominated traditional historiography and is equally prominent in
post-revisionist syntheses.774
However, two decades of access to Soviet and former Eastern Bloc archives suggests the
popular view of Soviet aggrandizement needs reassessment. Although any judgments are
preliminary due to the limited set of English-language documents and studies, my analysis
suggests that the Soviet Union acted with a large degree of restraint and with a substantial
interest in sustaining great power cooperation in the early postwar period. As a result, its policy
towards the United Kingdom mirrors that of the United States: the Soviet Union adopted a
Moderate Support strategy that 1) prevented the United Kingdom from growing weaker, 2)
passed on opportunities to grow its power at the United Kingdom's expense, but 3) acted
cautiously towards these goals. In diplomatic affairs, the Soviet Union went along with Anglo-
American plans to divide Germany into spheres of influence. The Soviet leadership also upheld
wartime agreements to divide Southeastern Europe into British and Soviet spheres of influence
and reined in the activities of the European communist parties. Militarily, meanwhile, the Soviet
Union appears to have been most interested in consolidating its hold on Eastern Europe while
demobilizing its military, rather than posing a military threat to the United Kingdom. All in all,
the USSR both avoided steps that complicated Britain's situation and adhered to military and
political agreements that promised to preserve the status quo in Europe. There is no doubt that
774 Representative is Gaddis, We Now Know, 15-25.
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British policymakers worried about the Soviet challenge, but new research suggests this was not
for want of Soviet efforts to the contrary.
B. Strategy and Arguments
i. Postwar Plans
Postwar Soviet policy towards Britain was presented in a series of analyses over the
course of 1944 through early 1945. At Stalin's instruction, former Foreign Minister Maxim
Litvinov, Andrei Gromyko, and Ivan Maisky developed a series of studies to guide postwar
Soviet relations with the other members of the wartime alliance.775 The final reports, delivered
before the February 1945 Yalta Conference, envisioned an opportunity for Anglo-Soviet
cooperation in postwar Europe for expressly the reasons Realist Decline Theory predicts. First,
both states had a common interest in preventing Germany's resurgence and the threat of another
war. If Germany remained the focus, then the USSR, United Kingdom, and United States could
sustain wartime cooperation and smoothly manage European security affairs.776 However, it was
also possible that the United States, as a rising and "dynamic imperialist" power, would prey
777
upon the declining Britain before going after the USSR. This situation would end great power
cooperation, but also gave Britain and the Soviet Union a common interest in preserving one
another to balance the United States. As my theory predicts, Soviet policymakers thus argued
that the prospective German and American threats meant that, "it will be to the USSR's interest
to keep Britain as a strong power". 778
To do so, Soviet analysts recommended dividing Europe into Soviet and British spheres
of interest. Under this solution, the USSR would control "Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Slav countries of the Balkans, and also Turkey" while Britain
dominated "Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece;" Germany, Italy, Denmark,
and Italy would be a neutral zone. 779 Except for Sweden and Turkey, where the Soviets allowed
they might have to "compromise" on their objectives, the Soviet sphere only encompassed areas
Soviet forces currently occupied. This suggests Soviet leaders neither planned for expansion,
nor saw expansion as strategically necessary. The British sphere, meanwhile, encompassed
780nearly the whole of Western Europe deemed crucial to British security. What would emerge,
as Pechatnov concludes, was "an Anglo-Soviet strategic condominium in Europe."
ii. Backing a Spheres of Influence Solution
Soviet behavior followed these guidelines. Pleshakov and Zubok, who are otherwise
critical of Soviet behavior, observe that "at no point did Stalin's demands and ambitions in 1945-
1946 exceed the maximum zone of responsibility discussed by Litvinov and Maisky [. . .] in
some cases, Stalin's moves in the international arena were more modest in scope." 781 First,
Stalin agreed to a November 1944 British proposal to divide Southeastern Europe into Soviet and
British sphere of influence, with Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria assigned to the USSR, Greece
77 Silvio Pons, "In the Aftermath of the Age of Wars: The Impact of World War II on Soviet Foreign Policy," in
Russia in the Age of Wars, ed. Silvio Pons and Andrea Romano (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 2000),
281; Vojtech Mastny, "Soviet Plans for Postwar Europe," in The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943-48, ed. Antonio
Varsori and Elena Calandri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 63.
776 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 29-35; Parrish, "USSR and Security Dilemma," 119-132.
777 Pechatnov, Big Three, 4.
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given to the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia under joint control.782 Yugoslavia's subsequent
liberation by Communist partisans vitiated the joint influence proposal, but the Soviet Union
783
adhered to the agreement in Greece. Notably, Stalin repeatedly denied aid to Greek
Communists waging an insurgency against the Greek government while criticizing the Greek
Communist effort, telling one colleague in January 1945: "I advised not starting this fighting in
Greece [.. .] They were evidently counting on the Red Army's coming down to the Aegean. We
cannot do that [. . .] The Greeks have acted foolishly."784 Moreover, once Stalin discovered that
Yugoslavia was the primary backer of Greek communist forces, he pressured Yugoslav leaders
to end the assistance, remarking it was "necessary to be circumspect in relation to foreign policy
questions [. ... ] it is necessary to avoid big demands on neighboring countries."785
Second, and in contrast to the Anglo-Soviet discord predicted by Democratic Peace
Theory, the USSR embraced steps to buttress Great Britain's position in Western Europe. As
noted earlier, the Soviet Union agreed to early American plans to divide Germany into Soviet
and Western sections. Although a divided Germany modified Litvinov's plan to keep Germany
neutral between Soviet and British spheres, the idea of dividing the country so both states
remained focused on the common German threat and maintained influence in the country
followed the spirit of the 1944-1945 plan. Later, as Trachtenberg shows, the spheres of influence
plan collapsed when the Soviet Union would not agree to Anglo-American pressure to moderate
786Soviet reparations demands and allow Germany's economic revival. This is true, but it is
important to note that the issues over which the Soviets fell out with the U.S. and Britain -
Germany's economic revival and reparations - revised the initial Soviet-U.S.-U.K. deal on
Germany proposed by Byrnes and violated the reparations agreement reached at Yalta. The
Soviets only objected when it appeared the Western powers 1) would backtrack from long-
standing arrangements to help the USSR gain reparations from Germany for wartime damage,
and 2) try to avoid a spheres of influence arrangement and thus threaten to integrate Germany
into the Western orbit.787
Even then, the Soviet response was restrained. First, and as Institutionalist Theory
predicts, Soviet leaders expressed interest in sustaining Anglo-American-Soviet consultations via
the CFM despite criticizing the new Anglo-American policies. 788 Second, and more importantly,
the Soviet response to growing great power tensions was to consolidate control in its zone of
occupation,789 while soft peddling evidence of Anglo-American-Soviet discord.790 Missing, in
782 Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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other words, were 1) efforts to organize political opposition to the United States and Britain in
the Western occupation zones that would make Anglo-American occupation efforts that much
more difficult, and 2) rhetorical challenges to the British and American political positions.
Simply put, the Soviets stayed in their zone and tried to avoid a rivalry with the United States
and United Kingdom.791 On balance, it appears the Soviet Union was willing to cooperate by
dividing Germany in order to neutralize it and unwilling to challenge British (or American)
control. This suggests a Moderate Support strategy for the reasons Realist Decline Theory
presents: the USSR accepted deals that would avoid challenges to British security that might
force Britain to balance and, as tensions mounted, avoided trying to weaken Britain's control
over its section of Germany. On the other hand, this policy is again in contrast to the predatory
strategy Democratic Peace Theory predicts should emerge between a rising non-democracy and a
declining democracy.
Third, Stalin limited Soviet interference in West European states assigned to the British
sphere of influence. Before 1939, Communist parties were active in many West European states.
With Communist activities ostensibly directed by the Soviet Union via the Communist
International (Comintern), Western leaders feared Communist-led insurrections, worried about
growing Soviet influence if these parties gained power at the ballot box, and so took steps to
suppress Communist activities. During the war, however, Stalin disbanded the Comintern and
refused throughout 1945-1946 to restart its activities.792 Meanwhile, Stalin supported British and
American efforts to reconstitute stable governments in Western Europe. Communist opposition
to the Germans during the war left Communist parties, particularly in France and Italy, with
significant popular support, such that their opposition could upset postwar West European
politics. Stalin avoided this outcome.793 Beginning in late 1944, the USSR both discouraged
Communist parties in France and Italy from opposing Anglo-American efforts, and encouraged
local Communist movements to work with other political parties in stabilizing postwar West
European politics. Moreover, Soviet pressure for local Communist collaboration continued
throughout 1945-1946 despite growing opposition from local Communist leaders and complaints
that the USSR was squandering opportunities to undermine British and American influence in
Western Europe.794 Indeed, the USSR attached such importance to this strategy that Stalin
eventually criticized the French Communist party for, as Eduard Mark details, "having too
confrontational an attitude toward potential allies." 795 The logic, as Pons describes in the Italian
case, matches what Realist Decline Theory predicts far more than either institutionalist or
democratic peace claims: "A moderate approach by the Italian Communist Party was seen as the
best way to preserve a balance of power between the Soviet Union and Great Britain." In short,
Stalin dampened Communist party activities as a way of signaling an interest in cooperation with
Britain and, by extension, avoid driving the United Kingdom out of the Soviet camp and into
American arms.796
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To be clear, many scholars surmise that Soviet support for Communist participation in
West European governing coalitions was designed to lay the foundation for a long-term
Communist takeover.797 This is a possibility, and Soviet instructions to West European
Communists certainly emphasized this goal. However, if a long-term takeover was the Soviet
objective, then the strategy of pushing local Communist groups to support ruling regimes seems
an odd choice. 798 By helping rebuild postwar societies, the French and Italian parties in
particular 1) helped non-Communist parties gain prominence, 2) passed on opportunities to
parlay wartime successes into postwar influence by serving as a kingmaker in postwar
governments, and 3) helped ensure France and Italy remained in the Western orbit at a time of
peak Communist strength. At a minimum, the evidence shows the Soviet Union passing on
chances to weaken the British position in Europe by pulling states vital to British security into
the Soviet orbit. On the whole, I consider this evidence of Moderate Support for the United
Kingdom, as the USSR consciously took steps to avoid worsening British security in Western
Europe and adopted positions that facilitated the reconstitution of states critical to British
economic and military well-being. Furthermore, considering this policy 1) began before United
Kingdom and USSR institutionalized postwar cooperation after Yalta, and 2) continued despite
different Anglo-Soviet regime types, this behavior diverges from both democratic peace and
institutionalist predictions.
iii. Reducing Military Competition
Fourth, Soviet military policy also seems to have been designed to limit the threat posed
to Western Europe and thus the extent with which Britain needed to balance the USSR. This
behavior again poses a problem for democratic peace arguments, as the Soviet Union was more
cooperative and supportive than Democratic Peace Theory predicts. To be clear, Britain
correctly recognized that the growth of Soviet military capabilities during the war, coupled with
Germany's defeat, left the Soviet Union the largest military power in Europe. As a result, British
policymakers developed military plans to balance a possible Soviet military threat.799 Yet within
the structural confines of the postwar period, my research suggests Soviet military policy was far
less threatening than appreciated. On one level, and in keeping with the spheres of influence
strategy, Soviet forces withdrew from areas assigned to the British or neutral sphere, and even
removed forces from areas allocated to the Soviet sphere (including Finland, Czechoslovakia,
and Bulgaria).800 At the same time, demobilization reduced the size of the Soviet military from
11.3 million personnel at the end of the European war, to 7.5 million by December 1945 and 3
million by mid-1946.801 Moreover, although the Soviet Union retained a significant force in and
around Europe, many of the remaining 25-30 divisions in Eastern Europe and 60 divisions in the
western USSR were not combat ready. 802 Many were in the process of converting into garrison
or "cadred" units maintained at less than full-strength, while the release of combat veterans
undermined the combat potential of remaining forces. 803 Combat potential was also reduced by
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political and economic conditions on the ground, as many of the troops found themselves
suppressing local insurgencies, engaged in reconstruction project, and forced to administer
804occupied German. By 1946, Soviet forces were barely adequate for occupation and garrison
duties, let alone able to stage an attack against Western Europe.805
Reflecting the Soviet decision to limit combat forces in Eastern Europe, recent research
by Evangelista, Mastny, Kennedy-Pipe, and Karber and Combs, suggests Soviet strategy in
1945-1946 was geared towards defensive operations in the event of war. Mastny's views are
instructive, concluding that "the weight of the fragmentary evidence lends support to [Soviet
strategy's] defensive rather than offensive character."806 On the one hand, more than half of the
Soviet tank force in Germany was garrisoned at about one-third strength in late 1945-1946.o7 A
large portion of Soviet combat power would therefore be unable to undertake offensive
operations without a substantial reinforcement effort. Furthermore, units in the future East
Germany were deployed in "small dispersed compounds for peacetime policing" rather than
grouped in large formations for high-intensity combat.8 08 Above all, Soviet operational plans
delineated in November 1946 called for Soviet forces to deploy in three defensive belts 50, 100,
and 150 kilometers from the (future) inter-German border in the event of war.809 In short, having
just pushed the German army over 1000 miles across Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet
Union turned around and configured itself (as Evangelista writes) "for defensive operations,
rather than the quick march to the English Channel" feared.81 0 This is not to say that moves
towards a defensive force and a significant demobilization were solely driven by a desire to
avoid weakening Britain. However, at a time when Britain was on the ropes, Soviet military
choices meant the United Kingdom did not face a worsening military situation, and in some
sense posed a more limited threat than otherwise would have been the case. This is precisely
what one expects of a Moderate Support strategy.
iv. Crises? What Crises?
Fifth, it is important to recognize the limited nature of Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran
during the "crises" with both countries in 1945-1946. As noted above, both countries were
important to British security because they guarded the approaches to British air bases in the
Middle East that provided the best means to strike the Soviet homeland. In 1945-1946, both
countries admittedly came under Soviet pressure. In Iran, the USSR violated an agreement
whereby British and Soviet forces stationed in the country to protect wartime supply lines would
withdraw by 5 March 1946.811 In Turkey, meanwhile, the USSR demanded Turkey allow the
USSR a military base on the Turkish Straits. 812 British and American analysts alike saw both
moves as a Soviet threat to the British position in the Middle East. If true, this would seem to
804 Evangelista, "Stalin's Army," 125-132.
805 Gibson, "Patterns of Demobilization," 214-215.
806 Vojtech Mastny, "Imaging War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning," in War Plans and Alliances in Europe:
Threat Perceptions in the East and West (New York: Routledge, 2006), 17.
807 Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe:
Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963," Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 413.
808 Ibid.
809 Matthew Evangelista, "The 'Soviet Threat': Intentions, Capabilities, and Context," Diplomatic History 22, no. 3
(Summer 1998): 444; see also Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's Cold War, 85-86.
810 Evangelista, "Soviet Threat," 444.
811 Eduard M. Mark, "Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947: The Origins of a Cold War Crisis," The Wisconsin
Magazine ofHistory 59, no. 1 (October 1975): 51-63; Gaddis, Origins, 309-312.
812 Melvyn Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,"
The Journal ofAmerican History 71, no. 4 (March 1985): 807-825; Gaddis, Origins, 336-337.
187
confirm Democratic Peace Theory's expectation of predation between a rising, non-democratic
USSR and declining, democratic United Kingdom.
Both events, however, seem to have been misinterpreted by Western analysts. Despite
Western concerns, the Soviet Union withdrew forces from Iran in May 1946 once Iranian leaders
signed an agreement allowing the USSR to drill for oil in northern Iran.813 Aside from the
rapidity with which the crisis resolved, that the Soviet Union was apparently driven by a desire
to access Iranian oil is ironic: Britain, as well as the United States, desired bases in the Middle
East and feared Soviet encroachment because the bases allowed Western air forces to target
Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus. Thus, an argument can be made that the British threat to Soviet
oil is what compelled the USSR to pressure Iran for access to Iranian oil, which in turn triggered
British fears of a Soviet threat. Instead of Soviet aggrandizement, the 1946 Iran crisis may have
stemmed from an Anglo-Soviet security dilemma.814 This seems to disconfirm democratic peace
predictions and buttress the Moderate Support coding in line with Realist Decline Theory.
The Turkish crisis falls into a similar category. Soviet pressure on Turkey brought the
United Kingdom, United States, and USSR close to war in 1946.815 After the USSR's demand
for a military base on the Turkish Strait was rebuffed by Britain and the United States at the
Potsdam Conference, the USSR subsequently went around institutionalized channels and issued
a demand for a base directly to Turkey. Notably, circumvention of allied pressure and
institutionalized channels of cooperation is problematic for institutionalist arguments.8 16 At the
time, U.S. and British intelligence reports showed a Soviet military buildup along the Turkish
border, and the United States and United Kingdom prepared to mobilize in Turkey's defense.
Drawing on declassified sources, however, Mark shows that reports of the Soviet military
buildup were wrong and Soviet force levels constant at the height of the Turkish crisis.8 17
Equally important, it is opaque how damaging a Soviet base on the Straits would have been.8 1 8
Even at the time, British and American military assessments concluded that granting the USSR a
military base on the Straits was militarily irrelevant: modern air and sea power meant that the
Mediterranean could be defended using air bases on Crete, Malta, and other islands in the
Eastern Mediterranean. 81 Although Britain and the United States responded as if the Soviets
were acting aggressively, it appears that the Soviet demands were limited and strategically
unimportant. Moreover, the crisis resolved in the manner predicted by Realist Decline Theory.
That is, having seen limited demands rebuffed and with an Anglo-American axis forming against
the USSR, the Soviet Union called off its demands and de-escalated the crisis. On the whole,
Soviet behavior does not seem to fit into the predatory mold predicted by Democratic Peace
Theory, while the resolution of the crisis seems to accord with predictions from Realist Decline
Theory.
V. Rationales
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Soviet policymakers offered two related arguments in favor of the Moderate Support
strategy. First, Soviet policymakers believed it was important to back Britain as a potential ally
against the United States in the postwar system. This matches one core prediction from Realist
Decline Theory, namely, that support emerges in multipolarity in part because of the
attractiveness of preserving a declining state as a partner against future threats. To be clear,
Stalin, Molotov, and other key Soviet officials hoped wartime cooperation would continue
postwar. In fact, Stalin went so far as to downplay evidence of great power differences by
arguing, "at the basis of the alliance [. . .] lie not accidental and transitory motive, but extremely
important and long-lasting interests." If a breakdown did occur, however, Soviet leaders
believed it would most likely emerge due to American aggrandizement: owing to the growth of
American power during the war, as well as the ingrained capitalist need for new markets, it was
possible that the United States would try to continue expanding in the postwar period. 820
American expansion, in turn, could lead to a breakdown in great power relations as the United
States isolated and threatened the USSR by "stimulating the resurrection of Germany and Japan
[and] building up an anti-Soviet bloc in Europe using such countries as France."821
The Soviet Union would need allies in this situation, and Britain was the obvious
candidate. In the Soviet analysis, Britain would be as threatened by American machinations as
the Soviet Union. On one level, a primary American postwar objective involved, per Litvinov's
analysis, "opening the doors of the British empire" and gaining access to British markets that
would further weaken the United Kingdom.822 At the same time, British security would be
imperiled if American efforts led to a German revival. Past Anglo-Soviet differences
notwithstanding, Anglo-American and Soviet-American tensions gave the USSR and United
Kingdom a stake in each other's survival.823
It was therefore in the Soviet Union's interest to bid for British friendship and "keep
Britain as a strong power."824 To this end, the USSR would "be interested in Britain's retention
of a strong navy, for such [. . .] can be needed by us to counterbalance the USA's imperialist
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expansion. At the same time, the aforementioned spheres of influence approach to Anglo-
Soviet relations would be used to strengthen Britain's hand in dealings with the United States by
allowing Britain to dominate France, Italy, and the other states of Western Europe. Combined,
the United Kingdom would be able to play a significant role in ensuring the Soviet Union was
not isolated and confronted by an aggressive United States. 826
Second, retaining Britain as a potential ally also meant the USSR needed to avoid steps
that would threaten Britain and drive the United Kingdom into the American orbit. This matches
another core realist prediction, namely that the USSR will be concerned with creating an Anglo-
American axis and thus try to avoid posing a challenge to British power. The Soviet task was
complicated by the expectation that Britain would, in all likelihood, turn to the United States in
the short-term as a source of postwar economic assistance, and as a hedge against the growth of
Soviet power in Europe. If Britain was to be kept out of the American orbit for the long-term,
then the Soviet Union needed to avoid deepening British suspicions of the Soviet Union. Stalin's
820 Filitov, "Problems," 12.
821 quoted in Pechatnov, Big Three, 6.
822 Quoted in ibid., 10.
823 Quoted in Filitov, "Problems," 13.
824 Quoted in ibid., 12.
825 Ibid.
8 2 6 Zubok and Pleshakov, Kremlin 's Cold War, 29-31.
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comments to members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in mid-1946 are instructive in
this regard. Explaining to BCP leaders why it was important not to establish a Communist
dictatorship, Stalin, as Eduard Mark describes, "advised the BCP to permit parties to exist
outside the [BCP], and shared with its leaders the reason for his advice: the need for both
Bulgaria and the USSR to maintain good relations with the United States and Britain."827 This
echoed Stalin's advice to other Communist groups in Iran, Yugoslavia, and other states in and
around Europe: avoiding local political challenges to areas central to British security was
828
expected to help reassure Britain and lay the foundation for future Anglo-Soviet cooperation.
Nor did signs of Anglo-American cooperation in 1945-1946 dispel Soviet plans to work
for British friendship. Anglo-American cooperation was expected to be ephemeral and Anglo-
American relations ultimately drift apart. Ambassador Nikolai Novikov captured the thinking
well, telling Molotov and Stalin as late as November 1946 that "current relations between
England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very
important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting."829
The Soviet Union needed to take advantage of the situation when it appeared and offer Britain an
alternative, particularly at a time when "the present policy of the American government with
regard to the USSR is also directed at limiting or dislodging the influence of the Soviet
Union." 830 Soviet officials even saw some evidence that British policymakers were inclined in
this direction, with Stalin protege Andrei Zhdanov noting in September 1946 that elements of the
British Labor Party "wanted to prepare the ground for the moment when, should they be in a
tight spot, they would have some support from the Soviet Union."831 The USSR stood ready to
offer this assistance.
However, too much support for the United Kingdom was not in the Soviet Union's
interest. First, just as the United States worried that an Anglo-American front would antagonize
the USSR, so too do Soviet leaders seem to have calculated that too clear a bid for Britain would
cause the breakdown in Soviet-American relations they sought to avoid: as Realist Decline
Theory predicts, the USSR limited support for the United Kingdom when it seemed an Anglo-
Soviet front might antagonize the United States! Insofar as the USSR sought to sustain great
power cooperation in the postwar period, a tight Anglo-Soviet front would threaten to close off
Europe to the United States at a time when the United States had "broken away from
isolationism and will remain actively involved with the world at large." 832 Given the American
interest in "the military defeat of Germany and [. . . its] economic and military enfeeblement," it
is likely Soviet policymakers particularly recognized the dangers of an Anglo-Soviet deal on
Germany. 833 A better solution was for the Soviet Union to provide limited support for the UK
while still trying to enlist the United States behind Soviet objectives. That is, if the United States
agreed to Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and British predominance in Western Europe,
then the Soviet Union could countenance Soviet dominance in the Western Hemisphere and
827 Mark, Revolution by Degree, 33.
828 Leonid Gibianskii, "The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin's
Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948," Cold War International History
Project Bulletin 10 (March 1998): 112-148; Haslam, Russia's Cold War, 74; Roberts, Stalin 's Wars, 222.
829 Nikolai Novikov, "The Novikov Telegram Washington, September 27, 1946," Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (Fall
1991): 535.
830 Ibid.
831 Quoted in Haslam, Russia's Cold War, 76.
832 Quoted in Pechatnov, Big Three, 6.
833 Ibid., 7.
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some kind of influence in Europe writ large. 834 This approach would also give the USSR the
option of playing Britain off the United States as necessary.
More importantly, at a time when Britain retained a robust posture, it appears Soviet
policymakers remained unclear how wise it was for the USSR to intensely back the United
Kingdom. This accords with another key implication of my argument, specifically: Soviet
support for the United Kingdom will be limited and cautious so long as Britain retains the
military wherewithal to defend itself and potentially threaten the USSR. Although data is scarce,
circumstantial evidence suggests Soviet policymakers worried that Britain's robust posture might
cause a supportive strategy to backfire. For example, Litvinov's paper arguing for Anglo-Soviet
cooperation began by first noting the long history of Anglo-Soviet antagonism and ongoing
Anglo-Soviet disputes in Iran and Turkey. Although Litvinov calculated these conflicts were
manageable, they still needed resolution before Britain and the USSR could make common
cause. 83 Likewise, Stalin's reticence to back the Greek Communists seems to have been
premised on concerns that intervention would provoke a clash with the British military that
might hurt the USSR.836 Above all, Anglo-Soviet cooperation was limited by British support for
non-Communist groups in Eastern Europe. As Roberts details, "any interference or involvement
by the British [. . .] was unacceptable to Stalin, who defined Eastern Europe as a sphere of
influence free from all great power meddling except his own." Until British intervention stopped
or capabilities eroded, the Soviet Union had no reason to intensely help a state that was
challenging a vital Soviet interest. These concerns reached a head in 1946-1947 as intervention
in Eastern Europe "became increasingly entangled with fears that the progressive deterioration of
Soviet relations with Britain and the United States was leading to [. . .1 an anti-communist
western bloc." 837
It is important to note that the preceding analysis of why the Soviet Union supported the
United Kingdom is not widely embraced by other scholars.838 Even researchers who dispute the
notion of an expansionist and aggressive USSR in the early Cold War allow that the Soviet
Union sought to support the United Kingdom as part of a long-term strategy to build up its
strength for an eventual clash with the West (broadly defined).839 As the above discussion
indicates, I disagree. Although Stalin and other Soviet leaders sometimes spoke in such terms,
the important point for this study is that for the first several years after the Second World War,
the USSR pursued a supportive strategy towards the United Kingdom due to a combination of
political and military factors. Moreover, and as I discuss in the next chapter, because Anglo-
Soviet relations permanently collapsed after 1947, it is difficult know whether and how long the
USSR's embrace of Moderate Support would have lasted under other conditions. On balance,
what we can say is that the Soviet Union pursued more restrained and cooperative policies
towards the United Kingdom in 1945-1946 for reasons that are in line with Realist Decline
Theory. Thus, it is at least plausible that Soviet support vis-a'-vis the United Kingdom would
have continued for a period of time despite Soviet rhetoric to the contrary.
C. Assessment
834 Pechatnov, Big Three, 10-11.
835 Ibid., 11-12.
836 Haslam, Russia's Cold War, 80-81.
837 Roberts, Stalin 's Wars, 222.
838 This includes many of the scholars using the declassified Soviet studies cited above; Filitov, "Problems"; ibid.;
Pechatnov, "Soviet Union."
839 A good example is Roberts, Stalin 's Wars, 297-320.
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Overall, Soviet strategy towards the United Kingdom provides good evidence for Realist
Decline Theory and somewhat less evidence for the competing explanations. Realist Decline
Theory predicted the Soviet Union would pursue a Moderate Support strategy in the case by
seeking to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power using cautious means. It further
expected the USSR would pursue this strategy in order to avoid the costs of triggering an Anglo-
American coalition against the USSR and provoking British internal balancing. These
predictions were borne out. First, and as shown, the Soviet Union adopted positions that did
little to further weaken the United Kingdom. In practice, this involved steps to limit the military
threat to the United Kingdom (thus limiting the extent to which Britain needed to balance the
USSR), embracing a spheres of influence solution to Europe that would preserve British
dominance in Western Europe, and limiting the activities of Communist parties that might
complicate British security in the postwar system. It is unclear whether more intensive forms of
support were considered and rejected, but overall Soviet strategy appears to have been designed
with a "live and let live" attitude in mind - the Soviet Union consciously avoided steps that
would make life more difficult for Britain at a time of British weakness.
Equally important, Soviet strategy was expressly predicated on the interactive goals of
preserving Britain as a potential ally, avoiding steps that might appear predatory and trigger
counterbalancing against the USSR, and yet avoiding intensive means of support at a time when
Britain still posed a threat to Soviet security. Although the documentary record is limited, the
weight of evidence shows that Soviet leaders shaped Soviet strategy in order to cooperate with
the United Kingdom and preserve Britain as a potential ally against either the United States or
Germany. The outlines of this strategy began before the close of World War Two, and reached
fruition in the early postwar period as Stalin expressly avoided opportunities to prey upon
Western Europe or British interests in Southeastern Europe. The inverse was also true and,
judging from arguments made to European Communist leaders and in internal reports, it seems
that the USSR feared driving Britain into American arms if it did not back Britain in the postwar
system and appeared predatory. In essence, the Soviet Union consciously decided upon a
strategy that would need to be at least as supportive and no more predatory than the United
States in order to avoid losing Britain as an ally and triggering Anglo-American balancing. And
yet, because the United Kingdom could still pose military problems for the Soviet Union, Soviet
policymakers seem to have avoid more intense means of support: given that the United Kingdom
could still threaten the Soviet homeland and back anti-Soviet groups in Eastern Europe and the
USSR, Soviet strategists appear to have decided the USSR could have its cake and eat it too if it
let British military capabilities erode before intensely aiding the United Kingdom. Overall,
Soviet strategists sought a Goldilocks solution that would 1) support Britain to preserve the U.K.
as an ally, 2) but not so much that the British military threat might continue, and 3) without
appearing predatory and triggering counterbalancing and Soviet isolation. These results match
the complicated calculations predicted by Realist Decline Theory in a multipolar system where
the declining state retains a robust military posture.
Competing arguments, on the other hand, do note fare as well. First, there is very little
evidence for Democratic Peace Theory. In contrast to the predatory strategy borne of divergent
Soviet and British regime types predicted by democratic peace arguments, the Soviet Union in
fact tried to preserve Britain as a great power. More importantly, the case suggests Soviet
strategists were happy to ignore the United Kingdom's democratic system if doing so would help
secure Britain as an ally against the United States and as a hedge against a revived Germany.
Simply put, British democracy was no barrier in the eyes of Soviet strategists to solid Anglo-
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Soviet relations and Soviet support for the United Kingdom in the postwar system. Both the
process and outcome thus go against the predictions from Democratic Peace Theory.
There is more evidence for Institutionalist Theory, though it also faces problems.
Institutionalist Theory correctly predicted that the USSR would adopt a Moderate Support
strategy. It also rightly expected that the USSR would try to work through existing institutions
(particularly the CFM) to sustain the United Kingdom. These are strong points in Institutionalist
Theory's favor. However, the theory faces three major limitations. First, Soviet policymakers
expressed interest in supporting the United Kingdom and took the first steps in that direction in
1944-1945, before the CFM began operations. Because the Soviet Union began formulating its
Moderate Support strategy before the major institution binding the United Kingdom and USSR
took root, it is difficult to claim institutions caused the Soviet Union to pursue the strategy - they
were not necessary for the USSR to avoid predation. Second, even after the CFM began
operating, the USSR proved willing to go around CFM constructs if it felt its interests so dictated.
This was notably the case during the Turkish Straits dispute as the USSR bucked Anglo-
American objections voiced in the CFM to a Soviet base in order to continue pressing Turkey.
Although I argue the Turkish Straits crisis is overblown and does not contradict the overall
Moderate Support strategy enacted by the USSR, it is noteworthy that the CFM proved
insufficient in breeding Anglo-Soviet cooperation when the two sides substantively disagreed.
Finally, the available evidence suggests Soviet rationales diverged from those suggested by
institutionalist arguments. That is, the available documentary record suggests Soviet strategists
wanted to support the United Kingdom for the sake of preserving the United Kingdom as a
potential ally rather than any particular desire to secure continued British participation in the
CFM. Although additional research may turn up evidence that Soviet policymakers wanted to
support the United Kingdom in order to sustain postwar institutions, the current record suggests
Soviet rationales do not match Institutionalist Theory predictions. Although Institutionalist
Theory receives more backing in the case than Democratic Peace Theory, it is ultimately limited
and mixed evidence.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summarizing the Results
In the aggregate, American and Soviet strategies towards the United Kingdom in 1945-
1946 provide significant evidence for Realist Decline Theory and suggest it is a better
explanation of American and Soviet strategies than its competitors. Not only did my argument
successfully predict that the United States and Soviet Union would both adopt strategies of
Moderate Support, but it aptly captured the underlying logics. As shown, both the Soviet Union
and United States sought to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power. Not only did Soviet
and American policymakers calculate that the United Kingdom might be useful as an ally in
another war, but it had great utility in providing peace and security in Western Europe. They
also recognized that adopting any strategy aside from support would be harmful, either by
weakening the United Kingdom and eliminating it as an ally, or pushing it into the arms of
another great power. However, and as my argument further predicted, intensive means of
support at a time when the declining United Kingdom retained a robust posture were avoided, as
it might either help the United Kingdom continue threatening the rising state's security (the
Soviet concern) or antagonize other great powers and increase the risk of chain-ganging (the
American concern). The cost-benefit calculations predicted by my theory were readily observed.
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In contrast, American and Soviet strategies offer only limited evidence for Democratic
Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. Democratic Peace Theory might provide a partial
explanation of American behavior. In particular, the theory aptly predicted the outcome of the
case, while the occasional reference to preserving Britain as a strong democracy suggests the
similarity in Anglo-American domestic regimes had some influence on U.S. strategy. However,
even in the American case, the overwhelming American concerns was on preserving Britain as a
balancer against the USSR and security provider in Europe - not about preserving the United
Kingdom as a democracy per se. Moreover, the theory utterly fails to capture why the Soviet
Union pursued a Moderate Support strategy; given the dissimilar domestic regimes, Democratic
Peace Theory predicts rivalry and predatory behavior by the USSR. This never emerged, and the
Soviet Union bent over backwards to preserve the United Kingdom as a potential ally. In other
words, the democratic United States and non-democratic Soviet Union behaved similarly
towards the democratic United Kingdom, outcomes that are the opposite of what Democratic
Peace Theory predicts.
The evidence is also mixed for Institutionalist Theory. Unlike Democratic Peace Theory,
institutionalist arguments rightly predicted that both the United States and Soviet Union would
adopt strategies of Moderate Support. The theory also captures the episodic efforts by American
policymakers to give life to the Bretton Woods institutions, and Soviet efforts to work through
the CFM. Overall, however, the rationales and internal arguments offered by both American and
Soviet analysts generally ignored the influence of international institutions; indeed, when passing
the Anglo-American loan, American policymakers expressly turned to the strategic value of
preserving Britain as an ally while downplaying the importance of the loan in incorporating the
Bretton Woods regime. Similarly, both the United States and Soviet Union were willing to work
around or ignore institutions when their interests so dictated rather than find them institutionally
constrained. Above all, institutions seem to have a hard time explaining the evolution of U.S. and
Soviet strategy in the case: American strategy was supportive despite the significant reduction in
Anglo-American institutional binding that accompanied the disbandment of the wartime joint
boards, while Soviet support for Britain emerged before the CFM became operational.
Ultimately, although there is some support for institutionalist arguments, it appears institutions
were neither necessary nor sufficient to produce the Moderate Support strategies. Realist
Decline Theory is a stronger explanation for the case.
B. Conclusion
The United States and Soviet Union pursued Moderate Support in 1945-1946 when it
appeared Britain was weak but not yet dead and might serve as an ally to either party. The
process and outcome of the cases provide more evidence for my argument than its competitors,
suggesting Realist Decline Theory may be a useful account of rising state behavior towards
declining great powers in multipolar settings. The next chapter continues this test by examining
American and Soviet reactions as British military power collapsed in early 1947 and its posture
shifted from robust to weak.
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Chapter Six:
The Decline of the United Kingdom and Great Powers Relations, Part II:
Diverging American and Soviet Policies, 1947-1949
I. Introduction
The preceding chapter evaluated American and Soviet strategy in response to Britain's
decline immediately after World War Two. I showed that the United States and USSR both
pursued strategies of Moderate Support. These behaviors contrast with dominant views of
American and Soviet policy in the immediate postwar period: the United States was less
supportive of the United Kingdom than often claimed, while the Soviet Union was less predatory
and more supportive than commonly perceived. In doing so, I also showed that Realist Decline
Theory offers a more powerful tool than either Democratic Peace Theory or Institutionalist
Theory to explain the course and outcome of U.S. and Soviet strategy. The results suggest
Realist Decline Theory can be used to account for rising state-declining state relations in
multipolar settings.
This chapter offers a final test of Realist Decline Theory's multipolar predictions by
examining Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet relations from 1947 through Great Britain's exit
from the great power ranks in 1949. Empirically, the chapter centers on two puzzles. First, why
did the United States move early in 1947 to intensely aid the United Kingdom? After all, British
weaknesses were clear for the preceding two years, yet the United States avoided using intense
means to keep Britain a great power. In the winter of 1947, however, the United States turned
and began pursuing an Extreme Support strategy to reconstruct British power and protect British
security using intense means. It did so by first defining core British interests as core American
interests, then providing extensive economic aid via the Marshall Plan, and ultimately promising
to fight alongside Britain at the start of any hostilities with the Soviet Union. What explains this
shift?
The second puzzle involves Soviet behavior. As shown in the prior chapter, the Soviet
Union pursued policies that tried to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power, provided
doing so would not allow the British to threaten Soviet security or imperil relations with the
United States. In 1947-1949, however, Soviet policy underwent two shifts. One shift involved
the move towards increase competition and, ultimately, efforts to prey upon the United
Kingdom; this was wrapped up in the oft-noted turn towards Soviet-Western competition
marking the start of the Cold War. However, before Soviet-Western tensions became entrenched,
the Soviet Union increased efforts to support the United Kingdom by offering a Britain formal
alliance in early 1947 that would ensure Anglo-Soviet cooperation in Europe. The Soviet
alliance offer, which relatively few scholars have discussed, is interesting not just because it
contradicts the widespread impression of Soviet hostility towards the West, but parallels growing
American support for Britain at the same time.840 What, then, explains the double shift in Soviet
policy - first towards Extreme Support for Britain, followed by predation?
Assessing the American and Soviet shift towards Extreme Support, followed by the
subsequent divergence in U.S. and Soviet policy towards the United Kingdom, is important for
840 Several searches turned up only one publication that expressly addresses the Anglo-Soviet alliance offer; Wayne
Knight, "Labourite Britain: America's 'Sure Friend'? The Anglo-Soviet Treaty Issue, 1947," Diplomatic History 7,
no. 4 (October 1983): 267-282.
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both theory and history. On the one hand, the more we unpack the ways in which American and
Soviet policies moved in response to Britain's decline, the more we may uncover new insight
into the origins of Soviet-American differences in the early Cold War. This, in turn, may help us
explain why wartime cooperation and the postwar effort to sustain wartime accord broke down
amongst the three great powers. On the other hand, understanding the degree to which American
and Soviet policies were shaped by calculations over the costs and benefits of balancing, the
influence of international institutions, and the similarities and differences among different
governing regimes can tell us much about the sources of great power behavior more broadly.
Given, in particular, that several scholars see the deepening of Anglo-American relations as
intimately related to the open, democratic nature of their governments and the availability of
international institutions to manage their relationship, re-examining the course and conduct of
both Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet relations provides a good check on democratic peace
and institutionalist arguments.8 41
Although all three theories gain some support from these tests, the results again provide
significant evidence for Realist Decline Theory and somewhat less for its competitors. First, I
show that the emergence of Extreme Support in Anglo-American relations flowed from
American calculations of the costs and benefits of retaining Britain as a great power. Seeking as
far back as 1945 to ensure Britain was available as a prospective ally, the collapse of British
military power in late 1946-early 1947 caused American policymakers to realize that, unless the
United States moved to intensely aid Britain, the United Kingdom might be lost as potential
partner. More than anything related to common democratic regimes or the advantages of
sustaining institutionalized cooperation with the United Kingdom, pure calculations of the need
for alliance options in a multipolar world drove American policy.
Second, and although the eventual Soviet turn towards predation diverges from my
argument, significant portions of what we know of Soviet policy accord with Realist Decline
Theory. Specifically, confronted with growing signs of British weakness in late 1946 and early
1947 as British posture shifted from robust to weak, the Soviet Union pursued a strategy of
Extreme Support by extending Britain a military alliance and diplomatic reinsurance treaty.
Although some scholars see the Soviet effort as a ploy to lure Britain into a false sense of
confidence to abet Soviet predation, it is telling that British policymakers were interested in the
Soviet offer and explored the option. In fact, it was only after the United States made Britain a
better offer in the form of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and Anglo-American military
cooperation that Britain turned away from the Soviet offer.842 This, in turn, pushed the USSR to
fear an Anglo-American axis directed against the USSR and pushed the USSR towards a
confrontational and predatory stance. While the documentary record is particularly sparse, what
we know of Soviet decision-making in this period thus accords with Realist Decline Theory: the
Soviet Union's first response to British military weakness was to turn towards Extreme Support.
Rather than break with Britain because of different regime types or support Britain because of
the presence of international institutions, Soviet policy was driven by a strait calculation of the
841 An overview is found in Ikenberry, After Victory, 190-210; Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 159-219; scholars
working in the democratic peace tradition argue Anglo-Americans relations were supportive well before 1945,
suggesting the post-1945 was simply a continuation of prior trends; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace:
Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6-7; Davidson and
Sucharov, "Peaceful Power Transitions: The Historical Cases," 102-112.
842 On questions of Soviet intentions, see Barker, Between, 70-74; for a moderate interpretation, see Bullock, Bevin,
371-372. My understanding largely comes from "Conclusions of the Meeting of the Cabinet," 3 February 1947,
CAB 128/9/15; Clement Atlee, "Revision of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty," 20 April 1947, CAB 129/18/29.
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benefits of preserving the United Kingdom as a prospective ally and the costs that would result if
Britain were lost.
To prove these points, the remainder of this chapter proceeds in several parts. Having
introduced the case, I code the variables central to Realist Decline Theory and derive predictions,
before doing the same for Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. Due to space
constraints, I avoid reproducing the extensive codings introduced in the prior chapter and focus
only on those variables that changed between the 1945-1946 and 1947-1949 periods. Next, I test
the assorted predictions against American policy in 1947-1949, before doing the same for Soviet
strategy; along the way, I weigh and assess the evidence. Finally, I summarize the results.
II. Realist Decline Theory: Coding and Predictions
A. Polarity: Multipolar
As the CINC scores (Tables 6.1-6.3) suggest, Europe remained multipolar through 1949.
Although British economic problems continued to fester, there were signs by late 1946 that
industrial production was recovering, and British strategists had long-term plans to bring
strategic ends and economic means in line to help them remain a major player in the European
security game. 843 Although the next two to five years would be challenging, British
policymakers were mildly optimistic that international trade, and with it the economic
foundations of British power, would recover within the next decade. 844 At the same time, the
wealthier United States had been successfully cajoled into providing the 1946 loan even as the
United States reduced its wartime association with European politics.8 45 Even if the loan was too
small to cover all Britain's problems, it was a good stopgap measure. The Soviet Union,
meanwhile, faced the daunting task of recovering from wartime damage and consolidating its
position in Central and Eastern Europe. 846 This would hinder the USSR's ability to use the latent
capabilities developed during the war to expand its political reach, but also meant it would have
to be taken seriously in any discussion of great power politics. Overall, the three victors from
World War Two remained the principle players in European politics at the start of 1947. It was
only in 1949-1950, after the British situation worsened and the United States and Soviet Union
surged ahead, that Britain fell out of the great power ranks (Tables 6.2, 6.3).
Table 6.1: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1947
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
State CINC Score (% total % of Strongest State CINC Score (% total % of StrongestEuropean capabilities) State (USA) European capabilities) State (USA)
USA 38.7 100 France 5.1 10.4
USSR 21.5 55.6 Italy 3.3 8.5
UK 12.3 31.8
843 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London: Methuen, 1984), 1-56; Cairncross,
Years of Recovery, 3-46, 61-120; Baylis, Pragmatism, 80-84.
844 CairnCross, Years of Recovery, 112-115; Richard Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and
Peace, 1942-1949, ed. Alec Cairncross (London: Clarendon Press, 1982), 66-82.
845 Clarke, Economic Collaboration, 66-71.
846 Discussion of Soviet problems is in V. M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from
Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 51-54.
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Table 6.2: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1949
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
State CINC Score (% total % of Strongest State CINC Score (% total % of StrongestEuropean capabilities) State (USA) European capabilities) State (USA)
USA 35.6 100 France 5.2 14.6
USSR 25 70.2 Italy 3.5 9.8
UK 10 28.1
Table 6.3: Identifying the European Great Powers, 1950
Great Powers Other States (for illustration)
State CINC Score (% total % of Strongest State CINC Score (% total % of StrongestEuropean capabilities) State (USA) European capabilities) State (USA)
USA 37.1 100 UK 8.9 24
USSR 27 72.8 France 5 13.5
Italy 3.3 8.9
As before, I am not arguing Britain was as strong as the Soviet Union or the United States.
Clearly the United States and USSR were stronger than Britain and gaining ground. However, as
late as 1949 Britain was nearly twice as strong as France (the next most powerful state on the
continent) and nearly three times as strong as Italy; the 1945 American judgment discussed in the
prior chapter that Britain would be in a "lower category" than the U.S. or USSR but still a viable
competitor remained apt. Overall, I code the period as multipolar.
B. British Military Posture: Weak
Unlike the polarity of the system, British military posture changed in late 1946 and early
1947 as it moved from robust to weak. This shift related to the underlying economic weakness
of the British position. Although British economic power was hoped to be slowly on the mend,
its recovery hinged on large-scale imports of goods and materials from the United States.
Because potential British trading partners in Western Europe also imported from the United
States, Britain's recovery did not correspond with a concomitant increase in exports and a large
deficit opened between British expenditures and income. Closing this gap forced British
policymakers to progressively reduce British military expenditures and its overseas presence.
Through 1945-1946, cuts occurred primarily in colonial areas as Britain reduced its footprint in
the Pacific, the Indian Subcontinent, and portions of the Middle East and Africa, in order to keep
British strength in and around Europe intact.
By the winter of 1946-1947, however, the continued gap between income and expenditures
meant more drastic cuts would be necessary and affect Britain's role in European politics.8 47
After sharp debate in the British Cabinet that winter, plans were announced in early-mid 1947 for
a major withdrawal and drawdown in British military forces in and around the continent.8 48
Forces in Greece, Italy, and Austria would be withdrawn entirely, assets in Germany kept at
minimal strength, and many units were either converted to a "training" cadre or mothballed
altogether.849 Under the retrenchment and reduction scheme presented by the middle of the year,
these reductions meant that the total British army by 1948-1949 would consist of one active
infantry division and two independent infantry brigades, with an additional 2 division
847 Bullock, Bevin, 352-368.
848 Lewis, Changing Direction, 286-315; Ovendale, Alliance, 45-61.
849 Following figures from Defence Committee, "Defence Requirements," 15 September 1947, CAB 131/4.
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equivalents as a "training" force; forces in Europe would fall to one active brigade and two
training divisions, or only 70,000 troops total, all stationed in Germany. The Royal Navy,
meanwhile, would be reduced to little more than a force in being, and even this would be
mothballed for much of 1947-1948. Above all, the Royal Air Force -- the primary means of
immediately retaliating against an aggressor and defending Britain against a Soviet attack - was
cut to 160 aircraft in Bomber Command and 192 in Fighter Command.850 These cuts came
against a force that was already estimated in late-1946 to be "inadequate for its peacetime
commitments" and meant, as the Cabinet concluded, an "inability to meet essential commitments,
as well as grave prejudice to the prospect of building up small but efficient post-war Forces in
the next 5 years or so."851 Britain, in short, was undercutting not just its short-term military
strength, but its ability to play a meaningful military role for the foreseeable future as well.
Although the country would try to keep a small presence in Europe and around the
Mediterranean, Britain's economy could no longer support a sufficient forward presence or
military deterrent to provide for British security. Thus, once British withdrawals and reductions
began in early 1947, Britain's military posture shifted from robust to weak.85 2
Table 6.4 provides a sense of the change by comparing the distribution of British land
forces in Europe in 1946, with the revised scheme under the post-1947 cuts.
850 I have been unable to find estimates for Bomber and Fighter Commands before these cuts. However, a report
from November 1946 shows plans to maintain 272 day fighters in Britain and Germany, alongside 280 strategic and
light bombers in the same area. The 272 and 280 figures themselves represent a large cut from the 384 fighters and
352 bombers planned for the post-1947 period in an early February 1946 estimates. The point is that British military
forces were cut over the course of 1946, and reached a crisis point in late 1946-early 1947; for the earlier estimates,
see Defence Committee, "Memorandum on the Size of the Armed Forces, 30 June 1946 and 31 December 1946," 13
February 1946, CAB 131/2; Defence Committee, "Strength of the Armed Forces at 31 December 1946 and 31
March 1948," 8 November 1946, CAB 131/3.
851 Assessment from Defence Committee, "Strength of the Armed Forces at 3l't December 1946 and 31 st March
1948," 8 November 1946, CAB 131/3; Defence Committee, "Defence Estimates 1947-1948," 7 January 1947, CAB
129/6/33. While the Cabinet initially agreed not to implement the feared changes, economic pressure soon forced
Britain's hand; Cabinet, "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet," 28 January 1947, CAB 128/9/13.
852 Aside from the above, see Defence Committee, "Strength of the Armed Forces," 2 August 1947, CAB 131/4.
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The British Withdrawal from Europe, 1947-1949853
Germany (active units)
armored divisions 1 0
infantry divisions 2.67 0
armored brigades 1 0
infantry brigades 0 1
occupation brigades 0 0
regiments 3 0
TOTAL 4+ divisions 1 active brigade + 2 "training"
divisions
Southeast Europe
(Austria, Italy, Greece,
armored divisions 1 0
infantry divisions 1 0
armored brigades 0 0
infantry brigades 3 0
occupation brigades 2 0
regiments 1 0
TOTAL 3+ divisions 0 (all withdrawn)
OVERALL IN . 1 active brigade, 2 training
EUROPE divisions
These cuts changed the military situation facing both the United States and Soviet Union.
For the Soviet Union, the cuts significantly reduced the prospective costs of British internal
balancing and thus the potential downside of assisting Britain. First, Britain's military weakness
meant that the risk of an accidental conflict arising between the Soviet Union and United
Kingdom was now unlikely. Even if a misunderstanding erupted between Soviet units and
remaining British forces in Germany, the chance of escalation was minimal. With British troops
barely adequate to garrison Germany, let alone defend it, and with British air and naval assets
unable to undertake offensive operations, Britain could not escalate very far before finding its
options limited. This, in turn, meant the USSR would not need to worry about British retaliatory
attacks or a sustained Anglo-Soviet rivalry: even if a crisis erupted, the USSR would easily hold
the upper hand and could escalate or de-escalate as its interests dictated.
Second, the likelihood of Britain cracking down on local Communist forces and spiraling
into conflict with the USSR was much reduced compared to the 1945-1946 period. As discussed
in the previous chapter, although Stalin ordered local Communist parties to cooperate with
Western governments, it was possible British leaders would incorrectly see a Communist threat
from local political movements, stage a crackdown, ensnare Soviet prestige, and thus lead to a
rivalry or war between the United Kingdom and USSR. Yet now, because British forces were in
fast retreat, this risk was reduced. The areas in which local Communists were most active -
namely, Southeastern Europe - were precisely those areas Britain was leaving. Furthermore, if
853 Defence Committee, "Strength of the Armed Forces at 3 1st December 1946 and 3 1st March 1948," 8 November
1946, CAB 131/3; Defence Committee, "Defence Requirements," 15 September 1947, CAB 131/4.
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Post-1947 plansDeployed, Nov-Dec 1946
Table 6.4:
Communist groups in British-occupied areas of Germany challenged British influence, the few
British forces on the ground were less likely to pick a fight with a local movement of unknown
force than if larger British forces were present; even if Britain responded, its forces could only
do so much before British resources were exhausted. And because British defense expenditures
were being cut, it had few tools available to back local anti-Communist forces in Eastern Europe
and the USSR in retaliation. In short, with British action against local Communist forces
unlikely and with British support for anti-Communist forces capped, the chance of an Anglo-
Soviet conflict arising out of local political difficulties was constrained.
The change in British posture also affected American security costs, although these
manifested in a different form than those with the USSR. In 1945-1946, the biggest cost posed
by Britain's robust posture was that of Britain chain-ganging the United States into a conflict
with the USSR that the United States wanted to avoid. Because the United Kingdom was strong
enough to spiral with the USSR but not strong enough to defend Europe, a war between the
USSR and United Kingdom would require American intervention to prevent Western Europe
from falling under Soviet domination. Yet because of Britain's weak posture, this problem was
now broadly solved. At least in the near-term, British military forces were so weak that they
could not engage the USSR without an American guarantee, thereby giving the United States the
ability to veto British actions. Put differently, because British military options were few and far
between, the United States could exert a de facto veto over British policies that threatened
American interests. As a result, Britain's shift from a robust to a weak posture reduced the
primary British threat to the United States, thereby freeing the United States from the need to
distance itself from close Anglo-American cooperation.
C. Predictions
Given the combination of multipolarity and a weak British posture, I predict that both the
United States and Soviet Union will pursue a strategy of Extreme Support. Freed of the need to
hedge against Britain's robust posture, the benefits of supporting a declining great power in a
multipolar environment will be recognized and acted upon. This carries several observable
implications. First, both the United States and Soviet Union will aim to preserve Britain as a
great power. Despite likely British concerns that they will be left bereft of allies and backers as
their problems mount, in fact both the United States and USSR will seek to prevent the United
Kingdom from falling from the great power ranks. Intensive means will be employed in this
effort as both states 1) offer Britain military alliances and diplomatic guarantees, 2) transfer
resources to Britain, and/or 3) settle outstanding political-military disputes. Particularly in
comparison to the distant and sometimes-tense relations marking Anglo-American and Anglo-
Soviet relations in 1945-1946, we expect to see a marked increase in American and Soviet
willingness to come to Britain's aid, alongside more sustained and consistent backing for British
security.
Additionally, we expect American and Soviet strategists to offer clear rationales for
American and Soviet behavior. As noted earlier, at the heart of my theory is an argument that
rising states in multipolarity fear being balanced and isolated, and therefore try to preserve
declining states as potential allies by adopting supportive strategies. I expect policymakers in the
United States and USSR to discuss and analyze this logic. Strategists in both states should
emphasize the security benefits of Extreme Support: they are expected to discuss their
recognition that support is a way of retaining alliance options. The inverse is also true, and they
should underscore the disadvantages of preying on Britain as other states might flock to Britain's
aid. Furthermore, policymakers will underscore the need to use intense means to aid Britain at a
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time when Britain is already on the geopolitical ropes. Internal analyses will justify intense
support out of worries that 1) any further weakening will lead to Britain being lost as a future
ally, and 2) they might be "outbid" for Britain's friendship by the other great power and thus
Britain be lost as an ally in a different fashion.
We additionally expect to see the United States and Soviet Union monitoring British
military posture for signs that it is continuing to weaken (or, inversely, strengthen). This should
particularly be an issue in 1947 as British military power collapses. Because American and
Soviet support will move in response to British posture, signs that British posture is continuing to
weaken will lead the United States and Soviet Union to double-down on assistance to Britain by,
for instance, offering more economic aid or tightening alliance bonds. Conversely, signs that the
British military is recovering and shifting back to a robust posture will lead the U.S. and USSR
to reduce their aid to Britain and shift to a Moderate Support strategy.
Finally, American and Soviet strategists will be highly attuned to signs of British
weakness and, when made aware of British problems, take steps to prevent additional problems
from manifesting by buttressing British capabilities. As such, American and Soviet
policymakers also will to try prevent other great powers from weakening Britain any further.
Because of this dynamic, unfortunately, there may be significant ground for misunderstanding
and spiraling between the United States and Soviet Union: with each trying to come to Britain's
aid to preserve the United Kingdom as a potential ally, each may end up seeing the other as
pursuing exclusivist and confrontational policies by allying with Britain and isolating the other
side. It would therefore not be surprising if, in the course of coming to Britain's aid using
intense means, both the Soviet Union and United States fear the hostile intentions of the other
side and accuse one another of diplomatically isolating the other.
II. Alternate Explanations
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory generate different predictions than
my realist argument. Here, I briefly code the independent variables and derive predictions from
the arguments in sequence.
A. Democratic Peace Theory
i. Coding Regime Type
Per Polity scores, the regime types of the various great powers did not change in the
1947-1949 period. Matching the codings from the 1945-1946 chapter, the United States and
United Kingdom remained democracies while the Soviet Union remained a non-democracy. As
before, this accords with common perceptions of the United States and United Kingdom as the
leading democracies in the post-1945 system and the Soviet Union the dominant state of a non-
democratic bloc.8 54 If anything, Soviet-Western domestic differences were ossifying in the late
1940s as Stalin prepared for another round of crackdowns and purges inside his regime to
buttress his rule in the postwar period. 855 Overall, there is a clear break between the democratic
United States, the democratic United Kingdom, and the non-democratic Soviet Union.
ii. Predictions
Under these conditions, we expect American and Soviet strategies towards the United
Kingdom to diverge. Given that the United States and United Kingdom constitute a democratic
dyad, the United States is expected to adopt an Extreme Support strategy towards the United
Kingdom. As before, American policymakers will want to preserve a fellow democracy to stand
854 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 186-188.
855 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, chap. 3.
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alongside it against the non-democratic USSR and preserve a democratic way of life. Unlike the
1945-1946 period, however, I expect the military weakness of the United Kingdom to focus
American attention and encourage intensive means to these ends; we should see the intensity of
American assistance increasing as Britain becomes weaker. Moreover, I predict American
policymakers will justify aid to the United Kingdom in the language of the democratic peace,
meaning that they should underscore in their private deliberations the need to ensure a fellow
democracy's survival against a rising non-democratic Soviet challenger. Particularly given
Britain's mounting military weakness, the Soviet threat ought to be portrayed in dire terms and
the risk of Britain "falling" to non-democratic forces especially acute. Thus, the logic of the
theory suggests American decision-makers will paint a dire picture of the international
environment if Britain were to "fall" to Communism and the United States lose its premier
democratic ally.
Meanwhile, once the decision for intensive assistance to Britain is made, I predict Anglo-
American negotiations to proceed free of widespread misunderstandings or disputes. Because
democratic institutions are transparent and generate a common democratic set of interests related
to peace and cooperation, it should be easy 1) for policymakers in the United States to
understand what needs to be done to aid Britain, and 2) for the United States and United
Kingdom to reach mutually-acceptable deal over the terms of American backing. These trends
should be all the more noticeable after the United States makes the decision to pursue Extreme
Support, as the pressing nature of British problems act to focus the attention of American
strategists on doing all that is necessary to preserve Britain as a democratic great power. Finally,
as before, we expect aid for Britain on democratic grounds to enjoy widespread popular and
political support as the joint democratic nature of the Anglo-American dyad generates
enthusiasm for American backing to a democratic ally.
Conversely, democratic peace arguments suggest the Soviet Union will pursue a strategy
of Extreme Predation. As in 1945-1946, the divergent British and Soviet regime types are likely
to breed Anglo-Soviet misunderstanding as the two sides misinterpret one another's power,
misconstrue their interests, and thereby end up in a rivalry with one another. This rivalry will
push the USSR to try to prey on the United Kingdom in order to reduce the British threat to
Soviet security. With British military posture shifting to weak, the Soviets will have a golden
opportunity to eliminate this threat by trying to further weaken the United Kingdom. Hence, the
Soviets will move into the breach created by British weakness to try to further adumbrate British
power. By definition, Anglo-Soviet relations will lack the ease of bargaining, communication,
and sense of shared interests predominating in Anglo-American relations, and there should be
few Soviet efforts to help the United Kingdom survive as a great power. Finally, to the extent
we can assess Soviet internal deliberations, we should find evidence that Soviet strategists
framed their policies around the different nature of the British ruling regime: we expect to see
Soviet policymakers from Stalin downward discussing the threatening nature of British liberal
democracy and therefore the attractiveness of undermining British strength.
B. Institutionalist Theory
i. Coding Institutional Presence
Unlike regime types, institutions underwent a subtle shift in the 1947-1949 period as the
Council on Foreign Ministers (CFM) broke down in 1947.856 As Trachtenberg details, the
inability of the great powers to reach an agreement on the future of Germany led the United
States to decide the CFM was a failure and of no use in managing inter-great powered relations.
856 Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 22-23.
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Following stalemated CFM meetings in April and December 1947, Americanpolicymakers (with
British backing) decided to call-off further collaboration with the USSR. 85 Thus, within one
year of Britain's shift to a weak military posture, the primary venue for binding the United
Kingdom to the USSR was also gone.858
In contrast, institutions binding the United States and United Kingdom continued.
Although the prior chapter documented the collapse of the Anglo-American wartime integration,
postwar institutions came online in their stead. In particular, scholars such as Ikenberry see the
growth of the Bretton Woods system, beginning with the IMF, as the start of a deeper process of
Anglo-American postwar integration. 859 Coming amidst the slide in Anglo-Soviet relations and
Britain's shift to a weak posture, the deepening of the Bretton Woods agreements ostensibly
bound the United States to Britain in the early postwar period. They may also have provided a
focal point around which other institutions were layered: Ikenberry in particular sees the
financial integration fostered by the IMF and Bretton Woods as preparing the ground for
eventual Western (including Anglo-American) integration via the North Atlantic Treaty from
1949 onwards. 860 Thus, just as Anglo-Soviet institutional binding broke down, Anglo-American
institutional integration continued.
ii. Predictions
Like Democratic Peace Theory, Institutionalist Theory makes divergent predictions of
Soviet and American strategy towards the United Kingdom. American strategy is the most
straightforward. Given the continued and deepening binding between the United States and
United Kingdom, we expect to see the United States respond to growing British problems by
adopting an Extreme Support strategy. The goal is to preserve the United Kingdom as a great
power, and the United States will do so using intense means. To justify the policy, policymakers
will emphasize the need to support Britain in order to aid and abet British participation in
Western institutions - American policymakers will be driven by a desire to preserve the
institutional status quo and fear British defection from extant institutions absent American
backing. In the process, we expect to see the United States funnel aid to Britain primarily
through extant institutions, while building up and layering additional institutional channels of
cooperation as necessary: if, as institutionalist scholars argue, institutions provide a venue for
states to negotiate bargains and communicate information, we ought to see American officials
utilizing and elaborating upon institutional mechanisms in the process of supporting Great
Britain. By definition, this means we expect to see few signs of American officials trying to
work around existing institutions and evidence that the United States is trying to avoid
institutional channels is strong disconfirming evidence of the argument. Finally, we expect to
see American support for Britain emerging without significant disagreement over the terms of
U.S. backing or delay in offering this assistance. That is, because institutions help states assess
the distribution of power and interests, bargain with one another, and avoid tendencies to buck-
pass, the institutionalized character of Anglo-American relations should see the United States
readily understand what it would take to buttress British power and offer the necessary
arrangements.
Soviet strategy is more complicated. Due to the collapse of the CFM in late 1947, we
expect to see a break in Soviet strategy around the start of 1948: before that point, we should see
857 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 60-70.
858 Baylis, Pragmatism, 64-65.
859 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 194-199.
860 Ibid., 199-207.
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Soviet efforts to pursue Extreme Support; afterwards, we expect a shift towards predation in the
absence of institutions able to manage Anglo-Soviet relationship. In pursuing Extreme Support
through the end of 1947, Soviet policy should mirror that of the United States: Soviet strategy
should try to preserve Britain as a great power in order to ensure it can continue to participate in
international institutions while funneling support through and within the CFM. After the CFM
collapses, however, we expect the USSR to prey on Britain as misunderstanding and
misperceptions proliferate in the absence of institutions able to structure great power relations.
In fact, the collapse of the CFM may even be taken as a sign that Britain is untrustworthy and
unreliable as a negotiating partner. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union has no reason not
to prey on the United Kingdom and to try to use its relative power its advantage; if it fails to do
otherwise, then Britain may recover from its present problems at some point in the future and
threaten Soviet security. Thus, the Soviet Union will move into the breach created by British
weakness to try and push Britain out of the great power ranks by pursuing a predatory strategy.
In turn, we expect to find evidence of policymakers rationalizing Soviet policy in these terms: we
expect to see policymakers stressing British perfidy and hostility, and stressing the advantages of
exploiting Britain while it was weak.
IV. American Strategy and British Decline, 1947-1949
This section analyzes American strategy towards the United Kingdom in 1947-1949.
Along the way, I weigh the results of the case against predictions from the competing theories.
G. Overview of American Strategy: Extreme Support
As all three theories predict, the United States adopted a strategy of Extreme Support
beginning in early 1947. Amidst growing signs of British military weakness, the United States
not only sought to keep Britain as a great power, but used intensive means to pursue this goal:
Britain would not be allowed to fail as a great power if the United States had anything to say
about it. In contrast to the early postwar period, the United States associated itself closely with
British security and the reconstruction of British power. Anglo-American military cooperation
took off, epitomized by the restart of joint Anglo-American military planning and development
of American military plans to fight alongside British forces should war with the USSR erupt.
Diplomatic support was equally intensive, as the United States moved to help rebuild the British
economy with few preconditions and extended diplomatic guarantees to protect British security
interests in and Europe. The overall process culminated in a formal military alliance and
American diplomatic guarantee to British security with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty
(NAT, forerunner of NATO) in mid-1949.
Overall, I find significant evidence for all three theories, but somewhat more evidence for
Realist Decline Theory. Simply put, American policy seems to have been driven by the security
advantages of retaining Britain as a great power and strengthening it enough to play a major role
against the Soviet Union. This is not to say institutionalist or democratic peace arguments were
unimportant, but simply that American strategy was more driven by the factors identified by my
theory and more closely followed the process described by my argument than anything else. I
elaborate on these points below.
Please note that because of the particularly complex interplay between military policy
and diplomatic policy in this period, I avoid the analytic structure of the prior chapters to provide
a synthesis of American strategy writ large in this period.
H. The Turn of 1947
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By the close of 1946, Anglo-American relations were stuck in an ambiguous position.
Although the United States did not want Britain to decline any further, American efforts to
buttress British power were limited at best. Not only had Anglo-American military cooperation
faltered in the aftermath of World War Two, but American diplomatic support for Britain -
epitomized by the Anglo-American loan negotiation - was idiosyncratic and fraught with
misunderstandings. At the start of 1947, it was unclear how far the United States would go to
prop up the United Kingdom as a great power.861
In the middle of February, however, Britain began the first phase of its retrenchment from
Europe by announcing the suspension of aid to Greece and Turkey and the withdrawal of
military units from Greece. 862 At the time, and as detailed in the preceding chapter, both Greece
and Turkey appeared to face a Soviet threat. If they were to fall, American policymakers feared
it could set off a cascade in which other countries would be lost to Soviet domination. 863 To
prevent this from happening, Britain had previously taken responsibility for defending the
countries by providing economic assistance and sending a large contingent of forces to fight
864
against insurgents in northern Greece. Now, however, the British withdrawal plan upset the
situation. If Britain were to withdraw while the Soviet threat continued, the domino effect feared
by U.S. strategists might take hold and "result in the loss of the whole Near and Middle East and
865
northern Africa," as well as France and Italy, to the USSR.
As shown in the prior chapter, when the putative Soviet threat to British security in the
Eastern Mediterranean first appeared in 1946, the United States responded with cautious means.
When, however, the diplomatic notes announcing the British withdrawal arrived on 21 February,
American policymakers were jolted into action.866 Acheson described the United States as "met
at Armageddon": the collapse of British military power left the United States uniquely
vulnerable. 867 Within one week, the United States decided to take up a British offer to begin
Anglo-American military consultations with an eye towards the United States accepting
responsibility for Greece and Turkey's military defense; plans were also developed to provide
the two countries with extensive economic assistance. 868 This was only the first step. On 12
March, Truman went before Congress to depict a world threatened by Soviet Union and to
portray Greece and Turkey as the opening salvo in the battle to keep Soviet totalitarianism at bay.
To do so at a time when Britain, "owing to its own difficulties," could no longer take the lead,
the United States needed to step into the breach and provide economic and political support for
those democracies resisting the Soviet threat; this effort soon became known as the Truman
Doctrine. 869 Between the extension of American aid to countries central to British security, and
accompanied by the implicit promise of open-ended American assistance following the 12 March
861 Ovendale, Alliance, 59-61.
862 Kunilholm, Near East, 404-405.
863 Gaddis, Origins, 348; Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 573.
864 Xydis, "Greek Arena"; Kunilholm, Near East, 406-409.
865 Gaddis, Origins, 348; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: Volume V,
The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 30, 39-40.
866 United States Department of State, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 31-38; Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War (New
York: Stein and Day, 1974), chap. 6.
867 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219.
868 United States Department of State, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 47-62.
869 Gaddis, "Turning Point," 386-388. Also Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and
Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846.
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speech, the United States intensified the means used to aid British security, limit British losses,
and in so doing abet American security. These moves in February and March 1947 represented
the start of an escalating series of American commitments to intensely support Britain as the
United States "decided in principle to assume Britain's obligations in the Near East."8 70
Prima facie, the fact that Truman publicly justified intense assistance as a way of
defeating totalitarianism and protecting democracy against the Soviet threat seems to confirm a
core democratic peace prediction, namely, that policymakers will justify Extreme Support as
needed to protect a fellow democracy.871 However, there are reasons to doubt the democratic
pitch reflected the true motivation for American strategy. First, Marshall's efforts to rally
Congressional support for aid to Greece and Turkey lack any reference to democracy and
totalitarianism, focusing instead on the dangers of growing Soviet power and ambitions if they
were not halted. 872 Second, senior members of the United States government including Marshall,
George Kennan, and State Department Counselor Charles Bohlen were taken aback by Truman's
presentation of an ideological struggle, wondering if "Truman was overstating the case a bit." In
reply, Truman, admitted the democratic rhetoric was largely for public consumption, explaining
that "this was the only way in which the measure could be passed" by Congress. 73
Above all, however, internal analyses explained that the American decision to aid Greece
and Turkey was driven by much more by fears of losing Britain a military partner against the
USSR. 874 This provides significant evidence for Realist Decline Theory: American
policymakers rationalized and argued for support to Greece and Turkey not due to Communist
threat, but because of how it would help preserve the United Kingdom as a potential ally. The
State Department committee charged with determining the U.S. response to the British pullout
was explicit on this issue, proposing that if the United States failed to accept responsibility for
British interests in the region, then "the resulting chaos would be accompanied by an immediate
weakening of the strategic position of the whole western world, particularly of Great Britain, and
the very security of the United States threatened." Indeed, if British efforts to engage the United
States failed to produce intensive American support, then "the British government might decide
that [. . .] it must come to an arrangement with the Soviet Union, including a military alliance
and the setting up of a spheres of influence." This result "would tend to isolate the United
States" and raised the risk that the United States "might become eventually involved in a world
conflict, possibly without the effective military support of Great Britain." Thus, the report
concluded, "it would be in the interest of the United States [. . .] to relieve the British
Government" of responsibility for Greece and Turkey.875 A meeting of the Secretaries of State,
War, and the Navy to assess the British request reached a similar conclusion, underscoring "the
position of Greece and Turkey in relation to the present financial difficulties of Great Britain and
the implications of the situation to the United States' strategic position" - that is, American
870 Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War, 192.
871 See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope. (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 100-
101.
872 United States Department of State, FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, 60-61; In his memoirs, Acheson claims Marshall's
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States as locked in a battle with totalitarianism. Kaiser, however, casts significant doubt that Acheson's story; see
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219; Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War, 191-192.
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security was affected by what happened to Britain following the pullout from Greece and
Turkey.876 And when Truman was briefed on the implications of the British pullout and decided
to take up the British burden, the State Department conclusions constituted the bulk of the
briefing material. 877 In short, there is significant evidence that the United States aided Greece
and Turkey in order to protect British security and prevent faltering Britain from striking a deal
with the USSR that would deny the United States a potential ally.
I. Extreme Support Deepens
The decision to intensely protect British interests in the Near East and Eastern
Mediterranean marked the start of Extreme Support for the United Kingdom. Yet while the
United States was now responsible for protecting a specific set of British interests, the American
military commitment to Britain proper remained opaque as there were "no assurances that the
United States would go further than supporting Greece and Turkey."8 78 Moreover, while the
United States was providing extensive economic aid to Greece and Turkey, no new American aid
for Britain emerged despite the recognition that the British pullout was due to Britain's
exhausted economic position. In short, Extreme Support began in early 1947, but there were still
gaps in the Anglo-American relationship to be filled in.879
The economic situation reached a turning point that spring. Although British military
commitments and forces were being cut left and right, the reduction in overseas expenditures did
not stabilize Britain's economy. Although industry continued to recover, the trade deficit with
the United States continued to grow as markets and trading partners (aside from the United
States) were absent. Growing deficits, however, ate into the Anglo-American loan. 80 Moreover,
with sterling-dollar convertibility scheduled to begin in July, Britain's economic position might
become even more pressed if convertibility led to a run on the pound, forced Britain to tap the
Anglo-American loan to defend its currency, and thus lack the resources needed for import-led
growth. An economic recovery was needed for Britain to reconstitute its military and function as
a potential ally. However, extant American economic assistance was insufficient to meet this
goal and the terms under which it was provided promised to worsen the British position.88 1
Shortly after the Truman Doctrine and decision to aid Greece and Turkey, American
policymakers began to address the economic problem.8 8 2 Rather than further bilateral aid akin to
the Anglo-American loan, American strategists turned to more intensive means of assistance by
looking to rebuild Britain's economy alongside that of Western Europe writ large (including an
economically revived Germany). Ideally, a Europe-wide approach would put Britain on a more
sustainable economic footing by creating 1) markets for its goods, and 2) trading partners from
whom it could obtain goods and materials, thereby helping to raise British industrial output and
avoid dollar-denominated deficits.883 The solution, laid out in a series of reports and culminating
in announcement of the European Recovery Program (ERP, informally known as the Marshall
Plan) in the spring, was large-scale resources transfers to prime the European economic pump
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and economic-political integration to contain a revived Germany.884 Once it began operating in
early 1948, over $13 billion dollars were transferred to Britain and Western Europe within four
years, while the United States used the political leverage resulting from its aid package to push
for lowered intra-European trade barriers and supranational institutions to sustain long-term
growth.885 Notably, of the $13 billion total, Britain received the most of any one country ($3.2
billion), nearly 20 percent more than France (2.7 billion) and well over double the total provided
to the future West Germany ($1.4 billion).886 Furthermore, once British opposition to European
integration spiked in 1948-1949, the United States backed away from its plans to push supra-
national institutions and European federation in favor of looser plans for European
rapprochement and inter-governmental coordination. In contrast to the haggling and discord that
marked the Anglo-American loan negotiations only two years earlier, the United States quickly
moved at a time of British military weakness to commit extensive sums of American economic
resources and political capital to the task of European and British recovery under terms amenable
to the United Kingdom.8 8
As Realist Decline Theory predicts, security calculations were integral to the ERP overall,
as well as the specific decision to aid Britain via the ERP. At the grossest level, the ERP was
intended to keep Western Europe outside of Soviet control. As Europe's economic conditions
continued to stagnate into 1947, policymakers including Kennan, Clayton, Marshall, and
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal worried that economic weakness would leave the region
susceptible to Soviet influence and Communist subversion. 88 This, in turn, would require
constant American efforts to prevent the USSR from dominating Europe's war-making potential
and thus scuttle any hopes of eventually disentangling the United States from Europe. Thus,
restoring Europe's economic health and making it economically and politically strong enough to
stand against the USSR was, as Forrestal put it in early 1948, "requisite to the maintenance of
peace" and a vital American interest. 889
Still, Britain's particular recovery and preservation as a leading great power was central
to this task. On one level, and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded in the spring, "two
world wars in the past thirty years have demonstrated the interdependence of France, Great
Britain, and the United States in case of war with central or eastern European powers. In war
these nations not only need one another but are in mortal peril if they do not combine their
forces." Therefore, "the maintenance of these two countries in a state of independence, friendly
to the United States and with economies able to support the armed forces necessary" for
continued independence was "of first importance to the national security of the United States."
Baldly stated, Britain (and France) needed to be supported as necessary to ensure it was available
as an ally in the event of another war.890
884 Ireland, Entangling Alliance, 35-37.
885 McAllister, No Exit, 124-141.
886 Agency for International Development, "'Marshall Plan' Assistance, Grants and Loans by Country, April 3,
1948-June 30, 1952," 24 August 1967, online via George C. Marshall Foundation,
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209
Second, Britain's economic recovery would allow it to take the lead in assuaging West
European concerns that a revived Germany would eventually dominate the continent and thus
ensuring Western Europe was sufficiently integrated to stand against the USSR. 891 As American
officials recognized, Western Europe's recovery would only be sustainable if the western zones
of Germany could be reconstructed and brought into the planned West European grouping. Yet
after the CFM collapsed in late 1947, and with memories of the war still fresh, a recovered
Germany was anathema to France and the smaller states of Western Europe without external
security guarantees.892 If (as policymakers hoped) the United States distanced itself from Europe,
then only Britain could fulfill this role and to do so, Britain needed to be strengthened.893 As
Kennan explained, plans for European recovery would therefore need to "embrace, or be linked
to, some sort of plan for dealing with the economic plight of Britain. The plan must formally be
a British one, worked out on British initiative and British responsibility, and the role of the
United States [. . .] must be to give friendly support." 894 After all, it was "questionable whether
[European integration] could be strong enough to serve its designed purpose unless it had the
participation and support of Great Britain [emphasis mine]."895 By rebuilding Britain alongside
Western Europe and laying the foundation for British leadership of a West European grouping,
the United States could withdraw from the continent confident that economic recovery and
political cooperation were self-sustaining as "British power balanced that of a revitalized
Germany." 896 If the ERP was designed to use Germany to solve Europe's economic malaise and
with it buttress European security, then it was also to be used to strengthen Britain's security
hand so the United States could reduce its commitment to the continent.897
Aiding Britain's recovery also meant limiting steps that contributed to British weaknesses
and hindered its ability to function as a useful American ally. This became a critical issue in the
summer of 1947 as sterling-dollar convertibility kicked in. As noted in the preceding chapter,
free convertibility of the pound was one of the lodestones of prior U.S. economic assistance to
the United Kingdom because of its perceived centrality to the smooth operation and viability of
the Bretton Woods institutions. British policymakers, however, feared a run on the pound if
convertibility went forward and that is precisely what happened: when convertibility began in
891 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 45-49.
892 On the CFM failure, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 60-65.
893 McAllister, No Exit, 149-150.
894 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: Volume I, The British
Commonwealth, Europe (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 227.
895 Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 115. State Department analysts were clearer in 1949, arguing, "no effective
integration of Europe would be possible without UK participation because of the belief (not without reason) held by
western continental powers of potential German domination if such UK participation did not take place;" quoted in
Ireland, Entangling Alliance, 164-165.
896 Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 20.
897 Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 116. Later analyses would present the ERP as designed to preserve democratic
governments, as the Harriman Report of November 1947 emphasized: "a European recovery program is an
investment in the continued survival of a world economically stabilized and peacefully conducted in which
governments based on fundamental democratic principles can prosper in which right, not night, prevails, and in
which religious freedom, economic opportunity, and individual liberties are maintained and respected." These
arguments, however, should be taken with a grain a salt as the initial discussion of aid to Europe and Britain
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but then refrained their arguments around democratic principles to mobilize public support; President's Committee
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July, Britain was forced to use the Anglo-American loan to defend its currency.898 Within six
weeks, the loan was close to being exhausted. 899 This left Britain with the unpalatable choice of
either devaluing its currency or suspending convertibility, and led British officials to visit
Washington to assess the American reaction if Britain took the latter route.900 In the process of
doing so, the British government warned not just of the dislocations that would result, but also
that "dollar shortage is bound to react [sic] on their military commitments abroad" -
underscoring that British economic weakness could lead to still sharper reductions in British
military posture.901
In contrast to the position adopted in 1945-1946, American officials signaled acceptance
if Britain backed away from the terms of the Anglo-American loan, sterling-dollar convertibility,
and adherence to the Bretton Woods regime. Rather than, as Institutionalist Theory predicts,
pressure Britain into maintaining institutional solidarity or providing additional assistance to help
Britain comply with the Bretton Woods accords, U.S. policymakers recognized that suspending
sterling-dollar convertibility for the indefinite future was the only way Britain could remain
economically solvent. Although American officials were annoyed at the peremptory nature of
the British announcement, they nevertheless reasoned that, "in the interest of over-all recovery,
we are and will continue to do our utmost to keep Britain afloat."902 As a result, not only was
convertibility suspended, but American officials from Marshall downwards worked to ensure
that the manner of the British withdrawal did not result in a Congressional backlash that might
jeopardize additional aid (such as under the Marshall Plan).903 Moreover, and after a brief period
of suspension, members of the State and Treasury Departments ensured that Britain could tap
into the remaining Anglo-American loan funds while still suspending convertibility. Overall, as
Milward concludes, "if 'the Bretton Woods system' [. . .] ever existed, it ended for European
countries in 1947."904 The United States, as my theory argues, was willing to cease activities
that undercut British capabilities and sacrifice its own international institutions if doing so helped
reconstruct British power.
J. Military Protection and Diplomatic Guarantees
As Ross observes, "the United States had become deeply engaged in European and global
power politics" by late 1947.905 As demonstrated, Britain's survival as a great power was central
to these plans. However, American military power was not yet committed to Britain's defense:
an alliance had been avoided all through 1945-1946, while Anglo-American military
coordination had significantly reduced with the end of the war. This began to change shortly
after the suspension of sterling-dollar convertibility. Beginning in October 1947, British and
American military planners met for staff talks aimed at developing Anglo-American war plans
for the defense of the Middle East. Baylis' description is instructive, arguing that these talks
"opened the door for a greater degree of strategic planning on a global basis between the two
898 Cairneross, Years of Recovery, 132-138.
899 Bullock, Bevin, 452.
900 Cairncross, Years of Recovery, 139-142.
901 United States Department of State, FRUS 1947, Vol. 3, 47.
902 Ibid., 62. Britain had failed to forewarn the United States that the Anglo-American loan was being exhausted at a
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903 Ibid., 66-68. Also Bullock, Bevin, 462.
904 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, 44.
905 Ross, American War Plans, 79.
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countries," so much so that by April 1948, "Britain and the United States were working on
parallel emergency war plans." 0 6
The plans themselves underwent an important change. As described in earlier in this
dissertation, American war plans in 1945-1946 emphasized freedom of maneuver and strategic
flexibility in the event of war in Europe: American forces would withdraw from the continent as
speedily as possible, Western Europe would be surrendered to the USSR, and the United States
would deploy air and sea assets as the situation mandated and opportunities arose irrespective of
British security concerns. Following the resumption of Anglo-American staff talks, however,
American military plans moved towards establishing a deeper American commitment to Europe.
Instead of withdrawing from Europe in the event of Anglo-Soviet hostilities, American forces
were now directed to fight alongside British units to delay a prospective Soviet advance. 90 7
Equally important, and amidst growing debates inside the American military over whether the
weakened British military could defend the British Isles, American planners decided that
American military aid would have to flow to the United Kingdom near-automatically. While the
denuded state of the U.S. military meant this aid would only be available after six months, the
United States was still prepared to deploy air and air-defense units to the United Kingdom as
soon as they became available. 90 8 And, rather than await an opportune moment to strike against
the USSR, American air power would immediately deploy to the Middle East to attack Soviet
troops and installations. 909 By mid-1948, the United States "accepted the idea of fighting in
Western Europe. The Americans [. . .] did not believe they could halt the Red Army, but had
nonetheless decided not to abandon the Continent without significant resistance." 910 Britain
would not have to fight and bear the brunt of a Soviet offensive by itself.
The underlying logic of American actions supports realist arguments. As the Joint Chiefs
of Staff put it in December 1947, "so long as the U.S. elects to take these steps [. . .] it may be
anticipated that Britain and the remaining western powers will be sufficiently reassured to
remain joined with the U.S. in a firm policy counter to that of the Soviets. In this event, the most
probable short-term trend in world politics should be one of improving western democratic
political and power position."911 Although framed in democratic terms, the real concern
involved the loss of Britain as an ally, as if the United States failed to act in Britain's support,
then the British might "consider a variation of their traditional 'balance of power' role [. . .] this
time as mediators on a global scale between the United States and U.S.S.R." Only intense
American support "would permit Britain to remain resolution in opposition to Soviet
pressure." 912
The intensification of American military support for Britain entailed more than simply
planning. Even as Anglo-American military coordination went forward and the economic
relationship progressed, the first true crisis of the Cold War erupted as the USSR blocked
Western access to Berlin. As the Berlin Crisis deepened, Anglo-American military consultations
took place to discuss what the two would do if war erupted. 13 More importantly, however, the
906 Baylis, Pragmatism, 82.
907 Ross, American War Plans, 91.
908 Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 304, 318-319.
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United States extended a type of nuclear guarantee to Britain and Europe by deploying two
groups (60 planes) of B-29s to British bases. Although the bombers were not nuclear-capable
(nuclear-capable bombers would not arrive until the summer of 1949), American strategists
obfuscated the point to trick the USSR into thinking (or at least wondering) otherwise.1 And
regardless of their nuclear-capabilities, the forward deployment "signaled to the Russians that an
attempt to seize West Berlin [thereby risking a general war and threats to Britain] might provoke
bombers raids into the Soviet Union." 915 Moreover, even after the crisis stabilized in the second
half of 1948, American strategists decided to keep one bomber group and one fighter squadron
constantly in Britain, while preparing British bases to handle American nuclear bombs if a new
crisis erupted. 916
The point of American efforts, as my argument predicts, was to buttress British resolve to
resist Soviet pressure and prevent Britain from sliding out of the American orbit. As Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal recorded at the time, the United States, had "the opportunity [... .] of
sending these planes, and once sent they would become somewhat of an accepted fixture [in
Britain] whereas a deterioration of the situation in Europe might lead to a condition of mind
under which the British would be compelled to reverse their present attitude." 917 In other words,
if the United States failed to act, then Britain (as well as other states in Europe) might
bandwagon with the USSR. 918 Thus, having ended 1946 by denying Britain access to American
nuclear expertise in contravention of wartime agreements, the intensification of American
support in 1947-1949 led the United States to extend a de facto nuclear umbrella over the
weakened state for fear of losing Britain to the USSR.
The stage was now set for codification of an American political guarantee and the revival
of a formal Anglo-American alliance as tensions with the USSR escalated. Already in March
1948, Truman announced the United States' willingness to "extend to the free nations [of
Europe] the support which the situation requires" to arm themselves against the USSR. 919 At a
time when Europe faced a threat of "fifth-column aggression supported by the threat of external
force," the United States needed to decide on a guarantee that reassured potential Soviet targets
and prevented "a fatal policy of appeasement." 920  This precipitated a series of internal and
external negotiations to decide the form of the American commitment. One approach would
simply extend an American military guarantee if a crisis or war appeared to be in the offing. The
alternative was to strike a formal alliance with Britain and the rest of Western Europe that
signaled a more general American interest in the fate of Western Europe. Notably, and aside
from deterring the USSR, the United States intended to use a political-military guarantee as
cover to continue pushing for European integration under British leadership that would
eventually rebuild western Europe as an independent military force able to confront the USSR. 92 1
914 Shlaim, "Berlin Blockade," 8-9.
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Policymakers were initially undecided between a unilateral declaration or formal alliance
guarantee. A series of negotiations with the British and Canadians in the spring, however, drove
the United States towards a formal commitment. British influence appears to have been decisive.
Not only did British policymakers underscore to American strategists that France desired a
formal American commitment as insurance against Germany, but Bevin himself played on
American fears of British bandwagoning and appeasement, cabling in April that, "one of my
great anxieties [. . .] is whether, if trouble did come, we should be left waiting as in 1940 in a
state of uncertainty. In view of our experience then it would be very difficult to be able to stand
up to it again unless there was a definite worked out arrangement for the Western area."922 He
followed up in mid-May with another message emphasizing that a treaty guarantee by the United
States "would, by itself, encourage the democratic forces all over the world and be far the best
deterrent to any Soviet miscalculation, which constitutes the only serious danger of war in the
near future." 923 Shortly after Bevin's second note arrived, the balance inside the United States
government shifted in favor of a formal alliance. The logic of this move, as both my argument
and Democratic Peace Theory predict, was to reinforce deterrence against the USSR and lay the
foundation for Western Europe's political integration as a democratic bulwark against the
USSR. 9 24 Indeed, as Ireland concludes, the United States calculated that if "the British were
hesitant to participate on the continent and to help smooth the integration of West Germany into
western Europe, [then] that task would have to be assumed by the United States" indefinitely.925
Although interrupted by the Berlin Crisis, negotiations over a formal American-West European
alliance thus began that fall and culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in
April 1949. The United States was now formally committed to Britain's survival and the
protection of vital British security interests on the continent. Funding for the reconstruction of
British and Western European military power followed shortly thereafter.
Hence, having started 1947 with a strategy of Moderate Support, within two years the
United States had renewed its alliance with the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, these efforts
were not enough to salvage Britain's great power status. Britain's relative decline continued as
the United States and USSR made good wartime losses and grew in the postwar system, while
Britain's economy continued to stagnate. By 1950, Britain fell from the great power ranks
entirely; by the middle of the Cold War, it was as weak or even weaker than France and West
Germany. Still, this was not for want of intense American support: even if late in the game, the
United States was willing to commit significant economic and military resources to Britain's
defense once its military position began to unravel. Although these efforts proved insufficient,
going forward Britain would at least decline under the aegis of American protection.
K. Assessment
All three theories correctly predicted the United States would adopt a strategy of Extreme
Support. Following on the Moderate Support strategy in 1945-1946, the revised strategy saw the
United States provide increasing amounts of political and military assistance to the United
Kingdom in order to reinforce Britain's role as a great power in postwar Europe. This process
culminated in the signing of the NAT and formal creation of an Anglo-American peacetime
alliance.
922 United States Department of State, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3, 80.
923 Ibid., 122.
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925 Ibid., 166.
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Overall, however, the course and rationale of American strategy provides significant
additional evidence for Realist Decline Theory while offering only limited process evidence for
Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. As my theory predicts, American
policymakers were explicit in justifying escalating levels of aid and backing for Britain as an
effort to retain Britain as an ally. At a time when American strategy sought to rebuild Western
Europe as a bulwark against the USSR, the United States looked to Britain to lead that alignment
and thereby sought to ensure Britain had the wherewithal to do so. Otherwise, if Britain were
not available, then the United States itself would have to commit to a long-term presence in
Europe in order to either 1) assuage West European concerns over a revived Germany, or 2) take
the lead itself in balancing the USSR. In essence, if the United States did not want to commit
itself to Europe in perpetuity, Britain needed to remain a great power and American strategy
oriented to that goal. The inverse was also true, as intense support for Britain would prevent the
United States from facing the isolation that could result if the United Kingdom, desperate and
broke, made a separate agreement with the Soviet Union. Dangerous in peacetime, isolation due
to an Anglo-Soviet deal could prove, as the JCS warned, devastating to American security in war
and therefore mandated increasingly intensive means to keep Britain a great power. In short, and
exactly as my theory predicts, the United States moved to back Britain in order to keep it at a
potential ally in a multipolar system and prevent the loss of external balancing options.
Equally important, and particularly in comparison to the situation in 1945-1946, the
collapse of British military power appears to have been the major driver of intensifying
American support. 926 First, strategists emphasized the collapse of the British military position in
Greece and Turkey as the precipitating cause of intensifying American military assistance.
Second, and although less explicit, American policymakers focused on Britain's role in
establishing an effective military coalition against the USSR throughout 1947-1949. Finally, in
the course of intensifying American support for Britain, American policymakers seem to have
paid particular attention to the state of the British military as a tool against the Soviet Union.
Combined, core realist predictions are confirmed as the United States 1) monitored the health of
the British military, and 2) seemingly shaped American strategy vis-a-vis the United Kingdom in
response to developments in British military posture.
Finally, it is briefly worth pointing out that as British military posture moved from robust
to weak, American concerns of British chain-ganging and entrapment appear to have dissipated.
This contrasts with the situation in 1945-1946, when American strategists feared that intensive
support for Britain would antagonize the Soviet Union and might lead Britain to try to chain-
gang the United States into a standoff with the Soviet Union. As my theory predicts in a
multipolar environment in which the declining state holds a weak posture, the absence of British
military options seems to have obviated American worries that intensive means of support would
rebound and undercut American security. This conclusion can only be tentative, as it is difficult
to say for certain whether a particular issue was absent from the strategic calculus. However,
given the prominence of these concerns throughout 1945-1946 and their virtual absence after the
winter of 1947, it appears the weakness of the British military position after this point altered
926 Some might claim that American strategy towards Britain was simply an outgrowth of rising Cold War tensions
between the United States and Soviet Union. Clearly this is partially the case, as intensifying American support for
the United Kingdom occurred against the backdrop of rising Soviet-American tensions. However, Soviet-American
tensions were mounting throughout the post-war period, yet it was only after British military power collapsed that
American aid to Britain intensified. The onrushing Cold War was an important backdrop, but changes in British
posture seem to have been decisive in the Anglo-American relationship within the broader Cold War.
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American calculations surrounding aid to Britain. Moreover, this change occurred before Soviet-
American relations turned irretrievably antagonistic with the collapse of the CFM and Berlin
Blockade, meaning that the shift in American concerns vis-d-vis Britain occurred before a
breakdown in Soviet-American relations would have made concerns of entrapment and chain-
ganging irrelevant. On the whole, the outcome and process of the case strongly match the
predictions of my theory and provide substantial confirming evidence.
In contrast, there is less evidence for Democratic Peace and Institutionalist Theory.
Aside from predicting the Extreme Support strategy, the strongest evidence for Democratic
Peace Theory comes from occasional public pronouncements by American policymakers
(particularly Truman) that the United States needed to act to prevent potential democratic allies
from falling under the sway of non-democratic governments. Decision-makers certainly justified
their policies this way in public. However, as shown by the opposition of Kennan, Marshall,
Bohlen, and other strategists to this effort, as well as Truman's own suggestion that such rhetoric
was mainly for public consumption, it is difficult to find evidence that American policy was
motivated by the desire to preserve Britain as a fellow democracy. These concerns may have
lurked in the background, but the major shifts in U.S. strategy and the private rationales offered
depended much more on the strategic desirability of preserving Great Britain as a military ally.
Furthermore, available evidence does not substantiate the point that American policymakers had
reason to be worried that Britain itself would be lost as a democracy if the United States did not
move to Britain's aid. As I describe in the following section, not only did the Soviet Union
maintain its policy of keeping West European Communist parties in check through the middle of
1948 (well after the U.S. moved towards Extreme Support), but even then this effort was a more
direct threat to France, Italy, and Germany than the United Kingdom itself. Overall, Democratic
Peace Theory receives very limited backing from the case.
Institutionalist Theory also receives mixed marks. As with Democratic Peace Theory, the
strongest evidence for the argument is the United States' adoption of a strategy of Extreme
Support. Otherwise, the theory performs poorly. First, there is virtually no mention in any of the
American discussions of the need to aid Britain to sustain existing international institutions.
Second, and as shown above, the United States was happy to allow Britain to work around and
defect from institutional mechanisms such as the Bretton Woods regime when doing so helped
buttress British capabilities. Rather than seeing institutions shape U.S. policy and encourage the
United States to support Britain to ensure institutions continued to operate, the Untied States did
the opposite and allowed the institutions to weaken in order to ensure Britain continued as a great
power. Third, the United States channeled much of its support for Great Britain - particularly
economic and military aid - to the country outside of institutional forum. That is, rather than
trying to sustain existing institutions such as the CFM or Bretton Woods, American support
instead involved efforts to channel aid bilaterally and create new mechanisms to provide
American assistance. Thus, instead of serving as prime venues to provide Britain with support,
existing institutions were either ignored or bypassed in the process of coming to the United
Kingdom's side.
Finally, institutionalist theory has a major timing problem. Simply put, the United States'
Extreme Support strategy reached its apogee with the signing of the NAT in the spring of 1949.
However, by the time this agreement was reached, major postwar institutions that might have
ostensibly brought the United States around to Britain's side, particularly Bretton Woods and the
CFM, had either failed or experienced serious setbacks in their operations. This means that
United States intensified support to Britain despite the absence of binding institutions rather than
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because of their function! Although some might counter that the restart of Anglo-American
military planning provided a de facto institution and paved the way for the alliance, this
overlooks the fact that Anglo-American military planning itself had significantly decreased after
the war and was a shadow of its former self; it is difficult to see why a much-weakened bilateral
institution would take the place of collapsed and truly multilateral forum. On balance,
Institutionalist Theory also receives very limited support from the process of American strategy
at this time.
V. Soviet Strategy and British Decline, 1947-1949
Having traced the evolution of the United States' Extreme Support strategy and shown
Realist Decline Theory provides a better explanation of U.S. policy than its competitors, this
section continues the test by examining the evolution of Soviet strategy in 1947-1949. As before,
I test competing predictions along the way before assessing the results.
A. Overview: Soviet Strategy and British Decline, Part II
Soviet strategy towards the United Kingdom underwent two shifts in the 1947-1949
period. Eventually, after mid-1947, it pursued a Moderate Predation strategy that matches the
conventional Cold War perception of a hostile and antagonistic USSR. This behavior saw the
Soviet Union try to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe as a competing grouping to the
nascent Western bloc centered around the Anglo-American alliance. In early-mid 1947, however,
the Soviet Union pursued a strategy of Extreme Support. It did so by preempting the United
States (by many months) and offering a formal Anglo-Soviet alliance. Although formally
directed at Germany, the alliance seems to have been designed to woo Britain into the Soviet
orbit more generally and represented a deepening of the 1945-1946 Moderate Support strategy
that looked to preserve Britain as an ally.927
In what follows, I discuss the evolution and development of both strategies. However,
due to the particular paucity of research on Soviet policy in this period and lack of access to
Soviet archives, it is difficult at times to isolate for the specific role of the United Kingdom in
Soviet strategy. Thus, for large portions, I am forced to rely upon the pattern of Soviet behavior
towards the United States and Western Europe writ large. Limited resources also means that I
am forced to combine diplomatic policy, military policy, and internal rationales into one general
description of Soviet strategy. This makes any results preliminary and tentative. Future research
will need to address these limits.
B. The First Turn: Extreme Support in early 1947
Anglo-Soviet relations had progressively deteriorated throughout 1945-1946 as British
worries over the insertion of Soviet power into Central-Eastern Europe overlapped with
misperceptions over the crises in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Nevertheless, the USSR continued
bidding for British friendship and was willing at the start of 1947 to utilize intense means to this
end. As British posture began to shift from robust to weak, the Soviet Union used a visit to
Moscow by British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery in January 1947 to broach the idea of a
revived Anglo-Soviet alliance. 928 At the time, Montgomery was one of the British officers
involved in secret staff talks with members of the U.S. military (noted in the preceding chapter),
927 Some see essentially no variation in Soviet behavior and argue the Anglo-Soviet alliance offer was mainly
tactical; I disagree, for reasons laid out below. William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy (New York: Norton,
1982), 155.
928 The Soviet Union and United Kingdom had signed an alliance against Germany in 1942, but its terms lapsed with
Germany's defeat.
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while the United Kingdom itself was in the process of finalizing the Treaty of Dunkirk with
France intended to organize an anti-German alliance to hedge against a German revival.929
Stalin likely knew of both developments and was willing to play along, emphasizing that the
USSR had no objection to an Anglo-American alliance (or any British alliance) provided it was
not directed against the Soviet Union. Then, in an apparent effort to prevent Britain from
associating too closely with the United States, Stalin proposed an Anglo-Soviet alliance.930
After deliberating over the next two weeks, British leaders decided to embrace the Soviet
offer. In contrast to ex post arguments presenting the Soviet offer as disingenuous, the record of
British deliberations strongly suggests British leaders saw the Soviet offer as sincere, a viable
solution for structuring Anglo-Soviet relations in a positive direction, and thus a way of breeding
Soviet support for British security. 931 Bevin's view is instructive, concluding in late January that,
"we should certainly welcome this opportunity of clarifying our relations with the Soviet Union
by bringing our Treaty with them up to date." 932 In practice, bringing the treaty "up to date"
involved active Anglo-Soviet cooperation. As Bevin prepared to the depart for the March 1947
CFM conference in Moscow during which Anglo-Soviet treaty talks would occur, the Cabinet
authorized him to "negotiate a Treaty, going as far as [. . .] the Anglo-French Treaty, giving him
full latitude to make variations as he may think necessary." 933 Considering the Anglo-French
treaty promised British support for France to "prevent Germany from becoming a menace again"
and vice versa, the implications of a similar treaty with the USSR were clear: the Soviet Union
would support Britain (and vice versa) if another war with Germany loomed.934
Soviet support vis-a-vis Germany was only the beginning, as the USSR intended a
revised treaty to open the door to a broader Anglo-Soviet alignment. By mid-April, the Soviet
Union tabled a revised treaty that promised not only an alliance against Germany, but 1)
"military and other aid and co-operation" in a war with any state allied or associated with
Germany, and 2) pledged Britain and the USSR "not to conclude any alliances and not to take
part in any coalitions or actions or measures directly or indirectly directed" against one another.
In other words, and as my theory predicts, the Soviet Union sought to keep Britain out of a
possible anti-Soviet coalition while ensuring Britain would function as a Soviet ally in case of
war with another state.935 British policymakers recognized the Soviet objective and worried that
this might set Britain against the United States, particularly if the United States and USSR went
to war and the United States mobilized its portion of Germany against the USSR. 93 6 This was
not, however, enough to prevent Britain from continuing negotiations with Soviet leaders as
929 Knight, "Anglo-Soviet Treaty," 274-275.
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British strategists apparently concluded the benefits of Soviet support outweighed the risks.
Thus, even over opposition from the British Chiefs of Staff, the Cabinet advanced a revised offer
promising "support and assistance will be afforded [. . .] against any other power which may join
with Germany in such an attack in Europe." Significantly, the British offer went beyond even the
terms of the United Kingdom's nascent alliance with France.937 The overall pattern is clear: the
Soviet Union was willing to pursue a strategy of Extreme Support at the very time British
military weaknesses began to tell by offering Britain an alliance, and British leaders were happy
to explore the offer.
C. The Second Turn: Moderate Predation, mid-1947 through 1949
Only a few days after British leaders agreed to proceed with the Anglo-Soviet alliance,
however, the United Kingdom reversed course and "decided, on reflection, that it would be
inadvisable to extend the military clauses on the lines discussed." The best Britain was now
willing to offer was general coordination and cooperation against Germany.938 The change,
which occurred on 22 April, apparently came in response to the collapse of the Moscow CFM
meeting amidst Anglo-American-Soviet recriminations and disharmony.
The CFM had been meeting throughout the second half of March and into April, for a
total of six weeks. Throughout the period, differences between the United States and the Soviet
Union mounted over the fate of Germany. Briefly stated, the United States sought a federal,
decentralized central government to run the country, limits on reparations, and permission to
immediately rebuild the German economy whereas the Soviet Union sought a centralized
government and significant reparations before restarting the German economy. No agreement
was reached. Already distrustful of the USSR, Britain was driven squarely onto the American
side by Soviet efforts to gain control over the Ruhr industries in the British occupation zone, as
well as Soviet rejection of an American offer to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years. 939 When
the CFM ended in disagreement approximately one week later, there was a clear division
between the USSR on the one hand, and the U.S. and U.K. on the other, over the future of
Germany and thus the future of Europe.940 Britain moved away from Anglo-Soviet alliance talks
as these divisions became clear.
Subsequent American announcement of the ERP apparently convinced the USSR that the
possibility of Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation was over. 9 Despite having just tried
resolving outstanding disputes over Germany with the United States and Great Britain, and even
as the Anglo-Soviet treaty offer officially remained on the table, Soviet leaders concluded the
USSR faced an Anglo-American front directed against the Soviet Union.942 Soviet Foreign
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's comments in July 1947 are illustrative, arguing that the Marshall
Plan represented, "behind the scenes collusion of the United States and Great Britain." 943
937 Cabinet, "Revision," 20 April. Also Appendix E to said document.
938 Cabinet, "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet," 22 April 1947, CAB 128/9.
939 Byrnes had first tabled the offer to disarm Germany one year earlier; now Marshall asked for a decision; Bullock,
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1943-48, ed. Antonio Varsori and Elena Calandri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 249-270.
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Ambassador Novikov was even clearer, cabling from Washington, "In this American proposal
are the clear contours of a West European bloc directed against us," and later, "a careful analysis
of the Marshall Plan shows that in the end it amounts to the creation of a West European bloc as
an instrument of US policy." 944 In Soviet eyes, Britain was now solidly in the American camp.
In response, the USSR shifted to a strategy of Moderate Predation. This strategy
contradicts my argument: rather than continue bidding for Britain's friendship and pursuing
support, the Soviet Union shifted to a strategy of confrontation that exacerbated British
insecurity and deepened the emerging Cold War.945 The effort became clear beginning in
September 1947 when the USSR stood up the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) as a
successor to the interwar Comintern with the goal of "coordinating the policies and actions of the
major European communist parties."946 Instead of pushing West European communist parties to
cooperate with the United States and United Kingdom in reconstructing Western Europe, the
USSR now adopted an oppositional line and urged local confrontation with non-Communist
groups. The result was a wave of strikes and political maneuvers that convulsed West European
governments. 94 7
The Soviet Union expressly linked the Cominform's creation to Anglo-American
consolidation and the appearance of an Anglo-American alliance against to the USSR. Even at
the time, Cominform head and Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov justified the
Cominform on the grounds that, "in England and the United States the activity of reactionary
circles [. . .] had steadily increased [. . .] the Anglo-American imperialists have shown their
unwillingness to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union [. . . and were
now] prepared not only to frustrate the policy of democratization and demilitarization of
Germany, but even to liquidate Germany as a unified state and divide her." 948  If the United
Kingdom was going to work with the United States against the USSR, then the Soviet Union was
not going to buttress British power and work for British friendship. Notably, although the
Moderate Predation strategy itself diverges from my theory, the focus on Anglo-American
cooperation and Britain's loss as a potential ally seems to better accord with my argument than
its competitors.
As Anglo-American coordination deepened in the second half of 1947 and into 1948,
Soviet policy became more oppositional. December 1947 saw a final CFM meeting in London
as the United States, Britain, and USSR made one last effort to reach a deal on Germany. It
failed when the Soviet Union, although evincing some movement on the reparations issue was
unwilling to move far enough towards the Anglo-American position, and the United States and
Great Britain were unwilling to delay restarting the German economy. 949  Immediately
944 Quoted in Roberts, Molotov, 114.
945 This behavior is understandable to some extent. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not have the
economic resources to help Britain reconstruct its economy and thus could not respond to the Marshall Plan with a
parallel effort. However, even if the Soviet Union could not outcompete the United States for British friendship, it
did not need to adopt policies that reinforced Britain's link to the United States.
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afterwards, Bevin and other British leaders began calling for moves towards a Western military
alliance and, as shown above, Anglo-American military cooperation began to pick up.950 In
response, the Soviet Union began to entrench its position in Central-Eastern Europe and actively
build up a bloc to match the Anglo-American position. This effort proceeded in three parallel
steps. First, the USSR began developing its zone of occupation in Germany as a separate state
(eventually the German Democratic Republic) under Communist control.951 Second, the USSR
minimally permitted, and may have sponsored, a coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 that
displaced a democratically-elected regime that sought to remain neutral in the onrushing Cold
War, with a Communist government allied to the USSR. 95 2 Finally, the USSR forged a series of
bilateral alliances with the states in Eastern Europe - many of which still hosted large numbers
of Soviet troops - in order to consolidate the region under Soviet control in the winter-spring of
1948.95' Although the areas now under Soviet control still did not expand beyond the areas
envisioned in the 1944-1945 spheres of influence strategy (except for East Germany, which was
matched by Anglo-American influence in West Germany), the Soviet Union was beginning to
form a security system optimized for a drawn-out struggle to compete with the Anglo-American
sphere.954 This suggests that the Soviet Union, although increasingly hostile to the United States
and Great Britain, still did not envision intensely preying on the West - it was interested in
Moderate rather than Extreme Predation.
In pursuing Moderate Predation, the limited documentary record suggests the USSR
remained attentive to Britain's loss as an ally and the military balance vis-d-vis the nascent
Anglo-American alliance. Stalin's comments to a special session of the Politburo in March
1948 is particularly telling, with the Soviet leader remarking that England and the other "small
European countries [. . .] follow America out of necessity, and yield to her through fear cast to
them by adroit propaganda. We have already spoken enough of that. We have already worked
out our active plans and it now rests for us to follow them." In this effort, the Soviet Union
needed to acquire the military capabilities to bring the United States and United Kingdom to the
bargaining table. Particular attention would therefore be paid "to the development of the Soviet
Army and Navy. Their present condition in comparison with the American and English armies,
about which we have absolutely correct information, I can definitely say that only in one respect
are we inferior, that of surface water fleet, whilst in all other respects, we are far superior." 955
This focus on the military balance and desire to obtain a military advantage seems to accord with
Institutionalist Theory's prediction that, in the absence of institutions, Anglo-Soviet relations
should resemble an offensive-realist world. At the same time, the desirability of balancing an
Anglo-American alliance by building up the USSR's own forces seems to accord with realist
predictions that states ultimately balance one another and will do so using internal means when
isolated from potential allies.
The denouement began in June 1948. As the United States prepared to consolidate its
alliance with Britain and the rest of Western Europe via NAT negotiations, the Soviet Union
announced the suspension of all road and rail traffic between Berlin and the western zones of
950 Ibid., 141-142, 146-147.
951 Wettig, Cold War in Europe, 159-166.
952 Kennedy-Pipe notes that it remains unclear whether the coup was sponsored by the USSR, or conducted by
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953 Ibid., 121; Parrish, "USSR and Security Dilemma," 253.
954 Parrish, "USSR and Security Dilemma," 254-256.
955 See the translated speech in Cold War International History Project, "Stalin and the Cold War, 1945-1953"
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 1999), 43 1.
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Germany. This set off the Berlin Crisis. Soviet objectives, as Kennedy-Pipe argues, were
straightforward: convince the West not to reconstruct the West German economy (via the ERP)
and military (via the NAT), encourage renewed Four Power negotiations over Germany's future,
and consolidate Soviet and Communist control over the eastern zone of Germany.956
Nevertheless, the effort to coerce the nascent Anglo-American alliance to these ends
backfired. Despite repeated Soviet offers to end the blockade if the United States and Britain
returned to the negotiating table, there was no interest in this by either party and no opening in
the Anglo-American position emerged. 957 Instead, the blockade simply reinforced American
efforts to come to the aid of Britain and the rest of Western Europe. American economic and
military aid began to flow in earnest, and the United States formalized its postwar alliance with
Britain with the spring 1949 signing of the NAT. By the time the blockade ended in May,
Britain was firmly established in the American camp in the onrushing Cold War.
Soviet political leaders appear to have eventually realized that their efforts were
deepening Anglo-American relationship. In the midst of the blockade, Molotov treated the
decision-makers in the two countries as oriented around the same policies, remarking that "the
Soviet Union is compelled to take into consideration the fact that the ruling circles of the United
States and Great Britain have gone over to a frankly aggressive political course."958 Pravda, the
official press organ of the Soviet government, was blunter shortly after Berlin crisis resolved,
noting the alliance between the two countries (and others in Western Europe) by describing,
"The Anglo-American bloc regards the German militarists as allies." 959 Thus, having begun the
postwar period seeking to support the United Kingdom as a potential ally, the Soviet Union
appeared resigned to Britain's loss as a partner by the time Britain fell from the great power
ranks after 1949.
D. Assessment
Soviet policy in 1947-1949 provides mixed evidence for all three theories tested in this
project. No single theory is overwhelmingly dominant, although the process evidence seems to
provide somewhat stronger support for Realist Decline Theory than its competitors.
Democratic Peace Theory performs strongest in capturing the turn towards predation in
Soviet policy beginning in mid-1947. As the theory predicts in a democratic/non-democratic
dyad, misperception and mistrust ultimately drove the two sides apart and generated power-
maximizing behavior on the part of the rising Soviet Union. Although Soviet strategy from mid-
1947 does not seem the extremely predatory course predicted by the theory, the overall turn
towards predation amidst major Anglo-Soviet misunderstandings are major points in the
argument's favor. That said, the theory has a hard time explaining why the initial Soviet
inclination was to intensify efforts to support the United Kingdom when confronted with a
militarily weak Britain at the start of 1947. If democratic peace variables drive rising state
behavior, then they should readily capture state strategy when decline begins to become a rout,
that is, when the declining state's geopolitical survival is on the line. Democratic Peace Theory
has a hard time in this regard. In particular, the Soviet alliance offer appears to have been
genuine and, given Britain's willingness to negotiate and explore the Soviet offer, seems to have
been seen as such by British policymakers. Therefore, and in contrast to what Democratic Peace
Theory expects, it seems the Soviet Union was more than willing to overlook the domestic
9 56 Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin 's Cold War, 125.
957 See, for instance, Stalin's January 1949 offer discussed in ibid., 127-128.
958 Quoted in ibid., 149.
959 Quoted in ibid., 145.
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political differences between the United Kingdom and USSR in order to make a serious bid for
British friendship.
Along similar lines, the apparently sincere Anglo-Soviet back and forth suggests
peaceable and sincere negotiations can take place and help states cooperate even when they are
led by dissimilar regime types. This behavior contradicts a core causal logic in the democratic
peace corpus, as dissimilar regimes did not hinder sincere bargains and substantive negotiations.
Relatedly, it is worth pointing out that even after the USSR turned towards Moderate Predation,
it expressed its logic in terms of Anglo-American cooperation as a bloc against the USSR - not
in terms of the basic, fundamental difference between Anglo-American and Soviet regime types.
In essence, the USSR seems to have been less focused on the internal politics of the United
Kingdom and more interested in its external behavior than Democratic Peace Theory expects.
Although the theory receives some backing from the episode, the overall evidence is mixed.
Institutionalist Theory performs somewhat better, though it also faces problems.
Institutionalist Theory seems to provide a ready explanation for the double shift in Soviet
strategy. Put simply, when the CFM was operational and appeared viable through mid-1947, the
Soviet Union responded to mounting signs of British weakness by increasing the degree of
support; when the CFM weakened, so did Soviet support for the United Kingdom. Equally
important, the prediction that the CFM would become a prime negotiating venue for the Soviet
Union to channel and negotiate support for the declining United Kingdom was borne out. As
shown, the March-April Moscow CFM helped Soviet and British officials work out the terms of
the planned Anglo-Soviet treaty. Existing institutions appeared, at least for a fleeting moment, to
generate important spillover effects in helping the United Kingdom and USSR maintain
cooperative relations as the Soviet Union worked to buttress British security. Finally, it is likely
significant that Soviet officials argued that Anglo-American cooperation caused the breakdown
in great power negotiations over Germany and, during the Berlin blockade, offered to end the
standoff if the Western powers returned to the negotiating table. Because negotiations over
Germany were a primary focus of CFM talks, Soviet statements imply the Soviet leadership may
have been thinking in terms of the potential for international institutions to help ameliorate great
power tensions. Although not definitive, this provides circumstantial evidence that Soviet
calculations may have developed along the lines predicted by Institutionalist Theory.
That said, Institutionalist Theory confronts a major problem in the case, namely, that
Anglo-Soviet relations collapsed and the Soviet Union shifted to Moderate Predation when the
CFM remained formally in operation. As noted, the turn towards Moderate Predation began in
the summer and early fall of 1947, yet the final meeting of the CFM only took place in
November-December. Why the Soviet Union moved towards a predatory stance when it was
still formally bound to the United Kingdom is difficult to explain using institutionalist constructs.
If the theory operates as designed, then we would expect Anglo-Soviet relations to collapse and
the USSR pursue predation only after the final CFM meeting. Instead, the timing of Soviet
decisions suggests institutionalist breakdown and the turn towards predation may have both been
endogenous to some other set of factors not captured by the theory. Hence, Institutionalist
Theory also provides an incomplete account for the case and the available evidence is not fully
supportive of institutionalist predictions.
Realist Decline Theory also receives mixed marks in the case, although process evidence
suggests it performs marginally better than either of its two competitors. The strongest strike
against the theory is the ultimate outcome of the case. My argument predicted that the Soviet
Union would bid for British friendship and try to retain the United Kingdom as an ally by using
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intensive means to preserve the United Kingdom as a great power. Ultimately, the USSR went
in the opposite direction, adopted a strategy of Moderate Predation, and pursued policies that
posed serious challenges to British security at a time when British resources were scarce. This
provides strong evidence against my argument.
That said, several pieces of process evidence provide backing for my argument. First, the
Soviet Union's pursuit of Moderate Predation only emerged after the USSR attempted a strategy
of Extreme Support. Soviet Extreme Support, moreover, emerged at the very time when British
military posture moved from robust to weak. In the absence of more abundant Soviet archival
documents, the timing of this decision provides at least circumstantial evidence that Soviet
policymakers monitored the state of the British military and shaped strategy accordingly.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why the USSR made the alliance offer in the winter of 1947
even though British decline was recognized throughout the postwar period: none of the
independent variables (e.g., Soviet or British domestic institutions, the CFM) identified by
competing accounts changed so as to predict Extreme Support specifically at this time. In short,
Realist Decline Theory successfully predicted the type of Soviet strategy when first confronted
by a declining and military weak United Kingdom. Even if this strategy was eventually
abandoned, the initial effort at adopting Extreme Support backs my argument.
Equally important, what we know of Soviet rationales and justifications turning away
from Extreme Support provide moderately strong evidence for realist arguments. As noted
above, a constant Soviet complaint and justification for Moderate Predation was the appearance
of an Anglo-American bloc directed against the USSR. This complaint is significant, because it
suggests the Soviet Union moved away from Extreme Support once it concluded Britain would
no longer be available as an ally. The Soviet focus on its external balancing options, in turn,
provides good backing for Realist Decline Theory: as expected in a multipolar system, a rising
USSR focused at least in part on retaining the declining United Kingdom as an ally and shaped
its strategy accordingly. Although the resulting Soviet strategy was not predicted by the theory,
the process and a large portion of the cost-benefit analysis predicted by Realist Decline Theory
appears to have been present in the case. Simply put, the Soviet Union appeared to be fixed on
the United Kingdom's availability (or unavailability) as an ally in the precise manner predicted
by my argument.
In the final analysis, none of the three theories perfectly explains the Anglo-Soviet case.
This suggests the case may be anomalous, or the theories themselves need revision. On points,
however, it seems that my argument marginally outperforms its competitors. Democratic Peace
Theory misses what we know of the logic undergirding Soviet strategy and the initial effort to
pursue Extreme Support. Institutionalist Theory captures some of the rationales expressed by
Soviet policymakers and predicted the effort to negotiate an Anglo-Soviet alliance during the
CFM, but the turn to Moderate Predation seems to be driven by variables other than those
identified by the theory. Realist Decline Theory, on the other hand, predicted the initial Extreme
Support strategy, predicted the timing of the effort, and offers some insight into the rationales
expressed by Soviet policymakers even for the move towards Moderate Predation. Although
Moderate Predation itself was not expected, the realist story is the only explanation that explains
both some of the outcome of the case and provides consistent insight into what we know of
Soviet rationales. Although not perfect, it somewhat outperforms its competitors.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summarizing the Results
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Although the evidence is less robust than in the 1945-1946 period, American and Soviet
strategies towards the United Kingdom in 1947-1949 again provide strong evidence for Realist
Decline Theory and suggest it is a better explanation of American and Soviet strategies than its
competitors. First, the theory aptly predicted the United States' adoption of an Extreme Support
strategy and, while the Soviet Union eventually turned towards Moderate Predation from mid-
1947, accounts for the USSR's initial effort to similarly intensify support for the United
Kingdom. Second, my argument captured the underlying logic of American and, to a lesser
extent, Soviet behavior. That is, both the United States and Soviet Union remained focused in
this period on preserving the United Kingdom as a great power and potentially ally. Here, the
United States continued to see Britain as important in ensuring stability in Western Europe.
While the evidence is less clear-cut, Soviet behavior and policy suggests the USSR believed it
important to prevent the United Kingdom from allying with the United States and thus presenting
the USSR with a front of the major European powers. Third, the collapse of British military
power and shift of British posture from robust to weak led, as predicted, to an intensification of
American and Soviet efforts to buttress British power. American strategists were explicit on the
underlying rationale, emphasizing in early 1947 the need to provide extensive economic and
military assistance to the United Kingdom if the United Kingdom was going to play a
meaningful role in European security affairs. There is no direct evidence on the Soviet side for
the justification behind the Anglo-Soviet alliance offer in January 1947, but the timing of the
decision (coming as British posture eroded) strongly suggests Soviet strategists were attuned to
British military developments and shaped strategy accordingly as my theory predicts. Overall,
the theory is able to explain much of the behavior in the case, and offers significant insight into
the cost-benefit calculations of the United States and Soviet Union.
In contrast, American and Soviet strategies in 1947-1949 provide only limited evidence
for Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory. Democratic Peace Theory might
provide a partial explanation of American and Soviet strategy. The theory rightly predicted that
the United States would pursue a strategy of Extreme Support, while also capturing the eventual
Soviet pursuit of predation. Yet even in the American case, the overwhelming focus was on
preserving Britain as a potential ally against the USSR and as a source of military support in
Europe - there is strong evidence that any discussion of preserving Britain because of Britain's
democratic legacy was purely for public consumption. Furthermore, the theory confronts a
major empirical anomaly in the initial Soviet effort to pursue an Extreme Support strategy with
the United Kingdom. As in 1945-1946, there is again evidence that the democratic United States
and non-democratic Soviet Union behaved similarly towards the democratic United Kingdom.
This outcome is again problematic for Democratic Peace Theory.
The evidence is similarly limited for Institutionalist Theory. Institutionalist Theory
correctly predicted that the United States and Soviet Union would pursue Extreme Support
strategies so long as binding institutions were available. It also offers insight into the Soviet
shift towards predation once the CFM - the main institution linking the United Kingdom and
USSR - collapsed. Still, what we know of American and Soviet rationales and internal
arguments suggest policymakers generally ignored the influence of international institutions and
focused on the benefits of keeping the United Kingdom an ally. More importantly, the United
States was willing to allow Britain to defect from existing institutions when doing so buttressed
British capabilities, and continued to provide intense support even as the postwar institutions
binding the U.S. and U.K. (especially the CFM and Bretton Woods regimes) frayed. As for the
Soviet Union, it began to pursue its predatory strategy despite the continued operation of the
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CFM, suggesting the institution itself was not enough to maintain Extreme Support once Anglo-
American relations began to solidify. In the final analysis, while there is some evidence that
institutionalist arguments can explain portions of the case, there is strong discordant evidence
that limits the theory's applicability to the 1947-1949 period.
B. Conclusion
America and Soviet strategies towards the United Kingdom diverged in 1947-1949 after
an initial parallel effort to pursue Extreme Predation. Although the USSR's eventual adoption of
Moderate Predation does not fully match what was predicted by Realist Decline Theory, my
argument does account for American strategy, the initial Soviet move towards Extreme Support,
and many of the arguments and cost-benefit analyses evinced in the 1947-1949 period. Overall,
the case provides more evidence for my argument than its competitors. Combined with the tests
presented in the preceding chapter, there is strong evidence that Realist Decline Theory provides
a good account for rising state strategy towards declining great powers in multipolar systems.
226
Chapter Seven:
Conclusion, Implications, and Extensions
I. Introduction: Overview of Project and Findings
The preceding chapters presented one overarching argument: rising states shape their
strategy towards declining great powers in response to the structure of the international system
and the military posture of the declining state itself. This argument, tested using detailed case
studies and process tracing, challenges much of the existing wisdom on the fate of declining
great powers and the behavior of rising competitors.
Scholarship on great power decline has traditionally been dominated by the assumption
that rising states are natural born predators who seek to further grow their power at the expense
of declining states. Rising states, in this view, are enjoined by the competitive nature of
international politics and the new opportunities available to them as increasingly capable actors
to act as power maximizers. And as Thucydides' famous description of the origins of the
Peloponnesian War - that the war was caused by "the growth of Athenian power and the fear
which this caused in Sparta" - reminds us, both the reality and the concern of rising state
predation can carry profound consequences: not only can rising state predation lead to the
destruction of once-great powers, but declining states fearing rising state predation may wage
preventive wars and adopt risky behaviors of their own that roil international politics.
The theory and findings of this project, which I summarize below, add nuance and
challenge large elements of this assumption. Far from pursuing predation whenever and
wherever possible, rising states are much more discriminate and display more variation in their
strategies towards declining peers. Rather than accept the notion that international politics
invariably propels relatively rising states to make life for declining states nasty, brutish, and short,
I focus on the varying structural and military conditions under which a rising state has to address
a declining great power. These differing structural and military conditions can generate both
powerful incentives for preying on a declining state, but also profound disincentives that cause
rising states to pursue varying degrees of predation at different times and in different places.
Under certain conditions, it is even possible that structural and military circumstances can give
rising states strong reasons to avoid predation altogether and try to preserve a declining state as a
great power by pursuing a supportive strategy. In short, rising states sometimes act as predators,
but they may also act as power satisficers and try to support a declining great power depending
on the specific structural and military conditions at hand.
These findings further rebut widely held liberal notions as to the options available to
declining states to limit or avert rising state predation. One school of thought holds that by
encouraging the spread of liberal democracy, declining democracies can create a democratic
community in which rising states will continue to cooperate and support the power and security
of their declining democratic brethren. I find, however, that there is more variation in rising state
strategy than regime-type arguments suggest: rising democracies are often less supportive of
declining democracies than Democratic Peace Theory suggests, while rising non-democracies
are often more supportive than democratic peace arguments allow.
A second liberal view comes out of Institutionalist Theory. This school of thought holds
by embedding rising and declining states in the same international institutions, rising states are
given a stake in the international status quo that can lead them to support declining states. Again,
the results of my work challenge these arguments. Rather than ameliorating great power
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competition during power shifts, international institutions were shown to be either superfluous to
rising state calculations of their power and interest, or ignored altogether when doing so suited
rising states. Put differently, international institutions were either endogenous or irrelevant.
The remainder of this conclusion proceeds in five parts. Following this overview, I first
summarize the theory before reviewing the evidence. Next, I discuss the implications of my
work for both international relations theory and ongoing policy debates. I conclude by highlight
areas for further research and improvement.
II. Summarizing the Theory
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Conditions
Declining states fear predation by their rising peers. In some sense, they are right to do
so: all states operating in an anarchic international system have reason to advance their security
by maximizing power at other states' expense and preying on their peers. The notion that states
are inclined to maximize power stands at the core of what I term Realist Decline Theory.
However, rising states do not always act as power maximizers. Because power is a
means to security, whether a rising state pursues predation depends on the costs and benefits
associated with this strategy. Under certain conditions, the security costs can be sufficiently
large that rising states may end up acting as power satisficers and pass on opportunities to grow
their relative power at a declining state's expense. Put differently, when the costs of predation
are minimal and the benefits large, rising states pursue predatory strategies and act as power
maximizers. Yet when these costs are large and the benefits dubious, rising states tend to
support declining states and act as power satisficers.
Rising states reap an obvious benefit from successful predation: they become relatively
stronger. Still, there are three potential costs a rising state may face along the way. First, the
declining state itself may internally balance and threaten or wage war against the riser. Second,
other great powers in the international system may flock to the declining state's side as the
declining state externally balances. Finally, there is a long-term political cost associated with
lost alliance opportunities if a rising state pushes a declining state from the great power ranks,
only to discover it (the rising state) needs allies of its own against a future threat.
A combination of the polarity of the international system and the declining state's own
military posture determine when the costs and benefits of predation obtain in a specific situation.
First, one great power may rise and another decline in a bipolar system. Under bipolarity, the
declining state cannot attract great power allies to help it externally balance, just as the declining
state itself has no value to the rising state as a future partner. Instead, the rising state can
eliminate all great power threats to its security if it pushes the declining state from the great
power ranks; only the declining state's internal balancing keeps this behavior in check. Thus,
bipolarity minimizes the costs of predation, maximizes the benefits, and encourages predatory
strategies.
Different calculations occur in multipolar systems. Multipolarity virtually guarantee that
the declining state, in addition to internally balancing, will attract allies of its own and have some
use to the rising state as a partner. Hence, multipolarity encourages supportive strategies in order
to 1) avoid the risks associated with predation and 2) preserve the declining state as an ally.
However, much also depends on the declining state's own military choices. The military
capabilities at the declining state's expense - what I term the declining state's military posture -
determine the decliner's ability to internally balance in bipolarity, in addition to the
attractiveness for other states in aiding or preserving the decliner in multipolarity. When a
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declining state holds a robust military posture (meaning that it has the wherewithal to secure
itself and possibly aggress against others) other states are likely to fear being ensnared in a
conflict or contest with a declining state that can still effectively internally balance. As a result,
relatively rising great powers are likely to act cautiously towards the decliner. In contrast, a state
with a weak military posture (defined as a state that is unable to defend itself and is thus unable
to threaten the other great powers) cannot effectively internally balance, reduces the risk of other
states ending up in a war or competition with the declining state, and minimizes rising state
concerns of the declining state's future behavior.
B. Combining Polarity and Posture: Predicted Outcomes
Combined, polarity and posture generate four ideal-type strategies a rising state may
pursue. First, decline in a bipolar world in which the declining state holds a robust posture
generates what I term Extreme Predation. In this scenario, the rising state has reason to push the
declining state from the great power ranks to eliminate all threats to its security, while the
decliner's weak posture means the rising state can use intense means to pursue this goal freed of
the risk of internal balancing by the decliner.
Yet decline may also occur in a bipolar system in which the declining state holds a robust
military posture. Here, the declining state still has reason to push the declining state from the
great power ranks. The declining state's ability to wage war in response to predation, however,
keeps the intensity of rising state predation in check. This situation generates a strategy of
Moderate Predation, in which the rising state attempts to slowly shift the distribution of power in
its favor using cautious, prudent means.
Third, decline in a multipolar system in which the declining state retains a robust posture
produces a strategy of Moderate Support. Although rising states in multipolarity have reason to
support a declining state, the decliner's robust posture act as an impediment to its obtaining
international backing. Not only may great powers that would otherwise ally with the declining
state be reluctant to do so for fear of being entrapped into a conflict generated by the decliner or
being snookered and attacked by the declining state, but the need to work hard to preserve the
declining state as a future ally is obviated if the decliner looks like it is able to provide security
for itself. The result is a strategy of Moderate Support in which the rising state tries to preserve
the declining state using cautious, low-risk, and low-cost means.
Finally, rising states adopt a strategy of Extreme Support when a great power declines in
multipolarity and holds a weak military posture. Here, the rising state's incentive to preserve the
declining state as a potential ally encourages a supportive strategy, while the decliner's military
weakness encourages intensive efforts to prop up the decliner for fear of the decliner being too
weak - or lost entirely - to serve in this role. If Extreme Predation represents the classic fear of
declining states, then Extreme Support is, ceteris paribus, the best possible outcome for a
declining great power.
III. Reviewing the Evidence
The study tested these arguments against competing claims from the democratic peace
and institutionalist traditions using a series of case studies and extensive process tracing from
post-1945 European politics. Specifically, I focused on American strategy towards the declining
Soviet Union in 1989-1990, alongside American and Soviet strategy towards the declining
United Kingdom in 1945-1949. Because the post-1945 world is often portrayed as
overwhelmingly stable and dominated by the United States, these cases have not often been
included in the literature on great power rise and decline. As demonstrated, however, there has
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been massive change in the post-Word War Two international distribution of power as the world
went from multipolarity, to bipolarity, and ultimately to a period of American unipolarity. Thus,
analyzing the strategies adopted by relatively rising states in response to the decline of post-1945
great powers is to link the United States' unipolar era to the decline of the other major powers in
European politics. 960
Aside from the intrinsic value of the cases, the project looked to these cases because they
offered a series of strong tests for Realist Decline Theory against its liberal competitors. Not
only was there significant variation over time and space in the degree to which 1) rising and
declining states were embedded in the same international institutions and 2) were led by
democratic or non-democratic regimes, but prominent scholars have attempted to explain rising
state strategy within the cases using theories I argue against. By pitting my argument against its
challengers in the British and Soviet cases, I am therefore giving other theories the benefit of the
doubt and staging multi-cornered tests of my argument. Using this approach, I am able to assess
not just whether my argument is able to explain the cases, but whether its predictions capture
more of the process and outcome and rising state strategy than alternate arguments.
American strategy towards the Soviet Union was a good first test in this regard. On one
level, institutionalist scholars such as Ikenberry and Deudney have explicitly argued that the
United States pursued a supportive strategy towards the Soviet Union following the November
1989 opening of the Berlin Wall thanks to the influence of international institutionalist. At the
same time, Haas' recent work suggests that the liberal-democratic reforms launched by
Gorbachev from late 1988 bred American support for the Soviet Union from 1989 onward.
None of these claims held up to scrutiny. Instead, and as my theory predicts in a bipolar system,
the United States pursued a Moderate Predation strategy in 1989 when the Soviet Union held a
robust posture, before adopting an Extremely Predation strategy once Soviet military power
collapsed in the winter of 1990. More specifically, American policymakers initially adopted a
Moderate Predation strategy geared towards gradually weakening the Soviet hold over the
USSR's East European client states without triggering violent Soviet backlash. In 1990,
American strategists recognized a window of opportunity to make maximal gains at the USSR's
expense using any and all means at the United States' disposal explicitly due to the USSR's lack
of military options; thus, American strategy focused on rapidly reunifying East and West
Germany within NATO, tearing the heart out of the Warsaw Pact, and denying the USSR any
compensation for this change. Meanwhile, American policymakers showed themselves more
than happy to ignore or circumscribe international institutions for fear of actually being forced to
support Soviet security in Central-Eastern Europe, and equally inclined to pursue a predatory
course irrespective of the state of Gorbachev's domestic reforms. Simply put, both the process
960 For discussion and debate over American unipolarity, see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment,"
Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991 1990): 23-33; Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters,"
International Security 17, no. 4 (April 1993): 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the
Candle?," International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New
Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17, no. 4 (April 1993): 5-5 1; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability
of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar
Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security 31, no. 2
(Autumn 2006): 7-41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International
Relations and the Challenge ofAmerican Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); G. John Ikenberry,
Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic
Consequences," World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27; Beckley, "China's Century?".
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and outcome of the 1989-1990 case provided strong evidence for Realist Decline Theory and
little evidence for democratic peace and institutionalist arguments.
American and Soviet strategy towards the United Kingdom in 1945-1949 provides
additional evidence backing my argument in a multipolar setting. Historians and political
scientists traditionally see a stark divergence in American and Soviet behavior after World War
Two. In liberal accounts, the United States quickly came to the aid of its democratic wartime
ally and constructed an array of institutions that used American power to buttress Britain's own
amidst Europe's postwar devastation. Conversely, the Soviet Union putatively embarked on an
aggressive, predatory strategy looking to capitalize on postwar chaos and Britain's weakened
position.
My research debunked these claims. In 1945-1946, both the United States and Soviet
Union adopted Moderate Support strategies. Both states looked to bid for Britain's friendship
and tried to preserve Britain as a great power, but remained leery of backing Britain too intensely
at a time when Britain retained significant military capabilities: the United States was willing to
offer limited and conditional military and economic aid that partially subsidized British security,
the USSR proved willing to allow Britain dominance in Western and Southeastern Europe, but
neither state was willing to actively reconstruct British power or offer a formal alliance. Notably,
these behaviors pose problems for competing accounts because the United States offered what
support it did despite the collapse of wartime institutions that embedded the United States and
Great Britain, while the Soviet Union adopted Moderate Support despite lacking the same
democratic institutions as the United Kingdom.
American and Soviet behavior shifted abruptly after 1947. Initially, both the United
States and Soviet Union pursued Extreme Support strategies towards the United Kingdom as the
USSR offered Britain an alliance, and the United States advanced the Marshall Plan. The trigger
for both Soviet and American behavior was the collapse of British military power at the turn of
1946-1947 that seems to have alerted American and Soviet policymakers that Britain might be
lost as a future ally unless intensive assistance were given as quickly as possible. However, once
it became clear that Britain was going to ally with the United States instead of Soviet Union,
American and Soviet strategy diverged. The United States continued Extreme Support for Britain,
culminating in Anglo-American military coordination and a formal American alliance under the
North Atlantic Treaty. The USSR, on the other hand, changed gears and pursued a Moderate
Predation strategy by launching the 1948 Berlin Crisis and organizing Eastern Europe to
confront the Anglo-American front. Although this outcome contradicts my argument, what we
know of Soviet debates suggests the processes identified by my theory held true: Soviet
policymakers worried that Britain was now lost as an ally and feared that, in the absence of its
own alliance options, it had no choice but to oppose the Anglo-American front. And, similar to
the situation in 1945-1946, American and Soviet strategies initially converged towards Extreme
Support despite the differences in American, British, and Soviet domestic regimes, while the
USSR moved towards Moderate Predation even when it was still bound to the United Kingdom
by de facto international institutions: again, we see American and Soviet behavior converging
and diverging at different times and in different places than those expected by liberal arguments.
Although the Soviet turn towards Moderate Predation in late 1947 means my theory does not
gain as much backing from the British case as from the late Cold War episode, Realist Decline
Theory ultimately explained substantial portions of the case and provided significantly more
insight into American and Soviet strategy writ large than liberal explanations.
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Overall, the outcomes and processes of the cases provided strong confirming evidence of
the theory presented in Chapter Two. Realist Decline Theory performed poorest in explaining
Soviet strategy towards the United Kingdom after the middle of 1947. Given that the Soviet
move toward Moderate Predation occurred in the face of an Anglo-American alliance, the case
suggests that the realist argument advanced in this project may break down if alliances become
too fixed and tight. Under these conditions, a rising state may conclude that even a militarily
weak declining state in a multipolar system will only be a threat by virtue of its relationship with
other great powers. A sense of the flexibility or inflexibility of existing alliances is currently
missing from the argument.
Still, the abundant evidence in the case of Soviet decline, as well as the theory's
performance in the whole of the British case, provides strong grounds for endorsing the theory.
Institutionalist and democratic peace arguments consistently failed to explain the course and
logic of rising state behavior. Instead, relatively rising states fixed on the security costs and
benefits of weakening or helping declining states, assessed these costs and benefits in light of the
polarity of the system and the decliner's ability to provide security for itself, and formulated
strategy accordingly. Under some conditions, this process led to the outcomes classically feared
by declining great powers - an all out rising state surge toward Extreme Predation. In most other
circumstances, however, rising states acted with significantly more caution, if not outright
interest in preventing decliners from falling from the great power ranks. Baldly stated, the
evidence indicates that relative decline is not always as pernicious as common wisdom suggests.
IV. Implications for International Relations Theory
The findings of this project carry important implications for international relations theory.
First and foremost, they suggest that structural realist hypotheses can be used to predict and
explain specific state strategies, at least under certain conditions. The debate over whether
structural realism makes specific foreign policy predictions has been ongoing since shortly after
Waltz published his Theory ofInternational Politics in the late 1970s. 96 1 Both critics and fans of
Waltz's work have allowed that a structural framework may be unable to generate specific
predictions of state behavior without additional variables.962 Indeed, an entire subfield of the
realist tradition - neoclassical realism - has emerged in large part as an effort to blend domestic-
level variables with structural insights to explain foreign policy decisions.963 In contrast, a subset
of scholars has maintained that structural realism can, at least theoretically, be used to predict
specific state behaviors provided additional structural variables are used in the analysis. Yet
after an effort to incorporate offense-defense variables into a Waltzian framework, this effort
petered out.964
My findings suggest the structural realism-as-foreign-policy camp may still be correct.
Using purely structural variables and hypotheses, I have shown that specific state policies can be
961 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979.
962 For an overview, see the text and notes in Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of
Foreign Policy?," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7-53; Waltz, "Not Foreign Policy"; Jeffrey W. Legro and
Andrew Moravesik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security 24, no. 2 (October 1999): 5-55.
963 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998):
144-172; Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and
Foreign Policy," in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman,
and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-41.
964 Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; Posen, Sources; Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States
Bandwagon?," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 383.
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explained without turning to domestic variables or sidestepping realist insights altogether. To do
so, scholars must fully account for how the distribution of power in the system affects unit-level
actions while allowing that, as Waltz suggests, multipolar and bipolar systems may produce
different behaviors. In other words, structure can produce regular and predictable unit-level
behaviors, but these behaviors may vary depending on the particular distribution of power at
hand. Power-maximizing and power satisficing behavior may then two sides of the same realist
coin.
Adopting this perspective while seeking out additional structural variables beyond those
identified by offense-defense theory, suggests a way to utilize the structural realist enterprise as a
predictor of state behavior. This approach may both allow structural realism to explain a greater
range of more subtle state behaviors than it has heretofore been used to capture, as well as more
readily function as a successor to classical realism in capturing the process by which great
powers interact and pursue their interests in a competitive international marketplace. It also
offers an important caveat to studies that critique structural realist insights on the grounds that
states do not always maximize "power." As demonstrated, just because a state (or states) are
found not to maximize "power" under certain circumstances does not refute the structural realist
enterprise: it could well be the case that pressures from the system argue for acting as power
satisficers rather than power maximizers, and the absence of power-maximizing behavior occur
along lines predicted by structural realist logic. In short, this project's effort at utilizing
structural realism as a theory of foreign policy suggests a path to explain unit-level behavior
without turning to domestic variables or abandoning the realist tradition entirely.
Second, and related to the preceding, this project offers a possible way of beginning to
integrate what have historically been different realist traditions into a unified whole. Internecine
fights between different branches of realism have occupied a prominent place in the international
relations literature over the past quarter century.965 These debates made good progress in
clarifying the fault lines between power maximizing realism, structural realism, and offense-
defense realism, but the debate remained intractable in the absence of a sovereign academic
authority able to adjudicate disputes. The theory offered in this project, however, suggests the
possibility of moving past the debate altogether. As shown, insights from the different traditions
can be usefully integrated into a unified approach that is both theoretically rigorous and that
captures important empirical phenomena. Future work may build on the effort in this project to
see whether and to what extent this effort at unifying the different realist branches can
productively bridge the chasm between the various schools of thought without resorting to unit-
level variables a la neoclassical realism. Just as neoclassical realism seeks to salvage realist
arguments by incorporating domestic variables to predict state behavior, so too may it be time to
attempt a "neo-structural realist" framework that builds across rather than within a single realist
body of work.
Finally, this project offers important caveats to liberal attempts to explain great power
behavior. In showing that democratic peace and institutionalist theories cannot readily account
for rising state behavior during power shifts, my findings raise the possibility that liberal
mechanisms that supposedly drive great power behavior are actually determined by hard-headed
calculations of state power and security. This was particularly shown to be the case with
American policy towards the USSR, where the supposed benefits and byproducts of international
965 A good precis is Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997):
445-477.
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institutions were shown not just to be a chimera, but in fact part of an effort to prey on the
declining Soviet Union.
These findings suggest the need for additional research that carefully delineates what
liberal accounts contribute to our understanding of great power behavior. On the one level, and
even if I have found liberal accounts an unsatisfactory explanation of great power behavior at
moments of decline, it could still be the case that liberal theories 1) explain great power behavior
absent power shifts, and 2) were important contributing explanations even if my realist account
proved dominant. On the other hand, finding that liberal mechanisms failed to produce the
supposed benefits for declining states raises red flags. If liberal accounts cannot explain great
power relations during periods of rise and decline - one the most basic issues in international
politics - within cases liberal scholars claim to account for, then the viability of liberal theories
as truly independent explanations of great power relations should be re-evaluated. In short, and
as this project offers a way of bridging the gap between different realist traditions, so may it be
the case that this project shows that some of the phenomena ascribed to liberal mechanisms are
better subsumed under a realist framework. It may not be the case that liberal mechanisms are
irrelevant (as some scholars suggest), but simply that their explanatory power is more limited
than some of their more ebullient proponents expect. 966
V. Implications for Policy
These findings also offer clear contributions of this project to ongoing policy debates
surrounding the decline of the United States. It is difficult to say for certain whether present
concerns surrounding the "decline of the United States" will turn out to be justified. After all, as
a recent study by Robert Lieber argues, the United States has been through several waves of
decline concerns since the end of World War Two without experiencing a substantial diminution
of its relative power. 967 Still, this study offers room for cautious optimism if present worries
over the waning of American power prove accurate.
First, this study has shown that the most pernicious and extreme forms of rising state
predation occur only under a restrictive set of conditions, namely, a situation in which 1) the
declining state is bereft of potential allies, 2) militarily weak, and 3) of no use to the rising state
as an ally in its own right. In all other situations, rising states either cautiously exploit the
declining state for fear of the decliner's internal balancing, or support and try to preserve the
declining state as an ally. In this regard, worries that a weakening United States will be intensely
preyed upon by a rising China, India, or other actor appear overblown. On one level, present
trends suggest American decline is occurring in a nascent multipolar system in which several
states, including the U.S., China, India, Japan, and perhaps Russia, will hold the capacity to
influence one another's behavior.968 If so, then my theory suggests American decline will be
mitigated as relatively rising states bid to retain the United States as an ally, and are deterred
from predation by the prospect of internal and external balancing.
Yet even if one rising state jumps in front of the others and the system appears on the
cusp of bipolarity, then the United States' robust military capabilities should allow it to keep
966 For charges of irrelevance, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions,"
International Security 19, no. 3 (December 1994): 5-49; for ebullience, see Slaughter, New World Order; Ikenberry,
Liberal Leviathan; Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace; Lipson, Reliable Partners.
967 Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline.
968 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternate Worlds; Barry R. Posen, "Emerging Multipolarity:
Why Should We Care?," Current History 108, no. 721 (November 2009).
234
Extreme Predation in check for a significant period of time. Given past American investments in
advanced military power, the absolute wealth of the United States and its significant advantages
in advanced technology, it would seem that the United States should be able to retrain a robust
military posture for the indefinite future. Combined, my study suggests that worries over the
consequences of American decline should be taken with a grain of salt: either the structure of the
system will encourage rising states to support the United States, or American military options
will keep the most intense forms of rising state power maximization in check. In short, even a
declining United States will be safe.
This framework, however, also offers a warning: the United States should not rest its
strategy on the kindness of fellow democracies, nor on the restraining and support-inducing
effects of international institutions. American efforts to spread liberal democracy and reinforce
the foundations of Western order may be useful for various things, but preventing rising state
predation is not one of them. Thus, not only do policymakers risk lulling themselves into a false
sense of confidence by relying too heavily on liberal precepts, but they may actually cause more
harm than good if efforts to spread democracy and build institutions antagonize rising states.
Ultimately, one of the core prescriptions of this project is a negative one, as policymakers should
reverse the long-standing hope in liberal tropes as a solution to great power problems when
fundamental questions of power and security are on the line.
Instead, policymakers would instead be better served by carefully analyzing the shifting
distribution of power over time and scoping American policy accordingly. Just as this project
warns against putting too much stock in liberal tropes, so does it suggest the need to carefully
shape U.S. military posture in response to the changing international distribution of power. This
approach may be counterintuitive, as declining states often seem inclined to pump ever greater
resources into their militaries in an effort to maintain military superiority against rising
challengers and, judging from debates over the U.S. defense budget today, the United States is
no exception.969 That said, one of the major implications of this project is that the benefits of
military strength vary according to the polarity of the system. To the extent that the system is
heading towards bipolarity, then American policymakers would indeed be wise to pump
capabilities into retaining a robust military posture. If the system is heading towards
multipolarity, however, then the United States actually risks antagonizing potential allies while
allowing prospective partners to free-ride on American largesse. A better strategy under these
conditions would be to curtail military spending and limit the size of the America military - akin
to what Britain did after 1947 - in order to encourage other stakes to flock to the United States'
aid out of their own self-interest. To be clear, successfully scoping American military posture to
the polarity of the system is unlikely to be an easy or frictionless task, and there is substantial
room for miscalculation along the way. Yet compared with the alternatives of 1) wasting
potentially scarce resources on military spending when allies could pick up the slack, or 2)
allowing a rising challenger a window of opportunity, carefully monitoring the distribution of
power and shaping American military policy accordingly may be the best of several unpalatable
options.
VI. Areas for Further Research
In an effort to establish when and why rising states target declining great powers for
predation, this project has necessarily raised several issues for future research. First, it would be
969 See, for an example, Barack Obama, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012).
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useful to examine a larger universe of rising state-declining state relations. As noted, I scoped
this study on post-1945 cases of decline in Europe in an effort to study modem cases of decline
that may offer insight to current policy debates. Building off this set of cases, I found my realist
argument to explain variation in rising state behavior. Future research, however, should examine
both whether these findings can explain great power behavior outside of Europe, as well as in
different time periods. Although there are good reasons to study modem European politics, it
could be the case that post-World War Two Europe represents a special type of great power
system, such that findings from the cases are less applicable in other settings. Examining a wider
array of cases would control for this possibility and explore the limits of Realist Decline Theory.
Second, this project treated all great powers as essentially undifferentiated in terms of
their aggregate capabilities. Future research should relax this assumption and assess whether
differences in gross capabilities among the great powers affect the behavior of relatively rising
states. For example, rising states may respond to the decline of the strongest state among several
great powers in a different manner than they respond to the decline of fourth or fifth strongest
state. Similarly, there may be important differences in rising state behavior if a state rises from
fourth to third place, rather than an already predominant state rising to even more dominant
position (e.g., the strongest state in the system growing even more capable). The present study
offers a series of hypotheses that can be used as a baseline for analysis, but future research is
needed.
Third, the empirical work in this project poses a theoretical question: when and why do
rising states recognize a fundamental change in the distribution of power? In other words, what
convinces states that the distribution of power is changing, and does this pattern vary in regular
ways? This project examined rising state behavior after rising states recognized a power shift. It
may be the case, however, that the same variables driving responses to great power decline also
influence the perception of great power decline and thus determine when in the course of one
state's decline rising states begin to adapt their strategy. Additional work is needed to probe the
link between a rising state's perception of a change in the distribution of power and its response,.
Admittedly, there are numerous attempts to determine whether and to what extent state
perceptions of the distribution of power track objective measures of power, all without making
substantial progress in offering a grounded theory to answer this problem. 970 Linking the
perceptual question to the outcomes of this process, however, may offer a new way forward
while simultaneously addressing whether the timing of a recognized change affects rising state
policy.
A fourth avenue for exploration concerns the treatment of "military posture." As noted
earlier, this study treats military posture as a basic issue of whether declining states hold enough
relative military capabilities to secure themselves in the face of the military threat posed by other
great powers. This approach, however, breaks from other efforts to assess military posture as
offensive, defensive, or deterrent.971 Additional work should explore whether finer-grained
distinctions in the decliner's military policy affect the strategies chosen by rising states.
Equally important, emerging from the cases is a sense that declining states have a
difficult time convincing relatively rising peers that their military capabilities are, in fact,
changing. In the Soviet case, the 1988 shift to a defensive military footing, largely undertaken
due to Soviet economic limits, failed to convince American policymakers that the USSR was
970 Amongst others, see Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 1988; William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia
in the Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics 39, no. 3 (April 1987): 353-381; Wohlforth, Elusive Balance.
971 Posen, Sources.
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essentially throwing in the towel in the Cold War military competition; the USSR attempted to
signal weakness, and the United States disregarded or missed the messaged. The British case
witnessed similar developments, as even Britain's poor military showing against Germany in the
war and constrained contributions compared to the USA and USSR failed to convince American
and Soviet strategists that Britain would be a military basket-case in the postwar period. In the
end, only the utter collapse of Soviet and British military power convinced the other great
powers that a fundamental change in military affairs was afoot. Additional work is needed to
explain this phenomenon: why do declining states have a difficult time convincing other great
powers that their military power is truly waning, and why do relatively rising states seem to
ignore or misinterpret signs of military weakness? This research would help verify whether the
choice of dichotomizing the military posture variable is empirically and theoretically valid.
Finally, additional work is needed to assess the systemic consequences of great power
decline. This project focused narrowly on the relationship between relatively rising and
declining states to challenge the notion that rising states act as inveterate power maximizers.
Beyond the rising state-declining state dyad, however, are questions of whether and to what
extent fundamental change in the distribution of power affects the stability of the international
system. Just as some scholars claim rising states prey on declining great powers, so too do other
scholars worry that power shifts prime the system writ large for instability as public goods go
underprovided, international institutions break down, and conflicts among weaker states
proliferate in the absence of a single hegemon able to adjudicate disputes; these concerns are
particularly common among long-cycle, hegemonic stability, and power transition scholars.972
Assessing when and why these broader consequences of decline emerge is a needed next-step.
Relative decline may not be as worrisome as often feared for declining great powers themselves,
but its effects on world politics writ large are still open to investigation.
972 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); Organski,
World Politics; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
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Appendix A: Identifying Declining Great Powers
To identify the universe of declining great powers and the periods of their decline, I
measure change in the distribution of great power capabilities. As noted in Chapter Two, the
hallmarks of this change are that one or more states 1) lose a significant proportion of their
relative capabilities, 2) within a politically meaningful period of time, and 3) are unable to
recover from the trend. To meet these criteria, I define cases of precipitous decline as situations
in which 1) a great power loses at least 5 percent of its share of great power capabilities, 2)
within a ten year window, after 3) at least five years of sustained losses to great power capability
share. For the post-1950 period, I measure losses solely on the basis of economic capabilities;
for the 1945-1950 period, I rely on the Correlates of War Composite Index of National
Capabilities (COW/CINC) scores. Methodology and justification are as follows.
First, using the list of great powers identified in Chapter Two, I assessed the share of
capabilities held by these states as an inclusive set. If, for example, I identified three states (A, B,
C) as great powers, I summed the total capabilities held by these three states and determined the
share of great power capabilities held by each relative to this total. Doing so presents a snapshot
of the distribution of capabilities at any point and establishes how states compare to one another.
Using shares of great power capabilities, I next identified situations in which a state lost
at least 5 percent of its share of capabilities compared to its average share over the preceding ten
years. Capturing a 5 percent drop against the ten year average ensures that the decline is
significant compared to its prior performance as a great power.973 Combined, this tells us that a
given state experienced a significant setback in the great power competition.
However, to further ensure that this losses was not a temporary aberration - for example,
resulting from an intense but brief recession - I next calculated the two year average change in
capability share. Taking a two year rolling average smooths out annual variation in state
performance - say, one year of exceptionally good economic growth or a sudden decrease in
energy consumption - while still showcasing overall trends in the distribution of power. As we
would intuit, a consistently negative change of share indicating that one's share of capabilities is
steadily falling, and a positive average indicating growth in share. Looking at cases where the
average change in share was negative for 5 or more years provides strong evidence that the state
was not able to recover from the prior setback - that the decline in great power share is more
than just a temporary aberration. This provides time for statesmen to recognize and begin to
respond to the changing distribution of power.
When all these conditions are met and a state has lost at least 5 percent of its capability
share after 5 or more years of sustained losses, I code the situation as a case of relative decline
and begin analyzing the strategies of other great powers after this point. I continue this analysis
until the declining state either drops from the great power ranks entirely (falling below the 10
percent overall share/25 percent share of strongest state threshold for a great power), begins to
recover as identified by 5 or more years of positive growth in capability share, or a decade
elapses. Table A.1 lists the results, showing both the United Kingdom and Soviet Union as
declining European great powers in the post-1945 world which ultimately exited the great power
ranks.
973 Thanks go to Chad Hazlett for helping think through a way of measuring change in the distribution of power over
time.
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Table A.1: Declining Great Powers in post-1945 Europe
Share of Great Share of Great Share of Great Power
Declining State Years Power Capabilities, Power Capabilities, Capabilities, 5 Years Rasn
Decline Start of Decline End of Decline after End of Decline Analysis Ends
United Kingdom 1945-1949 19.3* 14.1 11.4 Exits great
power ranks
Soviet Union 1989-1991 26.2 24.3 9.2 Exits great
_ _power ranks
* taken from 1946 due to sudden shifts in 1945 capabilities resulting from end of World War Two
Finally, it is worth observing that this list compares reasonably well with other datasets of
declining great powers. In particular, Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers argues
the United Kingdom exited the great power ranks circa 1944-1947 and led to the onset of the
U.S.-Soviet bipolar contest. My dataset shows multipolarity lasting a few additional years, but
agrees with Kennedy that multipolarity ended sometime in the mid-late 1940s. A larger
difference is Kennedy's argument that the USSR began declining in the early 1980s. This
discrepancy may be larger than it appears, however, since my study waits 5 years after a state
begins experiencing relative losses to begin the study of decline in order to allow time for
statesmen in the rising state to recognize the changing distribution of power.974
More recently, MacDonald and Parent have usefully compiled a list of great powers
worldwide and assessed those which declined over the last two centuries. 975 Because their list
uses a different definition of decline than my own, compares all great powers to one another
without accounting for whether the states actually interacted or assessed their performance
relative to one another, and (most importantly) identifies decline based on whether a state drops
by one or more ordinal ranks, their results are not fully comparable to my own. Indeed, their
study has some empirically questionable codings, such as the argument that the USSR "declined"
in the late 1980s due to the rise of Japan and China. However, even with these differences, their
results for the great powers I am interested in roughly match the results of my study and show
that the United Kingdom declined as a great power over 1946-1951, while the USSR declined
from 1987-1991. Given the different approaches to the phenomena, the fact that the MacDonald
and Parent study produces very similar results to my own corroborates the notion that the United
Kingdom and USSR fell from the great power ranks in the mid-late 1940s and late 1980s-early
1990s, respectively.
974 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 3 57, chap. 8.
975 MacDonald and Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment."
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Appendix B:
Tracing American Assessments of Soviet Decline in the 1980s
I began the analysis of U.S. strategy towards the declining USSR from the late 1980s. By
this time, the Soviet Union had been losing significant ground relative to the United States for
several years and showed no signs of recovery, allowing time for U.S. policymakers to begin
responding to the trend. In what follows, I begin by examining Soviet economic performance
relative to the United States. Because a large and modem economy is central to one's ability to
maintain military power and project influence in the modem world, focusing on Soviet and
American economic focus provides a crude proxy with which to assess the overall U.S.-Soviet
distribution of power. Because, however, economics is only one facet of a state's power, I
expand the analysis to consider evidence as to what American statesmen perceived to be relative
position of the United States and USSR.
Graph B. 1 shows the dyadic ratio of Soviet to American Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
using data from Angus Maddison from 1955 through 1993.976 As the graph shows, Soviet GDP
was consistently somewhere between forty and forty-five percent that of the United States
through the start of the 1980s. Although by the mid-1970s the Soviet Union was falling from its
postwar economic highs, Soviet performance vis-a-vis the United States remained within
historical parameters. However, this situation began to change sometime around the turn of the
decade. By the middle of the 1980s, the Soviet Union found itself rapidly weakening, not just
relative to the United States, but also relative to its own past situation. Indeed, by 1984, the
Soviet Union had lost more than 5 percent of its share of GDP against its average share of GDP
over the preceding ten year (e.g., GDP in 1989 versus the average GDP for the 1978-1988
period; Graph B.2).977 Through the Soviet collapse in December 1991, these losses to Soviet
GDP share continued and accelerated. Although Soviet GDP appeared to stabilize and recover
some ground episodically during the decade (most notably 1981-1983), by 1987-1988 the Soviet
economy was losing ground to the United States' on a regular basis. Using the coding criteria
described earlier in this project, I begin analyzing the U.S. response to Soviet decline after 1987-
1988: to repeat the earlier point, by this time, the Soviet share of GDP had fallen by over five
percent compared to the share held ten years earlier and Soviet growth rates had been
consistently negative for at least 3 years. Although Soviet decline became, in retrospect, more or
less permanent a few years prior, lagging the analysis through the 1987-1988 periods allows time
for American policymakers to recognize the changing distribution of power and begin
formulating a response.
976 Sarotte, 1989; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in
Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
977 Change in GDP shares provides a good way of assessing overall economic performance. Calculating shares lets
us see how the two economies measure up to one another in relative terms at any given point in time. By seeing how
these shares change over time, we thus capture the net relative performance of the two countries: if, over a given
period, Soviet GDP share increases, the economy has outperformed that of the United States (and vice versa).
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Graph B.1: Soviet Economic Performance, 1955-1993
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Graph B.2: American and Soviet Economic Performance, 1975-1990
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Graph B.3: Annual Change in American and Soviet GDP Share
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Some might contend that by delaying the analysis of U.S. policy until after 1988, I am
biasing the study by ignoring the possibility that American policymakers recognized Soviet
decline at an earlier date: if statesmen intensely care about and analyze changes in the
distribution of power, then it is reasonable to expect U.S. policymakers to recognize the change
in Soviet power relative to the United States at an earlier date. If true, then the analysis would
have to be extended to an earlier point in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
One way to check this possibility involves digging into the debates and assessments of
the U.S.-Soviet distribution of power in the 1981-1987 period. This period roughly corresponds
to what the economic data suggests might be the start of Soviet relative decline. Drawing on
archival research, interviews, memoirs, and the secondary literature on U.S. assessments of the
U.S.-Soviet distribution of power, I find fairly strong evidence to support my argument: although
many senior officials in the Reagan Administration recognized that the Soviet Union's economy
was under stress, it was only in the late 1980s that 1) this trend seemed to be affecting the overall
position of the USSR as a superpower competitor to the United States, and 2) that the Soviet
Union was unlikely to recover from its internal problems.
At first glance, there is much to commend the idea that American policymakers
recognized Soviet decline at an earlier date. For instance, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
briefings to President-elect Ronald Reagan and his advisors in November 1980 emphasized that
after a period of rapid growth, Soviet "industrial growth has slowed to lowest level since WW II;
[and] growth in GNP [Gross National Product] has averaged only 1% in each of last 2 years." 978
A year later, National Security Advisor Richard Allen praised and forwarded Reagan a similar
intelligence assessment arguing that "Soviet economic performance has deteriorated to the point
that, if military expenditures continue to expand as in the past, there will be few if any resources
left with which to raise living standards." 979 Richard Pipes, then the NSC's senior director for
Soviet affairs, argued at nearly the same time in a classified report that "Soviet Communism
[... .] confronts a profound crisis caused by persistent economic failures and difficulties brought
about by overexpansion," and compounded by a sclerotic leadership.980 By the middle of 1982,
Reagan himself was commenting in National Security Council meetings that "the Soviet Union
is economically on the ropes" and suggested that "the Soviets do not believe that they can keep
up with us" in a direct military competition.981 And, at the start of 1983, an interagency report
designed to outline U.S. policy on relations with the USSR concluded that the USSR faced
"declining productivity, morale, and economic growth" as well as political unrest at home and
978 See "Agenda for Briefing of President-elect Briefing," 11 December 1980, available online at:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/documentconversions/17/198012 L.pdf.
9 Richard Allen to The President, "CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate," 21 November 1989 and Special
National Intelligence Estimate, "Dependence of Soviet Military Power on Economic Relations with the West,"
SNIE 3/11-4-81, 1, both online at:
ittp://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/docunent conversions/ 7/198 1117.pdf/.
980 Richard Pipes, "Reagan Soviet Policy (Short Version)," November 1981, Pipes Files, Box 3, "Miscellaneous
Papers," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL), Executive Summary and 3-13. Pipes' report later
became the basis for Reagan's 1983 official statement on U.S-Soviet relations, National Security Decision Direct
(NSDD) 75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," 17 January 1983. For the report supporting NSDD-75, see "Response
to NSSD 11-82: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union," 6 December 1982, NSC Secretariat Files, Box 91285, "NSC
00070 16 Dec 82 [1 of 2]," RRPL. The NSSD 11-82 report has since been digitized:
littp://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/reagtan-collectioni.
981 National Security Council Meeting minutes, "Review of Soviet Sanctions," 24 May 1982, and NSC minutes,
"NSSD 1-82," 16 April 1982, both as printed in The Reagan Files, Jason Saltoun-Ebin, ed. (self-published: Jason
Saltoun-Ebin, 2010): 144, 164.
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abroad that left the Soviet leadership "sober about the consequences of unregulated competition
or direct confrontation with us".9 82 Combined, there is no shortage of evidence that the United
States recognized Soviet problems before the late 1980s.
However, evidence that the Soviet Union faced growing economic and political problems
is not the same thing as saying that the Soviet Union 1) was beginning to fall behind the United
States, and 2) that these trends would soon have an impact on international politics. On the one
hand, the Reagan Administration took office convinced that the United States was declining vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union.983 This conviction was rooted in the poor performance of the American
economy at the time, as well as a worry that the United States had underinvested in its
conventional military and nuclear capabilities, and failed to demonstrate its resolve to confront
the USSR throughout the late 1970s.9 84 Indeed, while Soviet economic performance was falling
compared to its postwar highs, Soviet economic growth was comparable to that of the United
States throughout the 1970s, and significantly higher than the United States at the turn of the
1980s (Table B.1). 985 Similarly, in the military realm, the Soviets were believed to be ahead of
the United States conventionally - where, as Reagan put it, they enjoyed "superiority" 986 - while
"all the momentum in the strategic race seemed to be on the Soviet side." 987 Combined, Reagan
982 The study was led by the State Department, with input from the CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD);
"U.S.-Soviet Relations: Executive Summary," (no date, circa 10 January 1983), Executive Secretariat, NSC:
National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, Box 91306, NSPG 0049 10 Jan 1983 [US/Soviet Relations] (1
of 2), RRPL. The report was reviewed by Reagan, Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State George
Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, members of Reagan's senior political staff, and representatives
from the military and CIA, and discussed at an NSPG meeting on 10 January 1983; for an overview of the
discussion, list of participants, and meeting background, see William P. Clark, "NSPG Meeting," 10 January 1983,
Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, Box 91306, NSPG 0049 10 Jan
1983 [US/Soviet Relations] (1 of 2), RRPL.
983 For an insightful description of the perception inside the government at the time, see Gates, From the Shadows,
170-184.
984 Jack Matlock, who served as Reagan's principal NSC advisor on Soviet affairs from 1983-1987, argued in
retrospect that "Reagan was convinced that U.S. defenses had been allowed to deteriorate during the 1970s [. . .] In
his view, an imbalance could encourage the Soviet leaders to believe that they could use their superior military
strength to blackmail the U.S. and split its alliances." At the same time, Reagan "was also convinced that the 1970s
had left the United States with a weakened economy (high inflation and unemployment) and a lack of political will
(the "post-Vietnam syndrome," Carter's talk of national "malaise")." Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 11, 13
Interviews with Matlock (3 August 2011) and his predecessor (Richard Pipes; 8 July 2011) confirmed this
perspective. see also Shultz, "A Perspective From Washington," xx; For an overview of American economic
problems in the 1970s and comparison to prior economic performance, see the chapter by Charles Maier in Ferguson,
Maier, and Manela, The Shock of the Global.
985 Soviet data is annual percent growth in Gross National Product (GNP), supplied in Central Intelligence Agency,
Office of Soviet Analysis, USSR: Economic Trends and Policy Developments, Congressional Joint Economic
Committee, Briefing Paper, 14 September 1983, Table 14, NARA, CREST. American data is from the World Bank
World Data Bank, annual percent growth in Gross National Income (GNI), most recently accessed March 2013,
http://databank.worldbank.org/. In the Economic Trends report, analysts cautioned that "the USSR has found ways
to muddle through periods of economic difficulty in the past, and it will do so again in the 1980s [. . .] economic
growth is likely to continue" at about 2 percent per year. Ultimately, "the USSR [was] not on the verge of economic
collapse" and retained strengths that would allow it to compete with the United States, including enormous natural
resources, an educated populace, and a large industrial base. If anything, the USSR could spur moderately increased
growth simply by redirecting resources to more productive sectors of the economy and away from less-efficient
sectors; Economic Trends, 40, 43-44.
986 Remarks at an 13 October 1981 meeting on Theater Nuclear Forces; Reagan Files, 59
987 Gates, From the Shadows, 171; see also 195-196. The CIA's 11 Dec 1980 briefing to Reagan suggested the trend,
noting that the Soviets "clearly established themselves in lead today [sic]" in strategic nuclear forces, and that a
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could argue that "the cold, hard fact of the matter is that our economic, military, and strategic
strength [. . .] is eroding." 988
Table B.1: Average Annual Economic Growth, USA and USSR, 1971-1982
Period USA (GNI) USSR (GNP)
1971-1975 2.8 3.7
1976-1980 3.7 2.7
1981-1982 1 2.1
The concern was such that a July 1981 report intended to guide U.S. relations with the
USSR concluded that "our national security strategy must rectify a deterioration across the
spectrum of our defense posture towards the Soviet Union" by engaging in sustained buildup of
U.S. conventional and nuclear assets.989 Similarly, a November 1981 NSC report intended to
summarize U.S. foreign policy in the Administration's first year emphasized that "our primary
foreign policy objective has been to restore the domestic capabilities (economic and military)
and credibility [. . .] of America's foreign policy leadership." 990 Despite acknowledging the
problems facing the Soviet Union, Reagan's advisors warned in April 1982 that "the growth of
Soviet military power over the last decade has called into question the ability of the United States
and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union [. . .] building on their strengthened military
position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated
political/military/economic strategy [. . . the objectives of which] are to extend Soviet influence
globally and to weaken the United States". 991 And, in a January 1983 strategy report on U.S.-
"bulge" in Soviet capabilities relative to those of the United States would hold through the middle of the 1980s.
Oddly, despite suggesting that Soviet nuclear assets dominated those of the United States, the CIA briefing noted
that American capabilities were sufficient to destroy all urban areas in the USSR ever after absorbing a Soviet first
strike. This discussion suggests a real disconnect between the perception of a Soviet nuclear advantage, and the lack
of a practical effect of a Soviet "lead" on the nuclear balance; see "Agenda for Briefing of President Elect," 11
December 1980, op. cit.
988 Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan, "A Strategy for Peace in the '80s," 19 October 1980, online at:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/Reference/10.19.80.html.
989 "East-West Policy Study," 14 July 1981, Box 91278, Executive Secretariat NSC: NSSD File, "NSSD 11-82 [US
Policy Toward the Soviet Union] (1 of 8), III-1. Pipes and National Security Advisor Richard Allen recommended
that Reagan approve the strategy in July 1981, but this step was apparently never taken. Core concepts, however,
were later dusted off and incorporated into Reagan's subsequent National Security Strategy (NSDD 32) and U.S.-
Soviet Strategy (NSDD 75). On this back and forth, see the 1981-1982 correspondence among NSC officials in
Richard Pipes Files, Box 5, "Soviet NSSD I [NSSD 11-82]," RRPL, particularly that involving Pipes, NSC staffer
Paula Dobriansky, Allen, and William P. Clark (Allen's successor as National Security Advisor).
990 Henry R. Nau to NSC Staff, "Charges of Foreign Policy Disarray," 25 November 1981, Matlock Files, Box 39,
"U.S. Policy General 2/2," RRPL, 1. An accompanying report reflecting on the Administration's accomplishments
during its first year in office similarly observed that, "Reagan administration [sic] foreign policy in the first 90-120
days began the process of restoring America's confidence, leadership, and strength in world affairs. It focused on
putting in place the instruments of a more confident American foreign policy, in particular a revitalized American
economy, vastly strengthened American defense capability, and upgraded intelligence, information and foreign
assistance programs. The objective was to avoid empty rhetoric, while carrying a big stick and taking the tough,
concrete policy decisions to affect real capabilities;" Henry R. Nau, "Foreign Policy at the Beginning," November
1981, 6-7, in ibid.
991 See "U.S. National Security Strategy," April 1982, System II Files, 8290283 (NSDD 32), RRPL, 2. The national
security strategy report was prepared at Reagan's request by long-time aide Thomas Reed, who was called into the
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Soviet relations the Administration concluded that Soviet leaders likely concluded they enjoyed a
number of major gains in the ongoing competition with the United States, including "superpower
status and global reach; a quarreling, economically shaky West; domestic political stability;
[and] an economy strong enough to support massive military outlays". As such, the effort to "re-
establish American ascendancy" would necessarily focus on "rearmament, world economic
recovery, respect for international law and order, and the promotion of democratic values." The
United States needed to work diligently to restore American economic power, military
capabilities, and use these capabilities abroad in order to restore American power and
leadership.992 In sum, there was a pronounced concern at the start of the 1980s that the United
States was losing ground to the Soviet Union due to a combination of economic problems of its
own, military underinvestment, and political problems. 993 Soviet problems notwithstanding, only
if the United States revitalized its own economic and military fortunes could the United States
recover ground and make it clear that the Soviet Union could not - as Reagan put it - "keep up
with us" in an all-out political competition.994
Nor, as the United States rebuilt its capabilities, did it mean the Soviet Union would fall
behind the United States overnight. By the start of 1983, Reagan's advisors began to conclude
that the United States had arrested its decline and laid the foundation for long-term recovery.
These trends, however, would not produce a change in the U.S.-Soviet distribution of power until
later in the decade. A February 1983 memorandum from National Security Advisor Clark argues
the position well and is worth quoting at length:
NSC specifically to author the strategy and translate Reagan's views into policy. Despite vocal opposition from the
foreign policy bureaucracy that Reed was pushing the strategy forward without sufficient time for review, the
strategy was reviewed by senior policymakers in April 1982 and approved on 20 May. For background on the
report, see author interview with Thomas Reed, 10 March 2011, and Michael Wheeler to L. Paul Bremer, et al.,
"Minutes of Interagency Review Group Meeting, NSSD 1-82, March 13, 1989," 15 March 1989, National Archives
and Record Administration (hereafter NARA), CIA Records Search Tool (hereafter CREST). For the senior level
review, see the transcript in Reagan Files, 137-144, 146-153. Interestingly, the report offers a much calmer
assessment of the strategic nuclear balance with the USSR, simply arguing that "the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority
means that the U.S. cannot depend on nuclear forces to offset its general purpose force deficiencies [. . . increasing]
the relative importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities." With nuclear parity, in other words, the United
States could not readily threaten to escalate to a nuclear exchange with the USSR, putting a premium on
conventional defense; see "U.S. National Security Strategy," 2.
992 "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Executive Summary," circa January 1983, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG Meetings
Files, Box 91306, "NSPG 0049 10 Jan 1983 [US/Soviet Relations] (1 of 2)," RRPL, 1, 5. The report was drafted by
an interagency group led by members of the State Department and involving principals from the Defense
Department and CIA. Secretary of State George Shultz was a major champion of the report. Given that Shultz was
widely perceived as a relative "dove" on U.S.-Soviet relations inside the Administration, the fact that the report
emphasized the relative strengths of the USSR is a telling indicator that many in the Administration were concerned
about the overall U.S.-Soviet distribution of power; see George P. Shultz to The President, "US-Soviet Relations in
1983," 19 January 1983, William P. Clark Files, Box 8, "U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains
Originals (3)," RRPL. The January report was briefed to and discussed by Reagan, Shultz, Vice President George
H.W. Bush, National Security Advisor William P. Clark, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and others on 10
January 1983; see William P. Clark, "NSPG Meeting," 10 January 1983, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSPG
Meetings Files, Box 91306, "NSPG 0049 10 Jan 1983 [US/Soviet Relations] (1 of 2)," RRPL.
993 In retrospect, much of the ostensible Soviet defense buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s appears to have
been a chimera: Soviet military investment was lower than many analysts feared. CIA analysts reported this
possibility at the time, but Reagan and his advisors appear not to have been aware of or acknowledged the trend.
For discussion of lower Soviet military investment, see Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Soviet Analysis,
USSR: Economic Trends and Policy Developments, Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Briefing Paper, 14
September 1983, 18, NARA, CREST.
994 Reagan Files, 144.
245
It was your view - correctly in my judgement [sic] - of the state of our relations
at the end of the decade of the seventies that the Soviets may well have
considered us a nation in decline and that before we could have any realistic
hope of getting them to bargain seriously with us towards the resolution of the
many problems before us, we had to make that we had reversed the trend [. . ]
Toward that end, you set out to restore our defenses, to reassure our allies, to
solve our economic problems at home and in sum, to show by action that we
were coming back [. . .] At the end of two years it seems to me that you have
succeeded and that there is a very solid basis for concluding that the Soviets may
be reconciled to the fact that by the end of the decade we will have passed them
again. The corollary is that now, at a position of maximum relative strength,
they ought to cut the best deal that they can. In this respect, they are not unlike
the Japanese in 1941 [emphasis added]. 995
In other words, by the mid-1980s trends were in the United States' favor, but the United States
would only begin gaining on the USSR towards the end of the 1980s.996 Other Reagan advisers
made similar points in the 1983-1986 period.997 At the start of 1984, for instance, Matlock and
Robert McFarlane - who replaced Clark as National Security Advisor in October 1983 - agreed
that the Soviet leadership was "very nervous about the prospects [of competition] with the
United States five to ten years down the road - not so much of confrontation as such, as of a
decisive shift in the balance of military power which would require them either to back down or
accept the risk of confrontation [. . .] just trying to keep up will put enormous pressures on their
shaky system." 998 Concurrently, a joint NSC-State Department memorandum argued that "after
a period in which they [the Soviets] were surging ahead, they now see us shifting the 'correlation
of forces' against them - through substantially increased military capabilities and overt and
covert activities in areas which hurt them [. . .] We should try to get them to recognize these
995 William P. Clark to The President, "The Prospects for Progress in US-Soviet Relations," 4 February 1983,
William P. Clark Files, Box 8, "US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2)," RRPL.
Annotations indicate Reagan read and analyzed the document. See also a memorandum from Clark to Reagan later
that year - likely the late spring or early summer - in which he argued: "we are well on track in rebuilding our
defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of a
long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured [. . .] The basics, therefore, are moving
unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to
manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term;"
William P. Clark to The President, "Summitry," no date, William P. Clark Files, Box 9, "US-Soviet Relations
Working File: Contains Original (15)," RRPL.
996 See, for instance, William P. Clark to The President, "National Security Priorities - Where Are We Going and
How Are We Going to Get There," 14 June 1983, Clark Files, Box 9, "US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:
Contains Originals (12)," RRPL.
997 Shultz, widely perceived as a "dove" on U.S.-Soviet relations compared to the more hawkish Clark and Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger, made essentially the same points as Clark in a January 1983 memorandum, arguing
that before progress could be made in U.S.-Soviet relations, the United States needed to continue to continue
"rebuilding of American economic and military strength." That Clark and Shultz agreed on the overall trend in the
U.S.-Soviet distribution of power is strong evidence that perceptions inside the Reagan Administration were
changing; George P. Shultz to The President, "US-Soviet Relations in 1983," 19 January 1983, William P. Clark
Files, Box 8, "US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2)," RRPL. See also George P. Shultz
to The President, "USG-Soviet Relations - Where Do We Want To Be and How Do We Get There?" 3 March 1983,
Clark Files, Box 8, "US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5)," RRPL.
998 Jack Matlock to Robert C. McFarlane, "CIA Study on Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation
with the United States," 11 January 1984, and Robert C. McFarlane to George P. Shultz and William J. Casey,
"U.S.-Soviet Relations," 21 January 1984, both online at: http ://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/rcagan-collection.
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realities." 999 And, at a September 1985 meeting designed to survey the state of U.S.-Soviet
relations, Shultz argued - and Reagan agreed - that "the Soviets may have a serious interest in
reaching an arms control agreement. Economic conditions, their situation in Afghanistan, and
Gorbachev's focus on his domestic agenda, could impel them to seek resolution of some of their
international difficulties [emphasis added]." 000 American officials perceived an increasing
chance that the distribution of power would soon be skewed in the United States' favor and the
Soviet Union fall from its powerful perch at the start of the decade.
Mikhail Gorbachev's March 1985 selection as Soviet General Secretary changed the
trend line. Prior Soviet leaders, while recognizing Soviet economic and domestic problems,
were nevertheless seen as committed to 1) maintaining military parity with the United States, and
2) making tactical fixes to the Soviet economy to ensure the USSR "muddled along" vis-a-vis
the United States. 1001 These dynamics were reinforced by a political consensus favoring
"sacrifices" to maintain the competition with the United States, meaning that civilian
consumption would be suppressed for the sake of short-term economic growth and military
spending.10 0 2 Through 1985, a succession of Soviet leaders - Leonid Brezhnev (ruled 1964-
1982), Yuri Andropov (1982-1984), and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985) - thus made limited
efforts to spur Soviet economic performance and improve productivity, while sustaining high
levels of defense spending.
Gorbachev came to power interested in revitalizing the Soviet system to make it an
economically and militarily viable superpower over the long-term.' 003 His initial efforts seemed
an extension of earlier reforms under Andropov that called for limited reforms to the current
system of resource allocation and planning to make it more efficient and productive.1004 Despite
999 These points were argued in a rough draft of a memorandum ultimately sent to Robert McFarlane - who replaced
Clark as National Security Advisor in October 1983 - on 24 February 1984. The finalized version lacks the
discussion of the changing 'correlation of forces.' Note that the rough draft is undated, but an envelope from the
State Department in which the document was sent is stamped 15 February 1984. McFarlane seems to have sent the
memorandum to Reagan in time for a 2 March 1984 meeting with his national security team. For the rough draft,
see "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Framework for the Future," no date (circa 15 February), Jack F. Matlock Files, Box
42, "US-USSR Relations [Feb 1984] 1/2," RRPL. The finalized version can be found in Jack Matlock to Robert C.
McFarlane, "U.S.-Soviet Relations 'Framework' Paper," 24 February 1984, Jack F. Matlock Files, Box 42, "US-
USSR Relations [Feb 1984] 2/2," RRPL. For the 2 March 1984 meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations, see the scope
memo and transcript of conversation in Jack Matlock Files, Box 42, "US-USSR Relations [March 1984] 1/3," RRPL.
1000 For Shultz's comments and Reagan's agreement, see Reagan Files, 282.
1001 As Matlock offered, "There was, from 1981 to 1984, no hope for any fundamental change in Soviet policy until
a new generation came to power. Even then, it would take a while before it was clear to the Soviet leader how
dysfunctional the system had become." Simply put, heading into 1985 American policymakers expected the basic
contours of the U.S.-Soviet competition -- with the USSR muddling along -- to remain intact; Matlock, Reagan and
Gorbachev, 104-105.
1002 "U.S. National Security Strategy," April 1982, ii. For examples of such behavior, see State Department cables
reporting on Soviet efforts to "tighten" worker discipline and play up external pressure to divert attention from
economic problems; Amembassy Moscow to SecState, "Party Decree on Control Criticizes 'Bureaucratism,"' 17
August 1981 and Amembassy Moscow to SecState, "Soviet 'Public Opinion' on Political Issues," 21 October 1981,
both in Jack Matlock Files, Box 24, "USSR-Domestic EE (1/2)," RRPL.
1003 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 110.
On the Andropov program, see Amembassy Moscow to SecState, "Andropov on Economic Changes," 16
August 2013, Jack Matlock Files, Box 25, "USSR-Economy (6/10)," RRPL, and Amembassy to SecState, "The
Soviet Union Under Andropov: A Year Later," Jack Matlock Files, Box 20, "Andropov (4)," RRPL; Hanson, The
Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 164-176, esp. 174. A late 1983 memorandum in the files of Deputy National
Security Advisor Donald Fortier noted the janus-faced implications of Andropov's reforms for U.S.-Soviet relations.
Indeed, Andropov commissioned a series of studies while General Secretary to look at options for fixing the Soviet
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rhetorical calls for extensive change to the Soviet system in 1985-1986, major plans to
restructure the Soviet economy did not emerge until after the initial reform effort petered out in
1986-1987 and only took hold in 1987.1005 In the interim, Gorbachev pressed ahead with limited
efforts to tighten worker and managerial discipline (notably cracking down on alcohol
consumption) and increasing the resources allocated to investments in infrastructure and high
technology.1006 Where Andropov failed to institutionalize his reforms, Gorbachev looked to
create a political base for sustained change by appointing younger, reform-minded colleagues to
the Soviet leadership. And, of great interest to American policymakers, Gorbachev's early
pronouncements suggested interest in slowing or halting the growth in Soviet defense
expenditures as part of a broader effort to create propitious internal conditions for economic
success.1007 Collectively, Gorbachev's focus on domestic reform, the solidification of a political
consensus favoring reform, and recognition that resources for domestic efforts opened the
possibility that, if initial reforms faltered, then the fundamental nature of the U.S.-USSR
competition might change. In the absence of quick success, Gorbachev might feel pressure to
alter the traditional course of "muddling along" in the competition with the United States and
undertake deeper changes that would require a fundamental rethink of the USSR's place in world
politics. The question for American policymakers was stark: would Gorbachev's initial efforts
succeed?
At least initially, American policymakers were cautious and waited to see how the
reforms played out. Shortly after Gorbachev's March 1985 selection, Matlock apparently gave it
a 70-30 chance that the USSR would do as well or better under Gorbachev as under prior Soviet
leaders: there was a 30 percent chance the USSR would experience a liberal revolution (bad for
the Soviet regime, but potentially propitious for the United States), a 50 percent chance that the
USSR would muddle along, and a 20 percent chance that Gorbachev would successfully meet
the "needs of system for modernity [sic]."1 008 Even if "time was working to the advantage of the
United States" - as Matlock later wrote - a window of American opportunity vis-d-vis the USSR
was not yet in the offing and the United States needed to see whether Gorbachev came "to the
conclusion that the Soviet Union required more than arms control agreements to solve its
problems."100 9 CIA Director William Casey, in a briefing to Reagan just before the November
1985 Geneva Summit, echoed Matlock's analysis, arguing analysts "do not believe Gorbachev
now is prepared to pay much for breathing space." Even if Gorbachev's reforms were
unsuccessful and pressure to offer "real concessions on strategic forces and foreign policy"
mounted in the future, for the time being the USSR could sustain competition with the United
system. Gorbachev was familiar with these studies, and may have played an instrumental in the reviews themselves.
See Garthoff, The Great Transition, 262.
1005 Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 490-491.
1006 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 178-185.
1007 Archie Brown, Seven Years That Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 82-96; Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 488; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the
United States, Subcommittee on National Security Economics, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and
China, 1986 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 14-16.
1008 These options were sketched out in diagram form on a piece of paper Matlock left for his successor on the NSC,
Fritz Ermarth. The diagram is undated, but an accompanying sheet of questions used to guide Matlock's analysis
suggests these outcomes date from early in Gorbachev's tenure in office. The diagram and questions can be found
in Jack Matlock Files, Box 27, "Important History pre-1987 [Material Left for Fritz Ermarth] 4/4," RRPL.1009 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 112.
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States. 010 Appropriately, Reagan and Shultz had discussed just this question a few weeks earlier
and came to an analogous finding. That is, while Gorbachev might be interested in reaching a
strategic accord with the United States - particularly an arms control accord - to allow him to
focus on his economic problems, the key question remained (as Reagan put it) "how far
Gorbachev will be prepared to go because of [economic problems.]"' 0" Given that the U.S.-
Soviet competition was relative, much also depended on the United States: to ensure the Soviet
Union could no longer readily compete, the United States needed to both sustain its own
domestic bases of power and the ongoing military buildup to sustain the pressure on the Soviet
Union. 1012
Over the course of 1986 and 1987, however, it became increasingly clear that
Gorbachev's reforms would not turn Soviet fortunes around. Soviet decline, which seemed in
the offing for much of the preceding decade, now became acute. The November 1985 Geneva
Summit saw Gorbachev criticize those American analysts suggesting Soviet economic problems
would prevent the Soviet Union from sustaining its superpower status vis-a-vis the United States;
at the same time, however, he averred that both the United States and USSR "could do better if
they could release [military] resources to the civilian economy." 013 After Gorbachev repeated
these themes during a private discussion with Reagan, Reagan came away convinced that "the
Soviets have more to gain by exercising restraint now from an economic perspective."1014
Despite a spurt in Soviet growth in 1985-1986,1015 American officials watched as Soviet growth
collapsed in 1987 and Gorbachev sought more extensive reforms to fix the Soviet economy
' "DCI Talking Points: Meeting with the President," 13 November 1985, online at:
hittp://www. loia.cia.gov/sites/defLilt/files/docuinent conversions/i 7/1985 1113A.pdf".
1011 Reagan Files, 282. On the eve of the Geneva Summit, Reagan recorded his janus-faced conception of the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev. On the one hand, Gorbachev "will be out to prove his strength and dedication to Soviet
traditional goals" and looked to "weaning our European friends away from us" by promoting high-profile if hollow
proposals for peace and stability in Europe. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet leader sought to "reduce the burden of
defense spending that is stagnating the Soviet economy" and did not "want to face the cost of competing with us."
Clearly, there is a tension in suggesting that Gorbachev wanted to reduce the Soviet defense burden yet also
demonstrate Soviet strength and pursue traditional Soviet goals, hinting at the ambiguous American assessment of
the new Soviet government. Reagan's comments can be found in Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 151.
1012 See "DCI Talking Points," op. cit., and Reagan Files, 279-283. In a late 1985 memorandum intended to help
prepare Reagan for his Geneva meeting with Gorbachev, Matlock went so far as to argue, "the Soviet Union is a
superpower only in military terms [. . .] the Soviet Union is non-competitive in a peaceful world, and its leaders
know it. Therefore, they can be dissuaded from applying or threatening force in given situations only by being
convinced either that their efforts are doomed to failure, or that they would run unacceptable risks such as a
dangerous military confrontation with the United States or a political defeat damaging to their prestige [emphasis
added]." Soviet leaders, in short, would bandwagon with a stronger power, putting pressure on the United States to
ensure such an outcome; Jack Matlock, "Russia's Place in the World: The View from Moscow," Jack Matlock Files,
Box 21, "Background Material for the Pres Extra Copies + Incoming 2/3," RRPL. The report is undated, but
accompanying reports are dated from early August. The report was sent to Reagan in the run-up to the Summit; see
Robert C. McFarlane to The President, "Background Reading on the Soviet Union: Internal Problems," no date,
found in ibid.
1013 Memorandum of Conversation, "Plenary Session," Geneva Summit, 19 November 1985, available online at:
htt ://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB I 72/Doc 16.pdf. See also Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 156.
101 Reagan Files, 315. Reagan's remarks were made at a 25 March 1986 NSPG meeting on nuclear arms control.
1015 Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Subcommittee on National Security Economics,
Allocation ofResources in the Soviet Union and China, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989),
Table 12. GNP growth in 1985 was only estimated to be 1.6 percent, but the CIA praised Gorbachev for preventing
the Soviet economy from performing even worse; see pp. I1-13.
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while refashioning the Soviet political system. 016 The former effort culminated in the first half
of 1987 as Gorbachev and his allies pushed through laws allowing foreign firms to operate in the
USSR and a "law on state enterprises" that gave businesses significant say in setting their own
economic priorities and production goals. 10 1 7 Talk of capping military expenditures became
acute, as Gorbachev and his colleagues sought ways of ensuring Soviet security that did not
require such an extensive and costly military presence around the world. 01 8 Clearly, if prior
reforms were sufficient to put the Soviet economy back on track, then these more fundamental
efforts would not have been necessary.
As if to accentuate the point, NSC talking points for Reagan's use in a spring 1986
meeting averred that "the momentum in the balance of power is with the United State" -
meaning, the distribution of power was still moving in the United States' favor.10 1 9 Shultz,
speaking at an NSC meeting in June, tellingly argued that the Soviets were "at a fork in the road
where they can either choose to wait out the President - gambling that Congress will cut the
defense budget - or go for an agreement that will allow them to reduce their defense spending on
that premise that " Ronald Reagan is their best hope for selling an agreement to the American
public."10 20 This sense of Soviet decline on the cusp of becoming a rout - but not yet there - was
echoed in October, where separate CIA and NSC memoranda developed for the Reykjavik
Summit that month concluded that Gorbachev faced little immediate pressure to improve U.S.-
Soviet relations.'102  If anything, Shultz warned Reagan to be prepared for "a Gorbachev blast" at
Reykjavik - meaning, Soviet opposition to American policy and dedication to thwarting
American objectives. 1022
1016 For a general overview, see Garthoff, The Great Transition, 300-307; for American monitoring and assessments
at the time, see Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Subcommittee on National Security
Economics, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1987, 12-14. Reagan was apprised of these
results no later than the run-up to the December 1987 Washington Summit; see the briefing papers on Soviet
economic performance in "Soviet Economic Performance" and "USSR: Political and Economic Reforms," circa 8
December 1987, Kenneth Duberstein Files, Box 4, "Washington Summit," RRPL.
1017 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 195-197.
1018 William E Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Blacker,
Hostage to Revolution; Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Subcommittee on National
Security Economics, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1987, 77-78.
1019 Jack Matlock "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Strategy for 1986," no date, Jack Matlock Files, Box 44, US-USSR
Relations [March-May 1986] (2)," RRPL. Matlock's report was sent to colleauges on the NSC on 29 May; see the
accompanying cover memo, "Poindexter Tasking on U.S.-Soviet Relations," in ibid.
1020 Shultz's remarks at a 2 June 1986 meeting on U.S.-Soviet affairs, in Reagan Files 322. The United States, in
turn, needed to keep the pressure on Gorbachev and hopefully bring him around to seeking an agreement by
"restore[ing] budget cuts to defense and international functions; work[ing] on alliance relationships; and go[ing] for
a good arms control agreement." At a follow-up meeting six days later, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
argued that "The Soviets want [an arms control] agreement to cut their defense budget." Chief of Staff Don Regan
agreed, stating "the right agreement will give the Soviets what they want - reduced costs," while Reagan chimed in
"The Soviets have economic problems and Gorbachev has his own internal problems with the [political] hardliners."
The United States thus needed to stick to its positions on arms control and regional conflicts and wait to see if the
Soviets met U.S. positions; meeting on 12 June 1986, Reagan Files, 324-235
1021 CIA, "Gorbachev's Position on the Eve of the Summit," 2 October 1986, online at:
http://www.tfoia.cia.gov/sitcs/dclault/filcs/document conversions'1 7/19861 002.pdf; Stephen Sestanovich,
"Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik," 4 October 1986, online at:
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarc11iv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Documcnt06.pdf.
George Shultz to The President, "Reykjavik," 2 October 1986, online at:
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document04.pdf.
250
One year later, however, the American assessment was different. Alongside evidence
that Gorbachev's initial reforms were failing, Gorbachev escalated the search for a deep
rapprochement with the United States, encapsulated in proposals at the October 1987 Reykjavik
Summit to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and Soviet acceptance of U.S.
demands for a ban on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) throughout 1987.1023 To
American policymakers, the sustained Soviet interest in acceding to American demands in
international affairs and the demonstrable failure of efforts to fix the Soviet system combined to
signal that the Soviet government was prepared to accept American strength and their own
weaknesses. 10 Even if the USSR wanted to compete with the United States over the long term,
Soviet leaders recognized they would need a "breathing space" to make fundamental fixes to the
Soviet domestic system.102 5 Strikingly, the run-up to the December 1987 Washington Summit
saw Shultz, newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, and equally new National
Security Advisor Colin Powell each agree that the Soviet Union was now actively looking to
focus on its mounting internal problems, and needed American cooperation to do so. The
American objective, in turn, was to force Soviet concessions to American interests - compelling
the Soviets to "purchase" American cooperation - in order to better position the United States for
future competition with a revitalized USSR. Carlucci put the point well, writing in November
that, "the Soviet Union is in deep trouble at home, in East Europe, and around the world. It can
only get out of that trouble with far-reaching reforms and, even then, only with Western help.
This gives us an opportunity to demand a high price on behalf of peace, stability, and freedom
[emphasis added]."0 26 Even if, as Powell wrote, Gorbachev faced "a troubled political scene at
his back [. . .] which probably preclude[d] major new concessions," he was still looking to
concede to U.S. demands; ultimately, Gorbachev was "playing for the longer haul, for 1988 and
beyond [... he needs] a positive atmosphere and forward movement." 1027
12 For discussion of Reykjavik and Soviet concessions to the United States in 1987, see Garthoff, The Great
Transition; Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev; George Pratt Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of
State (New York: Scribner's, 1993); Oberdorfer, The Turn.
12 In essence, American policymakers defined Soviet decline as "the weakening of the Soviet Union as evidenced
by Soviet bandwagoning with American objectives." This is admittedly a problematic definition as it kludges
capabilities and behavior together in one net assessment. Nevertheless, it tracks fairly closely with the continued
slowdown in the Soviet economy and domestic base, the failure of basic reforms to get the system working again,
and a credible signal that Soviet leaders recognized "muddling along" would not be sufficient over the long haul.
There is thus a basic capabilities story undergirding the American assessment of Soviet decline.
1025 Aside from the reports cited above and below, see also Robert Gates, "Gorbachev's Gameplan: The Long
View," 24 November 1987, online at:
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/deftIlt/fiCs/docuimentconversions/"1 7/19871124.pdf. Gates' memo was distributed to
Vice President Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1026 Frank Carlucci to The President, "Scope Paper on December US-Soviet Summit," no date, Lisa Jameson Files,
Box 92305, "Summit/Background Material," RRPL. Ermarth was the original author of the document. Given the
content, Carlucci most likely sent the memo while serving as Powell's predecessor as National Security Advisor,
which ended on 23 November. See also the accompanying report on "Key Issues for the Summit."
1027 Colin Powell to The President, "Your Meetings with Gorbachev," 2 December 1987, Kenneth Duberstein Files,
Box 4, "Washington Summit Briefing Book," RRPL. Shultz was more ebullient than Powell, arguing that
"Gorbachev's hands have never been fuller, and he has fewer options. The 'breathing space' he has said he wants is
probably more important to him than ever. He is thus probably prepared to go even further than he has so far to
achieve a predictability in U.S.-Soviet relations that will enable him to focus on getting his own house in order;"
George P. Shultz to The President, "The Washington Summit," in ibid.
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Table B.2: Economic Growth in the USA and USSR, 1982-19891028
Year USA (GNI) USSR (GNP)
1981 2.8 1.0
1982 -0.9 2.2
1983 3.1 3.3
1984 7.7 1.4
1985 3.6 0.7
1986 2.6 3.9
1987 4.0 0.5-1.5
1988 5.1 1.5
In sum, by 1988 senior officials inside the Reagan Administration had come to the
conclusion that the Soviet Union faced a period of acute relative decline, that Soviet leaders
recognized this situation, and that this situation offered the United States a window of
opportunity - of uncertain duration - in which the United States could choose to pressure the
USSR. While there is undoubtedly evidence that American policymakers recognized the
potential for fundamental change in the U.S.-Soviet distribution of power at earlier points in the
decade, it sustained Soviet problems, American recovery, and the mounting failures of Soviet
reforms to convince decision-makers that a period of decline was at hand. From this point
onward, American policy became a debate over what the United States should do response to the
changing distribution of power - not whether a change was in the offing. By February 1988,
documents for Reagan's upcoming visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels argued that Reagan
should claim the success of American policies in dealing with the Soviet Union: the West was
"dealing from strength in its dealings with the Soviet Union" while the USSR was on the mats
due to "the evident and glaring failure of the Soviet economic system." 0 2 9 In a meeting with the
Finish President that May, Reagan bluntly echoed these points, noting: "there been a great
change in our relationship [with the USSR] over the past three years [. . .] we recognize that
Gorbachev is motivated less by his interest in developing a positive relationship with us than by
the nature of his internal economic situation. He knows what we have long known, namely, that
his economy is kind of a basket case."1 030 While long known, it was only in the late 1980s that
Soviet problems were viewed as decisive, such that the Soviet Union appeared to be slipping
down the great power ranks with no end in sight.
Finally, it is briefly worth noting that senior policymakers in the Bush Administration
shared their predecessors' views of the U.S.-Soviet distribution of power. Of the seven core
1028 Soviet data for 1981-1986 is from JEC 1987, Table 4, 64. For 1987 and 1988, see JEC 1988, 38; American data
from WorldBank, World Databank, updated 8 Jan 2013, last accessed March 2013
1029 Fritz Ermarth and Nelson Ledsky to Colin Powell, "The State of the Atlantic Alliance," 10 February 1988, in
"President's Weekend Reading: The NATO Summit," Nelson Ledsky Files, Box 92164, "NATO Summit March
1988 Memos-Letters-Cables," RRPL, 2.
1030 "The President's Meeting and Lunch with President Koivisto of Finland," 27 May 1988, Fritz Ermarth Files,
Box 92084, "1988 US-Soviet Summit Memcons (1)," RRPL, 3. Two weeks later, Shultz similarly argued that
"certainly the West had the winning hand; it simply had to play it well;" USDel Secretary in Spain to SecState,
"Madrid NAC: Discussion of Vienna Negotiations and Global Trends," 10 June 1988, Nelson Ledsky Files, Box
92164, "Travel/NATO Ministerial Lowenkron Madrid, Spain 6/6 - 6/10/88 (2)," RRPL. See also Shultz's equally
frank discussion of the need to maintain pressure on Gorbachev, in USDel Secretary in Spain to SecState, "Madrid:
NAC: Burdensharing Discussion," 10 June 1988, in ibid.
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individuals who advised him on foreign policy - the "Core Group" of Secretary of State James
Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert
Gates, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell,
Chief of Staff John Sununu, and Vice President Dan Quayle - Gates, Powell, and Baker served
in the Reagan Administration, while Scowcroft often served as an outside advisor on national
security matters.' 03 1 As Bush had been Vice President for Reagan's two terms, a critical mass in
the Bush foreign policy apparatus were privy to the debates and changing assessments of the
Reagan Administration. Indeed, around the time Powell - then Reagan's Chief of Staff - wrote
of Gorbachev's need for a period of quiet in U.S.-Soviet relations to focus on his internal
problems, Gates - then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - offered that, "The Soviets'
need to relax tensions is critical because only thus can massive new expenditures for defense be
avoided and Western help in economic development be obtained."' 03 2 By early February 1989,
Baker argued that Gorbachev was trying to help the USSR cope with "era of stagnation."'033
Less than a week later, Bush agreed to Scowcroft's proposal to review of U.S. policy towards the
USSR, largely inspired by the realization that "the pressures of a failing system at home and
frustrated policies abroad" had caused the USSR to focus on its internal problems, trends which
were likely to continue during the Administration's time in office; on balance, "the trends in US-
Soviet relations are, in large part, favorable to us."103 4
For composition and background on the Core Group, see Miller Center, Interview with Scowcroft, 31-33.
1032 Colin Powell to The President, "Your Meetings with Gorbachev," 2 December 1987; Robert Gates,
"Gorbachev's Gameplan: The Long View," 24 November 1987, op cit.
1033 Baker added the phrase by hand to a paper meant to outline the Administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet
relations; see "U.S.-Soviet Relations," 10 February 1989, Box 108, Folder 2, James Baker Papers, Seeley Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter BP).
1034 George H.W. Bush, "National Security Review 3: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations," 15 February
1989, online at: http://busllibrary.taiiu.dui/research/pdfs/nsr/nsr3 .pdf. The Bush Administration later criticized the
anodyne results of the review, but Bush and Scowcoft initially had high hopes and took an active role in shaping the
study; see Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 24-25; Miller Center, Interview with Scowcroft, 19, 31.
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Appendix C: American Policy and Soviet Decline in 1991
I. Overview
Chapters Three and Four examined American policy towards the declining Soviet Union
in 1989 and 1990. The chapters demonstrated that the degree of American predation waxed and
waned in response to Soviet military posture: when Soviet posture was robust, the degree of
American predation was limited, while intense means of predation emerged once Soviet posture
became weak.
This Appendix briefly discusses American strategy towards the Soviet Union in 1991.
Because the Soviet Union tottered and eventually collapsed in the course of the year, it is
difficult to assess American policy purely in light of the variables identified by my argument and
its competitors. Large elements of American policy were driven by factors outside the domain of
this study, in particular, the desirability of averting nuclear anarchy in the former USSR once
Soviet collapse appeared inevitable. 1035 Nevertheless, the case is sufficiently clear to provide at
least some evidence in support of Realist Decline Theory.
II. The Question of American Strategy
American strategy in 1991 centered on the fundamental question of whether the United
States would side with a growing number of independence and secessionist movements in the
Soviet Union to encourage the breakup of the Soviet state, or work with central Soviet authorities
under Gorbachev that would have the effect of playing for time and let Soviet decline continue
without active American involvement. In essence, the choice was again Extreme Predation by
encouraging a breakup, or Moderate Predation by adopting a hands-off attitude.
Prima facie, one might expect American strategists to pursue the first approach and
expedite the dissolution of the USSR. After all, the United States was more than happy to evict
the USSR from Eastern Europe in 1990 by ripping the GDR out of the Soviet alliance network;
presumably, if the United States was content to destroy the Soviet Union's presence in Europe, it
would be equally enthused to encourage the destruction of the USSR as a great power in and of
itself. Moreover, Democratic Peace Theory and Institutionalist Theory would both predict
Extreme Predation: not only did the Soviet leadership appear to be moving away from
democracy and democratic reforms (epitomized by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's December
1990 resignation amidst charges that Gorbachev was establishing a dictatorship), but Germany's
reunification ended the Two Plus Four process and with it, the main forum binding the United
States and USSR.10 36 Baldly stated, recent American strategy as well as liberal theories of rising
state behavior both suggest the United States should take advantage of Soviet domestic problems,
side against Gorbachev, and encourage the expeditious breakup of the Cold War adversary.
I1. Pursuing Moderate Predation
In fact, American policymakers took the opposite track and adopted. a strategy of
Moderate Predation. This policy composed three inter-related elements. First, the United States
refrained from publicly or privately backing secessionist, autonomy, or independence
movements within the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin, who became President of the Russian Soviet
Republic within the USSR, was arguably the leading proponent of American intervention in
1035 Interview, Larry Napper, 25 October 2011. On nuclear anarchy, see Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear
Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996).
1036 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 491-500.
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favor of a Soviet breakup, but substantial pressure also came from members of the Baltic
republics, Ukraine, Georgia, and political groups in Central Asia. Through December 1991,
however, American policymakers refrained from endorsing these calls and instead were willing
to simply let Soviet central authority gradually weaken without efforts to expedite the process.
Bush hinted at the hands-off strategy in an August 1991 visit to Kiev, during which he
told a heavily nationalist Ukrainian audience that the United States "will not try to pick winners
and losers in political competitions between Republics or between Republics and the center. That
is your business; that's not the business of the United States of America." 037 Though criticized
at the time, Bush's public remarks simply reflected preexisting policy. As early as January 1991,
Bush and his advisors had refused to limit or penalize U.S.-Soviet relations after the USSR
launched a crackdown against independence movements in the Baltics, arguing that the U.S.-
Soviet relationship as a whole needed to be preserved and "we still have a great deal of business
to do with the Soviets." 0 3 8 Nor did American policy change afterwards, as an interagency group
tasked with shaping American policy towards the disintegrating USSR similarly emphasized in
November that, the United States would deal with "what's there" in the USSR, meaning "we
continue to deal with central government institutions on some issues - nuclear/military issues
and some portions of foreign policy - at the same time building new and more vigorous
relationships with the republics [of the USSR seeking independence]."1 039 And when it became
clear around the same time that the Soviet Union would fragment within a few years (at most),
Bush and Baker dispatched diplomatic missions to lay out a series of preconditions the
independence-seeking republics would have to meet (focusing heavily on nuclear command and
control issues) to obtain American support for the effort; in doing so, American policymakers
offered a de facto sop to Soviet authorities by not rushing to embrace a Soviet breakup.104 0
Neither, however, would the United States do anything to help actively protect Soviet
central authority. Even if the United States was unwilling to intensely prey on Soviet weakness
in 1991, Moderate Predation also meant avoiding steps that might help buttress the foundations
of Soviet power. This was notably an issue in the spring of 1991. At the time, Soviet leaders
(aided by intermediaries at the John F. Kennedy School of Government) renewed a push to
obtain substantial Western economic support for Soviet reforms. This time, the effort was
pitched as part of a "Grand Bargain" in which the USSR would adopt a series of reforms to
democratize Soviet politics and liberalize the Soviet economy, and the West would respond with
1037 George Bush: "Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet Union," August 1,
1991, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19864&st=&stI=.
1038 Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, "Responding to Moscow," 21 January 1991, Rice Files, CF00718,
"Baltics," GBPL; Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, "Dealing with the Lull in the Baltic Crisis," 15 January
1991, Rice Files, CF00718, "Baltics," GBPL; Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft, "Your Meeting with
Representatives of Major Baltic-American Organizations," 21 January 1991, Rice Files, CF00718, "Baltics," GBPL.
1039 No author [likely Ed Hewett], "Contingency Group Workplan," undated, Bums and Hewett Files, CF01599,
"Policy Group Meetings 1991 [1]," GBPL. Given the content of the document, the report comes from November
1991.
1040 These missions were led by Deputy Secretary of State Reg Bartholomew. Many of Bartholomew's cables can
be found in the Bums and Hewett Files at GBPL. For an overview, see "JAB Notes from 10/2/91 mtg w/Gen.
Scowcroft, Sec. Cheney, The White House," 2 October 1991, Box 110, Folder 7, BP, and Arnie [Kanter] to the
Secretary, [Untitled Letter on Nuclear Initiatives], found on back of document entitled, "JAB Notes from 9/27/91
mtgs. w/UK, France, Germany; Soviet FM Pankin; NATO, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia re: POTUS speech
on Defense Strategy," 1 October 1991, Box 110, Folder 7, BP.
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billions of dollars of economic aid. 10 4 ' As before, American policymakers feared the Soviet plan
might arouse interest among American allies or the American public, and the United States
government be cajoled or pressured into assisting the Soviet government and thus abetting the
USSR's continued presence as a potential competitor.
The solution, laid out in a Cabinet meeting in early June, was to muddy the issue and
block the Soviet effort. The Soviet problem was to successfully trade domestic reforms that did
not affect the U.S.-Soviet competition, for substantive concessions by the United States - or, as
Baker put it, "how do you beat something for nothing?" 0 42 To deflect Soviet pressure, the
United States would instead "come up with a package [of putative assistance to the USSR] that
does not cost," including associate status for the USSR in Western financial institutions and
developing plans to convert Soviet defense plants to civilian purposes. At the end of the day,
and as Scowcroft put it, the United States needed to "set [demands] they would find it hard to
meet" in return for true American aid, "get away from schemes that simply pour money down a
rathole [sic]," and be seen as cooperating with the USSR without truly aiding Soviet plans to
reform and remain a great power. 0 4 3 Thus, when Soviet efforts to obtain American backing
resurfaced in the summer and fall, American policymakers simply referred back to a policy that
demanded additional Soviet reforms that would help transform the USSR into a "third-rate
power."1 044 In line with Moderate Predation, the USSR would receive no meaningful support
from the United States.
Finally, concurrent with efforts to cautiously weaken the USSR were steps to reinforce
American military dominance in Europe. On one level, and although Soviet forces were
withdrawing from Central-Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact was defunct, Bush made final
Congressional ratification of the CFE treaty a priority in order to formalize an American military
edge in Europe. Second, members of the U.S. military and Defense Department developed plans
to retain a significant military presence in Europe, and to deploy overwhelming force to deter or
defeat a future hegemonic threat to Europe from a revived USSR if future events required. 1045
This process occurred even as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe allowed the
United States to reduce the overall size of its military, but the net result ensured the United States
enjoyed a significantly greater relative conventional advantage over the USSR than at any time
in the past.1 04 6
Third, and following the Soviet coup attempt of August 1991, Bush and his senior
advisors formulated what became known as the "Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI)" of 1991.
On one level, PNI represented an American effort to limit the threat of nuclear anarchy, the
1041 Graham Allison and Grigor Yavlinsky, "Window of Opportunity: Joint Program for Western Cooperation in the
Soviet Transformation to Democracy and the Market Economy," 13 June 1991, Burns and Hewett File, CF01407,
"USSR Chron File: June 1991 [1]," GBPL; "JAB Notes from 6/3/91 NSC Principals mtg on US Economic
Relationship w/USSR," Box 110, Folder 4, BP. Also Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American
Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 534-550.
1042 The following is from Memorandum for the Files, "Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations, 1:30-2:30 PM,
June 3, 1991, White House Situation Room," Burns and Hewett Files, CF01407, "USSR Chron File: June 1991 [1],"
GBPL; to my knowledge, this is the first internal senior conversation on U.S.-Soviet relations to come to light.
143 See also James Baker, "Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President, June 26, 1991," Box 115, Folder 8, BP.
1044 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 540-541.
1045 Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992; Paul Wolfowitz, "Shaping the Future: Planning at the
Pentagon, 1989-1992," in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11, ed. Melvyn
P. Leffler and Jeffrey Legro (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 44-62.
1046 Dale A. Vesser to Scooter Libby, "First Draft of DPG," 3 September 1991, online at:
http://www.gwu.edu/-insarchiv/n ukeva ult/ebb245/.
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Soviet loss of nuclear command and control, and de-escalate the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff.1047
It did so by removing U.S. and Soviet tactical nuclear assets from Europe, taking U.S. nuclear
bombers off of alert while requesting the Soviets reciprocate by confining mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to garrisons, and reducing U.S. ICBM modernization
programs while calling on the USSR to do the same.10 4 8 PNI's terms, however, also seem to
have locked in substantial U.S. nuclear advantages. Not only would confinement of Soviet
mobile ICBMs make them easier to track and target in the event of hostilities, but PNI did not
affect U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thus kept a potential counter-
force asset untouched. 1049 Like the CFE in 1989, therefore, Soviet adherence to PNI would help
foster a relatively improved U.S. military position than which obtained beforehand. Even if PNI
had semi-altruistic motives, the terms were heavily weighted in the United States' favor.
IV. Realist Decline Theory as an Explanation
Driving Moderate Predation in 1991 were two countervailing incentives. First, American
policymakers wanted to improve the United States' relative power position at the Soviet Union's
expense and so held predatory goals. This mirrored the situation in both 1989 and 1990, and
matches my theory's expectation that a rising United States will want to make relative gains at
the USSR's expense. Shortly after the Gulf War concluded in 1991, Scowcroft outlined the
approach to Bush, arguing that it was "time to consolidate our gains" with the USSR.1050 In
practice, this meant (as Baker explained in his memoirs), "trying to get as much as we could out
of the Soviets before there was an even greater turn to the right or shift into disintegration."10 5
A June Cabinet meeting was even more explicit, with Baker, Scowcroft, and other senior
officials agreeing that the United States wanted "to see the Soviet military radically reduced"
while recognizing that "a real reform program would turn [the USSR] into a third-rate
power."10 5 2 Hence, as the United States maneuvered to address Soviet political unrest and
fragmentation, the United States needed to keep its eyes on the prize of a much weaker Soviet
Union. As a mid-June interagency report concluded:
Our priority now should be to lock in moderate Soviet international behavior and
limits on their ability to threaten us or their neighbors. We want to create barriers
against any resumption of past misconduct [. . .] We also want to see the Soviet
defense sector - and the conventional and military capabilities it sustains -
drastically reduced [. . .] this is among the most vital interests we have both in
arms control and in engaging the Soviets on the reform of their system.1053
1047 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 543-545; Matthew Fuhrmann and Bryan R. Early, "Following
START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives," Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 1
(January 2008): 21-43.
1048 Susan Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992, Case Study Series (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 2012).
1049 The accuracy of the D-5 Trident missile would allow the U.S. to use SLBMs as a counterforce weapon rather
than a purely counter-value asset. Thanks go to Owen Cote for conversations on the D-5. Combined with the
garrisoning of Soviet road-mobile ICBMs, it is not implausible that Soviet adherence to the PNI would facilitate an
American counterforce strike on Soviet nuclear assets. This is particularly so at a time when Soviet forces were
already fraying due to internal fragmentation in the USSR.
1050 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 499.
101 Baker, Politics, 475.
1052 Memorandum, "Meeting on U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations."
1053 Brent Scowcroft to The President, "The U.S. Response to the New Soviet Pluralism," undated [circa 13 June
1991], Burns and Hewett Files, CF01407, "USSR Chron File: June 1991 [1]," GBPL.
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At the end of the day, and as my theory predicts, American strategists sought to let the Soviet
Union weaken and incorporate a world in which the U.S. would constitute "the world's sole
superpower."' 0 54
However, the United States could not use intense means to undercut Soviet capabilities
for fear of Soviet internal balancing. Even though Soviet military forces were withdrawing from
Central and Eastern Europe in line with the 1990 deals, the USSR still retained robust military
capabilities that could prevent the dissolution of the USSR itself.105 5 Put differently, even if the
Soviet military could not threaten an attack against Western Europe, it had the wherewithal to
crack down against unrest within the USSR itself (epitomized by crackdowns in Lithuania and
Latvia in early 1991).1056 Crackdowns, in turn, might roil U.S.-Soviet relations, upset ongoing
change in Europe, and potentially lead to a nuclear crisis with a Soviet Union that, though
weakening, still had a significant nuclear arsenal. Equally important, crackdowns might further
diminish Gorbachev's domestic authority, thereby allowing hardliners to press for more
resources for the Soviet military and an effort to reassert Soviet control over Eastern Europe.'0 5 7
Efforts to reconstitute a Soviet military threat might take months or years, but it might still
happen. In short, because the USSR could intervene at home, the United States faced potential
costs from predation related to Soviet internal balancing. 1058
Therefore, and as my theory expects, even as the United States worked to ensure the
continued weakening of the Soviet Union, American strategists consciously avoided intense and
all-out efforts to encourage the USSR's dissolution. As Gates put it in retrospect, "a constant
question before us was how much pressure the system could take without a rightist backlash
(something we all worried about) - which could erase many, if not most, of the internal and
external changes." 0 59 As Gates suggests, American officials repeatedly feared Gorbachev was
on the verge of either launching a crackdown of his own, or would soon be displaced by a right-
wing group, and circumscribed American policy to try and avoid such a development.1060 Indeed,
Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft were sufficiently worried about this risk that they used a late-July
meeting with Shevardnadze (then a private citizen) to query him as to the strength of right-wing
1054 Vesser, "First Draft of DPG." Also Eric S. Edelman, "The Strange Career of the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance," in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11, ed. Melvyn P Leffler
and Jeffrey Legro (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 63-77.
105 On the troop withdrawals, see Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Soviet Analysis to Philip Zelikow,
"Soviet Withdrawals from Eastern Europe," 30 January 1991, Zelikow Files, CF01468, "File 148: NATO Strategy
Review #1 [2]," GBPL; David Armstrong, "Relocation and Resubordination [sic] of Soviet Ground Equipment:
Motives and Significance," NIC 00109/91, 7 February 1991, online at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
1056 Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, "Dealing with the 'Lull' in the Baltics Crisis," 15 January 1991, Rice
Files, CF00718, "Baltics," GBPL; Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, "Responding to Moscow," 21 January
1991, Rice Files, CF00718, "Baltics," GBPL; James Baker, "Letter from Secretary Baker to Lithuanian President
Landsbergis," 18 March 1991, Burns Files, CF01487, "Lithuania [1]," GBPL.
See the discussion in Rice, "Responding to Moscow." Also James Baker, "Proposed Agenda for Meeting with
the President," 13 February 1991, Box 115, Folder 8, BP.
1058 Director of Central Intelligence, "Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Year
2000," 8 August 1991, NIE 11-318-91W; Director of Central Intelligence, "Implications of Alternative Soviet
Futures," NIE 11-18-91, June 1991; both reports online at foia.cia.gov. See also a list of possible "crisis
contingencies" related to Soviet internal weakness in Condoleezza Rice to Robert Gates, "Soviet Crisis
Contingencies," 18 December 1990, Burns and Hewett Files, CF01536, "4.3.0 - U.S. Relations with Russia; Policy
on the Debate Over the Union," GBPL.
1059 Gates, From the Shadows, 528.
1060 This was confirmed in a series of interviews with senior policymakers throughout 2010 and 2011. I particularly
thank Nicholas Burns for his help in the matter.
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forces and assess the likelihood of a crisis resulting from the continued decline of the Soviet
Union.1061 And, even when reformers led by Boris Yeltsin defeated an August 1991 hardline
coup and seemed to show that a conservative backlash was unsustainable, American strategists
remained fixed on the short-term risks in expediting a Soviet breakup. Not only might American
encouragement of a collapse push conservatives towards a second coup attempt to keep the
USSR together, but it could discredit Soviet reformers and encourage the emergence of "fascism
with nuclear weapons" in the USSR.i162 As late as October and November, these were going
concerns that limited the American embrace of Soviet fragmentation. 163 As Bush ultimately put
it in his memoirs, even as the United States contemplated the destruction of the USSR's "old
order" that would improve the American strategic position, the U.S. government, "wanted to see
stable, and above all peaceful, change."1064 Avoiding the costs of Soviet internal balancing was
the prime downside to be avoided and the major threat to peace. These concerns again match
what we expect if robust military postures deter intense predation in bipolar systems.
V. Conclusion
The above sketch is intended only to show that American foreign policy towards the
Soviet Union in 1991 broadly tracks with what we would expect if Realist Decline Theory were
accurate. Clearly, due to the breakup of the USSR itself, factors beyond those highlighted above
drove American strategy decisions and discussions. Additional work is necessary to flush out
the ins and outs of American strategy and adjudicate among the drivers of American policy.
Nevertheless, available evidence makes clear that the threat of Soviet internal balancing for
internal purposes and the use of Soviet military forces to suppress domestic changes, buttress a
hardline regime, and confront the United States proved a major impediment to intense American
predation. This is sufficient to indicate Realist Decline Theory affords some traction in the case
and, due to the nature of U.S. strategy and concerns, relatively more purchase than competing
accounts. Security concerns remained powerful drivers of American behavior even at the
twilight of the Soviet Union.
1061 "JAB Notes from 7/29/91 mtg/dinner with E. Shevardnadze, Moscow, USSR," 29 July 1991, Box 110, Folder 5,
BP; also Memorandum of Conversation, "Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union," 6 May 1991,
Burns and Hewett Files, CF01422, "POTUS Meetings March 1991 - July 1991," GBPL.
1062 "JAB Notes from 9/4/91 Cabinet Meeting w/GB, The White House, Washington, DC," 4 September 1991, Box
110, Folder 7, BP; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 543.
1063 Conversations with Bob Hutchings and Nicholas Burns made this point clear. See, too, the annotations on the
NSC copy of National Intelligence Officer/USSR, "Gathering Storm," 24 October 1991, Burns Files, CF01498,
"USSR Contingency Papers (Past)," GBPL; also No Author [likely Burns], "The Debate over a Successor (or
Successors) to the USSR: Possible Outcomes, U.S. Influence over Those Outcomes, and Contingent Responses," 7
October 1991, Burns and Hewett Files, CF01599, "Policy Group Meetings 1991 [1]," GBPL.
1064 Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 502.
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